
JOURNAL *of* CENTRAL EUROPEAN AFFAIRS



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"WORK REDEEMS": CONCENTRATION CAMP LABOR AND NAZI GERMAN ECONOMY*

by Jan F. Triska

A TOTALITARIAN régime wages war against all all the time: before the revolution, during the revolution, and after the revolution. A minority movement, it is constantly on the offensive, first to gain momentum, then to win, and finally to preserve the victory at home in order to carry it around. There the cycle is repeated in order to gather rationale for the original revolutionary struggle at home.

There are no neutrals in this permanent struggle, and no quarter is given to anyone who is not a professed friend. As a consequence, the concept of "enemy of the régime" is applicable to the majority of the population at home as well as to the majority of states abroad. Both either have to become "friends" or must be physically eliminated as real obstacles to the final victory.

At home, the traditional system of jails and other institutions of detention and correction becomes obsolete overnight after the revolution. The proportion between the "free" and "unfree" population begins immediately to follow the ratio between friend and foe predetermined by the régime: as the numbers of "free" citizens diminish, the numbers of "unfree" persons swell. The régime is in a hurry, the number of enemies is large, the danger is imminent; the result is the concentration of the mass of detained enemies of the régime in camps far removed from population centers. The concentration camp is born.

Much has been written on the subject of concentration camps in totalitarian systems.¹ Over-all agreement on one point is quite unanimous: the

*Valuable suggestions of the author's associate at the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Robert M. Slusser, are gratefully acknowledged.

¹On the concentration camps in National Socialist Germany see especially Eugen Kogon, *Der SS-Staat—Das System der Deutschen Konzentrationslager*, Berlin, 1946 (translated into English: *The Theory and Practice of Hell: The German Concentration Camps and the System Behind Them*, London, 1950); Léon Poliakov, *Harvest of Hate*, Syracuse,

original and primary purpose of concentration camps is political; the security of the system overshadows all other considerations and subordinates them to the all-pervasive security formula of the rulers. Enemies of the régime must become its erstwhile supporters; if they cannot or do not, they are eradicated.

Because of the predetermined future goals, the tasks of a totalitarian economy are enormous: to gain everything, everything must be sacrificed. Industrial expansion, quotas, norms, outputs, ration cards, Five (Four) Year Plans, allocation of priorities—they all become catchwords and slogans which testify, if one may use the expression, to the absolute politization of totalitarian economy. Simple production is "struggle for production," economy becomes "command economy," and all citizens are required to carry employment cards at all times. The demand for resources, manpower and capital exceeds all available reserves. Shortages are characteristic, though inevitable, results of the total economic exertion.

On the one hand, there are millions of enemies of all kinds, unskilled, semi-skilled and skilled, concentrated in the camps—a whole armada of unemployed workers—the only officially sanctioned group of unemployed in the totalitarian economy. On the other hand, the ever-increasing manpower shortage forces those responsible for planning to seek new labor resources everywhere. The synthesis is direct utilization of the manpower of the concentration camps for economic purposes.

This conclusion is far less startling in terms of the economic exploitation of concentration camp labor in the Soviet Union than it is with respect to concentration camp labor in National Socialist Germany. True, the lacunae of knowledge even on the Soviet side are considerable, and further basic research into that subject is sorely needed. The fact that Soviet concentration camps do supply labor to Soviet economy *en masse*, however, is well-known. To reiterate briefly, this is the account:

The labor of Soviet prisons (for criminal offenders, the "brothers gone astray") and concentration camps (for political opposition, the enemies of the state) was originally conceived as a humanitarian method of social transformation of misfits of all kinds. Correction was the goal, and labor the means and the cure. Concentration camps were institutions where severe

1954, Ch. 3; David Rousset, *The Other Kingdom*, New York, 1947; Edward Crankshaw, *Gestapo, Instrument of Tyranny*, London, 1956, Chs. 13 and 16; Gerald Reitlinger, *The SS—Alibi of a Nation 1922-1945*, New York, 1957, Ch. 10; Allan Bullock, *Hitler, A Study in Tyranny*, New York, 1952; Henry Picker, *Hitler's Tischgespräche*, Bonn, 1951; E. K. Braumstedt, *Dictatorship and Political Police: The Technique of Control by Fear*, London, 1945; Walter Hagen, *Die Geheime Front*, Linz-Wien, 1950 (Hagen is the pseudonym of SS Lt. Col. Willy Hoettl of RSHA, Amt. VI). On Soviet concentration camps, see in particular Naum Jasny, "Labor and Output in Soviet Concentration Camps," *The Journal of Political Economy*, No. 5, Oct. 1951; J. Glicksman, *Tell the West*, New York, 1948; B. Yakovlev, *Kontsentratsionnye Lageri SSSR*, Munich, 1955; David J. Dallin and Boris J. Nicolaevsky, *Forced Labor in Soviet Russia*, New Haven, 1947; Gustav Herling, *A World Apart*, New York, 1951; *Inside Soviet Slave Labor Camps 1939-1942, An Analysis of Written Statements by 9,200 Former Prisoners*, U. S. Library of Congress, (no date of publication given) — (The complete collection is kept in the custody of the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University.)

treatment of the grave vices of the inmates was administered through hard labor.

Up to about 1930, when the penal system was changed and imprisonment abolished in favor of concentration camps, forced labor was of comparatively little significance to the Soviet economic structure. From then on, although the exaltation of labor as a means of correction and social therapy was still a potent source of active Soviet propaganda, the mass of manpower concentrated in camps began to be mobilized for special tasks in the Soviet economy. With the start of the Five Year Plan era, concentration camps became an important source of a cheap, mobile and almost inexhaustible labor force. The preparation for the Second World War and the war itself accelerated the already rapid integration of concentration camps into the Soviet economic system; whenever possible, prisoners were shifted to war production and, with the influx of deported non-Soviet citizens from countries occupied by the Red Army, new camps were built, new tasks dictated by the war economy undertaken, new areas opened for exploitation of concentration camp labor. Once the war was won, the cycle was repeated on a still larger scale; this time, the goal of Soviet economy, of which the concentration camps became a significant and integral part, became the problematic task of arriving at the per capita labor productivity of the United States.

The concentration camps, then, were originally intended to be places of isolation and "cure," not sources of labor; however, the early "regeneration of men" concept became a farce after 1930: as Vyshinsky frankly admitted, treatment through labor "in the 'twenties meant culture and enlightenment. In the 'thirties it meant productive labor."² The concentration camps were not established for economic reasons, advantage or exploitation; once in existence, however, with their ever-increasing concentration of manpower, they were utilized extensively and effectively as an outstanding ready-made labor resource.

The labor thus acquired constituted a highly significant factor in the development of the Soviet state economy in general and of its industrial, construction and defense sectors in particular. Its exploitation was an ironic consequence of the specific principles upon which the Soviet society was founded. Concentration camp inmates became a new, important, separate class in the Soviet social strata. Giant economic enterprises administered by the Soviet secret police were developed to utilize the manpower concentrated in the camps. The administration in charge of Soviet concentration camps became a huge, bureaucratic machine which controlled the whole network of concentration camps centrally from Moscow. Here the directives, norms, and over-all plans were elaborated and sent to the camp directors, who put them into effect.

Once established and working, these enterprises needed manpower which would fast replace that which they consumed. Reserves were needed

²Ot Tyurem, quoted in David J. Dallin and Boris J. Nicolaevsky, *Forced Labor in Soviet Russia*, 1947, p. 152.

and, thanks to the unrelenting effort of the secret police, found. As productive members of society, the concentration camp inmates would have been an economic asset; as prisoners, they became an asset when forcibly employed in areas or industries in which it would be difficult to rely on "free" labor. Concentration camps populated whole territories and operated entire industries. The economic development in remote Soviet territories, where climatic hardships and primitive conditions prevail, would have been impossible without forced labor. The secret police derived huge profit from the undertaking because little investment capital and no modern industrial equipment were needed.³

The Soviet concentration camps were formed for political and security reasons; and even when adroitly utilized for economic purposes, they still retained their original function of neutralization of individuals and groups considered politically unreliable, while effectively generating fear and docility within the population. Concentration camp labor represented a successful (from the point of view of the societal planners) combination of important political and economic factors. It also represented cynical rationalization and ideological perversion: because of the objective need, the Soviet rulers compromised their ideological rationale in order to expedite their economic program.

Concentration camp labor in National Socialist Germany, on the other hand, has been a neglected phenomenon, in spite of the abundance of material and documentary evidence available.⁴ To some extent, this is understandable: the over-all purpose of the National Socialist concentration camps—extermination of inmates by genocide; useless work; euthanasia; criminal medical, surgical and biological experiments; the systematic torture and brutality of the SS guards (for whom concentration camp duty, "how to deal with subhumans," was part of their general training)—have overshadowed other considerations by reason of their planned cruelty, the all-pervasive method of terror, and the sheer scope on which they were committed. However, to view the concentration camp system in National Socialist Germany only in these terms, without taking into consideration the function allotted to them on a mass scale since 1938, during the war, and for the victorious future, namely supplying productive labor of the

³For 1941, fourteen per cent of the Soviet gross capital investment was officially planned to be executed by concentration camp labor. This investment, which probably was increased in favor of speedy armament and defense needs, seems to evidence the importance of forced labor as a massive economic factor. See *Gosudarstvennyi Plan Razvitiia Narodnogo Khoziaistva SSSR Na 1941 God*, (Suppl. to the Order of S.N.R., U.S.S.R. and V.R.P. (b), No. 127 of Jan. 17, 1941. American Council of Learned Societies, Reprint, Russian Ser. No. 30). See a brilliant analysis of this Plan in Naum Jasny, *op cit.*, p. 417.

⁴Even such reputable scholars as Carl Y. Friedrich and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, my former teachers, comparing the Soviet and National Socialist concentration camp systems, went so far as to state that "another striking feature of the Soviet forced labor system is the fact that not infrequently the secret police hires out its prisoners to local agencies for the purpose of carrying out some local project." (*Totalitarian Dictatorships and Autocracy*, Cambridge, 1956, p. 164.) The SS organization did exactly that on a vast scale with the concentration camp inmates in National Socialist Germany.

inmates to the National Socialist economy, is to misunderstand the *whole* role played by concentration camps in a totalitarian society.

Although the genesis of forced labor ("*Arbeit Macht Frei*") was an organic element of the National Socialist concentration camps ever since their establishment in 1933 by the SA,⁵ it was at first merely a by-product of the ideological ratiocination of the concentration camp system, which was the "custody and re-education of those fit for education."⁶ In practice this meant "the immobilization of brains and hands which in some conceivable way might undermine the Nazi tenure of power,"⁷ the physical removal from society of political, racial and social enemies of the régime. Hard labor served as one of many instruments of "purification" and "re-education" of the undesirable elements banished into camps.

With the rapid growth of the régime, concentration camps underwent profound alterations in more than one sense: they grew in number,⁸ in their respective sizes,⁹ and in the number of inmates.¹⁰ In 1934, after the Röehm purge, the SA administration of the camps was replaced briefly by the Gestapo and then by a specially created independent SS organization;¹¹ the "Inspectorate of the Concentration Camps" of Himmler's own SS Staff Office became the center of administration and control.^{11a} Increasingly broader categories of social misfits were singled out as new inmates for

⁵According to Rudolf Diels, one-time head of the Gestapo (*Lucifer Ante Portas*, Zurich, 1950), a member of the SA (*die Sturmabteilungen der NSDAP*) by the name of Edmund Heines started the practice of concentrating his prisoners in a barbed-wire stockade. The first SA concentration camp was Oranienburg established in March, 1933, to take care of the "needs" of Greater Berlin, by Goering. (*The Proceedings of the International Military Tribunal at Nürnberg* [henceforth to be referred to as IMT], Vol. IX, Goering's and Kesselring's evidence). According to the testimony of Defendant Oswald Pohl, apart from smaller camps in central Germany and in northern Germany near Esterwegen, the first SS (*die Schutzstaffeln der NSDAP*) concentration camp in which "first of all were incarcerated the political opponents of the régime . . . [i.e.] those persons who were opposing the new régime or who could oppose the new régime . . ." was Dachau. *Trial of War Criminals before the Nürnberg Military Tribunals*, Vol. V, the Pohl Case, p. 436, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C., 1950 [subsequently abbreviated to Case V; relevant documents are referred to by the numbers given in Court].

⁶Himmler's letter to SS-Obergruppenführer and Lieutenant General of the Waffen SS, Oswald Pohl, of May 29, 1942. Case V, Doc. No. 719. The "protective custody" order was issued on February 28, 1933, as an emergency "Decree of the Reich President for Order and Protection of the State," signed by Hindenburg, Hitler, Frick, and Gürtner. Case V, p. 438.

⁷Judgment, Concurring Opinion by Judge Michael A. Musmanno, Case V, pp. 1096-097.

⁸Sachsenhausen, the successor to Oranienburg, was created in 1936; Buchenwald in 1937; Flossenbürg, Ravensbrück and Mauthausen (with Gusen) in 1938; Auschwitz, Stutthof, Natzweiler, Neuengamme and Gross-Rosen in 1941; Lublin in 1942; Nordhausen and Bergen-Belsen in 1943; etc.

⁹Dachau ended with twenty subsidiary labor camps, Sachsenhausen had fifteen, Buchenwald between 80 to 100, Flossenbürg 20 to 25, Ravensbrück 20, Mauthausen 15, Auschwitz 60, Stutthof 10, Natzweiler 10, Neuengamme 60, Gross-Rosen 70, Lublin 10, Bergen-Belsen 1.

¹⁰From about 20,000 in 1934 to 300,000 in 1939, and up to more than 600,000 at the end of 1944. Case IV, Testimony of Defendant Oswald Pohl, pp. 442-445.

¹¹On the interesting personal reasons for the latter change, see Pohl's testimony, *ibid.*, p. 439.

^{11a}Case IV, transcript, p. 1335.

"special treatment" in the camps, old camps were rebuilt, new techniques added.

Not that the forced labor of concentration camp inmates was entirely useless and senseless from the beginning;¹² but the number of inmates was comparatively small and did not warrant systematic, centralized economic utilization; the work was limited both in range and scope to projects within workshops or in the immediate vicinity of the camps¹³ and consisted primarily in extending the camp accommodations for future tasks.¹⁴ It is reasonable to assume that the productive value of forced labor before 1938 was only of local significance.¹⁵

After 1938 and before the outbreak of the war,¹⁶ however, when the population of the concentration camps began to swell, those in charge of concentration camps on the one hand and National Socialist economists on the other began to show interest in the economic utilization of manpower in concentration camps. Albert Speer, Minister for Armaments and War Production, submitted to Hitler a plan for rebuilding Nürnberg, Hamburg, Berlin, etc., which incorporated the concentration camp inmates as laborers;¹⁷ Himmler suggested that Sachsenhausen, Dachau and Buchenwald supply stone, gravel, bricks and cement for that purpose. To that end, "at the end of 1938, the workshops which had been in existence up to then in concentration camps, due to their increase in size, had been transferred as economic enterprises to the supervision of the *Wirtschafts- und Verwaltungshauptamt* (WVHA, Main Office, Administration and Economy).¹⁸ A year later Himmler formed two companies, *Deutsche Ausrüstungswerke* (DAW, German Armament Works) and *Deutsche Erd- und Steinwerke* (DEST, German Soil and Stone Works) under the WVHA.¹⁹ The concentration camps were in business.

By June, 1941, DEST worked eight quarries and brickworks entirely through concentration camp labor in Flossenbürg, Mauthausen, Gross-Rosen and Natzweiler, Neuengamme, Stutthof and Buchenwald; operated a gravel dredging pit at Auschwitz;²⁰ and controlled two porcelain manufacturing plants.²¹ Five thousand inmates were trained to be brick layers

¹²The labor details of the concentration camps were engaged in excavations, quarries, stone-splitting, construction of barracks, loading and unloading of sand, gravel, and snow, road and railway building, waterworks, drainage, lumberyards, salt mines, gardening and agriculture, rope-making, and in the general maintenance work of camps.

¹³The Oranienburg inmates were moved to Osterwege in 1934 to work on land reclamation, only to be moved back in 1937 because of the objection that such work was "too honorable" for concentration camp inmates. Reitlinger, *op. cit.*, p. 257, quoting *Neuer Vorwärts*, September 26, 1937.

¹⁴See Case V, p. 329, and IMT XI, p. 421.

¹⁵However, Pohl testified that already between 1934 and 1938 he was in charge of concentration camp workshops as a whole. Case V, p. 331.

¹⁶After the pogrom of November, 1938, the Austrian Anschluss, and the two seizures of Czechoslovakia.

¹⁷IMT XVI, pp. 385-386.

¹⁸Himmler's Order of April 20, 1939. Case V, Doc. No. 1451. See also testimony of Oswald Pohl, Case V, p. 329. See Case IV, Transcript, p. 1537.

¹⁹Case IV, Transcript, p. 1937.

²⁰Case IV, Doc. No. 2309; Case V, p. 216.

²¹Case V, p. 219.

and ten thousand to be stone masons; the inducement was extra food, clothing, and lighter discipline.²² Enthusiastic, Himmler wanted to build housing for the demobilized SS as well, “by forcing the scum of mankind, the prisoners, the professional criminals, to do *positive* work.”²³

DAW developed from the nucleus of concentration camp workshops in Dachau; in the course of time, more workshops and similar enterprises in other concentration camps were added, at first at Buchenwald, Sachsenhausen and in Neuengamme, and later in all concentration camps.²⁴

With the increasing demands for manpower in the armament industries and with the realization of the mass labor force in concentration camps, Speer followed Himmler’s initiative. In February, 1942, he protested to Hitler the generally “wasteful use of concentration camp labor” in non-military construction tasks. Himmler, who built the WVHA as a basis for a solid organizational foundation and entrusted to it the “economic, administrative and construction matters” of the concentration camps,²⁵ was ready for action. The Inspectorate of Concentration Camps was incorporated into a brand new SS Economic and Administration Main Office, the SS WVHA, as its *Amtsgruppe* D (Division D, Concentration Camps) to better direct “the war effort with regard to manpower.”²⁶ The last remaining step to integrate the concentration camps completely into the National Socialist economy was taken. Oswald Pohl, now the chief of the SS Economic and Administration Main Office, reported back to Himmler as follows:

- 1) The war has brought about a marked change in the structure of the concentration camps and has changed their duties fundamentally with regard to the employment of prisoners. The custody of prisoners for the sole reasons of security, education, or as a preventive measure, is no longer the main consideration. Its importance now lies on the economic side. The mobilization of all prisoner labor for purposes of the war (increase of armament) now, and for purposes of construction in the forthcoming peace, is coming more and more to the foreground.
- 2) From this knowledge necessary measures result which require a gradual transformation of the concentration camps from their one-sided political character into an organization adapted to economic tasks.
- 3) For this reason I called together all the leaders of the former inspectorate of concentration camps, all camp commanders, and all managers and supervisors of work . . . and explained to them this new development . . . which must be brought into effect with the utmost urgency if the commencement of work for the purposes of the armament industry is not to be delayed.²⁷

Himmler agreed “with all the points” of Pohl’s report: The need for

²²Case IV, Doc. No. 385.

²³*International Military Tribunal at Nürnberg, Documents in Evidence*, Document 1918-PS [henceforth abbreviated Doc. 1918-PS]. Author’s italics.

²⁴Pohl’s testimony, Case V, p. 558.

²⁵Case IV, Doc. No. 495.

²⁶On March 3, 1942. Case IV, Doc. 1063 (F) -PS.

²⁷Report of April 30, 1942; Doc. R-129; IMT III, p. 467.

manpower exceeded all reserves and the ready-made pool of the concentration camps had to be exploited totally. He had one reservation, however, which concerned public relations:

The idea could arise that we arrest people, or keep them in custody after they have been arrested, in order to get workers. . . . It should be stressed somehow that no change of policy took place regarding the questions of . . . custody . . . nor of the educational aims for those fit for education.

But the policy was already changed, and forced labor of concentration camp inmates received priority; Himmler concluded lamely:

Besides that, and giving a hundred per cent priority to the labor to be gotten out [of the inmates], I feel that the camp commandants should take care of the education of those fit for education.²⁸

The immediate economic need of the state proved stronger than some chimeric ideological stipulations.

To obtain maximum efficiency and to exploit completely the available manpower of the concentration camps, Pohl issued the following order:

There is no limit to working hours. Their duration depends on the kind of working establishments in the camps and the kind of work to be done. They are fixed by the camp commandants alone.

Any circumstances which may result in a shortening of working hours (e.g. meals, roll-calls, etc.) have therefore to be restricted to an irreducible minimum. Time-wasting walks and noon intervals, except for the purpose of taking meals, are forbidden.

Guard duties must be freed from traditional rigidity and be made more flexible, having regard to the coming task of peace. Sentries on horseback, watchdogs, and movable obstacles are to be developed.²⁹

As if to stress the "secretly" changed function of the concentration camps, which Himmler wished to shield from the public, he stated that, "since the concentration camps were so productive in certain types of work, . . . the Gestapo was actually instructed to arrest certain classes of laborers so that they could be used in this way."³⁰ But there were still prisoners in reformatory camps and in prisons whose work could easily be added to the effective labor plan of the concentration camps; also, the foreign "volunteer" workers and workers in forced labor camps seemed to be far less efficient than the concentration camp inmates. To remedy the situation, Himmler issued another order:

For reasons of war necessity, not to be discussed further here, the Reichsführer SS and Chief of German Police, on the 14th of December, 1942, has ordered that by the end of January, 1943, at least 35,000 prisoners fit for work are to be sent to the concentration camps. . . .

1) As of now . . . all Eastern workers or foreign workers who have been fugitives or who have broken contracts . . . are to be brought by the quickest means to the nearest concentration camps.

2) The commanders and the commandants of the Security Police and

²⁸Himmler's reply to Pohl of May 29, 1942. Case IV, Doc. No. 719.

²⁹IMT III, p. 462.

³⁰IMT I, p. 246.

the Security Service, and the chiefs of the state police headquarters will check immediately on the basis of a close and strict rule: (a) the prisons, and (b) the labor reformatory camps. All prisoners fit for work, if it is practically and humanly possible, will be committed at once to the nearest concentration camp, according to the following instructions, even, for example, those who are about to be brought to trial. . . . Every single laborer counts!³¹

Now it was time for Himmler to regret former excesses of the SS, who killed Russian prisoners in tens of thousands or let them die of starvation and exhaustion. In his Posen speech in October, 1943, he mourned these prisoners captured in the early days of the war:

At that time we did not value the mass of humanity as we value it today, as raw material, as labor. What, after all, thinking in terms of generations, is not to be regretted, but is now deplorable by reason of the loss of labor, is that the prisoners died in tens and hundreds of thousands of exhaustion and hunger.³²

The needs of the war economy were enormous, and the labor of concentration camp inmates was expected to ease the burden of a manpower shortage to a considerable degree.³³ This it did, especially in that kind of labor which was considered dangerous, difficult, or exceptionally heavy. The SS began to farm out tens of thousands of its concentration camp inmates to German industry under the technical control of the Speer Ministry. In addition, the SS organized its own labor corps from concentration camp inmates for the purpose of working in the private enterprise plants.³⁴

The three original SS offices in charge of concentration camp administration, the Inspectorate of Concentration Camps, the SS Administrative Department (SS *Verwaltungsamt*, of which Pohl was chief since February, 1934,) and the Department of Budget and Buildings, were eliminated. In April, 1939, the Administrative Department was raised to the status of Main Office, a top branch in the SS organization (for comparison, see SS Main Office, SO Main Office, Security Police Main Office, etc.) called Main Office, Administration and Economy—WVHA. Pohl was appointed chief and became at the same time chief of the Main Office Budget and Building.³⁵ In

January, 1942, these two Main Offices as well as what was left of the SS Administrative Office were dissolved and taken over (on February 1) by the SS Economic and Administrative Office (SS WVHA),³⁶ in which "all

³¹IMT III, pp. 464-465.

³²IMT Doc. 1919.

³³Henry Picker, *op. cit.*, comment of July 5, 1942.

³⁴"To permit the workers to arrive fresh and ready for work" the concentration camp branches were established in the vicinity of plants and factories. IMT XVI, p. 441. In 1942 Himmler wanted to go into armaments production with his own labor force in his own concentration camps. Speer intervened—an uncontrolled armament production by the SS would give Himmler power over the state; Hitler agreed and prohibited further expansion of the SS. (IMT XVII, p. 17.) After protracted negotiations between Himmler and Speer, a compromise was reached: Himmler would provide only private enterprise plants with concentration camp inmates. (Doc. R-124; see also Speer's testimony, IMT XVI, p. 517.)

³⁵Case V, Doc. No. 1451.

³⁶Case V, Doc. No. 495.

economic, administrative and construction matters of the Reich Leader SS will be dealt with at a ministerial level."³⁷ Soon afterwards, the Inspectorate of the Concentration Camps was incorporated into the SS Economic and Administrative Office.³⁸ According to Pohl's testimony, he proposed to Himmler that instead of the SS WVHA, the *Reichssicherheitshauptamt* (RSHA, Reich Security Main Office) take over the Inspectorate of the Concentration Camps, "where it logically belonged." Himmler, however, "saw the preëminent *economic* importance of these camps, believing that neither RSHA nor any other Main Office would represent these economic views sufficiently."³⁹ In this way, the whole National Socialist concentration camp system became, in all its functions, directly administered and controlled by the SS Economic and Administrative Office. The economic aspect of the concentration camp received primacy and undisputed priority, as it did in the Soviet Union.

The SS Economic and Administrative Main Office was divided into five branches, *Amtsgruppen* A, B, C, D, and W.⁴⁰ *Amtsgruppe* A had the chief authority for the finance and administration of the whole of the SS. *Amtsgruppe* B controlled food supply, uniforms, billeting, raw materials and equipment for the SS. *Amtsgruppe* C was charged with construction tasks of the SS. It was "the greatest user of concentration camp labor in all of Germany, far outstripping such industries as I. G. Farben and the Hermann Goering Works." *Amtsgruppe* D was in charge of the administration of concentration camps. *Amtsgruppe* W managed the economic enterprises run by the WVHA, namely the DWB combine (German Economic Enterprises), DEST, and DAW.⁴¹ Both *Amtsgruppen* C and W

were engaged in the actual construction of armaments, and each had its own munition program, using inmate labor supplied by *Amtsgruppe* D on a gigantic scale. In addition, the SS WVHA supplied thousands of workers to private industries engaged in the manufacturing of armaments. Finally, the SS WVHA worked in close cooperation with the highest Reich officials in the armament program—Goering, Speer, Sauckel, etc."⁴²

The SS WVHA also cooperated with Sauer, the head of the technical office of armament production in the Speer ministry, in building tank engines for the Jaeger program, and with members of the Central Planning Board in building armament plants.⁴³

The classification of camps, graded according to the type of prisoner to be committed, lost its meaning once the SS WVHA took over the concentration camps; the switch to economic exploitation of concentration camp labor "necessitated deviations from the classification plan. Inmate:

³⁷*Ibid.*, Himmler's order of Jan. 19, 1942.

³⁸Doc. R-129.

³⁹Case V, pp. 332-333. Author's italics.

⁴⁰For the detailed organizational structure of the whole SS-WVHA, see Case V, Doc. No. 111.

⁴¹Case V, pp. 217-219.

⁴²Case V, p. 238.

⁴³Case V, p. 239.

were transferred from one camp to another solely according to their working capabilities and the needs of the economic enterprises run by the SS WVHA."⁴⁴

Amtsgruppe C of the SS WVHA constructed plants for other National Socialist agencies on an enormous scale exclusively through the labor of concentration camp inmates. It undertook such construction as the erection of V-2 plants and produced V-1 and V-2 weapons at Nordhausen-Dora concentration camp; this giant underground munitions plant employed some 50,000 concentration camp laborers, who worked, ate, and slept in the subterranean tunnels.⁴⁵ It also carried out fifteen extensive plans for the construction of subterranean plants for the airplane industry by concentration camp inmates, in cooperation with the Armament Commission and the Plenipotentiary General for Construction in the Reich Aviation Ministry.⁴⁶ *Amtsgruppe C* also supplied concentration camp inmates for surface work details and for secret building detachments such as the construction of a secret Führer headquarters with subterranean command posts near Ohrdruf in Thuringia (code name S III)⁴⁷ and installed and extended crematoriums in Buchenwald and Mauthausen.⁴⁸

Amtsgruppe W of the WVHA manufactured weapons and armaments in Auschwitz, Buchenwald, Dachau, Lublin, Ravensbrück, Sachsenhausen, and Stutthof.⁴⁹ In the plants of the DEST industry, concentration camp inmates worked on the manufacture of airplane parts at Flossenbürg and Mauthausen, assembled planes at Hertogenbosch, and welded air torpedoes at Natzweiler.⁵⁰ For purposes of commercial law, registration, and taxation, *Amtsgruppe W* was classified as a private enterprise. The parent holding company, the German Economic Enterprises (DWB), was a giant combine which stood at the head of the various W enterprises designed to amalgamate the theories of industrial management with principles of the party, state, the military, etc.⁵¹

The SS officers supervising the engagement of concentration camps in economic tasks, members of the SS WVHA *Amtsgruppen W* and C, were men of commerce of the new order—the élite industrialists. It was their goal to carry the economics of business efficiency to the Nazi terminus. Fanatical Nazis turned into fanatical businessmen. . . . In order that German economic life could be recast and rebuilt on the SS pattern, entrepreneurs were trained in the SS WVHA industries, and schools for business administration were established where SS principles of commerce were taught . . . such as Junkerschule Tölz and the SS Führerschule-Verwaltung.⁵²

⁴⁴Case V, p. 221.

⁴⁵Case V, p. 238.

⁴⁶Case V, p. 239.

⁴⁷Concentration camp workers working in three shifts from Buchenwald; Case V, p.

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⁴⁸Case V, p. 218.

⁴⁹Case V, p. 238.

⁵⁰Case V, p. 239.

⁵¹Case V, p. 244.

⁵²*Ibid.*

Amt W I (Reich) of the *Amtsgruppe W* operated the Bohemia Ceramic Works and the Porcelain Factory Allach-Munich, utilizing concentration camp labor on a large scale. *Amt W I* also "put large underground stone quarries at the disposal of armament factories where the prisoners could carry out work without danger from air attacks. . . . For example, aircraft assembly of the Messerschmitt 109 (Me-109) and Messerschmitt-262 was carried out at Mauthausen."⁵³ The Golleschauer-Zement A.G., under *Amt W II (East)*, was the first cement factory operated by the SS; it produced 200,000 tons yearly, using concentration camp inmates from Auschwitz. It was one of many subsidiaries (others produced glazed tile, lime, chalk, etc.) of the Clinker Cement Company, which itself was a subsidiary of DWB. *Amt W III* operated nutrition firms, supplying provisions for concentration camps and troops; it used concentration camp labor in its branches in Oranienburg, Dachau, Auschwitz, Lublin, etc. *Amt. W IV* controlled the DAW combine, one of the largest SS enterprises, which was placed under Pohl's administration as early as 1936. It engaged in armament production and had branches in Auschwitz, Buchenwald, Dachau, Lublin, Ravensbrück, Sachsenhausen, Stutthof, etc. *Amt W V* used concentration camp labor in agriculture, forestries, and fisheries; when large fertile territories were acquired in the east, its activities greatly increased. *Amt W VI* operated textile and leather plants in Ravensbrück. *Amt W VII* owned the Nordland Publishing House Company, one of the largest publishing firms in Germany, and Völkischer Kunstverlag, which produced photographs and oil painting reproductions with the help of concentration camp labor. *Amt W VII* used concentration camp labor on a large scale in its "cultural" activities, such as the construction of recreation centers, sanitariums, convalescent homes, foundations, museums, galleries, etc.⁵⁴

The camp commandants were charged with responsibility for the productivity of concentration camp labor. The administration of a concentration camp and of "all the economic enterprises of the SS within its sphere of organization is in the hands of the camp commander. He alone is therefore responsible for the economic enterprises being as productive as possible." The camp commander must know his economics:

He needs a clear professional knowledge of matters military and economic and must be a clever and wise leader of men whom he has to weld into a big potential of performance.

In addition, every concentration camp had a plant manager who was jointly responsible if any damages or failures ensue with regard to the work or the economic results. [However,] the camp commander alone is responsible for the employment of the labor available. This employment must be, in the true meaning of the word, exhaustive, in order to obtain the greatest measure of performance. Work is allotted by the chief of the Division D centrally and alone. The camp commanders themselves may

⁵³Case V, p. 219.

⁵⁴Description of Organization and Tasks of *Amtsgruppe W* of the SS WVHA, Case V, Doc. No. 1016.

not accept on their own initiative work offered by third parties and may not negotiate concerning it.⁵⁵

Concentration camp labor, then, was utilized mainly in defense work, construction, and industry; to a lesser degree, the inmates were employed in agriculture, camp maintenance, and various services. In 1944 there were 185 camps under Pohl's administration with some 600,000-plus inmates⁵⁶ guarded by 35,000 men. (Only 6,000 of these were SS members; the rest came from the Reich War Veteran Legion—*Reichskriegerbund Kyffhäuser*—the army, the air force, the home guard, the SA, etc.). Of the 600,000-plus prisoners, between 230,000 to 250,000 worked in private armament industries; 170,000 were employed by the Speer Reich Ministry for Armament and War Production on the construction of subterranean works; some 15,000 worked in construction and railroad brigades; between 10,000 to 12,000 built the Führer's headquarters in Thuringia; between 40,000 to 50,000 worked in construction supervised by *Amtsgruppe C* of the SS WVHA; the rest, some 130,000 inmates, worked in big repair shops, in agriculture, in the quartermaster office, on camp maintenance and various services.⁵⁷

The concentration camp inmates remaining in the camps (sometimes up to two-fifths of the prisoners) worked in the mess, laundry, repair shops, hospital supplies, depots, armament works and other shops. The remainder of the prisoners were either farmed out to widely separated areas where new industrial and armament enterprises were being set up, or, when the distance of these outside labor details grew too large and the particular conditions of these plants, mines, or factories called for it, the prisoners had to build their own subsidiary camps. In the first instance, they remained under the direct authority of the base camp; in the second case, they remained within the general organization of the base camp. In their new position, these subsidiaries often became a base to other subsidiary camps, and so on. As Defendant Speer pointed out at Nürnberg, "... we were anxious to use workers from concentration camps directly in factories, in order to use the manpower most efficiently."⁵⁸

The armament industry had a lion's share of concentration camp labor. Buchenwald prisoners, for example, worked at the Gustloff plant, the Mittelbau, the Deutsche Autowerke, at the manufacturing center at Neuen-
gamme, in the underground factory at Bartensleben, at the new Siemens plant at Helmstadt, in the vicinity of Nordhausen, in another underground plant for Junkers Works at Dessau, etc. To the end of the war, construction brigades from Buchenwald were dispatched as far as the Channel Islands, while thousands of Buchenwald prisoners worked in plants and fortifications on the Rhine. In the north, Buchenwald subsidiary camps extended as far as Magdeburg, in the east, to beyond Leipzig. At Ohrdruf near

⁵⁵Pohl's order of April 30, 1942; Doc. R-129.

⁵⁶Pohl's letter to Himmler of April 25, 1944; Case V, Doc. No. 020 (a).

⁵⁷Pohl's testimony, Case V, pp. 445-446.

⁵⁸IMT III, p. 466.

Gotha, Buchenwald prisoners constructed munition factories. Buchenwald also supplied the labor for the factories of Hollerith and Dora. Ravensbrück supplied the labor for the Siemens factories, those of Czechoslovakia, and the workshops at Hannover.⁵⁹ At Goering's request, eight to ten thousand concentration camp inmates were sent to build the Buna armament plant for the I. G. Farbenindustrie. The I.G.F. was one of the largest private employers of concentration camp prisoners, with priority on prisoners, once the Buna plant was constructed, over all other armament plants. In Auschwitz, 7,000 inmates worked in another Farben armament plant. Other large private employers of the inmates were the Hermann Goering Works, Krupp, Siemens-Schuckert, Flick, and many others.⁶⁰

In addition, concentration camp inmates worked on military and defense installations, air raid shelters, airfields and landing strips, the erection of war plants, ammunition dumps, port facilities, etc.⁶¹ They also continued to work on pre-war projects—in the salt mines, such as the Brausberg mine at Schacht Marie and Neustassfurt; in agriculture, which was once the chief occupation, at Oranienburg; in a diamond-cutting factory in concentration camp Hertogenbosch; in the peatbog details of the moor camps in the northeast; etc.⁶²

According to a top secret letter from Himmler to Goering of March 9, 1944,⁶³ 36,000 concentration camp prisoners worked at that time for the aviation industry. On Goering's request,⁶⁴ Himmler agreed to raise the number to 90,000 concentration camp inmates. He reported that, since the SS guards take care of the required speed "through constant supervision of the work groups (*Kommandos*) . . . they have some influence on the results of the production." Always eager to enlarge his state within the state, Himmler added: "I may suggest consideration of the fact that in enlarging our responsibility through a speeding up of the total work, better results can definitely be expected." Himmler continued:

We produce now, with 2,000 men, 900 sets of engine cowlings and radiator covers, as well as 120,000 single parts of various kinds for the fighter plane Me-109.

In Oranienburg we are employing 6,000 prisoners at the Heinkel works now for construction of the He-177. . . . [Because of satisfactory results] we are increasing this employment to 8,000 prisoners. . . .

The movement of manufacturing plants of the aviation industry to subterranean locations requires further employment of about 100,000 prisoners. The plans for this employment are already under way.⁶⁵

But there were other tasks and "projects." According to the testimony of the camp commandant at Mauthausen, about a thousand inmates, engravers and lithographers by profession, were used to manufacture counter-

⁵⁹IMT VI, p. 330.

⁶⁰Case V, p. 239.

⁶¹IMT III, p. 480.

⁶²IMT XI, p. 421.

⁶³Doc. 1584 (III)-PS.

⁶⁴Of February 14, 1944. Doc. 1584 (I)-PS.

⁶⁵*Ibid.*

feit foreign bank notes, identification papers and seals.⁶⁶ Similarly, Murray T. Bloom, newspaperman and American intelligence officer during the war, wrote in *Harper's Magazine* of July, 1957, about a very successful counterfeiting enclave in Sachsenhausen composed of a printing office, bookbinding shop, photography and phototype section, and staffed by Jewish inmates.⁶⁷ One should not forget, however, that at Dachau and Mauthausen the human skin of dead prisoners was used to make lampshades, saddles, riding breeches, gloves, house slippers, and ladies' handbags.⁶⁸

Jewish inmates of concentration camps were used as productive labor during the war, too, but at first their tasks were the hardest and their screening for forced labor the most selective. According to Rudolf Höss, appearing as a defense witness for Kaltenbrunner, only twenty to thirty per cent of all Jews sent to Auschwitz were picked to work in concentration camp industries; the rest were exterminated by gassing and burning.⁶⁹ Originally, Himmler chose Auschwitz as a clearing station for foreign Jews in order to select a labor force to manufacture synthetic gasoline in its neighborhood (the Buna project, operated by I. G. Farben). He felt that even with tough screening policies, the newly arrived Jews in Auschwitz "should yield at least 10,000 to 15,000 people fit for work."⁷⁰

Toward the end of the war, however, the demand for manpower became so acute that Himmler was about to end the Auschwitz selection for good: he was interested only in those Jews able to work in the armament industries. On March 10, 1942, Kommler, chief of *Amtsgruppe* C, wrote to Glücks, chief of *Amtsgruppe* D:

In view of the increasing shortage of civilian workers the execution of the construction tasks devolving upon the SS Economic Administration Main Office (SS WVHA) in the third year of war, 1942, requires the employment of an increased number of concentration camp prisoners, prisoners of war, and Jews . . . ; it is essential that concentration camp prisoners, prisoners of war and Jews be kept in readiness as helpers for the jobs in all circumstances.⁷¹

The construction engineers of *Amtsgruppe* C of the SS WVHA used Jewish inmates to construct crematoriums, gas chambers, and underground plants; *Amtsgruppe* W used Jewish inmates by the tens of thousands in the granite quarries of Mauthausen and the brick factories in Poland.⁷² Action Reinhardt was instituted "to gather into the Reich all the Jewish man-

⁶⁶Case V, p. 296.

⁶⁷The top secret undertaking, "Operation Bernhard," was quite successful in reproducing counterfeit British currency. See *Harper's Magazine*, Vol. 215, No. 1286, July, 1957, pp. 47-53.

⁶⁸Case V, p. 246.

⁶⁹Doc. D-749. "The prisoners would be marched past one of the doctors, who would make spot decisions as they walked by. Those who were found 'fit for work' would be sent into the camp. Others were sent immediately to the extermination plants. Children of tender years were invariably exterminated, since by reason of their youth they were unable to work." IMT I, pp. 251, 252.

⁷⁰Telegram dated Dec. 16, 1942. Italics in the original text. Doc. No. R-91.

⁷¹Case IV, p. 242.

⁷²Case V, p. 261.

power" from Czechoslovakia.⁷³ Krupp employed Hungarian Jewish women in its works in Essen and other West German towns.⁷⁴ Small German firms which administered requisitioned plants in Poland employed Jewish prisoners from the Warsaw ghetto.

Prisoners who were ill were still employed "on a limited scale"; they were engaged in the manufacturing of weaving and plaiting products in the plants of Auschwitz, Dachau, Neuengamme, and Stutthof.⁷⁵ Boys and girls, too young for hard labor but old enough to learn rapidly, were trained as farm workers, locksmiths, stonemasons, joiners, etc. (boys), and as farm workers, weavers, spinners, knitters, etc. (girls) in concentration camp Lublin.⁷⁶ Women were used in hard labor tasks, and, on Pohl's request, even in the OT (*Todt Organisation*) construction commandos:

Of course [Jewish] women are to be used for [such] labor. In this case one has merely to provide a healthy diet. Here a diet with raw vegetables is important. Be sure to import garlic from Hungary in sufficient quantity.⁷⁷

Female concentration camp prisoners worked in the aviation industry mechanical workshops in Neubrandenburg

in the manufacture of devices for dropping bombs and rudder control. In the month of January, 30,000 devices, as well as 500 rudder controls and altitude regulators have been manufactured. We are increasing employment to 4,000 women. The performance of the women is excellent.⁷⁸

The SS industries paid for the use of concentration camp labor between 30 pfennigs to 5 RM a day per prisoner, "ostensibly to be used as prisoner's wages." (The wage scale paid to the SS for concentration camp labor was not much lower than that paid to civilian workers.)⁷⁹ "However, it was never even considered that the inmate should receive any part of the sum. 'Legally,' such 'wages' belonged to the Reich treasury. Various schemes, however, were utilized by staff W to enable the SS WVHA illegally to retain a substantial part of the funds."⁸⁰

Some of the concentration camp prisoners engaged in heavy labor, especially those in important armament industries or special tasks, drew supplementary rations and received other "benefits," such as bonus coupons or permission to visit the camp brothel.⁸¹ On the other hand, decrease in food rations as punishment was used often but led to a vicious spiral. For cases of inefficiency or evading work, every concentration camp had its penal details, where the treatment of prisoners was particularly brutal;

⁷³Judgment of the U. S. Military Tribunal II, Case V, p. 977.

⁷⁴IMT XII, pp. 322-323.

⁷⁵Memorandum of April 24, 1944. Case V, p. 233.

⁷⁶Himmler's letter to Pohl, Jan. 6, 1943. Case V, pp. 234-235.

⁷⁷Himmler's reply to Pohl's telegram of May 24, 1944, concerning Hungarian Jews. Case V, p. 235.

⁷⁸Himmler's letter to Goering of March 9, 1944. Doc. 1584 (III)-PS.

⁷⁹Pohl's testimony, Case V, p. 594.

⁸⁰Case V, p. 245.

⁸¹IMT XXII, p. 16.

they were assigned the hardest labor, often in the quarries, with less food and longer working hours, including Sundays.

Conclusion

It is true that concentration camp labor before 1938 was incidental to the over-all security function of the concentration camps. The mass exploitation of concentration camp labor was not, however, exclusively "a temporary phenomenon" of the war. As in the Soviet Union, where it took almost thirteen years to realize the huge economic potential of the concentrated forced labor, there was in National Socialist Germany since 1938 an army of available manpower needed in the economic structure of the state. The resulting application of that manpower to economic use in peace as in war was viewed as entirely logical.

According to the testimony of SS Sturmbannführer Mummenthey, the chief of DEST, even long before the war Hitler dreamed of building new *Reichsautobahnen*, large bridges such as the one in Berlin, party rally grounds such as the one in Nürnberg, and of rebuilding whole cities such as Berlin, Hamburg, Weimar, Nürnberg. Todt and Speer incorporated a number of these plans into the Four Year Plan. However, colossal proposals of this kind meant extraordinary requirements of all sorts, primarily of construction materials. Hoping that Speer would support him financially, Himmler decided to establish brick and granite works; he

knew quite well that, in order to meet those enormous requirements, Germany did not have enough labor. In his capacity as chief of the German police, he, of course, was aware of the fact that in concentration camps there were thousands of inmates who were kept by the Reich without performing any productive work. Therefore, it was a logical thing for him to decide to use these inmates as workers . . .⁸²

even in peace time.

Moreover, there is abundant material evidence to the effect that, had National Socialist Germany been victorious in the war, it would have continued its prewar and war practice of exploiting the concentration camp on a large scale. The National Socialist victory would have brought about a new era of coercive labor practices, similar in scope to that in the Soviet Union; laborers concentrated in huge camps would have been utilized to man the planned industrial expansion, not only of victorious Germany proper but also of its newly acquired territories, and to colonize, in the same manner, large agricultural areas in the east and southeast. As Pohl, the man in charge of the SS Economic and Administration Main Office, put it, "The mobilization of all prisoner labor for purposes of the war now, *and for purposes of construction in the forthcoming peace* is coming more and more to the foreground."⁸³

Undoubtedly, the speeches, letters, orders and other materials of the National Socialist leaders dating from the pre-1945 period have to be

⁸²Testimony of Mummenthey. Case V, p. 567.

⁸³Doc. R-129. Author's italics.

accepted with reserve since they are obviously inflated evidence; the testimony of the defendants in the various trials after the war, on the other hand, because of the consequences of such testimonies, is almost always deflated. But after all is said and done, the facts remain. Forced labor was part and parcel of concentration camps in National Socialist Germany since 1934; there were attempts to integrate some facets of this labor into the national economy already in 1936, but this change occurred only in 1938. By the end of 1941 and the beginning of 1942 the concentration camps became an organic, inseparable part of the National Socialist economy.

Was concentration camp labor economically a dead loss, a wasteful use of manpower, a liability to the National Socialist economy, as is generally believed, or did it actually contribute to National Socialist productivity?

With respect to the German prisoners, concentration camp labor meant a relative loss to the National Socialist economy; as "free" workers, the German inmates would have contributed their full share to the economy, would have shouldered the burden of taxation, would have made better and more extended use of their skills and their specialties; in sum, they could have been exploited much more effectively as "free" citizens.

However, what is usually overlooked is that after 1938 and before 1945 the ratio between German and foreign inmates was never less than about one to four; in other words, during these years there were some eighty per cent of foreigners in the concentration camps and only about twenty per cent of German inmates.⁸⁴ The foreign prisoners, like the slaves on Roman markets, were acquired abroad, and *any* labor they contributed to the National Socialist economy, however wasteful, short, or misdirected, was an absolute economic asset to the National Socialist economy.

It is true, of course, that the concentration camps as an important source of manpower were badly managed: The top National Socialist leaders—Himmler, Speer, Sauckel, Thierack, etc.—fought among themselves continuously for that increment of power which concentration camp labor represented. Commandants of individual camps, instead of helping economic production, "kept interfering time and again," issued instructions which were defective, and "regarded themselves as masters of the enterprises, [and] numerous tensions and differences of opinion between the management of the plants . . . and the commandants resulted."⁸⁵ The SS guards, instructed as to the proper attitude to take toward inferior races, failed to learn how to handle the valuable commodity which the inmates as a labor source represented; the criminal prisoners, the immediate superiors

⁸⁴Addressing the Gauleiters in Posen on August 3, 1944, Himmler said: "We have five hundred and fifty thousand detainees, of whom about four hundred and fifty thousand are foreigners." *Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, Vol. 4, Stuttgart, 1953, p. 593.

Nationalities represented in Buchenwald in April, 1945, were as follows: French, 2,900; Polish, 3,800; Hungarians, 1,240; Yugoslavs, 570; Russians, 4,380; Dutch, 324; Belgians, 622; Austrians, 550; Italians, 242; Czechs, 2,105; Germans, 1,800; Spanish and miscell., 1,207. Thus, out of a total 20,000 inmates, only 1,800, less than ten per cent, were German. Case V, Doc. L-159, p. 1080.

⁸⁵Testimony of Mummenthey. Case V, pp. 569-570.

of concentration camp inmates, became their lay foremen. The state of health of concentration camp inmates and especially of the prisoners "in protective custody" was "catastrophic." In all the camps "a loss of between at least 25-30 per cent is to be reckoned with, and then this number is only reached if the prisoners are treated with consideration for a greater length of time."⁸⁶

Himmler ordered monthly reports on the state of health of the prisoners and circulated an order stating that "the Reichsführer has ordered absolute reduction of the death rate."⁸⁷ In July, 1943, he instituted prosecution against lax concentration camp commanders, had some shot and others transferred.⁸⁸ The manpower had to be preserved at all costs. However, the mortality rate was still extremely high.⁸⁹ The racial enemies, the Jews, were treated worse than any other group and when forced to work were so maltreated that their mortality rate was the highest of all the concentration camp inmates.

Thus, the general labor efficiency—due to the nature of the work, the inadequate planning of details, the mental torture, the brutality of the SS guards and the criminal prisoners, the mortality rate, the work on luxury goods for the SS officers (in spite of strict orders to the contrary) and the internecine quarrels among the National Socialist leaders—was quite low.

Nevertheless, the prisoners did work, and on an enormous mass scale. The concentration camps embraced a huge army of labor operating under strict discipline; this army was mobile, was employed in tasks which were difficult, dangerous and onerous, and could be directed to new duties with speed and efficiency. It represented little or no investment capital, and its productivity, however small, was bound to be in excess of prisoner upkeep.

According to Kogon's estimate, the profit value of a fully utilized concentration camp laborer was about 1,630 RM. Multiplied by a conservative number of 600,000 prisoners, the total is a respectable sum of almost 1,000,000,000 RM for the year 1944 alone.⁹⁰ This estimate may be corroborated by other evidence. According to the production statement of SS Obersturmbannführer Koegel, commander of Flossenbürg concentration camp, the net profit accumulated for the year 1944 for Flossenbürg inmates farmed

⁸⁶Case V, Doc. No. 1825.

⁸⁷Doc. PS-217.

⁸⁸IMT XX, p. 303.

⁸⁹Ever new measures were taken to increase the concentration camp labor force; however, most reports on the efficiency of prisoners ended like this one: "I should like to point out that because of the great number of deaths in the concentration camps, it was impossible to increase the total number of prisoners in spite of the increased numbers sent to them recently, and that with a constant or even increasing death rate, it is unlikely that an improvement can be effected, even by sending an increased number of prisoners." Report from SS Untersturmführer Otto to Pohl of December 31, 1942. Case V, Doc. No. 1523.

As a consequence, new orders were issued "to lower the death rate in the camp by every means. Full utilization and tasty preparation of the rations at hand, as well as the increased reception of parcels makes this quite possible. I hold the camp commandant and the chief of the camp administration personally responsible for exhausting every possibility of maintaining the physical strength of the prisoners." Case V, Doc. No. 1523.

⁹⁰Kogon, p. 269.

out to private and SS industrial enterprises totaled 3,673,965 RM. This sum, of course, did not include the total allocation of Flossenbürg's work; still, multiplied by some 200 camps, the final amount is not much smaller than Kogon's estimate.⁹¹

To conclude, then, it appears clear that the contribution of the small minority of concentration camp inmates, the German prisoners, to the National Socialist economy was less than their productive potentiality on the outside. As long as they were kept in the concentration camps for "security" reasons anyway, however, their labor was still a contribution. The forced labor of alien inmates, on the other hand, represented an absolute asset to the National Socialist economy. Their alarming mortality rate meant only potential, not actual loss to the National Socialist economic effort.

With respect to the ideological foundation, the change in function of concentration camps was bound to bring about a change in policy. "The re-education of social deviates" theme was eradicated, even in National Socialist propaganda. Security considerations, which led to the establishment of concentration camps in the first place, were of course still present but were equated with the economic exploitation. The function of the concentration camps was now

to get hold of all anti-social elements, which no longer had a right to live within the National Socialist state, and to turn their working strength to the benefit of the whole nation. This was effected in the concentration camps. The Reich Leader SS, therefore, delegated SS Obergruppenführer Pohl to set up concentration camp enterprises; in addition, he gave orders to establish companies on a private economy basis for the purpose of employing the prisoners.

National Socialism maintains this point of view: The State gives order to the economy. The State does not exist for the benefit of the economy, but the economy exists for the benefit of the State.⁹²

In other words, the concentration camps and the SS apparatus were a *sine qua non* of the National Socialist system and had to be maintained even if prisoners would not be forced to work.⁹³ The altered rationalization, just as in the USSR, was made to fit the changed policy. The original motivation was corrupted but not destroyed: security and labor were usefully and cynically synthesized.

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⁹¹Case V, Doc. No. 395.

⁹²Case V, Doc. No. 1016.

⁹³Gerald Reitlinger's argument that "cheap though concentration camp labor might be, it was a wasteful use of man-power, since every twenty inmates of a concentration camp required an armed sentry whose services were lost to the armed forces or to industry . . ." (Reitlinger, p. 265) does not make sense. These services were viewed as valuable and could not be dispensed with even if no labor whatsoever was performed.

"OPERATION CYCLAMEN," GERMANY AND ALBANIA, 1940-1941

by Charles B. Burdick

THE Italian invasion of Greece on October 28, 1940, caught Germany completely by surprise. Hitler had a few brief uncertain warnings about Italian intentions, but he had no specific information about the time or location of the attack.¹ The Italian forces made a few local advances to open the campaign, but they were soon checked by the Greeks. The Axis was now involved in the Balkans, despite the German desire for peace and quiet in that area. Hitler found himself confronted with an entirely unexpected and unwelcome situation. The much publicized Rome-Berlin Axis suffered an immediate loss of prestige because of the unannounced and unsuccessful aggression. Even more serious was the British seizure of Lemnos, Crete, and other strategic islands off the Greek mainland. The Allied forces had gained an excellent position to bomb the Rumanian oil fields and threaten the southern flank of the German forces scheduled to invade the Soviet Union.

Following his initial shock, Hitler quickly decided that German troops would have to intervene in order to save the situation. He issued instructions on November 4, 1940, for the preparation of the necessary plans to commit German units for an assault against Greek Macedonia and Western Thrace. The approach march of the forces would be through Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria.² Plans proceeded slowly because the weather prevented serious military operations until spring.

In his report on November 7, General Enno von Rintelen, the German military attaché in Italy, declared that the Italian offensive had failed for a number of reasons. The severe weather had turned the difficult terrain into an impassable morass. So far as Rintelen could tell, the Italians had not made adequate preparations for the attack. They apparently believed that the Greeks would surrender after a brief show of force. Rintelen declared that the Italians could not, because of transport problems, reinforce the Albanian front for some time. Because of this latter factor he warned the German High Command that the Greeks might be able to mount a major counter-attack before the Italians were reorganized and prepared.³

Rintelen's fears were well founded. In mid-November the Greeks attacked along the entire front and pushed the Italian units back into Albania. Italian losses were severe and their situation serious by the end of the month.

¹For a detailed examination of this question see Ehrengard Schramm von Thadden, *Griechenland und die Grossmächte im zweiten Weltkrieg* (Wiesbaden, 1955), pp. 92-117.

²Helmuth Greiner, *Die oberste Wehrmachtführung, 1939-1943* (Wiesbaden, 1951), p. 239.

³This information comes from the private papers of Ministerialrat A.D. Helmuth Greiner who was in charge of the German High Command's War Diary. Fortunately for posterity he kept personal notes on most of the High Command's activities. These notes survived the war although the official diary was destroyed in 1945. Ministerialrat Greiner kindly made his papers available to the author. Hereafter cited as the *Greiner Papers*.

The Führer, seeing the Italian position, wrote a short letter to Mussolini on November 20, in which he showed his displeasure with the Italian action. Two days later the Duce answered that the most difficult part of the campaign was over. He blamed the Italian difficulties on the weather, the Albanians who had deserted, and the Bulgarians who had helped the Greeks. He claimed that thirty divisions were being prepared in Italy to crush the Greeks.⁴

The last days of November did see an improvement in the general Italian military situation. In Rome the government relaxed and started to plan for a new spring offensive. Mussolini's optimism, however, was of short duration. On December 4, the Greeks broke through the Italian lines in the general direction of Valona, one of the most valuable ports in Albania. Their quick success caused consternation among the Italian leaders. General Ubaldo Soddu, the newly appointed field commander in Albania, telegraphed Mussolini and Ciano that the situation was desperate and had to be settled through immediate political intervention. The Duce was extremely discouraged over the frightful turn of events. He told Ciano: "There is nothing else to do. This is grotesque and absurd but it is a fact. We have to ask for a truce through Hitler."⁵ Ciano, in the deepest despair, immediately called the Italian ambassador to Germany, Dino Alfieri, who was in Rome on sick leave. Alfieri found the foreign minister nervous and fearful about the turn of events. After a short talk the two men proceeded to the Palazzo Venezia to see the panic stricken Mussolini. Both Ciano and Mussolini agreed that Alfieri should fly to Berlin the next morning and request immediate German assistance.⁶ Ciano expressed his instructions to Alfieri in the most general terms but emphasized the necessity for timely assistance. Alfieri's job was to acquaint Hitler with the problems involved and make sure that Germany would help in the critical days ahead.

Alfieri, delayed by bad weather over the Alps, arrived in Berlin on December 7. He visited the German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop and asked for German military relief through Rumania. The German foreign minister pointed out the impossibility of such action, because of the weather and the military-political situation in Europe. He also turned a deaf ear on Alfieri's request for increased German influence in Bulgaria and Yugoslavia in support of Italy. In general, Ribbentrop treated his Italian visitor with visible hostility and went so far as to demand a guarantee that the Italians would hold the bridgeheads at Valona and Durazzo.

The next day Alfieri saw the Führer. The Italian ambassador plunged into the Albanian situation without introduction or extensive detail. He attempted to report on the situation without discussing the causes or the responsibility for the catastrophe. In all events he did not hide the pre-

⁴Adolf Hitler, *Hitler e Mussolini, lettere e documenti* (Milano, 1946), pp. 11-19.

⁵Galeazzo Ciano, *Ciano's Diary, 1939-1943* (London, 1947), p. 313.

⁶Dino Alfieri, *Dictators Face to Face* (London, 1954), p. 82f. Schramm von Thadden, *op. cit.*, p. 136.

various Italian military position. After the survey of the problem Alfieri concluded with a special plea for understanding and assistance.⁷ Hitler was visibly disturbed with the turn of events and irritated with Mussolini for his Greek débâcle. The Führer's immediate response was to make some bitter remarks about the foolishness of the entire undertaking, the fighting qualities of the Italian army, and the inhospitable Albanian weather. After a short summary discussion, Hitler agreed to send transport planes to Italy. He also expressed a desire to meet the Duce at the earliest possible opportunity. Then, in closing, he told Alfieri that the German staffs were already considering an attack of two armored divisions, supported by Stuka bombers, in an effort to encircle the Greek army. Hitler indicated a general direction for the attack from the port of Durazzo to Ponavec.⁸

The Führer's decision to help his unfortunate ally was quickly put into effect. On December 6, Field Marshal Erhard Milch of the German air force arrived in Rome to discuss the use of German aircraft. He brought with him a letter from Hitler which was optimistic and friendly. The view, expressed by the German leader, was that the Albanian campaign was only a passing phase of the war. Milch thought a solution could be found and the battle brought to a rapid conclusion. By December 9, the first German air force transport units were flying between Foggia, Italy, and Albanian airfields.⁹ Hitler, however, was still not sure about the actual situation in Italy and he decided to obtain more information before acting in Albania. On December 10, therefore, he ordered General von Rintelen to investigate the Albanian military situation as soon as possible. He was also to look into the Italian air transportation problems and check the possibilities of further German help in this regard.¹⁰

The Italian troops, following their near collapse on December 4, consolidated their positions and held on in the face of further Greek attacks. General von Rintelen reported, on December 12, that the Italian High Command, in contrast to Ambassador Alfieri, was quite optimistic about the campaign. The general feeling among the military leaders was that the most serious crisis had passed. A number of the Italian commanders pointed out to Rintelen that Alfieri had departed on a day which was especially critical and, as a result, his report was not quite accurate. The Italians now

⁷Leonardo Simoni (pseudonym), *Berlino, Ambassade d'Italia* (Roma, 1947?), p. 87f.; Alfieri, *op. cit.*, p. 85.

⁸*Ibid.*, p. 88. That night Alfieri telegraphed Mussolini to report his progress. He received a telephone call from Ciano who said: "It is still understood that you are not to ask for any help. We want nothing—absolutely nothing. Incidentally the news is better, and there is a chance now that we shall get through the critical phase without any trouble." The position of Italian foreign affairs had reached such a state that the ambassador to Germany had no idea what his policy should be. Alfieri did not see Hitler again on this subject.

⁹Ciano, *op. cit.*, p. 316.

¹⁰Schramm von Thadden, *op. cit.*, p. 144; the German military leadership thought the Italians had put forth their best effort in Albania. The Italians could continue to hold the Greeks but they could not hope to achieve a decisive victory. The problem to the German officers was whether to intervene in Albania with German troops or to wait for a spring attack on Greece via Bulgaria. See Simoni, *op. cit.*, p. 189.

expressed a desire for nothing more than a few transport planes and trucks. Von Rintelen, while passing on the Italian reports, advocated caution in studying the new Italian position. He thought that the Italians were apt to present a far more hopeful report than was warranted by the circumstances.¹¹

Hitler was of the same mind as General von Rintelen, and, in Directive 20 for the conduct of the war, issued on December 12, stated that the results of the battles in Albania were not yet clear. A serious solution could not, therefore, be considered until more facts were known. He emphasized the great danger posed by the new British island air bases to the Rumanian oil fields and the Italian mainland. The body of the new order dealt with the attack on Greece from Bulgaria, known under the code name, "Marita," which would relieve the Italians by a flank attack.¹²

By mid-December, 1940, the Italians had established a definite line in Albania. They had no respite notwithstanding their apparent success in Albania. In Africa the British broke through the Italian lines and pushed forward rapidly. On December 19, the Italian army asked that a German armored division immediately be sent to Tripoli. In addition, they sought equipment for ten divisions and large supplies of raw materials. While pleading for assistance in Africa, the Italians cited the improved situation in Albania as proof of their willingness to undertake a spring offensive.¹³

Despite the optimistic tone concerning Albania in the Italian request to Germany, the situation remained serious. On December 21, the Duce and Ciano met with the newly returned Italian military attaché in Berlin, General Efisio Marras. After a lengthy discussion General Marras concluded that (1) Hitler could not attack Greece before March; (2) it was useless to request German troops in Albania because of the difficulty in transferring them to the front in time; (3) the addition of two German armored divisions in Africa would strengthen the front there.¹⁴

In contrast to the conclusions of this conference and the confidence shown the Germans, the members of the Italian High Command had once more changed their minds. They now thought that the Albanian situation was serious. After further discussion, they ordered General Marras to see Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel, Chief of the German High Command, about possible reinforcements. Marras saw Keitel on December 28. The Italian began with the usual requests for war material. He followed with a special plea for Albania where, he pointed out, the Greeks seldom attacked with more than one or two battalions but the Italians could not stabilize the front. He thought that the commitment of a single mountain infantry regiment would strengthen the Italian situation. The chief advantage in such an operation was the bolstering effect it would have upon Italian.

¹¹*Greiner Papers.*

¹²United States, Office of the United States Chief of Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality. Official Documents. Document 1541PS.

¹³*Greiner Papers.*

¹⁴Ciano, *op. cit.*, p. 320.

morale and the counter reaction on that of the Greeks.¹⁵ The motion made by Marras was strongly seconded by General Alfredo Guzzoni, deputy chief of the Italian General Staff, on January 3, 1941, when he discussed the situation with General von Rintelen. General Guzzoni thought the proposal for a German regiment excellent and asked the Germans to put such a unit in readiness. He also informed von Rintelen that the Italians anticipated a strong Greek attack, either along the coast in the direction of Valona or in the Osum Valley towards Berat. The Italians believed they could contain this assault.

General von Rintelen's conference with Guzzoni was the first step in his inspection of the Albanian front. As he traveled along the front General von Rintelen concluded that a successful Italian offensive was impossible without the addition of more troops and equipment. He discovered the critical stage of Italian supply—there was only two days' supply of food and munitions in all Albania. The physical strength of the Italian troops was also poor. The terrain of the area was extremely rough and unfriendly, with mules being the only means of transport in many areas. Lateral communication along the front did not exist. General von Rintelen noted the lack of preparation for mountain warfare on the part of the Italians and the break-down of the entire transportation system. The port of Adia was congested and needed a complete reorganization. New divisions formed in Italy found the Albanian ports cluttered with the rear elements of divisions already at the front.

On January 10, the Greeks once more attacked. General von Rintelen barely escaped capture when the Greeks occupied Klisura. The Greek offensive could not break through the Italian front, however, despite the weakness of the Italians. The Greeks lacked the necessary reserves, supplies and ammunition to mount a major offensive. In addition, the weather was bitterly cold. General von Rintelen concluded, therefore, that the Italians could hold the front but could not attempt an aggressive operation.¹⁶ He filed his report as soon as he arrived in Italy. The OKW ordered him to report in person on January 14.

While General von Rintelen inspected the Albanian front, the German High Command also discussed the question of intervention. On January 9, at the Berghof, Hitler conferred with his top military commanders on the Albanian problem. The Führer explained that if German troops were to be committed to Albania they would have to be of sufficient strength to assist the planned operation, "Marita," by smashing Greek concentration west of Salonika. In all events the first consideration was the breakthrough of the front lines in Albania. This objective, according to Hitler,

¹⁵Greiner Papers; Schramm von Thadden, *op. cit.*, p. 155.

¹⁶Enno von Rintelen, *Mussolini als Bundesgenosse; Erinnerungen des deutschen Militärattachés in Rom, 1936-1943* (Tübingen, 1951), p. 121f. Schramm von Thadden, *op. cit.*, p. 156. The Greeks suffered from a lack of warm clothing, boots, vehicles and pack animals. In particular they were short of ammunition. I. S. O. Playfair, *The Mediterranean and the Middle East, Vol. I, The Early Successes Against Italy (to May, 1941)* (London, 1954), p. 334f.

would require a combined armed force consisting of German mounted troops and an Italian motorized unit, with appropriate armor and assault guns. Field Marshal Walter von Brauchitsch, Commander-in-Chief of the German Army, opined that such a force could be effective only if German influence could be brought to bear on the Italian command to coordinate the final assault. After further discussion Hitler decided to dispatch a reconnaissance staff to Albania before preparing a detailed plan. The inspection would supplement General von Rintelen's reconnaissance mission. At the same time Hitler ordered the preparation of two and one half divisions, including one mountain division, and parts of an armored division and a motorized infantry division. In the event the Duce approved the project, the Führer thought the troops would use the transport route from Brindisi to Durazzo and begin to attack some time before the "Marita" operation.¹⁷

Two days later the German High Command issued Directive 22 for the conduct of the war. Among other things the new order contained instructions for the possible relief expedition to Albania. German troops to the strength of one Corps, including the First Mountain Division and armored forces, were to be prepared for the Albanian venture. The transport would start as soon as Italy approved and the investigations of a reconnaissance staff were concluded. The task of this corps was the formation of a reserve to meet any new crisis in Albania. It would also assist the Italians in opening a new offensive to break through the Greek defensive front in a vital sector, to open the narrows west of Salonika from the rear, and to support the frontal assault of Field Marshal List's army from Bulgaria. The operation also received a covering title, "Operation Cyclamen."¹⁸

On January 13, the Italians agreed to the dispatch of a small reconnaissance unit to Albania. The German High Command ordered Colonel Ferdinand Jodl, Chief of Staff of the XLIX Mountain Corps, and a team of four officers to Albania for a four weeks inspection. Colonel Jodl had considerable experience in the peculiarities of mountain warfare and was highly qualified for the mission. His staff included experts on armored warfare and supply problems. The High Command ordered Colonel Jodl to investigate the possibilities of committing a Corps of two divisions with an armored regiment. Jodl was also to keep in mind the possibilities for using this force in an attack south of Florina. The group left for Albania the next day.¹⁹

On January 14, General von Rintelen reported to Berchtesgaden with the findings of his inspection. Rintelen summarized his findings, emphasizing the confused logistical state of affairs, the unsolved transportation problems, and the obvious inability of the Italians to control the situation. He presented a pessimistic view of the situation but justified his stand with

¹⁷United States, Navy Department, *Führer Conferences on Matters Dealing with the German Navy* (Washington, 1947), IV, 1-4. *Greiner Papers*.

¹⁸United States, Office of the United States Chief of Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality. Official Documents. Document 448 PS.

¹⁹Correspondence with General der Gebirgstruppen a.D. Ferdinand Jodl.

appropriate facts. Following Rintelen's report, Hitler made no comment but told him to attend the forthcoming meeting with the Italians. The conference, after lengthy delays by the Duce, had been arranged for January 19-20 at the Brenner Pass. Following his discussion with the Führer, Rintelen traveled on to Zossen where he conferred with General von Brauchitsch. The main discussion during this latter report centered around the logistics of the German troops—transport, billeting, supply, etc. The conferees finally agreed that logistical control should be exercised by General Staff Officers, initially assigned to von Rintelen's staff.²⁰

Rintelen's second report, emphasizing the transport problem, instituted an immediate order to the German navy. The High Command told the naval authorities to examine all phases of the transport situation. They were to study the possibilities of additional shipping, the practicality of sending simultaneous transports to Tripoli and Albania, and the question of which Albanian ports were most useful. The order emphasized the need for removing Italian confusion in the port areas before considering the transport of the German troops.²¹

Two days later, January 16, Hitler held another conference at the Berghof. The High Command's chief operations officer, General Friedrich Paulus, reported that the First Mountain Division would be ready as of January 20, while the Fourth Mountain Division would be prepared on February 10. He emphasized the transport problem throughout his talk. Durazzo had a capacity of three vessels at a time while the Valona area was too uncertain to be useful. Paulus pointed out that shipping a mountain division by sea might take more than six weeks!²²

With this in mind, Field Marshal Keitel conferred with General Guzzoni on January 18, in a preliminary discussion prior to the full scale conference scheduled to begin the next day. Guzzoni, changing again from his former position, thought the dispatch of a German unit was desirable but not necessary. In any event, the sending of a corps was out of the question in view of the inadequate transport facilities. The Italians would consider the commitment of a mountain division with light equipment. The decision, said Guzzoni, was not urgent. An Italian attack, unless strong Greek forces were moved to the Bulgarian border, was not possible before April. Guzzoni urged Keitel to withhold a final decision until March, although the Germans should continue the basic preparations. Keitel agreed with the Italian commander without serious reservations.²³

The full scale conference opened the next day with Hitler, Keitel, Rintelen, Colonel Schmundt, Hitler's personal adjutant, and Admiral Puttkamer representing Germany. On the Italian side were Mussolini,

²⁰Von Rintelen, *op. cit.*, p. 122.

²¹United States, Office of the United States Chief of Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality. Official Documents. Document C-132.

²²Franz Halder, "The Halder Diaries" (Copyright by the Infantry Journal Association, n.d.), V, 85f. (Mimeographed)

²³United States, Office of the United States Chief of Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality. Official Documents. Document C-134.

Ciano, Guzzoni, and Marras. The Italians took the position that the dispatch of German troops to Albania was desirable but no longer vital. Additionally, the Italians thought that the transport difficulties would prevent the movement of any force other than a lightly equipped mountain division. Mussolini, therefore, concluded that the German troops were not needed before April and suggested a further study and final decision in March. Hitler agreed to take the matter under advisement.

The following day the Führer declared that the transport difficulties were such that he could not authorize the shipment of German troops to Albania. In addition, Hitler thought it advisable to wait because German units behind the front would have a psychologically undesirable effect on the Italians who were engaged in heavy fighting. The commitment of German troops would also start the war in the southeast prematurely and warn the English about the forthcoming German assault.²⁴

The Führer's wishes reached the High Command that same day. Hitler's instructions postponed the final decision to commit German troops until March. Prior to that time the troops designated for the operation would remain on their regular assignments.²⁵

Two days later, on January 22, the High Command received Field Marshal Keitel's written report of the conference. The memorandum did not change the previous reports although it amplified certain aspects. According to Keitel, General Guzzoni had guaranteed that the Italians would hold the Albanian front. Keitel claimed that Guzzoni had gone on to discuss the Italian spring offensive which would move in the direction of Karca. The Italian intention was to roll up the northern sector of the Greek front and smash all Greek resistance. Keitel himself suggested a cautious approach and warned that the Germans could not count on Italian aid in the operation against Greece.²⁶

Early in February, Colonel Jodl's reconnaissance mission returned from Albania. The report supported the earlier study by General von Rintelen. After repeating most of von Rintelen's opinions, Colonel Jodl concluded that, even with German assistance, a decisive victory in Albania could not be expected. The report, combined with a noticeable stabilization of the general situation and a reorganized Italian defense, convinced the High Command that German troops were not needed in Albania. With the approval of the Italians the High Command then rescinded the orders for the transport of German troops and discontinued all preparations. The units designated for Albanian service were divided up for use in the Greek operation, "Marita," and as occupation troops in Norway.

The German stand with regard to the Italian position in Albania proved remarkably accurate. On March 9, the Italians, with the Duce present, launched a powerful offensive against the Greeks. Although the Italians

²⁴*Ibid.*, Document 2764-PS.

²⁵*Halder Diary*, V, 89.

²⁶*Greiner Papers*.

were numerically superior and better organized than previously, they had to abandon the assault after a few days.

The Italians were never able to launch a successful offensive against the Greeks. Throughout their Albanian venture the Italians were subjected to the most difficult type of fighting. The numerous defeats in Albania combined with those in Africa brought Italian morale to its lowest point. Italy, despite the successful German attack in Greece in April, 1941, never recovered its fighting morale, and became a hangweight for Germany throughout the remaining years of the war.

The Germans, after cancelling "Operation Cyclamen," went on to solve the Albanian difficulty through a flanking attack. Nevertheless, the time lost in the campaign brought disaster to German arms in the invasion of the Soviet Union. The decision not to implement the relief of Italian troops in Albania certainly was a valid one. The situation in that area was too confused and uncertain to justify the expenditure of time, men, and materials. Certainly the "on again off again" attitude expressed by both countries on this problem indicated the unhappy situation then existing in the so-called "Pact of Hell."

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THE CROATIAN MINORITY OF BURGENLAND*

by Thomas M. Barker

I

IN THE State Treaty which the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain and France concluded with Austria in May of 1955 reference is made and special guarantees are given to several ethnic minority groups.¹ Best known are the Slovenes of the Klagenfurt Basin in the southern border province of Carinthia, where about 22,000 people profess Slovene nationality.² The smallest group, numbering 3950, is made up of the Czech speaking inhabitants of Vienna. Next in size (11,176) are the Magyars, about 46% of whom live scattered in a number of concentrations throughout Austria's narrow, distended eastern border province of Burgenland. Largest in size (30,599) and likewise scattered from one end of Burgenland to the other are the Croats. It is to this last-named group that the present study is devoted.³

The territory which the Croats inhabit is the youngest political entity within Austria. Its traditional historical name is West Hungary, for until the disintegration of the Habsburg monarchy it was a part of the realm of St. Stephen. First settled by Germans (Bavarians) in Carolingian times, alternately under German and Hungarian control during the Middle Ages but permanently Hungarian by around 1650,⁴ it has long been regarded

*The author is greatly indebted to his father-in-law, Veterinärarzt Dr. Fritz Scheuhammer of Stegersbach, Burgenland, for the contribution of much source material. However, opinions on controversial matters are the author's own.

¹The author believes that the following definition of the often loosely applied word "minority" is generally acceptable: "We can only say that a national minority exists when a group of people within a state exhibits the conviction that it constitutes a nation or a part of a nation, which is distinct from the national body to which the majority of the population of that state belongs . . ." Inis Claude, *National Minorities* (Cambridge, Mass., 1955), p. 2. See also *Definition and Classification of Minorities*, United Nations Commission on Human Rights (Lake Success, 1950), especially p. 8f.

²*Österreichische Statistische Nachrichten*, November, 1952, p. 423. About 40,000 people admit to knowledge of the Slovene language in some form or degree (*Volkszählungsergebnisse der Gemeinden mit zweisprachigen Schulen 1890-1951*), "Beilage zur Kärntner Landes-Zeitung," Nr. 4 vom 29. Jänner, 1954.

³Conceivably one might also consider the remaining 18,010 refugees from the 1918-19 Hungarian Rebellion, not to mention escapees from Yugoslavia, but since these persons are not Austrian citizens and since many, particularly of the latter group, emigrated, they may be disregarded.

In all the provinces of Austria, out of a total population of 6,933,905 there are 23,835 Slovenes, 4875 Czechs and 33,972 Croats (*Österreichische Statistische Nachrichten*, loc. cit.). It should be noted that the figures are calculated on the subjective basis of *Umgangssprache* (language of intercourse) and not on the objective basis of family or native language. Thus they represent an awareness of ethnic distinctiveness (but not necessarily political nationalism). If the latter basis were used, the figures would be higher as shown by the example of Carinthia (footnote 2).

⁴Landesarchivar Professor J. K. Homma, "Das Burgenland im Rahmen der österreichischen Geschichte" in *Das Burgenlandbuch* (Vienna, 1950), pp. 21-24. In the latter part of the eighth century the Bavarians were in a constant state of turmoil because of their Avar neighbors in Noricum and Pannonia. After the final subjection of the Bavarians by the Franks in 788, Charlemagne commenced a series of campaigns against the Avars which resulted in their defeat (ca. 805) and rapid disappearance from the East Central

Germans as a first line of defense against incursions from the open plains to the East. Rechristened Burgenland in 1919, it was claimed by Germany at the Paris Peace Conference. The new designation, "Land of the castles," is a completely non-historical epithet. It is derived from the common last part of the names of the main towns claimed at Paris; that is, Sopron (Sopron), Pressburg (Bratislava), Wieselburg and Eisenburg.⁵

Austria today one occasionally hears the erroneous explanation that the province is named directly after the many impressive fortresses which actually are found lying within its boundaries.

By the Treaty of St.-Germain-en-Laye the Austrians were awarded all Burgenland except Bratislava which fell to the Czechs. However, the Austrians found that their former Magyar colleagues were reluctant to relinquish a territory which had been indisputably theirs for more than two and a half centuries. When the Austrians attempted to take possession, they met the armed resistance of specious irregulars and were repulsed (August, 1919). The Hungarians were particularly adamant about Sopron (33,000 inhabitants in 1910) in which they appear to have constituted a small majority. The other small Magyar settlements in West Hungary consisted largely of the descendants of the old Szeklers (i.e., border guards)⁶ and the administrative personnel of the magnates' estates and of the Hungarian government. They lived mixed among the predominant German population (250,000), the so-called Hienzen or Heinzen (in the south) and the Heidebauern or Heath Peasants (in the north), and among the Croats. The Sopron Hungarians, themselves mostly of nineteenth century origin (Magyarization policy), and the other tiny enclaves hardly provided a convincing basis of argument for Budapest's claims to retention of the whole area.

In order to break the deadlock the Allies, elsewhere occupied, allowed the Italians to intervene. The latter, who were inclined to support Hungary as a counterweight to the new Slavic states, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, could discern in Austro-Hungarian discord a possible strengthening of the Slavic nations. In fact, the Czechs had already offered their services as mediators to the Austrian Chancellor, Schober. But even more serious in the minds of the Italian diplomats must have been the reflection that the

European scene. The Pannonian section of the new *Ostmark*, which reached to the Raab and thus included all of present-day Burgenland, was not actually settled until the middle of the ninth century and then only lightly. Interrupted by the Magyar invasions of the tenth century, German colonization did not begin in earnest until the eleventh century and the advent of Allemanic and Frankish elements, partially brought in by the Hungarian kings themselves. On these topics see Ignaz Zibermayr, *Noricum, Baiern und Österreich: Lorch als Hauptstadt und die Einführung des Christentums*, 2nd ed. (Horn, Lower Austria, 1956), Part III, Chapters 2 to 6, inclusive.

⁵Walter Goldinger, "Der geschichtliche Ablauf der Ereignisse in Österreich von 1918-1945" in *Geschichte der Republik Österreich*, Heinrich Benedikt, ed. (Vienna, 1954), p. 82. For bibliography on Burgenland see also G. F. Litschauer, *Bibliographie zur Geschichte, Landes- und Volkskunde des Burgenlandes 1800-1929* (Linz, 1933).

⁶Schulrat Joseph Karner, "Bezirk Oberwart" in *Das Burgenlandbuch*, p. 143f. There are also some small concentrations of Jews (Eisenstadt) and gypsies, but both groups were terribly decimated during the Hitler period.

Czech *pater patriae* Masaryk had advocated since 1915 the establishment of a corridor which would run from north to south through Burgenland and which would link up the West and the South Slavs. The Czech delegation at Paris had actually made such a proposal.⁷ The basis for this suggestion was the Croatian population of Burgenland.

At a conference held in Venice in October 1921, the Austrians and the Hungarians accepted the compromise settlement of a plebiscite for Sopron and its immediate vicinity. Held under somewhat dubious circumstances in December 1921, the plebiscite resulted in a Hungarian victory.⁸ As a glance at the map of Austrian provincial divisions will indicate, Burgenland was thus deprived of its natural center and capital, with only a narrow strip in between. On one side of the strip was the salient of Sopron and on the other the Rosaliengebirge, the last important extension of the Styrian Alps. In the strip was but one very poor road and no railway.

Superficially, Burgenland would seem to have many assets: its agricultural wealth, its industrious population (239,000 today), the proximity of the Viennese market and mineral baths and deposits. One should also mention the prosperous wine industry along the shores of the Neusiedlersee, the scenic attractions of the curious lake (including its abundant, exotic wildlife) and, of course, the castles, many of which are well-preserved. Despite these advantages Burgenland has remained relatively undeveloped, the poorest as well as the youngest Austrian province. Economists still classify it as a "deficit area."⁹ There has, however, been some improvement since 1945, especially with respect to the highway network and tourism.


During the Third Reich Burgenland was divided between the *Gau* of Styria and the *Gau* of Lower Danubia (Lower Austria). The scene of heavy fighting and of considerable destruction in the spring of 1945, it entered upon the international scene again in 1947 in connection with Yugoslavia's claim to the Klagenfurt Basin. In their *Memorandum*, prepared for the spring 1947 Foreign Ministers' Meeting, the Yugoslavs charged that the Croats, allegedly 50,000 in number, had been subject to discrimination and deliberate denationalization during the First Austrian Republic, particularly through governmental administrative policy and through the schools; they further maintained that the Croats were the victims of outright persecution during the Nazi régime. Tito's representatives therefore demanded exchange of populations or at least a special minority statute. The great powers failed to approve the Yugoslav demands in the cases both of Carinthia and Burgenland (although the Russians did lend their support as long, apparently, as it could be fitted in with their overall European

⁷Sarah Wambaugh, *Plebiscites After the War*, 2 vols. (New York, 1933), I, 279; Golinger, *loc. cit.*, p. 92.

⁸Thorough discussion in Wambaugh, *op. cit.*, pp. 280-297.

⁹*Austrian Information*, November 9, 1957, p. 6.

¹⁰*Memorandum of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia Concerning the Slovene Carinthia, Southern Styria and the Croats of Burgenland*, place of publication not listed (Ljubljana?), 1946, Annex (no page numbering).



policy). The sole recognition accorded the Yugoslav position was one article regarding minority rights in the final version of the Treaty.¹¹

II

For the reader of any general work on Austria¹² who chances to come across references to the Croatian minority certain questions may arise. One may wonder precisely how the Croats happened to settle in the area in the beginning and how they have gotten on with their German neighbors. One may also wonder about their own sentiments and whether it is correct to consider them a minority in the accepted sense.¹³ Perhaps these questions can be answered best—and the answers illustrated most vividly—by studying in detail one of the many splotches of Burgenland Croats that may be found on an ethnographic map of the area.¹⁴ The author has chosen the *Marktgemeinde* of Stegersbach and its general vicinity, located in the *Bezirk* (County) of Güssing in the southern extremity of Burgenland.¹⁵

Stegersbach appears to have been founded in the Carolingian period, at which time it was probably an amalgam of Bavarians, early Slavs and the remnants of the old, Romanized Illyro-Celtic population. It was located on territory from which the Avars had just been expelled. It is not known whether the Carolingian Germans survived the Magyar invasion of the tenth century, but it is certain that it was solidly settled with Germans in the twelfth century.¹⁶ The name first appears in 1289 as "Stegraifepach" in connection with Duke Albrecht (Emperor Albert I) of Habsburg's famous feud with the Count of Güssing, and it means "Stirrup Brook" ("Stegraif" from "Steg" or "thong" and "Raif" or "hoop," obsolescent today.)¹⁷ It is a translation of the old Slavic "strem," the name still used for the brook

¹¹For an account of the negotiations see the gossipy memoirs of Karl Gruber, former Austrian foreign minister and later ambassador to the U. S., *Zwischen Befreiung und Freiheit* (Vienna, 1953).

¹²For example, Gordon Shepherd, *Austrian Odyssey* (London, 1957). This work contains an incisive discussion of the Austrian split personality and of the recent development of an independent national consciousness.


¹³See footnote 1.

¹⁴The Annex of the previously cited (footnote 10) *Memorandum* of the Yugoslav Government contains such a map, but it greatly exaggerates the extent of the Croatian population. A map based on the 1934 census may be found in *Das Joanneum: Beiträge zur Naturkunde, Geschichte, Kunst und Wirtschaft des Alpenraumes* (Graz, 1940), pp. 47-58. Since this map was constructed from statistics of nationality confession, it of course does not present an accurate linguistic picture. The notes accompanying the map give a full bibliography of ethnographic cartography of the region, of which the earliest listing is the famous 1855 work of Baron von Czörnig.

¹⁵*Marktgemeinde* ("Market Community") is an official ranking; the *Bezirk* corresponds to the German *Kreis*. There are five *Bezirke* in Burgenland, including the *Verwaltungsbezirk* of Eisenstadt, provincial capital and burial place of Haydn. The author has chosen Güssing and Stegersbach because of family connections and personal residence there.

¹⁶J. K. Homma, "Zur Geschichte von Stegersbach" in *Die Hauptschule in Stegersbach: Festschrift zur Eröffnung und Einweihung des Neubaus* (Stegersbach, 1954), p. 35.

¹⁷*Monumenta Germaniae Historica*, Pertz, ed., Vol. IX, 117 p. 23ff. Johann Adelring, *Grammatisch-Kritisches Wörterbuch der hochdeutschen Mundart*, revised by F. H. Schönbeger, Part IV (Vienna, 1808), p. 324. For the Güssing Feud see Heinrich Kunnert and Alfred Wahlhelm, "Die Güssinger Fehde," *Burgenländische Heimatblätter*, II, No. 3 & 4, 1933, 177-188.



which runs through Stegersbach and which also divides much of southern Burgenland.¹⁸ Thus it is possible to conclude that here on the easternmost limit of the Medieval Reich there was originally a special concentration of mounted soldiers on border patrol.¹⁹

Except for their subservience to Magyar lords, the Germans of Stegersbach and the surrounding area had the land for themselves in the Late Middle Ages. But by the first quarter of the sixteenth century the depredations of the Ottoman Turks were becoming serious in West Hungary. Many settlements lay partially or wholly deserted, and others required further exploitation and development. To the south and southwest in Slavonia and in the Croatian littoral region the situation was even worse since the inhabitants were closer to the Turks or actually under Turkish domination. As the Hungarian magnates desired to strengthen their domains, the advent of refugees from the more endangered regions could only be regarded as a fortunate coincidence. Indeed, in many cases the magnates themselves were property holders in the Croatian motherland and actively encouraged their own subjects to emigrate. Eventually an estimated 100,000 persons moved to the northeast, some settling in Lower Austria and Slovakia but most in West Hungary.²⁰

On May 1, 1558, Ferenc Batthány, first of his family as burgrave of Güssing, concluded an agreement with twenty Croatian family patriarchs who had fled from Slavonia with wives, children and, presumably, other kin. Since Batthány and other magnates settled further groups of Croatians on their lands, similar agreements were probably included in other cases, including that of Stegersbach. The contract reads as follows:

Franz de Bathyan, Councillor of His Holy Majesty,

By means of this letter We announce to all concerned that in the bygone year 1544 on the feast of St. George the Martyr [April 23] some Slavs [20 names specified here] appeared before Us and announced that they could no longer dwell or stay in Slavonia because of the continual, devastating incursions of the enemies of the Christian name, the Turks, by whom they had been persecuted almost without cease and [by whom they had also been] placed under almost hourly danger of death and of gruesome captivity, but that they were forced to betake themselves, their wives and their children to a safer place. We wish to take them upon

¹⁸Homma, *loc. cit.*, p. 35.

¹⁹It is also possible that Stegersbach was a robbers' nest since the archaic phrase "vom Stegraiß wahren" ("to live from the stirrup") could imply that. Johann Heyse, *Handwörterbuch der deutschen Sprache* (Magdeburg, 1849), p. 1056. Cf. Homma, *loc. cit.*, p. 39, footnote 5.

²⁰Domherr Adolf Mohl, "Die burgenländischen Kroaten," *Burgenländische Heimatblätter*, II, No. 3 & 4, 1933, 189f.; Rudolf A. Hrandek, "Grundsätzliches zur kroatischen Besiedlung des Burgenlandes," *Burgenländische Heimatblätter*, XI, No. 4, pp. 164-169. See also J. Breu, *Die Kroatensiedlung im südostdeutschen Grenzraum*, doctoral dissertation (University of Vienna, 1937); Ivan Dobrovich, *Iz stare domovine u nepoznatu novu* (Vienna, 1947); . . . , *Naši Hrvati u dobi reformacije*; J. K. Homma, *Zur Herrschaftsgeschichte des südlichen Burgenlandes* (Horn-Vienna, 1947); P. Jandrisevits, *Urkunden und Dokumente über das südliche Burgenland*, MS, Provincial Archives, Eisenstadt; Adolf Mohl, *Horvátok bevándorlása 1533-ban* (Budapest, 1915); and Mate Ujević, *Gradišćanske Hrvati* (Vienna, 1935).

Our properties of this Our castle of Güssing and to assure them a suitable place of settlement. Since We proposed [in any case] to further Our properties and to provide them with ever more people, after mature consideration We assigned and gave to those Slavs for settlement a desolate, scrubby and wooded place near the Church of the Holy Confessor and Bishop Nicholas here below Our above-named castle of Güssing and granted them in writing a liberty of twelve years' duration, beginning on the Feast of St. George the Martyr in the year 1557. Those Slavs came again to Us and submitted to Us that, because of the few cultivated fields, as with Our other peasants in Our other properties and belongings of this castle, they could not pay the ordinary and extraordinary rent and the income due to Us by virtue of Our castle, and thus they implored Us to conclude with them a contract concerning services to be rendered, which contract should last forever. Since We lent an ear to their appeal and took note of their industry, which they had manifested in the clearing of the scrubby and wooded place as well as in the construction of their homes, and since they wish to remain further on Our properties, We concluded with those Slavs a perpetual contract, according to which they are released and freed from all ordinary and extraordinary duties, taxes and incomes due to Us and Our castle and from all other payments, under the condition that, as often as they are called by Our people and officials, they will be inclined to perform manual works for Us and will come for this work wherever the need requires and will perform it as these peasants, called the Padvarczok, were accustomed to do for their lord in Slavonia; and if two find themselves on the same section [of land], then one of them must come for Our work in the one day and the other in the next day, and when the men are working for us, the women can stay at home and care for their own weal. If the women are called to work any whatever, the men can stay at home; if, however, an obviously pressing emergency arises, either in the fishpond or in the castle or anywhere else, all without distinction, men as well as women, are to appear to give help whether they are called or not and to carry out without refusal the tasks commanded of them.

At ploughing and harvest time Our work can be restricted in order that they may pursue their own interests.

This contract which is binding for them as well as for all others who may settle around the above-named Church of St. Nicholas and who desire to become Our peasants We shall observe and have observed according to the liberty granted them. Therefore, We order you, prefects, castellans, administrators and all other officials settled in Our castle, by power of these lines, to have this contract observed in all its points by the above-named Slavs and those still to come and not to burden them further.

Given in Our so-named castle of Güssing on May 1 in the Year of Our Lord 1558.

Signature

Original Batthány seal²¹.

²¹Fr. Gratian Leser, "St. Nikolaus," *Güssinger Zeitung*, No. 220 (1928), p. 1f. The term "Padvarczak" ("Padvaršaki") could conceivably stem from "pad" ("slope" or "water-l") and "varoš" ("town").

Thus the first Croatian settlement in the region of Güssing took place in 1545. The village of St. Nicholas, though now Germanized, still exists located about one kilometer below the castle. The latter, veteran of many sieges, is perched on a small hill in the middle of relatively level land Güssing, the largest town and the capital of the *Bezirk*, lies snugly at its base.

As for Stegersbach, which is located about twenty kilometers to the northwest, only five years passed before it, too, got its complement of Croatian immigrants. In Croatian the town's name became Santalek, a designation which seems to have derived from the Hungarian form, Szent Elek, i.e., St. Alexius. (The latter first appeared documentarily in 1428.) The newcomers belonged to the *čakavština* or *ča* dialect grouping of Serbo-Croatian and seem to have lived previously in the Lika-Krbava region.²² Thus, they formed a contrast to the Croats of St. Nicholas who spoke *štokavština* and who had come from Slavonia. The family names of Stegersbach are also common in Split and Šibenik, and hence the German inhabitants regarded their Slavic neighbors as *Wasserkroaten*.²³

Like other refugees the new arrivals seem to have been granted a twelve

²²Lika-Krbava is a basin with a centripetal river system located behind the Velebit Mountains of northernmost Dalmatia; it is located about 20 miles inland. Its inhabitants no longer speak *čakavština*. Regarding the question of the refugee dialects in general it is perhaps best to quote from an authoritative work: "Since the sixteenth century settlement of the Croats in Lower Austria, West Hungary, Slovakia and Moravia proceeded from many parts of present-day Yugoslavia, we have to do with a mixture of various dialects, especially in Burgenland where Croatian linguistic islands have been preserved best. The old homeland is reflected in miniature in the Burgenland Croatian language. The Croats of southern Burgenland speak *štokavština*, and the Croats of central and northern Burgenland speak *čakavština*. Since no connection existed with the homeland, the *čakavština* became the 'written language'. The orthographic reform, which began in the south with Gaj ca. 1835, and which replaced the Hungarian forms *s*, *zs*, *cs*, *ch* and *sz* with the Czech *š*, *ž*, *č*, *ć* and *s*, commenced only hesitatingly in Burgenland after 1870 because there was fear of being disloyal to the Hungarian motherland."

"Of the three types of *štokavština* only two, in a very colorful mixture to be sure, are still in use among the people today; namely, the southern type or *ijekavština* and the western type or *ikavština*. This is a strong indication that the old settlers came exclusively from Croatia, for the eastern type or *ekavština* is used today, as previously, only by the Serbs. It remained for the so-called Burgenland Croatian written language to introduce and to use the eastern type, although none of the people speaks it. Alongside of definitely *ikavština* words such as *mliko*, *svit*, *dite*, *lipo*, the Burgenland Croatian uses original *ijekavština* forms such as *bijelo*, *cijelo*, *tijelo*, *pjesma* and *svijet*. From these words used by the people of central and northern Burgenland, i.e., the *ča* speakers, the written language creates the *ekavština* forms *belo*, *celo*, *telo*, *pesma* and *svet*, although nobody pronounces them that way." *Allgemeine Landestopographie des Burgenlandes* (Eisenstadt, 1954), p. 126f. The same source also notes the presence of Romance words among the *ča*-speakers, stemming from the Italian influence in Dalmatia, as well as the total absence of Turkish derivatives. Moreover, *kajavština* is spoken today nowhere except in several villages near Köszeg (Güns), Hungary. One must also take into account the fact that Burgenland Croatian has been submitted to the influence of Magyar, German and of an independent existence. (*Idem.*) The fact that Burgenland Croatian is not really a unified tongue and that its speakers cannot always understand each other has led opponents of the Croatian nationalist movement of the province to ridicule it. Such an approach naturally ignores the fact that the Burgenland Croats have not had the benefit of a linguistically unified and long established school system and also that individuals from disparate areas of the German-speaking world would fare no better in a meeting had they not been thoroughly trained in *Hochdeutsch*.

²³According to the author's father-in-law.

year immunity from feudal dues. One part of the group was assigned a piece of land at the eastern end of the village. The latter was known as "der Schoada" (from "Schotter," "little stone"), a name which it still bears. For cultivation the Croats received a strip of countryside running as far as the next hamlet, six kilometers northeast of Stagersbach. The names of every single parcel of this strip are still Croatian today. E.g., "Cilina" ("cjelina," "grassy spot"), "Kustyara" (kapušnjarak" or "kapušnjak," "cabbage patch"), "Dobrovica" ("dobra ovica," "good little ditch"), "Naprik" ("other side" from "naprijed," "beyond") and "Zerovaz" "se rovač," "it's being chewed up," i.e., by moles).²⁴

The other portion of the settlers was given a plot on the western side of the town which came to be called the "Fabitschgraben" because of the many persons of the Fabić clan who populated it. From the field nomenclature of "Riblak" ("ribljak," "fishpond"), "Boya" ("bodlja," "thorny bush") and "Lipelberg" (lipa, "linden tree") it may be assumed that the first Croats encountered a dammed-up brook, briers and a linden wood.²⁵ This side of the town also contains the parish church which already at that time or soon thereafter was Calvinist. Although the Croats were converted, it cannot be said that Stagersbach was either typical or atypical, for present knowledge does not permit one to draw final conclusions as to the religious allegiance of the immigrants and their immediate descendants.²⁶

The large influx of Croats made a minority of the German inhabitants and resulted in considerable difficulties for the municipal administration. The solution was somewhat drastic but proved to be quite workable: the town was simply split into two communities (*Gemeinden*), one German and one Croatian. Each chose a judge (*Richter*) who was in reality a sort of burgomaster. In the year 1650, for example, the judges were Thomas Rath and Michael Wensits. For financial purposes the division was one third of receipts and payments to be accredited or debited to the Germans and two thirds to the Croats. It is not illogical to assume that this division reflected the actual size of each group.²⁷

The judges were also charged with the keeping of a property register (*Urbarium*). One of these, from 1790, is quite instructive. In that year the inhabitants of German Stagersbach owned 27 horses while those of Croatian Stagersbach owned 113. The explanation for the disproportionately large number of Croatian-owned animals is that the Slavic inhabitants required a big livery for their long-distance hauling business. Some draymen

²⁴The Croatian form in parentheses is taken from a standard, modern dictionary, Milan Drvodelić, *Hrvatsko-Engleski Rječnik* (Zagreb, 1953).

²⁵For the Protestant point of view see Bernhard Hans Zimmermann, *Reformation und Gegenreformation bei den Kroaten im österreichisch-ungarischen Grenzraum*, Heft 8 in series "Burgenländische Forschungen" (Eisenstadt, 1950). For the Catholic point of view, see Josef Rittsteuer, "Über die konfessionelle Zugehörigkeit unserer Kroaten zur Zeit der Reformation und Gegenreformation," *Burgenländische Heimatblätter*, XV, No. 1 (1953), pp. 19-32. See also Dobrovich, *op. cit.*

²⁶Fr. Gratian Leser, "Stegersbach," *Güssinger Zeitung*, No. 305 (1930), p. 2.

²⁷*Ibid.*, No. 302, p. 2.

went as far as Rijeka (Fiume), Trieste and Venice and stayed away from home for months.²⁸

The nineteenth century, particularly the latter half, seems to have marked a turning point in the ethnic distinctiveness of the two fragments of the population. The twin administration was discarded in 1860, and Croatian school instruction was dropped in the 1890s.²⁹ Inter-marriage had apparently begun at an early date; from the church records it can be determined that even in the late seventeenth century the ethnic line was crossed frequently. Today pure German families can be found only in the more remote hills around Stegersbach.³⁰

Complete census records for the period 1850-1900 are not available to the author. The Hungarian government was not known for meticulous accuracy in this regard. However, one list from 1900 registered a population of 2977, of which ten per cent admitted to Croatian nationality; by this time there was a handful of Magyars too.³¹ To use these figures as an accurate index of linguistic Germanization would be a major error since the principle, supposedly, was not the mother tongue but the individual's own, free decision as to nationality. On the other hand, they may be regarded as a rough approximation of the extent of Croatian absorption into the German cultural sphere.

This latter assumption can be justified on the basis of the more recent situation for which the facts can be checked and verified. In the 1920s the parish priests still preached alternately in German and Croatian. But by the 1930s bilingual services were no longer necessary. Since the Catholic clergy in Burgenland contains a disproportionately large number of priests of Croatian origin and since the Church is generally known to stress instruction in the mother tongue, this fact may be assumed to reflect actual conditions. As for official figures, the census of 1934 listed 326 non-Germans, and the latest census lists but 36, of whom ten are Magyars. The population of the town itself decreased by 655 from 1900.³² On the basis of actual language used there are no more than a hundred people, all elderly, who may really be classified as Croatian.

The psychology of the local population in ethnic matters is another aspect of the problem that merits examination. No virulent or overt anti-Croatian sentiment exists, but there does seem to be a feeling that Croatian nationality is less worthy and less desirable. To say to somebody "Du Krowott!" is definitely uncomplimentary.

Several examples of a rather subjective nature may be cited to illustrate the attitude of the Croats themselves. One comes from the earliest days of the *Anschluss* and bears witness to the almost frantic desire to be identi-

²⁸*Ibid.*, No. 303, p. 2.

²⁹According to an old resident of Stegersbach, *Sparkassendirektor i. R.* Franz Grabner.

³⁰The writer possesses a number of genealogical charts from Stegersbach which clearly indicate the degree of intermarriage.

³¹According to Grabner.

³²*Das Joanneum* . . . p. 52; *Volkszählungsergebnisse 1951*, Heft 3, "Ergebnisse der Volkszählung vom 1. 6. 1951 nach Gemeinden. Burgenland" (Vienna, 1952).

ed with the majority. Just prior to the German occupation non-assimilated Croats from the neighboring town of Stinatz (Stinjaki)³³ demonstrated vigorously in favor of Schuschnigg's pro-Austria plebiscite. But after March 8, upon the announcement of the result of the Hitler plebiscite, the same individuals hastened to burn the unfortunate Chancellor in effigy and to dance a joyous ring-around-the-rosy.³⁴ Although it is true that the rush to catch the bandwagon of the Third Reich was a common Austrian phenomenon in the *Märztag* of 1938, this incident appears especially flagrant. The second example is that of an acquaintance of the writer, a young, ambitious Croatian woman, born in a village in northern Burgenland where her father was master of the Croatian primary school. While it was quite evident from her precise, flawless pronunciation that German was not her mother tongue, she was most reluctant, in fact indignant, to be considered a Croatian. The case is worthy of note because it portrays an outlook that, to the writer, seems to be particularly characteristic of the younger generation.

Further personal experience of both condenscension by others and Croatian self-disparagement might be cited. Candid, objective local inhabitants will also admit confidentially the existence of such sentiment. Understandably, nothing is ever conceded in public or officially. Rather when the foreigner happens to mention the subject of the minority to anyone in an official position or when the topic must be discussed for public consumption in some publication, very emphatic assurance is given that there is no anti-Croatian feeling at all. Insofar as there is no discrimination, the statement is correct. Moreover, as the history of Stegersbach demonstrates, marriage across ethnic lines is not uncommon. Thus it is clear that prejudice is merely incipient; it is by no means comparable to that found in countries in which the racial-color factor is present. If one were to attempt to delimit its extent, the most accurate description would be to say that the image in people's minds is one of a lack of progressiveness. For the German or would-be German, "Krowottisch" seems to connote muddy, unpaved streets, personal uncleanness and body odor, inbreeding and a high incidence of tuberculosis. It is also claimed that the Croats are especially erotic, and the high rate of illegitimate offspring among them—actually a common phenomenon among many European peasant groups—is cited to support the allegation. Related to these beliefs is the fact that the Croats themselves apparently associate Germanization with an improvement in economic status and social prestige, i.e., the idea that a full command of German will enable a person to "get ahead in the world."

Unfortunately, under such circumstances the very attractive aspects of the Croats are sometimes ignored or overlooked: their industry, their hospitality, their linguistic talent, their own rich mother tongue, their brilliant festive dress as well as many charming customs and usages.³⁵

The ultimate cause of this low esteem appears to be the mere existence

³³See page 44.

³⁴Recollections of the author's wife who spent her childhood in Stegersbach.

of an agrarian, Slavic society, tiny numerically, in the midst of a modern technical, urban-influenced German society, numerically large.

Yet one may also ask whether there are not any other more immediate causes for the shunning of Croatian ethnic character. Persons acquainted with the history of other minorities in old Austria-Hungary will certainly wonder to what extent the Croats were affected or influenced in the latter part of the nineteenth century by the propaganda of German nationalist organizations. Is there, for example, any evidence of activity by the *deutsche Schulverein* or by the *Südmark* as in the cases of Carniola, Lower Styria and Carinthia? In considering such a possibility one must recall that West Hungary was subject to unchecked Magyar administration after 1868 and that there was a systematic attempt to Magyarize the population. Therefore it is only reasonable to assume that German nationalist activity would probably have concentrated upon the defense of German interests in Sopron. The author has found, in fact, no evidence of widespread German propaganda activity among the Croats.³⁵

Another question is whether Stegersbach represents the exact pattern of assimilation for all of the province. The answer is that it is an example of one of four types, whose principle distinguishing mark is variation in the rate of assimilation. Stegersbach is a larger population center. It has never been purely Croatian, contrary to the Yugoslav maps. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries it has lain upon a main artery of highway traffic. It has been particularly subject to the influence of German society, technology and culture.³⁷ Thus it has experienced a fairly rapid rate of assimilation.

A second pattern is found in the isolated, pure Croatian village. A prime example is the aforementioned Stinatz or Stinjaki. Like the Stegersbach Croats the Stinatzers speak *Čakavština* and seem to have come from Dalmatia, perhaps from the town of Stinograd. Because of the existence of the *slava de zadruga*, or the custom of the clan patron saint instead of the Latin *patrocinium*, and because of the prevalence of the *Kolo* dance, some of them may once have been *Pravo* Slavs. Settled by the Batthány of Güssing under conditions similar to those of St. Nicholas, they specialized not only in farming but also—because of the poverty of the local soil—in handicrafts, cattle-dealing and part-time harvest and road work. In the twentieth century many Stinatzers emigrated to the United States. (Emigration was typical of Burgenland as a whole and is one of the causes of depopulation).

Stinatz lies about ten kilometers from Stegersbach on an unpaved and almost impassable side road. It lacks even the almost ubiquitous—for Austria—post autobus service. Its appearance is strikingly different from

³⁵See Hrandek, *op. cit.*, footnote 38.

³⁶See page 54.

³⁷The Croatian population of Stegersbach over the past half century has also sent about 700 of its sons to work for the Telegraphic Service of the Austrian Postal System. This type of work, with its extensive travel and marriages outside the town resulting therefrom, has probably helped to hasten Germanization (according to Johann Jusits of Stegersbach, *Telephoninspektor i. R.*). Another influencing factor was most certainly the long service of Croatian men in the *Wehrmacht* and of the women in the *Arbeitsdienst* (Author's father-in-law).

the latter town. Although a *Strassendorf* and thus not atypical of Burgenland (Stegersbach is a *Längsdreiecksangerdorf*, i.e., "village along a triangular meadow"), Stinatz is devoid of shop signs and advertisements. There are a few Croatian topographical inscriptions, not a common sight for the province. The tombstones in the graveyard are inscribed in Croatian. Only Croatian is heard in the streets although the stranger will be addressed in German by almost everyone. With 1204 inhabitants the place is by its own voluntary confession overwhelmingly Croatian, for in 1951 it claimed only 109 Germans.³⁸ Quite clearly, then, the rate of assimilation is relatively slow.

Finally, there are two somewhat intermediary patterns of Germanization. They are the pure Croatian settlement that is located on a major traffic artery and the remote but ethnically mixed settlement. Both are marked by a moderate rate of assimilation.

In order to illustrate the existence of all four patterns and to provide further examples one may construct a comparative table based on statistics from the last two censuses and on information as to terrain, roads and original settlement conditions (*Bezirk Güssing*):

COMMUNITY	Elevation in meters		Ger- man	Croat	Topography, Highway Location and Type of Original Settlement
Eisenhüttl	246	1951	178	67	Valley; on alternate, secondary route
Jezerje (ih Jezerjani)		1934	110	226	Stegb.-Güssing; pure Croatian resettlement
groß-Mürbisch	257	1951	473	35	Valley; near (8 km. to SE) Güssing;
Veliki Medvoš)		1934	302	242	pure Croatian settlement.
Güssing	225	1951	2700	4	In relatively broad valley; seat of
Novi Grad)		1934	2058	4	Batthány; road junction; Ger. settlement
Güttenbach	260	1951	70	986	Remote, hilly, forested; dirt road
Pinkovac)		1934	34	978	pure Croatian settlement.
Hackerberg	350	1951	355	109	Remote, hilly; dirt road; two parts: old
Stinjački Vrh)		1934	272	216	German village + Stinatz extension.
Hasendorf	250	1951	107	----	Valley; near (3 km. to NW) Güssing;
Zajče Selo)		1934	89	28	pure Croatian settlement
Heugraben	250	1951	77	280	Valley; on alternate, secondary route
Žarnovica)		1934	10	411	Stegb.-Güssing; pure Croatian resettlement
Kroatisch-Ehrendorf	300	1951	137	----	Remote, hilly; dirt road; but located
Hrvatski Hašaš)		1934	58	90	next to Deutsch-Ehrendorf.
Kroatisch-Tschantsch-	270	1951	141	----	Valley; on main route Stegb.-Güssing
endorf (Hrvatska Čenča)		1934	10	175	located next to Deutsch-Tschantschendorf.
Neuberg	330	1951	517	636	Remote, hilly; dirt road; originally Ger.
Nova Gora)		1934	326	885	but extensive Croatian repopulation.
Punitz	263	1951	446	10	Remote, hilly, forested; pure Croatian;
Punice)		1934	537	7	poor soil, outside work, emigration U. S.
Rehgraben	250	1951	335	----	Valley; on alternate, secondary route
Prasčevo)		1934	279	117	Stegb.-Güssing; pure Croatian settlement.
Reinersdorf	236	1951	306	153	Remote valley; new road; mixed settle-
Žamar)		1934	156	340	ment (next to Deutsch-Reinersdorf)

³⁸Rudolf Hrandek, "Volkskundliches aus Stinatz, einer kroatischen Ortschaft im Burgenland," *Österreichische Zeitschrift für Volkskunde*, Neue Serie, Vol. I, 1947, 101-115, *assim*; also according to the former pastor, Fr. Jandrisevits. It should be noted that the Croats of Dalmatia held tenaciously to the Glagolitic alphabet and the Old Slavic liturgy although they confessed allegiance to Rome. The Stinatzers used to be known locally for their tradition of marrying only within the village, but in recent years this custom has begun to disappear.

Stegersbach (Santalek)	260	1951	2322	36	See text.
		1934	2180	326	
Steinfurt (Lipovac)	244	1951	156	—	Remote, forested; poor road; presumal
		1934	179	1	mixed settlement.
Steingraben (Bojane)	260	1951	236	5	Valley; 2 km. from Güssing; Croatian
		1934	258	—	settlement Ger. village; few Germans.
Stinatz (Stinjaki)	344	1951	109	1095	See text.
		1934	56	1176	
Sulz (šeškut)	230	1951	411	—	Valley; 2 km. from Güssing; Croatian
		1934	416	7	resettlement among a few Germans.
Tudersdorf (Tudorica)	280	1951	75	—	Valley; 1 km. from Kroatisch-Tschantsch
		1934	95	1	endorf; emigration to U. S.

TOTALS: in 1934 there were 5527 Croats (not including Magyars) out of a *Bezi* population of 27,280; in 1951 3380 out of 31,312.³⁹

The principle of assimilation seems fairly simple. Original settlement among Germans and/or exposure to traffic has meant absorption, after little more than a century, of the conditions of modern life, whereas isolation has meant a greater retention of ethnic distinctiveness, the degree depending upon mixed or unmixed settlement. The more isolated a town is and the less the amount of direct contact with Germans, the longer it will endure. But it may be assumed that soon even the most remote localities will be touched much more closely by the life of the twentieth century and that they, the last strongpoints with fissures already discernible in their walls, will then also fall.

III

That the assimilation of the Croats could have been (or still could be) prevented or delayed by means of a systematic cultivation of the Croatian language is conceivable. That this has not happened does not necessarily constitute grounds for recrimination, to be sure. On the other hand an understanding of the assimilative process is not complete without an examination of government policy under both past and present régimes.

When Burgenland came within the legal competence of the Austrian Republic in 1921, all provisions of Austrian constitutional law, including those that concern ethnic minorities, became effective. Since Austrian constitutional law incorporates much of the legislation of the old monarchy, the basic principle applicable to the Croats and others is the famous Article 19 of the Basic State Law Concerning the General Rights of Citizens of December 21, 1867, renamed Article 149 in the *Bundesverfassungsgesetz* of 1920. According to this article all ethnic groups are assured "equal rights and the inviolable right" to preserve and further their own nationality and language, and the "equality of all the languages currently used in the

³⁹The table is based on *Ortverzeichnis des Burgenlandes* (Eisenstadt, 1947); *Verzeichnis der burgenländischen Ortsnamen nebst ihrer Bezeichnungen in magyarischer und kroatischer Sprache* (Eisenstadt, 1954); *Volkszählungsergebnisse 1951*, Heft 3, "Ergebnisse der Volkszählung vom 1. 6. 1951 nach Gemeinden, Burgenland" (Vienna, 1952); *Provisorische Ausgabe der Österreichischen Karte*, No. 167, "Güssing" (Vienna, 1946); and local information. Note: Croatian figures include 10 Magyars in Stegersbach and several others elsewhere. Stinatz, Hackerberg, Stegersbach, Heugraben and Eisenhüttl use the *ča*-form, the others the *što*-form.

Länder, in schools, at work and in public life is recognized by the State." The Article further declares that in ethnically mixed areas each people might receive the "requisite means for education in its own language, without the use of compulsion in regard to learning a second language of the province."⁴⁰ This last provision, however, was "derogated" by Article 8 of the republican constitution which states that the "German language is the language of the State without affecting adversely the rights conceded by federal law to the linguistic minorities."⁴¹

The first specific measure enacted under the general philosophy of the Basic State Law was the Imperial Primary School Law of May 14, 1869, which in 1921 likewise became operative for Burgenland. The most crucial section of this law is number 6, which provides that provincial school authorities decide upon the language of instruction "after hearing the persons who maintain [i.e., financially] the school."⁴² In short, the concept was self-determination, theoretically an unassailable approach to a minority problem.

Austrian minorities are protected further by Section V, Articles 63, 66, 67 and 68 of the Treaty of St. Germain. Along with the whole Treaty these Articles became an integral part of the Federal Constitution, and ordinary laws relating to them cannot be passed without a quorum of fifty per cent of the National Council and a two thirds majority thereof.⁴³ Article 63 was a general civil rights statement; Article 66 specifically provided for no restrictions on language. The core of Article 67 was the right of "linguistic minorities" to establish and maintain their own charitable, religious, social and educational institutions and, despite the existence of an official language, to enjoy adequate facilities in court respecting the oral or written use of the mother tongue. The most crucial Article, number 68, states that

Austria will provide in the public educational system in towns and districts in which a considerable proportion of Austrian nationals of other than German speech are residents adequate facilities for ensuring that in the primary schools the instruction shall be given to the children of such nationals through the medium of their own language. This provision shall not prevent the Austrian government from making the teaching of the German language obligatory in the said schools.⁴⁴

The second paragraph of the same Article guarantees the "minorities" an

⁴⁰*Provisions for the Protection of Minorities*, United Nations Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities (New York, 24 November, 1953), pp. 158, 197 (Mimeographed). For a discussion of the original implications of Article 19 see chapter by Oskar Lobjmeyer-Hohenleiten in *Das Nationalitätenrecht des alten Österreich*, ed. by K. G. Hugelmann (Vienna, 1934), pp. 81ff.

⁴¹Hermann Raschhofer, "Die nationalen Minderheiten in Österreich und ihre Rechtslage," *Vierteljahresschrift für Politik und Geschichte*, I (7), 1929; No. 1, p. 17; Ludwig Adamovich, *Grundriß des österreichischen Verfassungsrechtes* (Vienna, 1948), p. 366; see also Karl G. Hugelmann, "Das Nationalitätenrecht in Österreich vor und nach dem ersten Weltkrieg," *Zeitschrift der Ostforschung*, I, 1952, p. 269ff.

⁴²*Provisions for the Protection of Minorities*, p. 197.

⁴³*Ibid.*, p. 19.

⁴⁴*The Treaties of Peace: 1919-1923* (New York, 1924), p. 291.

equitable share of public funds for "educational, religious or charitable purposes."⁴⁵

How the phrase "considerable proportion" is to be interpreted is not specified in the Treaty, but the generally accepted practice is twenty per cent of the inhabitants of any one particular area.⁴⁶ Of course there is also the question of what or who constitutes a minority. The Treaty is unclear in this respect also, for in the first paragraph of Article 68 the term is "Austrian nationals of other than German speech" while in the second it is simply "minorities." In Austria the principle is *Bekanntnis* or personal confession. This means that there can be—and are—regions where the mother tongue of most people is not German but where, from the official point of view, no minority exists. Had the Treaty been more specific on this issue, Austria would have been spared much dissention. *Bekanntnis* is of course a generally recognized and accepted procedure.

Further protection is afforded to the Austrian minorities by Article 144 of the Federal Constitution which permits one to appeal to the Constitutional Court if one believes one's rights to have been injured in the administrative process.⁴⁷ In addition, Section 102 of the Austrian Penal Code should be mentioned. It decrees three to six months incarceration for "any person who incites, encourages or attempts to persuade others to commit hostile acts against the ethnic groups . . . or in general incites, encourages or attempts to persuade the inhabitants of the State to form mutually hostile factions."⁴⁸

The above corpus of legislation in force during the First Republic and the initial decade of the second was supplemented by Article 5 of the State Treaty of 1955. It contains another general statement of Austria's obligation to respect minority rights. It provides for elementary education in the mother tongue and "a proportional number of their own secondary schools." It requires that the usage of Croatian or Slovene by individuals in intercourse with officials be accepted. It enjoins the setting-up of bilingual topographic designations. It assures equal participation in cultural, administrative and judicial affairs. Finally it prohibits anti-minority propaganda activity.⁴⁹ This last measure appears directed against any activity on the part of German nationalist elements.⁵⁰

In discussing all these matters the Treaty speaks only of the "minorities" or of the "Slovene and Croat population." Although less ambiguous than the Treaty of St. Germain, it makes no attempt to define officially the

⁴⁵*Ibid.*, p. 292. The minority clauses were adapted from those for the Polish-German regions. C. A. Macartney, *National States and National Minorities* (London, 1934), p. 287.

⁴⁶Ludwig Adamovich, *op. cit.*, p. 367, footnote 2; quoted in *Provisions for the Protection of Minorities*, p. 197, footnote 2.

⁴⁷*Ibid.*, p. 31.

⁴⁸*Ibid.*, p. 150. This law was originally promulgated May 23, 1852. (Austrian Information Service, New York, letter).

⁴⁹*Bundesgesetzblatt für die Republik Österreich*, Vienna, July 30, 1955, "State Treaty Regarding the Restoration of an Independent and Democratic Austria"; from official English version therein.

⁵⁰See footnote 51.

word "minority." Whether this omission is intentional or not, the inference to be drawn is that the twenty per cent standard and the *Bekanntnis* principle of the First Republic are acceptable.

For the Slovenes of the Klagenfurt Basin, where a small-scale but vigorous nationality conflict is still taking place, the Austrian Government has found it necessary to consider the passage of two special laws implementing the provisions of the State Treaty.⁵¹ Since they are supposed to serve as models for later, similar legislation with specific reference to Burgenland, they are of some pertinence.

The first draft law defines the concept of minority: it explicitly affirms the right of *Bekanntnis*. It assures that a simple declaration without proof or official examination suffices for the determination of minority membership. It provides on the one hand that no pupil may be forced to receive instruction in Slovene against the will of his parent or guardian, but, on the other hand, that any pupil whose parent or guardian demands Slovene must be given the opportunity to attend a minority school "insofar as this is possible on the basis of school maintenance." The law then states that children of the ethnically-mixed territory may attend either a pure Slovene, a pure German or a bilingual ("utraquistic") primary and intermediary school (*Volks- und Hauptschule*), whereas previously only the bilingual school existed with compulsory attendance for all regardless of ethnic affiliation. The question of determining the conditions necessary for establishing the new types of schools or the retention of the old ones is left for the Carinthian Diet to decide. The draft law also legalizes the Slovene high school already established in Klagenfurt in the fall of 1957, and it requires the institution of a special Slovene school inspectorate.⁵²

⁵¹The Slovenes, to their detriment, are not politically united. However, in certain matters they do act jointly. One group, known as the "Tito Communists" locally, is allegedly supported by Yugoslavia although it is also sustained by its sharing in the local co-operatives. The other group, approximately twice as large (about 5,000 votes), Catholic and conservative, draws upon the resources both of the co-operatives and of overseas Slovenes. The most unrelenting opponents of the Slovenes are the former (?) German nationalists who are now found in various parties. A few are with the Socialists and many more with the People's Party (which together form the national coalition government). The remainder are organized in a more open form as the *Freiheitliche Partei* (impotent nationally but still a factor in Carinthia; former Union of Independents). Moreover, there are several "cultural" associations which are active propagandistically. The latter are skillful and subtle. They argue that most Slovenes whom they call the "Windisch" (actually the old German word for *all* Slovenes) are a unique ethnic group with their own independent, half German language; they demand the right of democratic self-determination which, after decades of their own propaganda, the natural effect of the cultural environment and the geographic location would result in a Slovene nationalist defeat, as in 1920 when a plebiscite was held. It should be noted that Carinthia, unlike West Hungary, has a tradition of Germano-Slavic conflict dating back to 1848; therefore German nationalism was much stronger. (Based on author's doctoral dissertation, University of Minnesota, 1957).

⁵²*Regierungsvorlage*, "Bundesgesetz vom 1957, womit für das Bundesland Kärnten Vorschriften zur Durchführung der Minderheiten-Bestimmungen des österreichischen Staatsvertrages getroffen werden," 288 der Beilagen zu den stenographischen Protokollen des Nationalrates VII. G. P. (Vienna, 1957). A *Regierungsvorlage* is almost as good as a law since under the very cozy coalition government the parliament has degenerated more or less into a rubber stamp.

The second draft law regulates the matter of court procedure when Slovene documents are submitted or when the oral use of Slovene is requested. Previously Slovene documents might or might not have been accepted.⁵³ Now they must be. Where Slovene is desired as a medium of oral communication, the right must be respected. The judge must use both languages and the protocol must be kept bilingually. These measures apply only for the three *Bezirke* of the Klagenfurt Basin in which many Slovenes still live.⁵⁴

Neither law concerns itself with the language used in the non-judicial administrative process. As far as the author could determine, the previous practice has been the oral and written use of Slovene *within* the few communities where the Slovene nationalists constitute a simple numerical majority (but not in intercourse with any higher echelon of government). Elsewhere German is the language, although sometimes, depending upon local circumstances, Slovene may be accepted. As for topographical inscriptions, the method used previously seems to have remained unchanged: a simple local majority decides.⁵⁵

The application of similar measures in the case of Burgenland would not cause fundamental alterations of the already existing arrangements. As far as the census is concerned, the practice has always been to permit the individual to designate freely his nationality. In the educational realm the bilingual primary school has been a feature of Austrian administration ever since the First Republic.

Interestingly, the Croatian primary school in Burgenland seems to have been modeled after its predecessor in Carinthia. The latter uses the mother tongue only in the early grades; by the fourth grade at the latest German has become the sole language of instruction. This "utraquistic" school was first instituted in Carinthia in 1869. At least one objective German source recognized it to be a very effective, long-term instrument of Germanization.⁵⁶ The German nationalists must likewise have realized this. Indeed, there are grounds to suspect that the bilingual school was originally conceived and cleverly propagated by such circles.⁵⁷ Transferred—whether on purpose or not—to Burgenland, it has had a similar assimilative effect. At least half of the children who enter the school have no knowledge of German, but when they leave they have some degree of fluency therein. Doubtless this is desirable on the basis of practical exigencies and citizenship; and doubtless the majority of Croats has willingly (often, in fact, eagerly) consented to the establishment of such schools. Nevertheless, it

⁵³See the Slovene nationalist (Titoist) brochure *Zur 30. Wiederkehr der Kärntner Volksabstimmung* (Klagenfurt, 1950), pp. 39-43.

⁵⁴*Regierungsvorlage*, "Bundesgesetz zur Durchführung der die Amtssprache bei Gericht betreffenden Bestimmungen des Artikels 7 §3 des Staatsvertrages," 289 *der Beilagen zu den stenographischen Protokollen des Nationalrates VIII. G. P.* (Vienna, 1957).

⁵⁵Based on the author's tour of the Klagenfurt Basin in August, 1955.

⁵⁶Theodor Veiter, *Die slowenische Volksgruppe in Kärnten* (Vienna, 1936), pp. 63-71.

⁵⁷The history of the Burgenland school system is very checkered. In the period of the Enlightenment instruction was given in both Croatian and German, but the Josefine régime is well-known for having stressed the latter in the cause of imperial unity. After the 1867 *Ausgleich* control was exercised by Budapest, and the effort at Magyarization

must be noted that the "utraquistic" *Volksschulen*, whether voluntarily created or not, definitely accelerate the disappearance of the Croatian ethnic group.

Judicial practice would be somewhat altered by the enactment of a law after the Carinthian manner. In the case of Croatians ignorant of German, present arrangements provide only for the substitution of a person given power of attorney and able to speak German or for an official translator. Since almost all mature Croatians have some command of the state language, the legal alternatives are not often used.⁵⁸ Non-court practice seems to follow the existing Carinthian pattern.⁵⁹

There is one aspect of the Burgenland situation which does differ considerably from Carinthia: namely, the rôle of the ethnic group in party politics. During the first twelve years of the postwar era the *Landeshauptmann* was Dr. Lorenz Karall. A member of the conservative, clerical People's Party, he did not deny that he was a Croatian.⁶⁰ Although some Croatians adhere to the Socialist Party, most of them, tradition-minded peasants, support the People's Party, of which they are a major pillar. Hence many persons of Croatian extraction were appointed to official positions during Karall's administration. Although the Croatian nationalist faction—which is organized apart from the *Volkspartei*—maintains that there are still not enough Croatian-speaking officials, the Germans claim that there are more of them than the actual size of the Croatian population justifies. "*Im Burgenland guckt aus jeder Schreibtischlade ein Krowott*," so the saying goes.⁶¹ It is difficult to say which point of view is correct, but one has the feeling that German resentment may result in exaggeration.

became increasingly intense over the decades. The famous Apponyi Acts of 1907 merit particular mention. Between 1912 and 1918 instruction was given only in Hungarian. People who attended school during this period are said to be able to read and write none of the three languages very well. In 1918 the Hungarians relaxed the pressure under the force of circumstances. From 1921 to 1937 the language of instruction was either German, Croatian-German, Croatian, Magyar-German or Magyar. (Josef Kath "Vom deutschen Schulwesen," *Deutsches Vaterland: Burgenland* (Vienna, 19-20), pp. 76-80; Raschhofer, *loc. cit.*, p. 33). In 1937, during Schuschnigg's *Deutscher Kurs*, a new system, more fully incorporating the Carinthian bilingual school, was introduced. Without abrogating the constitutional right of the community to have a voice in determining the language used, the following guideposts were erected: a) in communities with more than a 70% Croatian population according to the census, Croatian as the language of instruction; b) 70-30% Croatians, bilingual; c) less than 30%, German, with the possibility of Croatian as an elective. Under this arrangement most Croatian schools became bilingual. In the fall of 1957 there was a total of 3056 pupils with 104 teachers (also 604 Magyars and 6 teachers plus 230 gypsies), of whom less than a thousand were in category "a," where German is compulsory as a subject. The total number of students in Burgenland is 30,126. (Figures obtained through Prof. Dujmovits of Eisenhüttl from the *Schulreferat* of the Provincial Government as well as from the Austrian Information Service, New York; by letter).

⁵⁸Raschofer, *loc. cit.*, p. 20f. According to Dr. Linzer, court interpreter of Stegersbach, a High Court decision of very recent date has required the acceptance of Croatian as a supplementary language of procedure both spoken and written. The case was brought up by a "stubborn Croatian" and the decision apparently based on the State Treaty although the detailing law has not yet been officially passed. (By letter).

⁵⁹Various local informants.

⁶⁰He is a member of the Croatian Cultural Association (*vide post*, p. 17) but a nationalist.

⁶¹"In Burgenland a Croatian peeps from every desk drawer."

IV

Under the very unfavorable circumstances heretofore depicted one might conceivably conclude that national feeling never had the opportunity to appear even for a brief moment among the Burgenland Croats. One might suspect that the almost complete absence of a Croatian *bourgeoisie* stifled the growth of any intelligentsia at all and therefore of nationalism. But one must also take the existence of the Roman Catholic Church into account. And the Church, by accepting many sons of its Croatian faithful for the priesthood, filled the place of the absent middle class. In this way Burgenland was provided with a group of native-born intellectuals even though its size was infinitesimal and its political effect negligible.

The story of the birth of Croatian national feeling in Burgenland is intertwined with the history of the Croatian language and literature in the same region. The latter can be tracked back ultimately (though indirectly) to sixteenth century Protestantism, to Hans Ungnad, Baron of Sonneck and to the press which he established for the Croats in Urach (Württemberg).⁶² Aided by the great Slovene writers Primož Trubar and Georg Dalmatin, the press produced works some of which were also distributed among the newly-settled Burgenland Croats. Basing itself upon this precedent, the Roman Church of the Austrian Counter-Reformation subsidized a very extensive Croatian clerical literature (i.e., popular devotional material) in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Burgenland thus served not only as the transmitter of Baroque art to Hungary but also of Baroque piety with its strong Marian emphasis.⁶³

Yet the pattern of settlement in Burgenland had led to strong differentiation of language (not to mention the original variations), and this, of course, constituted a great hindrance to the unfolding of any literature. "The lack of a unified written language forced the young Croatian clergy of the Burgenland area always to look across the border toward the old homeland and to borrow from there what had disappeared or could not develop in the narrowness of the village. Thus the new grew in the shadow of the old."⁶⁴

The greatest of the Croatian writers of this period was father Josip Ficko or Fitzko (1772-1843), the first reformer of Croatian orthography and a purger of foreign influences. He was "not only a herald of the word of God but also an impassioned herald of Croatian nationality."⁶⁵ Through him Herder's great message penetrated even to the Croats of West Hungary. However, by the middle of the nineteenth century the political

⁶²Cf. Georg Stadtmüller, *Geschichte Südosteuropas* (Munich, 1950), p. 258.

⁶³F. Probst, "Die religiöse Erbauungsliteratur der burgenländischen Kroaten." *Burgenländische Heimatblätter*, III, 1951, p. 198f.

⁶⁴*Ibid.*, p. 201. But it should not be assumed that the Croatian peasants possessed nothing of aesthetic value. They had their folk songs brought from their ancestral homes by the first settlers and transmitted to posterity by local bards in the customary Balkan or Homeric fashion. See, e.g., Milovan Gavazzi, "Dva motiva iz narodne poezije gradišćanskih Hrvata," *Zbornik radova*, Zagreb University Philosophical Faculty (Zagreb, 1951), pp. 203-220.

⁶⁵Probst, *loc. cit.*, p. 302.

climate of Bach absolutism and of burgeoning Magyar nationalism presented a barrier to the further growth of Croatian literature, and it is an indication of the remaining strength of the Croatian ethnic group that it was still able to produce a series of scholars from the 1870s onward. Of course, this development would not have been possible without the bastion of the Roman Church; the center of Croatian literary activity and national feeling was the seminary at Raab.⁶⁶ The parallel with the Carinthian Slovenes is striking, for in that province, too, there would have been no Slovene nationalism without the Church and without Slovene control of the diocesan seminary in Klagenfurt (Celovec).

The greatest of the Croatian heroes was Mate Meršić Miloradić, a folk-singer and a poet, who entered the literary world with his contributions to the clerical *Kalendar Svete Familije* in 1903. It is said that he was for Burgenland what Gaj was for Croatia. The translator of St. Thomas à Kempis, Fr. Miloradić was himself noted for his deep piety. Having shed light on his native tongue and having demonstrated its latent beauty, his work "wakened and strengthened the sleeping and already dying [Croatian] national consciousness."⁶⁷ The founder of the first nationalist newspaper in Burgenland, *Naše Novine*, Fr. Miloradić spent his last days in Hungary, following the splintering of the Croatian ethnic group as a result of the new border demarcation. A message received in March, 1928, slightly less than a month after his death, by his colleagues on the other side of the frontier bears repetition as an illustration of the Burgenland Croatian nationalist psychology:

Our Croatian nationalism never was and is not today imperialism, for we do not love our own so much that we hate what is foreign. But on the other hand we will not subject ourselves to the foreign so much that we will reject our own. . . . You can now serve your Croatian nationality in freedom, can honor and care for it. We old ones, almost like martyrs, were looked upon with an evil eye, and they [the Magyars] pushed us aside wherever they could.⁶⁸

However, the nationalist group nurtured by Miloradić and his disciples was never very strong. Organized as the *Hrvatsko kulturno Društvo u Gradišću* ("Croatian Cultural Association in Burgenland"), it seems to have been active in an election only once (1923), on which occasion it was able to win no more than 2500 votes.⁶⁹ The pressure of the German environment was far too strong, and for all their piety the overwhelming majority of the Burgenland Croats decided against their pastors on the question of nationality.

On the other hand, the freedom of the new Republic allowed Croatian literature, especially journalism, to experience a "new flowering." Five different periodicals appeared, of which the most important were the

⁶⁶See Karl Preč, "Das kroatischsprachige Schrifttum im Burgenland," *Burgenländischer literarischer Bote* (II), p. 62f. Quoted in Probst, *loc. cit.*, p. 204.

⁶⁷*Ibid.*, p. 205.

⁶⁸*Idem.*

⁶⁹Raschhofer, *loc. cit.*, p. 17.

Kršćanske Hrvatske Novine ("Christian Croatian News") and the *Hrvatske Novine*. The latter was edited by Karall and the former by Fr. Ignac Horvath, the postwar (1945) leader of the Cultural Association.⁷⁰ Fr. Horvath, it might be added, is at present the foremost Croatian literary personage of Burgenland. He is known as a scholar, a short story writer and a playwright.⁷¹ Today the Croatians have their own publishing firm (founded in 1947) which publishes the weekly journal *Naš Tajednik*, an annual (calendar) and Horvath's works.⁷²

During the interwar period, with the mutual threat of Magyarization removed, the German nationalists first seem to have become aware of a potential danger in the form of Croatian nationalism. Doubtless the Masaryk plan contributed much to this development. Verification for this statement is afforded by a close study of bibliography on Burgenland.⁷³ Before World War One there is hardly a single work which can be identified as stemming from a German nationalist source, but during the first Austrian Republic a number of such publications appeared. In one of them there exists a very candid statement of what the policy with respect to the minority should be: namely, neither an acceleration by artificial means of the process of assimilation nor, on the other hand, the placing of any obstacles in its path.⁷⁴

The approach suggested by this statement actually seems to have been followed during the First Republic. There is not the slightest evidence to indicate suppression of the Croatian nationalists; in fact, the Republic was for them a new birth of liberty after Magyar tyranny.⁷⁵ The *Südmark* established only one school, and its *Ortsgruppen* are said to have been small and relatively inactive. On the other hand, there is certainly no indication of a program designed to turn the tide of voluntary Germanization. Of course, during the *Anschluss*, the Croatians did not fare quite as well. Croatian was dropped from the schools entirely at the very beginning, and the Croatian publications lasted only until 1941. The Yugoslav *Memorandum* mentions several deportations and executions;⁷⁶ but on the whole the Nazi policy seems to have been milder than elsewhere. Germany was allied with Pavelić's Croatia, and the Croatians were regarded as a related "Aryan" people.⁷⁷

⁷⁰Letter from Fr. Horvath.

⁷¹Wilhelm Täuber, "Der Dichter-Pfarrer Horvath," *Burgenländisches Leben*, April, 1950, p. 9.

⁷²Letter from Fr. Horvath.

⁷³See footnote 5.

⁷⁴Matthias Jurassovich, "Die Kroaten," *Deutsches Vaterland* . . . , p. 125.

⁷⁵See footnote 57.

⁷⁶This is contested locally. The imprisonments were simply a part of the general revenge taken on Catholics after the demise of the Schuschnigg régime. The alleged executions may possibly have been the work of the SS or *Feldgendarmarie* in 1944-1945 as part of the campaign against defeatism and going over to the enemy. Croatian was also still used in school to introduce the pupils to German.

⁷⁷The *Kreisleiter* for the Stegersbach region, Karl Popofsits, was of partial Croatian descent; many other Croatians were members of the Party; and the first holder of the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross was from a Croatian village (Eisenhüttl) and allegedly could scarcely speak German.

From 1945 to 1955 Burgenland suffered Russian occupation. However, the Croatian nationalists, aside from an extremely small number of Communists, do not seem to have had any particular benefit from the presence of their fellow Slavs. Although the Soviet government initially supported the Yugoslav claims against Austria, it should be remembered that the strongly Catholic Croatians as well as the majority of the Carinthian Slovenes could never really be on a cordial footing with any Communist power, Soviet or Titoist.⁷⁸

In 1955, shortly after the final ratification of the State Treaty, the Cultural Association presented a list of demands to the Austrian government regarding the carrying out of the Treaty's provisions. The first demand was for a special office for minority affairs with minority representation both on the federal and provincial level which was to make and administer the regulations necessary to carry out the State Treaty. The second demand concerned the schools: Croatian should be strengthened in the bilingual primary school and should be made compulsory for all Croatians in intermediary schools above the number of five; since a regular high school was not possible *at the moment* (due apparently to the lack of adequately prepared Croatian students) the introduction of Croatian as a subject (elective) at all other high schools was necessary, particularly in view of the lack of Croatian-speaking officials. There was to be a Croatian teachers' training institute, and no teacher was to be allowed to instruct without having been properly tested in the Croatian language. As far as the courts were concerned, Croatian was to be introduced gradually because of the lack of Croatian-speaking personnel. With respect to the prohibition on German nationalist activity precise conditions of proof should be established.⁷⁹ As of spring 1958, the only action which these demands had received was the statement that the Carinthian laws were to serve as a model.

The result of the demands of the Cultural Association was a protest upon the part of the Croatian Burgomasters' Conference that the Association did not represent the mass of the Croatian population and that any decisions should be made locally (i.e., in the *Gemeinde*).⁸⁰ It is interesting to note that the initiators of this protest are primarily "Reds" (Socialists); their disapproval is probably intensified by the "Black" (clerical) allegiance of their nationalist opponents. The *Volkspartei* itself seems to maintain a more or less discreet silence.

In 1957 the Cultural Association suffered a schism as a result of disagreement between the "strict" position represented by Horvath and the demand list and the moderates, who apparently opposed any political action. The affair ended with Horvath's resignation as president, but the new

⁷⁸Immediately after the war the Burgenland Croatian nationalists sent a deputation, including Fr. Horvath, to Yugoslavia. It was received by Tito who proposed an exchange of populations, the same idea which he was tentatively advancing for Slovene Carinthia at that time. When the news became known in Burgenland it redounded very unfavorably on the nationalists (local informants).

⁷⁹Typescript carbon copy provided by Fr. Horvath.

⁸⁰"Südpreß," *Pressdienst der Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Südkärnten*, Vienna, January 14, 1957 (mimeographed bulletin of former German nationalists).

leader, who has the very un-Croatian name of Béla Schreiner, more or less follows in his path. Today the Association is said to have no more than 70-80 members, clergymen, school teachers and officials.⁸¹ All in all it appears that the people fighting for measures to ensure the continued existence of the ethnic group are waging a losing struggle and that the will of the majority of Croats, *unexpressed* but still pervasive, is gradual assimilation.

It is clear that basically one cannot criticize the policy of the Austrian government which has merely acquiesced in the desires of the great majority of the Croats. It seems only obvious to state that there is no moral obligation for a government to preserve forcefully an ethnic group that has no interest in its own survival. Yet within the latter there is a genuine minority, however minuscule it may be. As a result of its mere existence the court language provisions of the Treaty will probably be implemented. Perhaps also there will be some increase in the instruction of Croatian. In the future the Croatian nationalists may possibly succeed in finding enough (75-100) qualified (i.e., by European gymnasial standards) students to warrant setting up a separate high school. One may hope, both on the basis of antiquarian sentiment and of democratic idealism, that the Austrian government will show itself to be magnanimous.

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⁸¹Local informants.

IMPERIAL GERMANY'S TRAGIC ERA, 1888-1918:

THRESHOLD TO DEMOCRACY OR FOREGROUND OF NAZISM?

*Conclusion**

by John L. Snell

THE FIRST half of this article began a review of post-1945 literature on German domestic history in the period 1888-1918. It sought to point up significant contributions which have been made, to call attention to some problems on which research is yet needed, and to define themes which seem to bring to focus the complex and refractory tendencies of Wilhelmian Germany. Five major themes were suggested: (1) attempts to preserve the Imperial régime and the society upon which it was based; (2) extreme contemporary intellectual criticisms—amounting to repudiations—of the political régime, social institutions, and moral values of Wilhelmian Germany; (3) movements for political and social democracy; (4) harbingers of what history would later define and condemn as National Socialism; and (5) the intensification of these contradictory forces and their interaction in World War I. These five themes suggest features of the Wilhelmian era which should continue to attract the attention of historical scholarship. The first half of this article closed with comments on the intellectual critics of the era. The third, fourth, and fifth of these themes remain to be discussed below.

IV

While men like Nietzsche, Harden, George and Hauptmann boldly criticized the existing reality of the Wilhelmian era, a chastened liberal democracy more wearily pursued its somewhat tarnished objectives for the future. Wariness was increasingly its watchword in the Wilhelmian era, and a growing loneliness was its fate in the political ring. But for its lack of following, liberal democracy would bear a much larger share of responsibility for the troubles of the tragic era than can be assigned to it. Even so, its failures must be included in any comprehensive reckoning with the era.

The Left-liberals of the period, by writing few memoirs, have made it difficult for historians to condemn or to defend them. One recent autobiography that might have been helpful proves to be a great disappointment: instead of telling the story of his own experiences as an editor of the influential and progressive *Frankfurter Zeitung*, Bernhard Guttman chose to write what is largely a conventional historical sketch.⁵⁰ Perhaps there is too little significant resolute action to recall. In any case, a number of recent secondary works on German liberalism agree that the middle class Left showed a marked reluctance to win control over the state. *Heinrich Heffter* develops the theme that German liberals were willing to settle for efficient government in the interest of *some* of the people instead of demand-

*The first part of this study appeared in the January 1959 issue of the *Journal*.

⁵⁰Bernhard Guttman, *Schattenriss einer Generation 1888-1919* (Stuttgart, 1950).

ing self-rule by *all* of the people.⁵¹ Relatively few Germans cared "to take the rudder of state power in their own hands." Heffter has provided us with a massive, somewhat drab, but highly useful catalogue of the changing administrative systems of nineteenth century Germany. *Leonard Krieger* is much more interested in the evolving *idea* of liberalism, but completely agrees with Heffter that the German middle class wanted freedom without the responsibility of self-government.⁵² The tendency to look to the "absolute state" for "rights and liberties" instead of seeking them through self-government was, Krieger writes, a "transvaluation of values" that penetrated the middle class "like an ineradicable natal influence" (p. 36). Though his style is ungraceful and his argument sometimes seems doctrinaire, Krieger's analysis of Wilhelminian era liberals is undoubtedly correct: "their activity consisted primarily in the characteristic responses which they made to issues presented by governmental initiative" (pp. 458-459). Like Heffter, Krieger gives the era of William II short treatment.

Friedrich C. Sell more adequately provides an account of German Left-liberals in the Wilhelminian period.⁵³ Sell writes as a liberal, but finds all too few fellow liberals in the history of modern Germany. The greatest "tragedy of German liberalism," in Sell's opinion, was the fusion of liberalism and nationalism in the nineteenth century. Furthermore, like Krieger, Sell deplores the fact that the German liberals were not always "fundamentally opposed to everything conservative" (p. 191). He bemoans their support for Bismarck's *Kulturkampf* and perceptively points to one of the significant causes of liberal failure in the Wilhelminian era when he writes that the liberals thereby alienated one third of the people of Germany from their principles and their institutions. The monarchical state was able to redeem itself both with German Catholics and, to a lesser extent, with the workingclass after 1890; German liberalism never succeeded in doing so.

How much German Catholicism went its own way is shown clearly in three post-1945 works: an unpublished dissertation by *Marshall Dill* on the Catholic trade unions of the Wilhelminian era, a published monograph by *Josef Deutz* on Adam Stegerwald, leader of the largely Catholic "Christian" unions from 1903 until 1929, and an excellent and generally defensive biography of Matthias Erzberger by *Klaus Epstein*.⁵⁴ Like German liberal

⁵¹Heinrich Heffter, *Die deutsche Selbstverwaltung im 19. Jahrhundert: Geschichte der Ideen und Institutionen* (Stuttgart, 1950), 353 and *passim*.

⁵²Leonard Krieger, *The German Idea of Freedom: History of a Political Tradition* (Boston, 1957).

⁵³Friedrich C. Sell, *Die Tragödie des deutschen Liberalismus* (Stuttgart, 1953). Cf. Karl Buchheim, *Leidensgeschichte des zivilen Geistes oder die Demokratie in Deutschland* (Munich, 1951), and Rudolf Olden, *The History of Liberty in Germany* (London, 1946), for similar interpretations. Gagel, *Die Wahlrechtsfrage*, provides a new and unflattering account of Progressive efforts to reform the Prussian three-class suffrage system. (Works fully cited in the first half of this article are given in abbreviated form in this half.)

⁵⁴George Marshall Dill, Jr., "The Christian Trade Unions and Catholic Corporatism in Germany, 1916-1924," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1949; Josef Deutz, *Adam Stegerwald: Gewerkschafter, Politiker, Minister 1874-1945* (Cologne, 1952); Klaus Epstein, *Matthias Erzberger* (Princeton, 1959). The Epstein volume, well written and sound in interpretation, is based upon the Erzberger Papers in the Bundes-

democrats, Centrist unionists emphasized the "mutual interests" of capital and labor and were thoroughly patriotic and monarchist; but the Catholic unions found too little in common with the bourgeois Left until the war of 1914 partly healed the wounds of the past. The *Kulturkampf* was remembered all too well, even into the post-Wilhelmian era, despite the energetic and often flamboyant efforts of Erzberger to achieve cooperation between the Center and the bourgeois Left. And the Erzberger-inspired criticism of colonial policy in 1906 brought a temporary reawakening of *Kulturkampf* spirit in the elections of 1907. For his efforts, Erzberger only won the scorn of more Conservative Center leaders. He would not fully regain his influence in the *Zentrum* until 1917.

The growth of anti-English sentiment in Germany may, as Sell suggests (pp. 277-286), have hurt middle class liberalism in the Wilhelmian period, even more than its antagonism of Catholic Germans, for liberals were traditionally pro-English in political orientation. How much the difficulties of parliamentary government in France also discouraged Germans of those years from supporting the liberals remains an interesting subject for investigation. Similarly unexplored and worthy of study is the effect upon German Left-liberalism of Europe's changing view of the nature of Man at the turn of the century. How much did liberal democracy share (and how much was it hurt by) the loss of faith in human rationalism about 1900? The political impact of Darwin, Mendel, Freud, Planck, Einstein, and Bergson upon German Left-liberals would be difficult to assess, but it needs to be detected and measured as exactly as the tools of historical research allow. Sell is only tantalizing in this respect when he reminds us that Friedrich Naumann considered himself to be "a Christian, a Darwinist, and an imperialist" (p. 292).

Heffter, Krieger, and Sell all overlook or reflect too little faith in the essentially liberal development of West Germany since 1948-1949 in their discussions of the liberal tradition in Germany. But Sell suggestively notes that a Naumannist liberal of the Wilhelmian era, Theodor Heuss, became the first president of the German Federal Republic; and Sell's evaluation of Friedrich Naumann shows more insight than does Krieger's brief dismissal of the founder of the "national social" movement (p. 464). It was that movement which gave German bourgeois liberalism a new conscience and a new life in the twentieth century. The Naumannist national-socialists were, indeed, "an army of officers without soldiers" before 1914 (Sell, p. 291), but the ideas they represented were to win a large following after World War II. Their beginnings are illuminated in the first volume of an autobiography by *Theodor Heuss* himself,⁵⁵ and a much fuller statement by one of

archiv, Koblenz; the Karl Bachem Papers in the Stadtarchiv, Cologne; the Georg von Hertling Papers in the Geheime Staatsarchiv, Munich; and an impressive array of published sources. See also Epstein's article, "Erzberger's Position in the Zentrumsstreit before World War I," *Catholic Historical Review*, XLIV (1958), 1-16. For the important Catholic contribution to the growth of corporate state theory in Wilhelmian Germany see Ralph Bowen, *German Theories of the Corporative State* (New York, 1947).

⁵⁵Theodor Heuss, *Vorspiele des Lebens: Jugenderinnerungen* (Tübingen, 1953).

their captains is provided in a remarkably interesting volume by *Ernst Jäckh*.⁵⁶ Part autobiography, part documentation, and part political sermon the Jäckh volume is most original in its material on the revolutionary period of October-November, 1918. But it also contains a wealth of information on the motivations and aims of leading personalities of all parties in the Germany of William II. It is especially useful for its insights on the men from many walks of life who found a unifying tie in Friedrich Naumann's dream of the fusion of all classes and several parties in Germany into a truly united and progressive nation.

What Naumann sought to create was a New Left, reminiscent of the New Right which Joseph von Radowitz had sought to inspire before 1848. The Kaiser himself would participate, his position strengthened by virtue of his assumption of the role of reformer-in-chief. Max Weber, scholarly associate of Naumann, is the subject of a critical study first published by *J. P. Mayer* during World War II and recently revised. Son of a National Liberal Reichstag deputy and a mother who was vitally interested in social reform, Max Weber early took a dim view of William II. Weber was disturbed in 1892 by traits in the new Kaiser which reminded him of "Boulangier and Bonaparte," commenting that the Kaiser was "obviously dealing with politics from the point of view of a young lieutenant" (p. 28). The realization gave urgency to Weber's scholarly work, for he was convinced that "the political education of our nation must remain the ultimate aim of our science." Like his friends Friedrich Meinecke, Ernst Troeltsch, and Naumann, Weber strove for political and social reform chiefly out of a desire to strengthen Germany's position in world affairs. For them, equalization of the suffrage was to be, as Walter Gagel reminds us, a "*sicherheitsventil gegen Revolutionen*."⁵⁷ The failure of the masses to rally to the overly-rational Naumannist intellectuals insured the continued weakness of the bourgeois Left in Wilhelmian era politics. The *Staatsräson* of the Naumannist national-socialists proved no match for the more emotional and material appeals of the S.P.D.

"*L'Age d'or de la Socialdémocratie Germanique*"—this is the apt section heading on the S.P.D. in the period 1890-1914 in a recently published bibliography which should interest students of the Wilhelmian era.⁵⁸ For Social Democracy was the major element in the New Left that emerged in

⁵⁶Ernst Jäckh, *Der goldene Pflug: Lebensernte eines Weltbürgers* (Stuttgart, 1954).

⁵⁷J. P. Mayer, *Max Weber and German Politics: A Study in Political Sociology* (London, 1944), and 2nd ed., revised and enlarged (London, 1956). Cf. Ilse E. Nelson, "The Practical Aspects of Max Weber's Political Philosophy: Max Weber's Attitude Toward the Political Problems of Germany, 1885-1920," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1951; available on microfilm, Chicago. On Meinecke see Richard W. Sterling, *Ethics in a World of Power: The Political Ideas of Friedrich Meinecke*, to be published in November, 1958, by the Princeton University Press. In 1908 Meinecke wrote: "Das Ziel, auf das alles ankommt, ist die volle Lebensgemeinschaft des deutschen Nationalstaats. . . ." (*Weltbürgertum und Nationalstaat*, 495).

⁵⁸Édouard Dolléans and Michel Crozier, *Mouvements ouvrier et socialiste: chronologie et bibliographie, Angleterre, France, Allemagne, États-Unis (1750-1918)* (Paris, 1950), 185. This work contains (187-221) most useful introductory lists of contemporary Social Democratic publications of the period 1888-1918.

Germany after 1870. Even bourgeois Left voters rallied to its standards, abandoning the Left-liberal party leaders. It made a special appeal to women and Käthe Kollwitz, an aspiring middle-class artist, was among those who responded in the 1890s. In retrospect she insisted in 1941 that she became the artist of the workingclass for non-political reasons, claiming that she painted workers because "only such subjects gave me in a simple and unequivocal way what I felt to be beautiful." But she spoke for many other feminists of the Wilhelmian era when she wrote that later she was "gripped by the full force of the proletarian's fate." "Unsolved problems such as prostitution and unemployment grieved and tormented me, and contributed to my feeling that I must keep on with my studies of the lower classes. And portraying them again and again opened a safety-valve for me, it made life bearable."⁵⁹ For the most varied of reasons—one of which was the art of Käthe Kollwitz—hundreds of thousands of Germans on the eve of 1914 looked to the Social Democrats to fulfill the long-denied dream of a democratic Germany, and made their party the largest in the Reichstag in 1912.

The S.P.D. has, therefore, become the subject of much research, especially since 1945. Its position in the Second International has been rather harshly surveyed in two recent volumes on that organization by James Joll and G. D. H. Cole.⁶⁰ The growth of its newspaper press in the Ruhr area and of feuds between its editors and party administrators have been treated in some detail by Kurt Koszyk.⁶¹ Several biographies and autobiographies of party leaders of the pre-1918 era have appeared in recent years, the most noted being the recollections of Carl Severing and Wilhelm Keil.⁶² Peter Gay, in a book that is more a history of political theory than biography, provides an excellent critical account of the rise and problems of revisionism and of Eduard Bernstein in German Social Democracy. Gay often suggests that Bernstein's work was doomed to futility, for he questions whether a socialist movement can ever come to power without first giving up its attachment to democratic principles. Similarly, he cautiously—perhaps too cautiously—estimates the significance of Bernstein's part in the transformation of the S.P.D. from a party of orthodox Marxism to one of democratic socialism. Unlike Erika Rikli, who emphasized the importance of revisionist theory, Gay treats that theory as a rationalization of transformations which were already being made without Bernstein (Gay, p. 299). Yet, Gay appropriately recognizes that Bernstein was "a great man in his own

⁵⁹Hans Kollwitz (ed.), *The Diary and Letters of Kaethe Kollwitz*, Richard and Clara Winston, trans. (Chicago, 1955), 43.

⁶⁰G. D. H. Cole, *The Second International, 1889-1914* (London, 1956). This is Vol. II, Part I of Cole's *History of Socialist Thought*. See also James Joll, *The Second International, 1889-1914* (New York, 1956), especially 121.

⁶¹Kurt Koszyk, *Anfänge und frühe Entwicklung der sozialdemokratischen Presse im Ruhrgebiet (1875-1908)* (Dortmund, 1953).

⁶²Carl Severing, *Mein Lebensweg*, 2 vols. (Cologne, 1950); Wilhelm Keil, *Erlebnisse eines Sozialdemokraten*, 2 vols. (Stuttgart, 1947-1948); Paul Löbe, *Der Weg war Lang: Lebenserinnerungen*, 2nd ed. (Berlin, 1954); Max Peters, *Friedrich Ebert: Erster Präsident der deutschen Republik, sein Werden und Wirken*, 2nd ed. (Berlin, 1954).

right" who "rose above expediency and party loyalty when truth demanded it" (p. xi). In another recent monograph, based upon manuscript holdings of the International Institute for Social History at Amsterdam, Reinhard Jansen sympathetically interprets the more pragmatic contributions of Georg von Vollmar to the rise of revisionism.⁶³

The emotional reaction of more orthodox party leaders to revisionism is vividly brought to life in a tremendously valuable collection of correspondence between August Bebel, Karl Kautsky, and other German Social Democrats on the one hand and Victor Adler on the other. These letters show clearly what Gay more vaguely indicated, that Bernstein in private statements went much further in his criticism of orthodox Marxism than he did in public statements.⁶⁴ "Do not forget," he urges the alarmed Bebel, "that *Das Kapital*, its scientific character notwithstanding, was in the last analysis a tendentious work and remained uncompleted, uncompleted, in my opinion, because the conflict between scientific knowledge and political opinion [*Tendenz*] made the task increasingly difficult for Marx."⁶⁵ Friedrich Adler and the Austrian Socialist Party have put historians much in their debt through this collection of some 500 letters, with 116 pages of material on the revisionist controversy (pp. 243-358). Its demonstration of Kautsky's wavering between the extreme Left and the revisionists (cf. pp. 352 and 367) is second in importance only to the new light it throws on the growth, turbulent survival, and eventual triumph of revisionism. One of the results is to suggest very strongly the great need for a critical biography of August Bebel, who stood at the center of the controversy and tried with decreasing success to surmount it.

Victor Adler, no mean observer, wrote to Kautsky on February 21, 1917, that he was convinced that the 1917 schism of the S.P.D. into two parties would have been avoided had the war ended half a year before (Adler letters, p. 634). In contrast, Carl E. Schorske strongly contends that the strains of the war merely hastened a schism that was inherent in the tensions that built up within the Social Democratic Party in the period 1905-1914.⁶⁶ It would appear that Adler is more reliable than Schorske on this point, if Schorske means to imply that the schism of 1917 was already made inevitable by pre-1914 developments. The history of German political parties—and not just of those in Germany—provides abundant evidence that a party can exist almost indefinitely amidst intense internal conflicts of opinion. In any case, Schorske's is the finest monograph on the S.P.D.

⁶³Peter Gay, *The Dilemma of Democratic Socialism: Eduard Bernstein's Challenge to Marx* (New York, 1952); Reinhard Jansen, *Georg von Vollmar: Eine politische Biographie* (Düsseldorf, 1958); Erika Rikli, *Der Revisionismus: Ein Revisions-Versuch der deutschen marxistischen Theorie (1890-1914)* (Zürich, 1936).

⁶⁴Adler (ed.), *Victor Adler: Briefwechsel*, 245, 254-265, and 272-278 for Kautsky to Adler, April 9; Bebel to Adler, October 6; Bebel to Bernstein, October 16; Bernstein to Bebel, October 20; Bebel to Bernstein, October 22; and Kautsky to Bernstein, October 22 (all 1898).

⁶⁵*Ibid.*, 261.

⁶⁶Carl E. Schorske, *German Social Democracy, 1905-1917: The Development of the Great Schism* (Cambridge, Mass., 1955).

that has appeared in any language, and one for which the literature on other Wilhelmian and Weimar political parties offers no counterpart. One regrets an occasional slip, such as Schorske's inexplicable comment that the pre-1914 S.P.D. "fought . . . to preserve the capitalist economy . . ." (p. 323). But there are impressively few slips in Schorske's study. His thorough and imaginative research, the illumination of empirically derived data by a keen intelligence, and a style that is often brilliant and always lucid and vigorous, all these qualities identify the author as an accomplished historian. Both the more general treatment by *Hermann Heidegger*⁶⁷ and the more restricted study by *A. J. Berlau*⁶⁸ suffer severely by comparison with the Schorske volume, though the latter provides a useful basic account of the wartime S.P.D.

The growth of trade union influence over the policies of the S.P.D., one of the theses which Schorske most convincingly demonstrates, has been treated by a number of more specific monographs. *Heinz Langerhans* has suggested in two perceptive articles that periods of depression brought party hegemony in party-union relations, whereas years of economic expansion enabled the unions to establish their autonomy and eventually their dominance in relations with the party.⁶⁹ The completeness of union autonomy is illustrated in an interesting case study of a single trade union, that of the mine workers, by *Max Jürgen Koch*.⁷⁰ The completeness of the eventual union dominance over the S.P.D. is documented in a more general monograph by *Heinz Josef Varain* on the central organization of the socialist unions under Carl Legien.⁷¹ No really satisfactory study of union-party relations or of this man who played so important a part in reshaping the relationship after 1890 is possible, since Legien apparently left no *Nachlass*. But Varain has used the central journal of the unions to excellent advantage to show the conservative political effect of rising trade union power upon party decisions. For the unions, socialist theory and principles were "entirely subordinated to the practical accomplishment of their [economic] aims" (p. 29). Varain, like *John L. Snell*,⁷² notes the importance of the

⁶⁷Hermann Heidegger, *Die deutsche Sozialdemokratie und der nationale Staat 1870-1920* (Göttingen, Berlin, Frankfurt, 1956). Heidegger argues that the S.P.D. became essentially nationalistic and yet remained too much devoted to Marxist principles. For a similar contention that the S.P.D. showed "too much respect for Marxism" see: John Plamenatz, *German Marxism and Russian Communism* (London, New York, and Toronto, 1954), and an interesting feature article in *Der Spiegel* (Hamburg), XII (May 14, 1958), 16-29.

⁶⁸A. Joseph Berlau, *The German Social Democratic Party, 1914-1921* (New York, 1949).

⁶⁹Heinz Langerhans, "Richtungsgewerkschaft und gewerkschaftliche Autonomie 1890-1914," *International Review of Social History*, II (1957), 22-51, 187-208.

⁷⁰Max Jürgen Koch, *Die Bergarbeiterbewegung im Ruhrgebiet zur Zeit Wilhelms II. (1889-1914)* (Düsseldorf, 1954).

⁷¹Heinz Josef Varain, *Freie Gewerkschaften, Sozialdemokratie und Staat: Die Politik der Generalkommission unter der Führung Carl Legiens (1880-1920)* (Düsseldorf, 1956).

⁷²John L. Snell, "German Socialists in the Last Imperial Reichstag, 1912-1918," *Bulletin of the International Institute for Social History*, No. 3 (1952), 196-205 and comment by Karl Dietrich Bracher, *Die Auflösung der Weimarer Republik: Eine Studie zum Problem des Machtverfalls in der Demokratie*, 2nd ed. (Stuttgart and Düsseldorf, 1957), 76.

increasing percentage of union leaders among the Social Democratic Reichstag deputies; with 11.6 percent of the S.P.D. seats in 1893, union representatives occupied 23.5 percent in 1903 and 32.7 percent in the Reichstag of 1912-1918 (Varain, p. 45).⁷³

The role of the radical Left within the S.P.D. has, meanwhile, not been ignored. Schorske himself shows that the increasing conservatism of the S.P.D. leaders toward 1914 was matched by a growing radicalism of the extreme Left. Leo Stern and his East-German colleagues have shown—and exaggerated—in a valuable documentary publication the degree to which the Russian Revolution of 1905 stimulated the growth of militant leftist agitation within the S.P.D.,⁷⁴ while other East-German scholars have published valuable new collections of the writings of Rosa Luxemburg⁷⁵ and Karl Liebknecht.⁷⁶ Paul Frölich, one-time editor of *Die rote Fahne*, has published a sympathetic biography of Luxemburg, based upon her *Nachlass*, showing how she laid down the theoretical foundations for the new radicalism; Karl Liebknecht, who dramatized its appeal to the German masses, is systematically if prosaically presented in a recent biography by Karl W. Meyer.⁷⁷

Schorske has emphasized the part played by the rise of leftist extremism in forcing the schism in the S.P.D.; perhaps one day we will have a study of the contribution leftist extremism made to the origins of Nazism. All that can be done here is to point to the similarity between the militant methods of Luxemburg and Liebknecht and those Hitler later used.⁷⁸ The author has elsewhere suggested the similarity of the social-psychiatric characteristics which both extreme Marxism and Nazism fostered (e.g., defensive psychoses; concept of the world as a realm of struggle; hatred of exploiters; condemnation of the existing state and bourgeois society, bourgeois ethics; justification of ruthless and illegal action).⁷⁹ Suggestive remarks have been made by Friedrich Meinecke on the relationship of socialism and National Socialism.⁸⁰ There can be little doubt that Social Democracy's condemna-

⁷³See also John L. Snell, "Socialist Unions and Socialist Patriotism in Germany, 1914-1918," *American Historical Review*, LIX (1953), 66-76.

⁷⁴Leo Stern, *Die Auswirkungen der ersten russischen Revolution von 1905-1907 auf Deutschland* (Berlin, 1955). See also: Richard W. Reichard, "The German Working Class and the Russian Revolution of 1905," *Journal of Central European Affairs*, XIII (1953), 136-153; Henry J. Tobias and John L. Snell, "A Soviet Interpretation of the SPD, 1895-1933," *Journal of Central European Affairs*, XIII (1953), 61-66.

⁷⁵Rosa Luxemburg, *Ausgewählte Reden und Schriften*, 2 vols. (Berlin, 1951).

⁷⁶Karl Liebknecht, *Ausgewählte Reden, Briefe und Aufsätze* (Berlin, 1952).

⁷⁷Paul Frölich, *Rosa Luxemburg: Gedanke und Tat* (Hamburg, 1949); Karl W. Meyer, *Karl Liebknecht: Man Without a Country* (Washington, 1957).

⁷⁸See the introductory essay in John L. Snell (ed.), *The Nazi Revolution: Germany's Guilt or Germany's Fate?* (Boston, 1959). As early as April 10, 1911, August Bebel in a letter to V. Adler bewailed the fact that the enemies of Social Democracy had adopted socialist methods of electoral agitation, and in some cases were outdoing the S.P.D.: Friedrich Adler (ed.), *Victor Adler: Briefwechsel*, 531.

⁷⁹See, e.g., Edward A. Shils, "Authoritarianism: 'Right' and 'Left,'" in Richard Christie and Marie Jahoda (eds.), *Studies in the Scope and Method of "The Authoritarian Personality"* (Glencoe, Ill., 1954), 24-49, especially 32-33.

⁸⁰Friedrich Meinecke, *The German Catastrophe: Reflections and Recollections*, Sidney B. Fay, trans. (Cambridge, Mass., 1950), especially 1, 16-19, 25, 70-72, and 111.

tion of liberal democracy helped pave the way for that of the Nazis. Karl Liebknecht's talk of a "dictatorship of the proletariat" was, like Nietzsche's sermons on superman, subject to divergent conclusions.

V

Other harbingers of Nazism in the Wilhelminian era have received their share of treatment by post-1945 historiography. The veteran politician and political commentator, *Willy Hellpach*, has argued that the divorce of the socialist and nationalist tendencies in the Wilhelminian era offers a key to the ultimate victory of Hitlerism in Germany.⁸¹ Hellpach dates the schism exactly in the years 1896-1903, the years in which the Naumannists tried without success to gain a mass following. Hellpach calls this seven-year period "the really tragic turning point in the destiny of the Reich and the people" (p. 117). Socialism henceforth ignored the national question in its loyalty to dogmas from which it freed itself only "fifty years too late," while an irrational romantic nationalism turned its back on social problems. The divorce opened the way for Hitler's National Socialism to rise and lead the German nation to ruin by claiming to fuse the nationalist and socialist longings of Germany (pp. 117-118). Hellpach suggests, therefore, as did Meinecke, that Hitlerism would never have arisen if Naumann's national social movement had achieved success.

Does this not in itself identify Naumannism as part of the Wilhelminian foreground of Nazism? The Naumannists have refused to admit that their movement had anything in common with Nazism. The Nazis, for their part, harshly renounced the Naumannist heritage as one that was insufficiently national and overly liberal.⁸² The movements certainly differed in the motivation, character, and humanity of their leaders and followers. The Naumannists appealed to the least selfish instincts of the most rational people of Germany; the Nazis aroused the basest emotions of an irrational mass. And yet, if ideas have any force at all in historical evolution, the great central ideal of Friedrich Naumann—the ideal of a union of capital and labor, authority and mass in a national and social community—surely helped prepare the way for Hitler's opportunistic pose as the leader of *all* real Germans, without regard to class or regional or religious distinctions. Hellpach rightly insists that this was not all pose, that Hitler gave the Germans more "*égalité und fraternité*" than they had ever known before (p. 157). How many one-time Naumannists were taken in, even briefly, by this feature of Nazism? Certainly it helps to explain the motives of those "intellectual fellow travelers" of Nazism of whom Hellpach can write convincingly (p. 149)—by virtue of having been one for a time.

Hellpach identifies Heinrich Treitschke as the first great prophet of

⁸¹Willy Hellpach, *Der deutsche Charakter* (Bonn, 1954). In contrast to Lowie, *Toward Understanding Germany*, Hellpach recognizes distinctive features of German "national character."

⁸²See, e.g., Oskar Gram, *Politik und Wehrpolitik bei Friedrich Naumann* (Würzburg, 1939), 31, 36, and *passim*.

that irrational nationalism which did so much to open the way for Nazism (p. 113). This is not new, but post-1945 publications show more clearly than earlier works how Treitschke was shaped by pre-1870 Germany and the way he helped to shape the Germany of Bismarck and William II. *Walter Bussmann*⁸³ has treated the early life of the historian, who openly boasted to foreign critics that he wrote only for Germans.⁸⁴ Bussmann convincingly emphasizes the psychological factors that greatly influenced the young Trietschke, finding in his complaint about life's burdens at ten years of age a leitmotiv which was "never to vanish from his life" (p. 3). *Andreas Dorpalen* has since written a full-length life story of Treitschke, basing his excellent account upon painstaking research in this country and in Germany.⁸⁵ By 1869 Trietschke's ideas and methods were fully matured: praise of aristocracy, opposition to middle class rule, a scorn for and hatred and fear of the masses which occasionally gave way to a demagogic flattery of them, disdain for France and England, glorification of the Prussian monarchy and of war, and a tendency to use whatever argument seemed momentarily most convenient—these were the characteristics which the querulous paranoic rubbed off on his era. Having helped to shape the character of the Wilhelmian era, he found it disillusioning (p. 274). "Perhaps the most tragic aspect of his activities was that he was quite unaware of the full implications of his teachings and writings and of their effect on his audience," Dorpalen writes (p. 174). And he reminds us in this important volume that Heinrich Class was one of those nameless faces in Treitschke's audiences who were influenced for life by his teachings (p. 234). Class himself was to contribute to the rise of Nazism as an anti-Semite and as leader of the Pan-German League in the Wilhelmian, Weimar, and Hitler eras.

Hannah Arendt has written that Nazism owed more to this Pan-Germanism of the Wilhelmian era than to "any other ideology or political movements."⁸⁶ Certainly the *Alldeutsche Verband* made its contribution to Nazism, though not so great a contribution as Arendt suggests. Accounts of the Pan-German League by *Mildred S. Wertheimer* and *Lothar Werner*⁸⁷ have now been reexamined and extended by *Alfred Kruck*,⁸⁸ who covers the entire history of the notoriously chauvinistic organization to the end of its existence in 1939. Kruck insists that both Wertheimer and Werner "strongly underrate" the significance of the Pan-German League. He exaggerates its importance, but illuminates its history. Founded in nucleus

⁸³Walter Bussmann, *Treitschke: Sein Welt und Geschichtsbild* (Göttingen, 1952). Historians will be interested in knowing that Treitschke, some forty years after Ranke had promised to write history "as it actually happened," asked a friend for an exact citation of the famous formula, which Treitschke vaguely remembered as "'was wirklich geschah'—oder ähnlich" (Bussmann, 201).

⁸⁴Heinrich von Treitschke, *Deutsche Geschichte im neunzehnten Jahrhundert*, 5 vols. (Leipzig, 1879-1894), IV, vi.

⁸⁵Andrea Dorpalen, *Heinrich von Treitschke* (New Haven, 1957).

⁸⁶Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (New York, 1951), 222.

⁸⁷Mildred S. Wertheimer, *The Pan-German League, 1890-1914* (New York, 1924); Lothar Werner, *Der alldeutsche Verband 1890-1918* (Berlin, 1935).

⁸⁸Alfred Kruck, *Geschichte des alldeutschen Verbandes 1890-1939* (Wiesbaden, 1954).

at Frankfurt in 1890 (Alfred Hugenberg was among those present), the League was reorganized and reinvigorated in 1893 under a new president, Ernst Hasse. Heinrich Class succeeded Hasse in 1908 and directed the organization until 1939. Despite his efforts to build a mass movement, the League remained largely an organization of the upper middle class. Even the Conservative Party was reserved in its official attitude toward the League.⁸⁹ As Kruck shows, it claimed 17,000 members on the eve of war and 35,000 by 1918, including Jews as well as non-Jews. Academicians accounted for about one third of the membership in 1914. Hostile in his attitude toward the League, Kruck provides an excellent account of its activities during World War I, and shows that the League served thereafter as an advance guard of Nazism.

Another type of advance guard of Nazism, the youth movement of the Wilhelmian era, is treated briefly but suggestively by *Friedrich Glum* and by *Robert G. L. Waite*. Both touch this matter incidentally, being pre-occupied with other problems. Nietzsche and Stefan George were literary heroes for many of the youth, and the highly impressionistic and flamboyant book by *Howard Becker*, like Glum's, powerfully suggests the continuities between the pre-1914 Free German Youth and the *Hitler-Jugend* of later years.⁹⁰ But both Glum and Becker overlook the socialist youth movement. It is well to heed Waite's reminder that there was no single German youth movement, but dozens of groups whose programs ranged from "open homosexuality and sexual excess to extreme self-abnegation; from vegetarianism to epicureanism; from atheism to religious fanaticism; and from pacifism to folkish nationalism" (p. 18). The youth movements of the Wilhelmian era still need critical historical study.

Many of the youth groups fostered a virulent form of anti-Semitism, which in its pre-1918 manifestations helped to nail down one plank in the program of Nazism. Lowie notwithstanding (see Part I of this article), social anti-Semitism was prevalent in the Germany of William II, and the intensity of feeling it aroused on the part of otherwise rational men is revealed by the new collection of Fontane letters. Those who remember Fontane's treatment of "Baruch" and "Isadore" in *Der Stechlin* (1898) will not be surprised to find that Fontane was alarmed at the rise of Jewish "influence." As early as 1892 he believed that Jewish control extended even to the military and nobility and could not be changed, and that Berlin was becoming a Jewish metropolis: "61 percent of all Berlin houses are in Jewish hands and in ten or twenty years it will probably be 80 percent; *wie will man da heraus?*"⁹¹ The Dreyfus affair convinced him that "the European press is a great Jewish power, which has tried to force its opinion upon the entire world."⁹² The belief that *Judentum* threatened German

⁸⁹Booms, *Die deutschkonservative Partei*, 120-129.

⁹⁰Glum, *Philosophen im Spiegel und Zerrspiegel*, 24-32; Robert G. L. Waite, *Vanguard of Nazism: The Free Corps Movement in Postwar Germany, 1918-1923* (Cambridge, Mass., 1952), 18 and *passim*; Howard Becker, *German Youth: Bond or Free?* (New York, 1946).

⁹¹Fontane (Schreinert, ed.), *Briefe an Georg Friedlaender*, 197.

Kultur was solidly imbedded in the social fabric of Germany well before Adolf Hitler and Alfred Rosenberg and Julius Streicher began their diabolical work of capitalizing upon it and amplifying it.

Yet, political anti-Semitism declined in the pre-1914 decade, as a recent study by Paul W. Massing demonstrates and carefully tries to explain.⁹² Massing's generalizations are not always consistent. Though he states that economic difficulties were basic causes of anti-Semitism, he also writes that "it was democratization of government that gave the greatest impetus to political anti-Semitism" by increasing the chances of organizing a "mass movement from the Right" (pp. 27-28, 89, 91). And he elsewhere contends that political anti-Semitism was chiefly prevalent not so much among the masses but among the "urban, educated strata . . ." (p. 101). Despite careful research, therefore, Massing's volume calls for more specific studies to test his various conclusions, especially his major thesis, that: "The years 1875-1895 were the formative period of all German political anti-Semitism. . . . The conditions of its growth and its inherent explosive forces had become discernible a generation prior to the Nazi ascent to power" (p. 109). It enjoyed a sudden resurgence in the elections of 1907. The fact of that resurgence suggests that Massing's explanation for the decline (return of economic prosperity after 1895) overlooks a number of factors of a political and psychological character that seem to have influenced the movement.

The increasing positive racism of the period, a tendency to glorify the German race, played an important part in bridging the gap between the Wilhelminian and the Hitler eras, and the English-born Houston Stewart Chamberlain personally embodied the bridge. Adalbert Wahl celebrated Chamberlain as "a German writer" and gave nine pages to his development of racism in Wilhelminian Germany.⁹⁴ His pre-1918 activities, his relations with the Kaiser, and his direct contact with an admiring Adolf Hitler in the Weimar era are treated in an admirable essay by Jean Réal, in a volume which contains several other chapters of great interest to students of the intellectual background of Nazism.⁹⁵ Among these are discussions of Paul de Lagarde and Moeller van den Bruck, both of whom are dealt with in greater detail in a perceptive and well written dissertation by Fritz Stern. The Stern monograph also includes a fine account of the author of the famous *Rembrandt Deutsche*, Julius Langbehn.⁹⁶

⁹²*Ibid.*, 320.

⁹³Paul W. Massing, *Rehearsal for Destruction: A Study of Political Anti-Semitism in Imperial Germany* (New York, 1949). The subject has also been treated by M. Broszat, "Die antisemitische Bewegung in Wilhelminischen Deutschland," Ph.D. dissertation, Kiel, 1953. Cf. John Higham, "Anti-Semitism in the Gilded Age: A Reinterpretation," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, XLIII (1957), 559-578, for parallels in the American and German experience.

⁹⁴Wahl, *Deutsche Geschichte . . . (1871 bis 1914)*, III, 54-63.

⁹⁵Jean Réal, "The Religious Conception of Race: Houston Stewart Chamberlain and Germanic Christianity," in Baumont, Fried, and Vermeil (eds.), *The Third Reich*, 243-286.

⁹⁶Fritz Richard Stern, "Cultural Despair and the Politics of Discontent: A Study of the Rise of the 'Germanic' Ideology," Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1953, available from University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, Michigan.

These men were pioneers in what Hugo von Hofmannsthal called a "conservative revolution." The term seems only superficially to be a happy one, for it confuses more than it clarifies; the old term "Tory Democracy" or perhaps a new one, "Tory Socialism," might be better. The writers the phrase is made to embrace did not constitute an organized movement, and if they had anything in common it was a variously defined desire for authoritarian leadership of a nationalistic German mass, solidly welded behind a state leader by patriarchal social welfare measures. It is not customary to call this type of Bonapartism "conservative," and it is questionable at best to think of it as essentially "revolutionary." To call it "neo-conservatism" is to avoid coming to grips with the problem. But whatever one may call it, the movement enjoyed its rise in the Wilhelmian era, helped to condition Germans to accept the similar but more ruthless dogmas of Nazism, and then found its demise under Hitler, to whom the "conservative revolutionaries" were at best superfluous and at worst potential opponents. Treated earlier by *Waldemar Gurian*⁹⁷ and by *Edmond Vermeil*,⁹⁸ this intellectual "vanguard of Nazism" has been reexamined more recently by *Klemens von Klemperer*, *Jean Neurohr*, and *Armin Mohler*.⁹⁹ Of these accounts, Klemperer's is of greatest interest to students of the 1888-1918 era. Klemperer claims too many writers, including Nietzsche and right-wing Social Democrats, as "conservative revolutionaries." Furthermore, his theses are overly murky and his generalizations are frequently more brittle than brilliant. But this volume is often highly suggestive and at least views the Wilhelmian era as one in which more than democracy and socialism are growing. Without agreeing with Neurohr that Treitschke and Class did less than the "conservative revolutionaries" to prepare the way for Nazism (p. 10), one should recognize their role and compare it with that of other harbingers of Hitlerism.

One of these was almost certainly William II himself, for one can see a remarkable forecast and prelude to Hitler's leadership in the last Kaiser's emotionalism, erratic use of threats in domestic and foreign policy, staged bravado and self-dramatization, tendencies to engage in "personal rule," willingness to pass judgment upon almost everything (including matters in which he lacked knowledge and experience) inability to learn by listening to others, and, worst of all, his attempts to ostracize literally hundreds of thousands of Social Democratic citizens of the Reich as "men without a Fatherland." Decades before the Nazi movement began, William II accustomed the people of Germany to paranoid behavior on the part of their ruler, and trained them to expect imposing demands from the head of state. The crowned monarch publicly and repeatedly insisted long before the plebeian dictator arose that: "There can only be one Leader in the

⁹⁷Waldemar Gurian, *Um des Reiches Zukunft . . .* (Freiburg im Breisgau, 1932).

⁹⁸Edmond Vermeil, *Doctrinaires de la révolution Allemande (1918-1938)* (Paris, 1939).

⁹⁹Klemens von Klemperer, *Germany's New Conservatism: Its History and Dilemma in the Twentieth Century* (Princeton, 1957); Neurohr, *Der Mythos vom dritten Reich*; and Armin Mohler, *Die konservative Revolution in Deutschland 1918-1932* (Stuttgart, 1950).

land—and I am that! Anyone who sets himself against me I shall crush.”

All these faults—pre-Hitlerite “Hitlerisms”—emerge clearly in a popularized and impressionistic but near-brilliant interpretation of the Kaiser’s life by *Joachim von Kürenberg* (J. von Reichel).¹⁰⁰ The account is filled with penetrating insights into the Kaiser’s personality, as when it sums up the effect of the tutor Hinzpeter’s ruthless discipline on the young Wilhelm: “The Prince became suspicious of people, and lost self-confidence. To fight against this feeling he tried early to make others forget his disability by dazzling them with a display of extravagant mannerisms” (p. 24). And Kürenberg knows that William II was often blamed for faults that were not his own. He assigns the major blame for the handling of the *Daily Telegraph* affair to Bülow, the man whom the Kaiser and many contemporaries had for years regarded as “a cow that gave whipped cream” (p. 130). He none the less concludes that the Kaiser remained an “ingenious dilettante” and that therein lay “the tragedy of his life” (p. 355).

The attempt by *Hans Helfritz* to counterbalance the effect of the Kürenberg account with a pro-Kaiser interpretation is generally unsuccessful.¹⁰¹ Helfritz matches praise for Philipp Eulenburg as “a loyal and clever adviser” of the Kaiser (pp. 102-123) with contrived arguments that William II could not have engaged in personal rule because the constitutions of 1850 and 1871 provided for limited monarchy (p. 58). This resurrects little respect for William II.

What can be said in extenuation of the Kaiser’s precedents for Hitler’s rule has been said better elsewhere. *Franz Schnabel*, *Hajo Holborn*, *Richard Sexau* and others have put the basic blame upon Bismarck for having established many of the precedents for both William II and Hitler,¹⁰² which reminds us that much of the Progressive Party’s contemporary criticism of William II was really criticism of the *System Bismarcks* which he tried to continue.¹⁰³ *Andreas Dorpalen* has strongly suggested that the Progressives would have been as disappointed by the “liberal” Frederick III, had he lived, as they were by his son, and goes even further in stating that the German liberals themselves must bear a considerable part of the

¹⁰⁰Joachim von Kürenberg (pseud. for J. von Reichel), *The Kaiser: A Life of William II, Last Emperor of Germany*, H. T. Russell and Herta Hagen, trans. (London, 1954). Cf. the published lecture by John W. Wheeler-Bennett, *Three Episodes in the Life of Kaiser William II* (Cambridge, 1956).

¹⁰¹Hans Helfritz, *Wilhelm II. als Kaiser und König: Eine historische Studie* (Zürich, 1954). See the critical review of this work by Walter Goetz, *Historische Zeitschrift*, CLXXIX (1955), 21-44.

¹⁰²See, e.g., Richard Sexau, “Bismarck: Fülle und Grenze der Macht,” *Neues Abendland*, X (1955), 723, and the essays by Hajo Holborn, Franz Schnabel, and others in Hans Kohn (ed.), *German History: Some New German Views* (Boston, 1954). But cf. Gustav Adolf Rein, *Die Revolution in der Politik Bismarcks* (Göttingen, Berlin, Frankfurt, 1957), for an appreciation of Bismarck’s skill in adapting “revolutionary” methods to conservative objectives.

¹⁰³See, e.g., Carl Schneider, “The Political Liberalism of the Progressive Parties in Germany, 1871 to 1914” (especially 205), unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1943. Cf. Kramer Jesse Rohfleisch, “Eugen Richter, Opponent of Bismarck,” unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, 1946.

blame for their disappointments.¹⁰⁴ An even more basic apology for the Kaiser was suggested by the compassionate *Walther Rathenau* in 1919 when he wrote that the Kaiser was built in the image of his era.¹⁰⁵ Surely the Kaiser should be portrayed as a pre-1914 harbinger of Nazism, but only if a large number of courtly sycophants, a greater number of party leaders, and a mass of subjects who passively endured his posturings of autocratic power are made to appear in the foreground. How many there were who echoed the words of Heinrich Mann's Diederich Hessling in *Der Untertan*: "I believe that in these hard times we need . . . a strong government as our young Kaiser runs it"! Yet, William II himself remains the greatest tragedy of all in Imperial Germany's tragic era, if only for his unstable fluctuations between concession to popular government and thoughts of dictatorship. The First World War was to point up the painful indecision that plagued him, and never so vividly and fatefully as when his defaults in October, 1918, compounding the defeat, undermined the very institution of monarchy in Germany.

VI

The First World War brought about an intensified interaction of domestic and international forces such as seldom exists in peacetime. It also brought an acute intensification of the opportunities facing the four forces previously traced in this article. The forces of preservation, like the forces of destructive criticism, largely failed to take advantage of the many opportunities the war presented them. The defaults of the first and the patriotic self-censorship of the second limited the possibilities to the two others. The contradictory possibilities for radically democratic change and for a ruthless and nationalist dictatorship were indefinitely enlarged as soon as the leaders of the Reich blundered into war in July, 1914.

Unfortunately, we can never know what would have happened had the leaders of Imperial Germany decided to pin their fate to voluntary reforms early in the war. Bethmann Hollweg wanted to do so, and a useful dissertation by *Rudolf Koschnitzke*, while revealing little that was not already known, accurately blames his failure to achieve a genuine *Neuorientierung* upon Conservative Party leaders and the military "demigods," Hindenburg and Ludendorff.¹⁰⁶ How they brought Bethmann Hollweg down in July, 1917, and the help they received from the Crown Prince and many party leaders, including Gustav Stresemann and Matthias Erzberger, has been demonstrated with much new detail by a number of post-1945 biographies and autobiographies. Among the most important of these are the already mentioned *Jäckh* autobiography and Epstein's biography of Erzberger; also helpful are the memoirs of *Friedrich von Prittwitz und*

¹⁰⁴Andreas Dorpalen, "Emperor Frederick III and the German Liberal Movement," *American Historical Review*, LIV (1948), 1-31.

¹⁰⁵Walther Rathenau, *Der Kaiser: Eine Betrachtung* (Berlin, 1919), 24, 44, 46.

¹⁰⁶Rudolf Koschnitzke, "Die Innenpolitik des Reichskanzlers von Bethmann Hollweg im Weltkrieg," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Kiel, 1951, especially 283-293.

Gaffron,¹⁰⁷ the memoirs of *General Wilhelm Groener*,¹⁰⁸ and a biography of him by his daughter, *Dorothea Groener-Geyer* (in which hindsight sometimes interferes with her usually close and authentic paraphrase-summary of Groener's own account)¹⁰⁹ and the fine biography of Crown Prince Wilhelm by *Paul Herre*,¹¹⁰ which generally confirms but supplements the earlier account of *Rudolf von Valentini*.¹¹¹

Of considerable value for the information it yields on the Reichstag politics of preservation is the war diary of *Hans Peter Hanssen*, whose reports on the meetings of the Budget Committee of the Reichstag in July, 1917, are especially valuable. An abridgment of the original Hanssen diary, published in Danish in 1924, is now available in an English translation by *Ralph H. Lutz*, *O. O. Winther*, and *Mary Schofield*.¹¹² Erzberger's part in the July, 1917, crisis and the wartime inner-party politics of the Center Party are clarified in an excellent article by *John K. Zeender*, based upon unpublished manuscript material,¹¹³ and in a well written doctoral dissertation by *Bruce Frye*, who made good use of the Hanssen diary.¹¹⁴ The various publications show that responsible leaders in the government and the Reichstag wanted to strengthen the Imperial régime by timely wartime reform, but that they were not even allowed to begin serious discussions until the Russian Revolution of March, 1917, and United States entry into the war in April, 1917, greatly radicalized German domestic politics. Even then the most influential men in German industry and politics were more willing to gamble upon victory to preserve the social order and the régime than to concede reforms. These groups and their war aims have been identified and their activities narrated in an exceptionally able study by *Hans W. Gatzke*.¹¹⁵ The efforts of Bethmann's successors, Georg Michaelis and Count Georg von Hertling, to preserve the empire have been treated in an unpublished doctoral dissertation by *Edward Hoop*.¹¹⁶

The rising of the democratic forces as war hardships and the prospects

¹⁰⁷Friedrich von Prittwitz and Gaffron, *Zwischen Petersburg und Washington: Ein Diplomatenleben* (Munich, 1952).

¹⁰⁸Wilhelm Groener (Friedrich Hiller von Gärtringen, ed.), *Lebenserinnerungen: Jugend, Generalstab, Weltkrieg* (Göttingen, 1957).

¹⁰⁹Dorothea Groener-Geyer, *General Groener: Soldat und Staatsmann* (Frankfurt am Main, 1955).

¹¹⁰Paul Herre, *Kronprinz Wilhelm: Seine Rolle in der deutschen Politik* (Munich, 1954).

¹¹¹Bernhard Schwertfeger (ed.), *Kaiser und Kabinettschef: Nach eigenen Aufzeichnungen und dem Briefwechsel des . . . Rudolf von Valentini* (Oldenburg, 1931).

¹¹²Hans Peter Hanssen (Ralph H. Lutz, Mary Schofield, and O. O. Winther, trans. and eds.), *Diary of a Dying Empire* (Bloomington, Ind., 1955). Cf. comment in *Historische Zeitschrift*, CLXXXIV (1957), 475-476.

¹¹³John K. Zeender, "The German Catholic Center Party during World War I. An Internal Study," *Catholic Historical Review*, XLII (1957), 441-468.

¹¹⁴Bruce Bradford Frye, "Matthias Erzberger and German Politics, 1914-1921," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University, 1953, available from University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, Michigan.

¹¹⁵Hans W. Gatzke, *Germany's Drive to the West (Drang nach Westen): A Study of Germany's Western War Aims during the First World War* (Baltimore, 1950).

¹¹⁶Edward Hoop, "Die Innenpolitik der Reichskanzler Michaelis und Graf Hertling," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Kiel, 1951.

of ultimate defeat increased may be followed in the Jäckh autobiography and more especially in the Hanssen diary. The activities of the extreme Left-Socialists, the Spartacists, have been eulogized in doctrinaire but useful essays in a recently published East-German collection, edited by *Albert Schreiner*, in which *Heinrich Scheel's* account of the strikes of April, 1917, in Berlin and *Walter Bartel's* report on the strikes of January, 1918, break the newest ground; all the essays considerably exaggerate the revolutionary effect of the Russian revolutions of 1917 upon Germany.¹¹⁷ A more reliable but very general estimate of the impact of those revolutions upon German labor is afforded by the newly published monograph by *Fritz Opel* on the metal workers union during the First World War.¹¹⁸ An uncompromisingly monarchist treatment of the final crisis of the German Empire in defeat can still appear in German doctoral dissertations, as the study by *A. Ritthaler* reveals.¹¹⁹ The author of this article¹²⁰ has presented a different viewpoint, based upon new documentation, on the general crisis of October-November, 1918, while *Theo Eberle*, in another German dissertation, briefly reviews the onset of the revolution of 1918 in Munich.¹²¹ The proto-Nazi forces have largely escaped recent analysis, even though the *Hilfsdienstgesetz* of 1916, the men around Colonel Max Bauer of Ludendorff's staff, and the Fatherland Party of 1917-1918 are obvious subjects that invite attention.¹²² Mature research will probably conclude that the chief role of the proto-Nazi forces in World War I was to insure the collapse of the Second Empire by holding out in favor of impossibly nationalist war aims and against democratic and representative government.

VII

The need for additional monographs and for works of synthesis on Wilhelmian Germany should be emphasized. Certain topics that need attention have been directly suggested above, and indirectly others may emerge as the reader contemplates gaps in the post-1945 literature. The field of economic history has been generally neglected, for example, and social and cultural affairs have gotten only slightly more attention. In the field of political history it might be mentioned that the whole complex of

¹¹⁷Albert Schreiner (ed.), *Revolutionäre Ereignisse und Probleme in Deutschland während der Periode der grossen sozialistischen Oktoberrevolution 1917/1918: Beiträge zum 40. Jahrestag der grossen sozialistischen Oktoberrevolution* (Berlin, 1957). A number of articles in *Voprosy Istorii* and East-German journals are noted in *Historical Abstracts*, I (1955-).

¹¹⁸Fritz Opel, *Der deutsche Metallarbeiter-Verband während der ersten Weltkriege und der Revolution* (Hanover and Frankfurt, 1957).

¹¹⁹A. Ritthaler, "Die Verantwortung Kaiser Wilhelms II. für den Ausgang des deutschen Kaisertums," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Munich, 1953. I am indebted to the author and to Prof. Dr. Heinz Gollwitzer, now at Münster, for making this dissertation available to me.

¹²⁰John L. Snell, "Republik aus Versäumnissen," *Die Welt als Geschichte*, XV (1955), 196-219, which must be used with caution because of a number of typographical errors.

¹²¹Theo Eberle, "Die grossen politischen Parteien und die Revolution 1918/1919 in München," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Tübingen, 1951. Prof. Dr. Hans Rothfels kindly made this dissertation available to me.

¹²²For a one-sided and sketchy report on the Fatherland Party see Karl Wortmann, *Geschichte der deutschen Vaterlands-Partei 1917-1918* (Halle, 1926).

factors involved in the 1908 crisis needs to be studied comprehensively, not just the *Daily Telegraph* affair in isolation. Furthermore, a study of the Reichstag elections of 1912 is yet to be made. Efforts of the parties to create majority blocs in the Reichstag and of the forces that prevented their success could be very valuably studied, and in general the advice that *Wilhelm Mommsen* gave in 1933 still holds good: that it is desirable to study limited periods of the history of specific political parties, and equally desirable to examine the attitudes of the various parties toward specific problems.¹²³ Studies in the interaction of domestic affairs and foreign policy, such as the outstanding monograph by *Henry Cord Meyer*,¹²⁴ are especially valuable and especially rare. Until they are made, the history of pre-1914 diplomacy will continue to be written as though it were restricted to the moves and counter moves of foreign offices. Is it only accidental, for example, that *A. J. P. Taylor* should come up with the surprisingly inaccurate comment that the statesmen of the era "enjoyed Freedom from Fear so far as revolution went"?¹²⁵

The period needs to be examined with new research tools and new attitudes. Social psychiatry may offer as many false leads as new insights, but historians need to try its methods, as *William L. Langer* has suggested.¹²⁶ As long ago as the turn of the century, when the Freudian age began, *Eugen Richter* perceptively commented that imperialism was for a nation "what megalomania is for an individual."¹²⁷ His challenging notion has gone untested and unstudied too long in decades of preoccupation with economic determinism. So has *Adalbert Wahl's* biased but pregnant description of the Spartacist leader as "the young (pathological) *Liebknecht*."¹²⁸ The end of the *Wilhelmian* era offers many problems for social psychiatrists, or for historians who have learned their mysteries. Viewed from the approach of the social psychiatrist, who is concerned with traumatic social experiences such as famines and plagues, the wartime food shortages and the influenza epidemic of 1918 may provide studies that are original, interesting, and important. Did the influenza and the wartime hunger and slaughter help to create and win receptivity for the Expressionist movement in German art, for example? One is intrigued by *Langer's* reminder (p. 297) of the "immense popularity of the Dance of Death woodcuts and murals . . . which appeared soon after the Black Death and which, it is agreed, expressed the sense of the immediacy of death and the dread of dying unshriven." And one thinks immediately of *Karl Barth* and neo-orthodoxy in post-1918

¹²³*Wilhelm Mommsen*, "Zur Methodik der deutschen Parteigeschichte," *Historische Zeitschrift*, CXLVII (1933), 53-62.

¹²⁴*Meyer*, *Mitteleuropa in German Thought and Action*; cited in n. 21, above. *Ludwig Dehio*, *Deutschland und die Weltpolitik im 20. Jahrhundert* (Munich, 1955), offers many provocative generalizations about the interaction of domestic developments and international forces.

¹²⁵*A. J. P. Taylor*, *The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848-1918* (Oxford, 1954), xxxiv.

¹²⁶*William L. Langer*, "The Next Assignment," *American Historical Review*, LXIII (1958), 283-304.

¹²⁷*Arendt*, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, 124.

¹²⁸*Wahl*, *Deutsche Geschichte . . . (1871 bis 1914)*, IV, 3.

Germany upon reading Langer's suggestive remark that the sense of sin is "naturally enhanced by the impact of vast unaccountable and uncontrollable forces threatening the existence of each and every one" (p. 299).

Finally, the study of the revolution of 1918 as a traumatic political experience may yet show that this very "threshold to democracy" was, in reality, but the "foreground of Nazism." The Wilhelmian era as a whole was neither the one nor the other. From that period came the men who stumbled through the Weimar era, those who ran the Hitlerian state, those who have directed the fortunes of the Bonn republic, and those who have since 1945 gambled their lives and their peoples' destiny upon the ultimate triumph of Soviet Communism in world affairs. It was both "threshold to democracy" and "foreground of Nazism," beyond which can be counted, thus far in subsequent history, two democracies and two dictatorships in Germany. As Germany's continuing revolution unfolds at home and in world affairs, the importance of the Wilhelmian era is not likely to appear diminished. And it will require the labor and imagination of scores of historians yet to come to complete the inventory of this overloaded historical entrepot, which has yielded both the miseries of the recent past and whatever prospects for the future that Germans presently enjoy.

TULANE UNIVERSITY

NOTES

The accumulation of increased costs of printing and publication has finally obliged us to raise the annual subscription price of the JOURNAL from \$5.00 to \$6.00 (Foreign subscribers add \$.40 postage). The increase took effect with the January 1959 issue; and a notification of the change was given in the October 1958 issue.

* * *

The Ohio State University will conduct a Summer Program on the Soviet Union, June 22 to July 24, 1959, featuring lectures by distinguished visiting scholars and recognized authorities, motion pictures, exhibitions of art, conferences and informal social meetings supplementary to the formal academic program. Faculty for the program will include M. V. Condoide, Charles Morley, Louis Nemzer, Gleb Struve, and Jack R. Villmow. For enrollment requirements and procedures, write to Dr. Charles Morley, Director, Summer Program on the Soviet Union, 211 University Hall, The Ohio State University, Columbus (10), Ohio.

* * *

New York City, Jan. 8. The Ford Foundation has announced that about twenty leaders and scholars from Yugoslavia will study and travel in the United States during 1959 and 1960 with Foundation funds provided under its program to strengthen educational and cultural relations between East Europe and the West. Previously, a major part of this exchange effort has been assistance for travel and study abroad by Polish nationals. With a grant of approximately \$130,000, the Institute of International Education, New York, will be responsible for planning and administering the programs of the individual visitors.

* * *

At the December 28 meeting of the American Division of the Istituto per la Storia del Risorgimento Italiano, in addition to voting on the organization's new official designation—the Society for Italian Historical Studies—it was also voted to introduce a new category of members, Graduate Students, who may join the Society by the payment of the net cost of the major Italian historical review to which they may wish to subscribe. Arrangements have been made with the editors of these Italian reviews to offer all members of the Society special subscription rates.

Announcement was made of the winner of the essay contest sponsored by the American Division for the best unpublished study in the history of modern Italy. The winner of the \$200.00 prize was Dr. Raymond Grew (Princeton) for his essay on *A Sterner Plan: The History of the Italian National Society*. Two contestants received honorable mention: Richard A. Webster (Columbia University) for his *The Formation of the Democratic Cadres in Italy, 1929-1945* and Paul W. Schroeder (Concordia Senior College), *Metternich and the Restored Governments at Naples and Piedmont, 1821-1822*.

Additional information concerning the aim and scope of the Society and applications for membership may be had from Professor Howard R. Marraro, Executive Secretary Treasurer of the Society for Italian Historical Studies, Columbia University, New York 27, N. Y.

The American Hungarian Studies Foundation, a non-profit organization now in its sixteenth year and headed by August J. Molnor, is requesting contributions and donations of Hungarian books or museum pieces to further its expanding program of disseminating the Hungarian cultural heritage in the United States. Plans for the near future include Hungarian studies programs for Eastern and Western colleges and universities; preparation in English of *Magyar Rhapsody*, a detailed book about Hungary and Hungarians; a museum and library building; and lecture series by Hungarian-born men and women of renown. Information and previous publications of the Foundation may be obtained from: American Hungarian Studies Foundation, Box 173, Elmhurst, Illinois.

* * *

The Far Western Slavic Conference of the Joint Committee on Slavic Studies (ACLS and SSRC, H. H. Fisher, Chairman of Conference) held its first meeting, at the invitation of the Hoover Institution in the Hoover Tower at Stanford, April 3, 4 and 5. The general topic of the meeting was "Nationalism and Communism" as discussed in four sessions. Brief written papers prepared and presented by participants in different academic disciplines were followed by discussion and questions from the floor.

The general purposes of the Conference are to encourage research and the exchange of ideas among members of different academic disciplines; to enlist the interest of university and college teachers and others who are not necessarily specialists in the Slavic field but who may wish to know more about the research and writing being done on topics relating to this field and the Communist movement; and to convey to a wider public a realization of the importance of these subjects in a general education and for public enlightenment.

* * *

Under the sponsorship of the Joint Committee on Slavic Studies of the ACLS, sixteen American specialists on Slavic languages and literatures presented papers at the Fourth International Congress of Slavists, held in Moscow, September 1-10, 1958. A special grant from the Ford Foundation subsidized their participation. The sixteen were a part of the total American delegation of twenty, representing seven principal American universities offering graduate work in the Slavic field. More than three hundred papers were presented and discussed at the ten-day meeting, which was attended by seven or eight hundred persons representing some twenty-five nations. The host organization was the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R. The sessions were held in the Moscow University. (William B. Edgerton, *A.C.L.S. Newsletter*, December 1958).

* * *

SLOBODAN JOVANOVIĆ (1869-1958)

Professor Slobodan Jovanovic, who died recently, was the most distinguished Serbian historian. The son of a prominent liberal leader, who tried to enlist the support of Herzen, Mazzini and Palmerston in the struggle for Serbian unification, S. Jovanovic was educated at Belgrade and Geneva. After a short career in the Serbian diplomatic service, he joined

in 1897 the Law Faculty of Belgrade University, becoming in the succeeding decades Rector of the University, President of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and member of several learned societies in Europe.

Jovanovic's contribution to learning was twofold. Firstly, his work on European political thought, sociology and literature helped to bring successive generations of Serbian intellectuals into closer touch with the West. Secondly, his numerous studies on various aspects of Serbian history and especially the second half of the nineteenth century, added enormously to our knowledge of modern Serbia and the origins of the Yugoslav state. Elegant in style and devoid of the bias which marred the work of some of his predecessors, his publications are a landmark in Serbian historiography. A bibliography of his books, articles and book reviews up to 1935 appeared in the 16th volume of his collected works (*Sabrana Dela*) published in Belgrade (1935).

A lifelong liberal, Prof. Jovanovic was associated with those circles which worked for parliamentary democracy in Serbia and Yugoslavia, and favored close co-operation with the West. In this capacity he was elected in 1937 president of the Serbian Cultural Club, a body representing the Serbian intellectual élite, that aimed at rousing public opinion against the growing threat of Germany. He joined the pro-British government in March 1941 and acted as Prime Minister of the Royal Yugoslav Government in London (Jan. 1942-June 1943). His approach to wartime politics was heavily criticized by even his admirers and former pupils. The followers of General Mihailovic blamed him for not giving sufficient support to the Chetnik movement, while the Communists accused him of collaboration with the enemy, war crimes, etc., and sentenced him to twenty years' imprisonment in absentia at the trial of General Mihailovic. Prof. Jovanovic spent the last seventeen years of his life in London, where, after the end of the Second World War, he acted as president of the Yugoslav National Committee. He also contributed a series of penetrating articles on various aspects of Yugoslav Communism, which showed conclusively that he had lost none of the brilliance and wit for which he will be remembered long after his exercises in practical politics are forgotten. A bibliography of his writings from 1941 to the end of 1954 appeared in the Yugoslav periodical *Poruka* (London), no. 25, December 1954.

University of Manitoba

IVAN AVAKUMOVIC

BOOK REVIEWS

BACKUS, OSWALD P., *Motives of West Russian Nobles in Deserting Lithuania for Moscow, 1377-1516*. Lawrence, Kansas: Kansas University Press, 1957. Pp. 174. 2 maps. \$5.00.

Professor Backus, in his own words, has embarked upon a project "to ascertain the impact of minority peoples upon Russian institutions and ideas." This study, the first of two planned on the "West Russians," examines the social structure of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in the period between the death of the Duke Algirdas (Olgerd) and the fall of Smolensk to the Muscovites, with the aim of uncovering the reasons for the Grand Duchy's failure to keep the allegiance of all its Orthodox Russian nobility in the face of the Muscovite challenge. The author's meticulous combing of land grants, privileges and records of local office holding has produced an extremely valuable picture of the position of the nobility in the Lithuanian state. Backus considers the explanations usually offered for the defections—religious conflict, resentment against centralization and Moscow expansionism—and concludes that while each of these was important, none was decisive. The decisive factors were personal ambition and, on the part of the great nobles, resentment over the growing role of the lesser nobility.

While the author has performed an admirable job in his research, nevertheless there are several points on which a reader might raise some questions. First, it would seem that the author relies too heavily on the reader's already knowing the basic facts of Lithuanian history in this period—especially the relations between Jagiello (Jogailo) and Vytautas (Witold), the civil war after Vytautas' death, and the plot against Casimir—and therefore his analysis at times may be unnecessarily confusing. In the discussion of the pro-Catholic character of Jagiello's privilege of 1387 (p. 34f.), it would be well to point out that Jagiello, among other things, was attempting to make Catholicism as alluring as possible to his conationals, who were mainly pagans. The Christianization of Lithuania was one of the conditions of the marriage contract at Krevo. A better analysis of the factors making possible Lithuanian expansion under Vytautas would also have been welcome (the account on p. 81 is barely adequate). The study, furthermore, leaves the reader in the dark as to just what the Muscovite state was offering the Lithuanian nobles as an alternative to their position within the Grand Duchy. However, the fact that the author ignores any discussion of the Muscovite side of the defections leads one to believe that this problem will probably be dealt with in the planned sequel.

The author compares his task with that of putting together a jigsaw puzzle which lacks many pieces, the final result being an incomplete picture, but nevertheless a picture. The reader cannot but be impressed with Backus' painstaking care in assembling the scattered bits of information, and the maps and lists into which he has organized his raw facts will be of great value to all who have any interest in this period.

Hunter College

ALFRED ERICH SENN

MIRTSCHUK, IVAN, *Geschichte der Ukrainischen Kultur*. Munich: Isar Verlag, 1957. Pp. 285. DM 22.80.

This book is written by Professor Ivan Mirtschuk, the long time Rector (President) of the Ukrainian Free University in Munich and professor of philosophy at that institution. Perhaps no one else among the Ukrainian scholars in exile was more competent to do this than he. His work is a short handbook, rather a sketch, of the Ukrainian culture in its historical development.

In the first part the author gives the historical background on which the culture of the Ukrainian people developed from prehistorical times to the present. In the second and third parts Mirtschuk presents the spiritual characteristics of the Ukrainians. For example, their deep and close ties with the Ukrainian soil, life idealism, ties with Western Europe despite their Eastern Christianity, strong individualism and religiosity, and, finally, Hellenistic-like life-optimism. Analysis of the genuine Ukrainian spirituality reveals how there exist deep differences between Ukrainians and their neighbors, especially the Russians.

This general section of the work is followed by special chapters: Ukrainian language, ethnography, church life, the philosophical mind of the Ukrainian people, and achievements in the field of Ukrainian science and humanities during the last three centuries. Dr. Mirtschuk's book treats also the field of Ukrainian art especially music, theater, architecture, sculpture, and painting. In all these fields folk art usually precedes the activity of individual artists and influences them in their creativity. The author ends his work with a review of Ukrainian schools, education, museums, and libraries.

It is evident that in a review of the development of Ukrainian culture during a period of more than one thousand years, with attention to all manifestations of Ukrainian cultural activity, this vast material had to be treated very concisely and synthetically. Mirtschuk was successful in this, without omitting any important cultural field. Despite this treatment of some parts of the material the book has not lost its usefulness since each part of the work is supported by an exhaustive list of relevant literature, especially in the languages of the Western world (English, German, French). The reader interested in any of these fields of Ukrainian culture is easily able to widen and deepen his knowledge.

The author emphasizes the spiritual characteristics of the Ukrainian, his individualism, his idealistic concept of life, and his life-optimism. This reviewer could add and underline the Ukrainian passion for freedom. Perhaps the author does not indicate expressively enough the source of this truly Hellenistic way of life of the Ukrainians. Without doubt this is the classic Greek influence, because all these spiritual characteristics were genuine among the old Greeks. The newest excavations on the territory of the Greek colonies of the northern shores of the Black Sea prove the unquestionable existence of very lively communication between the Greek colonial population and the population of the Ukrainian steppes.

Well-founded also is the author's view about the permanent ties of the Ukrainian people with the West. As early as the tenth century the Kievan Rus, the old Ukrainian state, combatted barbarian hordes invading Europe from Asia. Thus the Ukrainian people afforded protection to Western Europe. This associated the Ukrainians from the earliest times with Europe and her spirituality, to such a degree that even the Ukrainian communist writer of the 1920s, Mykola Khvylovy, proclaimed a literary slogan for Ukrainian writers: "We turn our face to Western Europe, our back to Moscow." This very clear orientation of the Ukraine has been typical for a thousand years. The author strongly remarked this trend in all his previous publications as well.

Mirtschuk's new book is a valuable acquisition for Western literature and a short guide for all those who desire to understand the Ukrainian problem, the most important unsolved problem of Eastern Europe, a steady headache of the Kremlin.

Mahwah, New Jersey

NICHOLAS D. CHUBATY

STANOJEVIĆ, GRIGOR, *Stjepan Mali*. Beograd: 1957. Pp. 103.

The activities of the impostor-tsar Stephen the Little (1767-1774) and his role in the history of Montenegro have long interested historians. Now, at last, we have a good study of the subject, published under the auspices of the Serbian Academy of Sciences in the new series of the Historical Institute. Earlier historians treated Stephen the Little merely as "an adventurer and impostor." Stanojević stresses his qualities as a ruler and a statesman.

The author first comments on the unpublished and published materials on Stephen the Little, and follows this with a discussion of the general situation in Montenegro and in the Balkans at the time of his appearance. The most important single problem in Montenegro in the 'sixties of the eighteenth century was that of the succession. In principle the election of the bishop of Montenegro was done by a general assembly of Montenegrins. In fact, however, the ruling bishops were hereditary in the house of Petrović. When in 1766 Bishop Sava attempted to designate his sister's son, Arsenije Plamenac, as his successor he encountered powerful opposition. Failing in his objective, Bishop Sava sought the support of Stephen the Little, who "had just begun his career in Montenegro." This led to a meeting of the Montenegrin tribal leaders, who agreed to make Arsenije the bishop-coadjutor.

The author next probes into the mysteries of the origin of Stephen the Little and comments on his character and personality. There are more materials on Stephen the Little, he says, than on any other Montenegrin, yet none shed light on his origin. For a variety of reasons Stephen the Little concealed his origin and at one time or another mentioned every place he knew as the place of his birth. It is almost certain that Stephen the Little was a Serb. The author believes that the place of Stephen's birth is irrelevant. What is important, he says, are his personal qualities, and in this regard the sources are plentiful and in agreement.

Why did Stephen the Little win popular acclaim in Montenegro? Stanojević attributes his success to favorable "social-psychological moments." After the death of Bishop Vasilije there was no real authority in the country and tribal anarchy was rampant. Bishop Sava was a weakling, the civil governor a youth. Empress Catherine II was unpopular for her treatment of Peter III. A group of "trusted" people, who had been in Russia, favored the cause of the impostor by agreeing that he was indeed Tsar Peter III. For centuries, under the influence of the church, there was nurtured a tradition regarding the medieval Serbian empire. The liberation from the Turks was conceived as a resurrection of the old state, that is, the re-establishment of the medieval empire. In the tsar of Russia the Montenegrins saw the tsar-liberator. There was widespread belief among the people that Empress Catherine II could not have murdered her husband Peter III and that he could have come to Montenegro. All these factors, writes Stanojević, made possible the appearance of the impostor and his acceptance in Montenegro.

When Stephen the Little appeared, claiming to be divinely guided and the former Russian tsar, he achieved far more for Montenegro than the quiet Bishop Sava was able to do with his cures or the tribal chiefs with their waning prestige. Having claimed to be the Tsar, he had to adopt the signs and symbols of that office, and the manner in which he behaved left the impression that he was something extraordinary. Stephen the Little was thoroughly acquainted with the tradition of the medieval Serbian state. In the official language he adopted there were many words from this medieval terminology.

During the first period of his rule Stephen the Little established his unlimited authority and brought peace and order to Montenegro through "a spontaneous

will of the people." This he did not accomplish by new legal norms but on the basis of existing customary law. The impostor-prince was able to make decisions that no one before him had made in Montenegro. Many of the measures he introduced were approved by a general assembly of Montenegrins (October 16, 1767). He was able to stop blood-feuds and check thievery. Criminals who had escaped to another country were allowed to return to their homeland. He introduced stringent measures against wife stealing, forced marriages, and imposed on the country many minor administrative reforms. To carry out his measures he organized a small armed unit of dedicated men and thereby gave Montenegro, for the first time, super-tribal authority.

The Turkish attack in 1768 marks a turning point in Stephen the Little's struggle against tribal anarchy. During the attack he manifested cowardice, characteristic much despised in Montenegrin tribal society. The Montenegrins threatened to turn him over to the Turks, but he managed to escape. For a time he lived concealed in a monastery, and later resided permanently at Crmnica, which became a center of Montenegrin secular and spiritual authority. Henceforth the impostor had many enemies and was compelled to recognize an oligarchy of the tribal leaders. In 1771 he organized a court of twelve tribal chiefs to handle inter-tribal conflicts. Its existence did not imply a complete turning back; the organization of the state "authority" continued. In 1772, on Russian instructions Stephen the Little was recognized as the head of Montenegro, but *de facto* power was vested in an official who was put in command of an armed body of eight persons, which became directly responsible to the government.

What was the attitude of Stephen the Little toward the church and the bishop? One of his first acts was a decree for the protection of church properties. Yet, he separated the secular from the spiritual affairs of Montenegro, leaving the latter to the bishop.

The activities of Stephen the Little were followed closely not only by the neighboring powers (Turkey and Venice) but also by other European countries (France, Austria, Russia). It was Russia, however, that showed the most interest in him. At first St. Petersburg considered him an obstacle to Russian aims in the Balkans, but subsequently befriended him. The Russian emissary, Prince Georgii V. Dolgorukov, failed to persuade the Montenegrins that Stephen the Little was not a Russian tsar, and even had he succeeded, Stanojević claims, the people of Montenegro would still have found Stephen indispensable. The Turks saw in the impostor an instrument of Venetian policy, and the Venetians considered him a dangerous prevaricator; it was probably a Turkish or Venetian agent who murdered the impostor on November 22, 1773. To the French he was no more than a Russian agent.

Stephen the Little will be remembered for many of his reforms and mostly for those which contributed to the development of state authority in Montenegro. Despite occasional Marxian exaggerations, this is a very good book, well documented and one which sheds fresh light on the history and tribal organization of Montenegro in the second half of the eighteenth century.

Stanford University

WAYNE VUCINICH

MAASS, FERDINAND, *Der Josephinismus. Quellen zu seiner Geschichte in Österreich, 1760-1850*. III. Band: *Das Werk des Hofrats Heinke 1768-1790*. Vienna: Verlag Herold, 1956. Pp. 500.—IV. Band: *Der Spätjosephinismus 1790-1820*. Vienna: Verlag Herold, 1957. Pp. 668. LS 180.

It is gratifying to see this important edition progressing from its somewhat difficult start and extending over the limits originally set by its author.

Following two earlier parts (reviewed in this Journal, volume XIII, p. 268) the third volume sheds light on the personality and activities of the Court Counsellor Francis Joseph Heinke (1726-1803). Books dealing in general with the Enlightenment in the Habsburg domains pay little, if any, attention to this man who most likely owed his appointment to a high post in the Bohemian and Austrian Court Chancellery to Prince Kaunitz. Working hand in hand with the powerful Chancellor, Heinke supported wholeheartedly the policies of Maria Theresa and her successors. In his official capacity he drafted governmental decrees or important letters and buttressed his enlightened concepts with concrete examples derived from historical and juridical studies. In the light of records, collected by Maas, Heinke appears to be the chief architect of the well thought out program by which Maria Theresa and her son endeavored to reverse the traditional relationship of church and state to the advantage of the latter. As Heinke shunned publicity, less has been known concerning him than of other staunch supporters of the enlightened tenets such as Francis von Qualtenberg, the chairman of the Spiritual Aulic Commission (*Geistliche Hofkommission*), the Court Counsellor in ecclesiastical matters August Zippe, and the enlightened abbot Francis Stephen Rautenstrauch. The third volume of Maass' edition is informative and, indeed, revealing, an outstanding contribution to our knowledge of the Enlightened era.

The editor's introductory study facilitates orientation in the documents which, though emanating from the same source, had bearing on various issues and did not make an organic unit. Little could be said in the opening chapter on Heinke's formative years and the early stage of his public career. A native of Silesia, Heinke completed his training at the University of Halle. More than this simple fact could not be established from documentary evidence. It can be, however, assumed that the teaching of such eminent professors as Christian Wolff and Justus Hennig Böhmer left a strong mark on Heinke's personality. It was significant that a graduate of a Protestant university could qualify for a public appointment. Heinke came to Vienna from Prague with some experience in public administration and anchored in rationalist philosophy. He served, in succession, four rulers—Maria Theresa, Joseph II, Leopold II, and Francis I—and died in the midst of the Napoleonic wars, eleven years after his retirement from active service.

In keeping with his rationalist orientation Heinke put the interests of the absolutist state above any other consideration. By his "preliminary remarks" on the church-state relationship he won the confidence of the Empress-Queen. As soon as she and Prince Kaunitz approved the succinct outline, Heinke set out to write a systematic survey both of principles and practical measures which were to regulate the relationship of the secular and spiritual authorities. His *Denkschrift*, divided into eighteen articles and supplemented by explanatory notes (pp. 154-207), gave Maria Theresa sufficient guarantee that, headed by Heinke, the Department for Ecclesiastical Affairs would effectively protect the state in any controversy or conflict with the hierarchy. There is in Maass' edition no evidence of the Empress' dissatisfaction with the Heinke's conduct of his department.

Soon after his accession to the throne Joseph II called upon Heinke to give expert opinion on the reform program which he, Joseph, was anxious to put through. Heinke acted promptly and displayed in his writing (pp. 251-300) his versatility in historical and legal problems. Heinke's advice was sought whenever Joseph's straightforward policy strained the links between Vienna and Rome.

Although he subscribed in general to the same ideas, Heinke did not hesitate to express disagreement with some bold schemes conceived by his zealous sovereign. When put by Heinke to an acid test Joseph's calculation that by the establishment of a patriarchate the dependence of the Austrian clergy on Rome could be diminished proved to be too risky to be undertaken. Heinke's penetrating studies of the problems involved, one for the Emperor, the other for Kressel (pp. 402-444), could not be shelved or disregarded when the matter was soberly reconsidered.

The original plan of Maass' work called for three volumes to cover the period from 1760 to 1790. In the course of preparatory studies he realized that if limited to Joseph's time only, the collection would be incomplete. He therefore extended the time limit from the Emperor's death to 1850. To make possible an adequate coverage of these six decades he decided to add two more volumes. One of them appeared recently; the other is expected soon.

Heinke's long tenure of the key position proved to be more than a symbol of continuity. Joseph's body mouldered in the Capuchin crypt but his concepts of the church-state relationship, though abandoned in some irritating points, guided his successors, Leopold II and Francis I. Only when Francis' reign had passed its zenith were partial concessions occasionally made to the Roman Curia. They could be ascribed mostly to Prince Metternich, who, untouched by Enlightened thought, endeavored, in the interest of his broad scheme of European stabilization, to reduce the tension between his sovereign and the Pontiff. Francis' journey in the spring of 1819 to Rome and his conferences with Pius VII also contributed to conciliation in matters not directly involving state interests.

Among materials making up the fourth volume there are some documents of great importance for the study of the Vienna court policy. A detailed account of the *Geistliche Hofkommission* of December 18, 1790, is a useful and highly instructive summary of the official policy and of objections raised, after Joseph's death, by Christopher Cardinal Migazzi and his associates from among the Austrian hierarchy. There are altogether two hundred and ten pieces in this collection. They cover a wide range of problems viewed from different angles by the governmental circles in Vienna and the higher clergy. The dedication of the fourth volume to the Theological Faculty in Innsbruck on the occasion of its centenary discreetly indicates the editor's attitude and approach.

University of Pennsylvania

OTAKAR ODLOŽILÍK

RADISCHEV, A. N., *A Journey from St. Petersburg to Moscow*. Translated by Leo Wiener, edited by Roderick Page Thaler. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1958. Pp. vii, 286. \$6.00.

Apart from using Russian originals, students of Russian history have been able to read some of the most important Russian sources in German translations. Though a knowledge of German is indispensable for the Russian scholar, such competent translations of Russian sources into English as have been gradually published (*Medieval Laws*, Kurbsky's *Correspondence*, Herberstein's *Commentaries*, and now Radischev's *Journey*) can only be greeted with enthusiasm. They make Russian material accessible to many historians in other fields (who may lack broad linguistic training), and they can provide, especially in American history, valuable material for comparative studies.

The present translation of Radischev's work, based on the late Professor Leo Wiener's draft and brought into final form by Roderick Page Thaler, is competently done. It tells in easily readable English Radischev's exciting observations

and reflections on the contemporary Russian scene (ca. 1780). Of course, Radischev's book is so famous that another discussion of its value would hardly be warranted here. It not only describes agricultural conditions, the sufferings of the Russian peasantry, the attitudes of the Russian landowning class, and, indirectly, numerous other aspects of Russian society, but it also reflects the climate of opinion as it spread from the West to Russia, and in particular the influence of French ideology of the Enlightenment upon the thinking of the emerging Russian intelligentsia.

The editor has provided the work with a forty page introduction. Stylistically it would have benefited from a few years of maturing, and as to contents the reader might have hoped for a discussion of various additional aspects. Yet, it provides us with an account of Radischev's life, with some glimpses of the intellectual scene of Europe, and with useful comparisons with various analogous products of Western literature.

In the Appendix we find a complete translation of Catherine the Great's notes on Radischev's *Journey*. The German edition (1922) gave excerpts of these notes in German translation. We can be grateful for the full text now—which, incidentally, mirrors the keen but narrow mind of the empress and a lack of "enlightenment" which was not only the result of her declining years but of her entire career. We also find a brief bibliography and numerous annotations. Again, we might wish for something different—at least in parts. While a number of the notes explain what the reader might either be expected to know beforehand or what he should look up in a dictionary, we miss others on more intricate problems which could serve especially the scholar in Russian history. On the other hand, there are valuable footnotes, e.g., those indicating the laws which Radischev discusses or criticizes or those giving brief biographical information on figures little known but mentioned in the *Journey*. The index, incomplete as it is, is less useful than it might have been.

As a whole, the fact that we now possess a reliable edition of Radischev's *Journey* in English far outweighs the shortcomings of the publication, and it may be regretted that the Harvard Press fixed for the small volume so unduly high a price. Radischev's *Journey* merits wide attention.

University of Delaware

WALTHER KIRCHNER

HAMEROW, THEODORE S., *Restoration, Revolution, Reaction: Economics and Politics in Germany, 1815-1871*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958. Pp. x, 347. \$6.00.

Despite the wide scope of its title this book deals primarily with the effect of the immense economic changes that went on within Germany from approximately 1815 to 1870 on the two classes which chiefly suffered from the overturn of the traditional order, the peasants and the artisans. Since the revolutions of 1848 marked the culmination of political and social discontent with the changing economic pattern, these revolts are the central theme of the narrative. The emancipation of the peasants throughout the German lands and the subsequent rise in the tempo of industrialization, until Germany by the end of the nineteenth century was an equal competitor of Britain, formed the economic basis of the great military power of our own day. The problem that has troubled western historians has always been the question of why these social and economic changes which led to liberal and constitutional governments in the West, resulted in the final establishment of a totalitarian dictatorship in Germany. Taking the revolutions of 1848 as the turning point in this development Professor Hamerow, as others before him,

believes that if a different result had come about, that is, if liberalism had triumphed, Germany would have been led along other roads. "The failure of the Revolution," he writes, "strengthened ideas and practices which led Europe to the holocaust. The penalty for the mistakes of 1848 was paid not in 1849, but in 1918, in 1933, and in 1945." In his next chapters he proceeds to demonstrate clearly and concisely why German liberalism failed. In fact, it is difficult to see from a study of the author's pages how the movement could have suffered a different fate. The book first presents a fine description of how peasant emancipation, carried out under different conditions in the various parts of Germany, created a class of landless farm laborers in the east and severe overpopulation on the constantly subdivided peasant holdings in the west. At the same time changing manufacturing methods gradually succeeded in impoverishing the craftsman and in breaking the hold of the guilds on production. These two groups, the land-hungry peasant and the impoverished artisan, became, as the author states, the "shock troops" of the liberal forces in 1848. Once in power, however, the basic division of interest between the liberal leaders and those who had fought for them in the countryside and on the city streets became apparent. The artisan wanted not economic freedom, but a return to a system of economic control which assured him a stable, living income; the peasant wanted not civil liberty, but land and a final end to all feudal obligations. The Frankfurt liberal, standing on the grounds of strict legality and the rights of private property, shrank from the violent actions of his allies and the consequences of further social revolution. Since they had nothing to gain from a liberal victory, both the peasant and the artisan were won back into the conservative camp. Although in subsequent years the conservative governments in the German states and, ultimately, in the German empire, offered palliative measures to ease the position of both of these groups, neither again occupied a position of real political significance comparable to that of 1848. A large proportion of the peasantry in the west was forced gradually into the factory because of the insufficiency of land; the guild system and the position of the artisan collapsed before the rapid industrialization of Germany. Thus the inability to cooperate of the groups most directly affected by the economic changes of the nineteenth century led ultimately to events detrimental to each in turn.

Given this specific course of events, discussed by Professor Hamerow with skill and insight, the reader is, however, led to question the initial assertion in the preface that Germany "unable to satisfy its civic aspirations within the liberal tradition . . . came to place increasing reliance on will-o'-the-wisp autocratic principles which led it deeper and deeper into a morass of authoritarianism to catastrophe." Certainly, the picture given of German liberalism in 1848 and 1849 does not appear to offer real grounds for a belief that a liberal victory in the revolution would have saved Germany and Europe from the present catastrophe. Although it is, of course, impossible to more than surmise, would it not have been more than probable that a liberal victory in 1849, with the establishment of constitutional government and unification through the Frankfurt parliament, would have meant little more than a liberalization of the franchise to bring in the propertied middle class and a subsequent alliance of that class with conservatism as a front against the "revolution," which would in turn have created a general political situation not much different than that after 1870? If, in 1849, the liberals were unable to come to an agreement of any sort with their lower class adherents, it is difficult to see how their victory would have produced a "new turn" in German history. And, in the final accounting, the German middle class, under a constitutional régime, did,

after all, fall into the arms of Hitler when menaced by the more remote spectre of communism.

These observations, however, are not meant to detract from the interest of the book itself. It will be of great value to all students of European social history since it deals directly with the major issues of German history in the period covered. It is written in a manner which makes it a pleasure to read; the extensive bibliography is a model of its kind.

University of California

BARBARA JELAVICH

TRAUTH, SR. MARY PHILIP, *Italo-American Diplomatic Relations, 1861-1882, The Mission of George Perkins Marsh, First American Minister to the Kingdom of Italy*. Washington, D. C.: The Catholic Univ. Press, 1958. Pp. xvii, 190. \$2.25.

It has been said of doctoral dissertations that too many of them fall into the category of telling us more and more about less and less. This may be an uncharitable thought to have been suggested by the work under review; but the subject of it cannot be called other than thin, hence the value of the contribution restricted. That the author is not unaware of this deficiency is borne out by an artificial attempt to establish a parallel between the specific courses of American and Italian affairs during the period under consideration, juxtaposing events that have no common ground, or seeking to establish similarities between the European diplomacy of alliances and that of the United States (pp. 49-51).

There is indeed room for very interesting comparisons in the common, though quite different, problem of the South in both countries. But if such an approach would have made for a more interesting, not to say more significant, essay it would hardly be fair to criticize the author for not having taken a subject other than that of her choice. The fact remains that, during the two decades here surveyed, contacts between the two countries were minimal for the simple reason that there was no cause for them to have been more extensive. The total absence of exchanges with Washington in the volume of the *Documenti Diplomatici Italiani* that deals with the year 1861, the only one so far published in the period under review, bears witness to this condition.

Having made the foregoing general reservations, within its chosen limits the work gives evidence of competence and thoroughness. Throughout the period in question the United States was represented in Italy by the same individual, George Perkins Marsh; a gentleman of the old school, he fitted well into the European society with which he came into contact, but the quality of his not very important mission may be described as mixed. His disillusioned appraisal of the course of Italian affairs, his understanding of the wastefulness of the military burden that Italy assumed, were wholly sound; but, if one can agree with many of his strictures on the Roman Church, it is equally true that his view of Catholicism stands best characterized as an example of New England Protestant bigotry at its narrowest. The extent to which the leaders of the new Kingdom of Italy were servilely subservient to France was likewise exaggerated by Marsh.

During the Civil War the United States was naturally desirous that Italy should not grant recognition to the South. There were also some negotiations dealing with the possibility that Garibaldi might receive a command in the Union armies, but his demand of the position of Commander-in-Chief must appear largely humorous, perhaps another illustration of his deficient sense of political reality. The influence of the romantic view of Italy, widespread in the Anglo-Saxon

world, whereas the *Risorgimento* "was the well-advertised work of an élite who knew how to use the volatile Italian temperament for its own ends" (p. 88) may be cited as illustrations of topics the discussion of which might have made for greater interest. To be sure, these matters have been discussed by other writers.

For the rest the author has to fall back on the survey of a record the substance of which often degenerates into trivialities. At the diplomatic level Italo-American relations hardly assumed significant proportions before the First World War. If a sequel to this study is planned, it is rather in the field of social questions, Italian emigration to the United States and its effects in both America and Italy for example, that a fruitful approach is to be found.

Barnard College

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RENÉ ALBRECHT-CARRIÉ

KANN, ROBERT A., *The Habsburg Empire: A Study in Integration and Disintegration*. New York: Praeger, 1957. Pp. xii, 227. \$5.00.

For three and one-half centuries after 1526 the Austrian Habsburgs, through sundry means, gathered an extraordinarily varied and numerous collection of lands and peoples around the archducal nucleus. Until the *Ausgleich* of 1867 centripetal forces within this composite state overbalanced the centrifugal, but hardly more than fifty years after the *Ausgleich* the Habsburg Empire was no more. How this empire came to be and how it disintegrated has been a subject of great interest to historians of Central Europe and of nationalism. Professor Kann of Rutgers University offers to the informed general reader as well as to the historian a work of value for understanding this socio-political phenomenon unique in European history.

This small volume, a study done for the Center for Research on World Political Institutions of Princeton University, is not intended to be a history of the Austrian Empire. It is, rather, a cogent outline of the elements, social and political, in the Habsburg lands that operated to produce integration or disintegration, to produce a "security-community" or bring dissolution of the state.

All societies, more or less homogeneous or heterogeneous, comprehend both harmonious and dissonant elements; their longevity as viable socio-political units depends upon the relative balance of integrative with non-integrative and disintegrative factors within the society. Before one blames Habsburg ineptitude for the dissolution of the monarchy in 1918, one should bear in mind that Austrian statesmen managed to govern a very diverse assortment of peoples for three hundred years and sustain integrative institutions of sufficient strength to withstand disintegrative elements—without the resources and steadying influence of a national majority. Especially in the first half of the nineteenth century, this was no mean achievement.

The Habsburg Empire weathered the storms of the Reformation, the stresses and strains of Theresian and Josephinian absolutism, and the onslaught of Napoleon I. Not even the national movements of the nineteenth century spelled imperial doom. The centripetal forces, consisting of the dynasty, the army, religion (in Cisleithanian Austria), the bureaucracy, the economic system, and an aristocracy of supranational ideology, continued to hold sway over the diversities of nationality, language, and culture.

Perhaps Austria lacked only one ingredient that, had it been present, would have generated a socio-political chemistry of union stable enough to resist disruptive forces within or without the empire. The empire failed to produce an

ideal of common validity to all the peoples, a myth or legend with universal appeal. No Austrian, in the wider, imperial sense, reached the stature of hero, a hero whose deeds afforded an opportunity for vicarious exaltation to all the peoples of the empire. Prince Eugen, a man of Western Heritage, who led the eastern peoples, united, against a common enemy, most closely approached the hero status. But even his memory has not been hallowed by the Danubian peoples as William Tell by the Swiss, for example. No man or idea became the epitome of Austrian nationhood, valid alike to Slavs, Germans, Magyars, Italians, and Rumanians.

An imbalance in the relative power of the national groups, not commensurate with numerical strength, made the structure of the state delicate. In 1866-67 the Magyars took advantage of Austria's adverse fortunes to wrest agreement to the *Ausgleich*. With this increment of Magyar power, the Hungarians and Germans became equal partners in ruling halves of an empire in which each was in fact a minority, and the bonds of partnership were, according to the Hungarian interpretation, contingent upon the unamended continuation in strength of the Austrian Constitution of December 1867. Preservation of the political status quo beyond the Leitha was a *conditio sine qua non* to the existence of the now dual monarchy.

The constitutional inflexibility imposed upon Austria by the Magyar view of the *Ausgleich* left Vienna impotent to satisfy the increasing national aspirations of the subject peoples. Various forms of irredentism around her borders made Austria's international problems more acute, and drove Austria, in frustration, to commit bellicose acts that finally led her into war. Once engaged in war, win or lose, the empire was doomed, for war would mean a change in the constitution or national composition of Cisleithania, and Hungary would then separate from Austria. Kann contends that the Allies could not have saved the empire if they had tried to do so.

Professor Kann's book is a useful, interesting review and assessment of the conditions that one must consider in studying the growth and decline of the Habsburg monarchy. One has the assurance of previously published evidence that Kann's outline is supported by scholarly research and evaluation. The selected bibliography is limited to easily accessible works in English, French, and German. Well chosen, informative statistical tables add to the utility of the book. The notes are collected at the back of the book, a practice becoming more prevalent and annoying to the serious reader.

University of Minnesota

WILLIAM E. WRIGHT

UEBERSBERGER, HANS, *Österreich zwischen Russland und Serbien; zur südslawischen Frage und der Entstehung des Weltkrieges*. Köln-Graz: Böhlau, 1958. Pp. ix, 332. DM 24.

As far as the bulk of this work is concerned, it may be classified as a rather detailed study in diplomatic history of Austrian-Serbian relations and Russia's counterplay against Austrian Balkan diplomacy, mainly from the Annexation crisis in 1908-09 to the outbreak of the First World War. Presumably, in view of the abundance of literature, the July 1914 high tide Balkan crisis is relegated to a few pages. The second, far smaller part of the volume deals with the interplay between the Serbian government, Black Hand and other terrorist organizations, and, in particular, also with an analysis of the Saloniki trial of colonel Dimitrijevic (Apis), executed in 1917. The subtitle of the work referring to the Southern Slav question

is, however, a misnomer. The discussion of the problems of Southern Slav nationalism is confined to an investigation of its conspiratorial character.

The author, whose reputation in the main is justly based on his co-editorship of the great documentary collection "Österreich-Ungarns Aussenpolitik," has written this study strictly from the imperial Austrian angle pictured against a German national background—as many of the best Austrians and friends of Austria did not see it before 1918 and do not see it now. There is little balance in Uebersberger's evaluation of facts. His heroes are Berchtold and Conrad, the villains Isvolskij and Sazonov. Conrad is commended for the fact that he considered the peaceful solution of the Annexation crisis in 1909 dangerous for the Danube monarchy, and Germany is gently blamed because, in view of the Russian aggressive designs in January, 1913 "she had omitted taking up the inevitable fight under more favorable conditions." (pp. 40, 208) Still, the author is fully within his rights to exercise his judgment as he sees fit, even though he overstates his case considerably.

One may, however, justly question the author's use of sources. The Austrian documents quoted outnumber the Russian ones by more than three to one. French official documents are not used at all, English ones only occasionally, and Serbian documents only in the second part dealing with the Black Hand conspiracy. The memoirs of Sazonov and Izvolskij, who are both consistently attacked, are not quoted. Neither is there any reference to Benckendorff's most important letters outside of "Internationale Beziehungen." Of secondary sources, Wegener is cited frequently, but Albertini, Fay, Gooch, Langer and Renouvin are not even mentioned. The remark that Masaryk whose "mask of an honorable man has been removed . . ." had "made use of the amnesty of Emperor Charles of June, 1917 to go home" (p. 63) is obscure.

The second part of the study dealing with conspiratorial activities concerning the assassination of the archduke analyzes documentary material—printed in Yugoslavia but never published—which clearly implicates the Serbian government. Even though Uebersberger naturally had no access to the strictly classified records of the 1953 revision of the Saloniki trial in Belgrad, his presentation at this point offers a decidedly useful and largely original contribution to a field which requires much supplementary research in any language. Here too, though, the author's line of reasoning leaves an unacknowledged gap. While he refers to the Black Hand file in the Austro-Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in general, he does not raise the salient question concerning the connecting link in the war guilt question, that is whether the Austrian government obtained any evidence, between June 28 and July 23, of the collaboration of the Serbian government in the specific activities leading to the murder of Sarajevo.

It does not mean an *a limine* rejection of the Revisionist viewpoint if one considers this work a passionate and sincere plea for a cause rather than a manifestation of impartial historical judgment.

Princeton University

ROBERT A. KANN

HAHLWEG, WERNER, ed., *Lenins Rückkehr nach Russland 1917. Die Deutschen Akten*. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1957. Pp. 139. Gldn. 16.25.

This is the fourth volume in *Studies in East European History*, which are being published under the general editorship of W. Philipp of the Free University of Berlin and P. Scheibert of the University of Cologne with the collaboration of an international board. An able introduction summarizes the essential points to be

found in the 100 pages of documents printed here. These documents are mostly from the files of the German embassy in Bern, but some have been taken from the sections of the German Foreign Office archives. The originals of these documents are at present in London in the custody of the British Foreign Office and the Public Record Office. Annotation is excellent and the editor has gone to great pains to identify many rather obscure persons whose names appear.

Two basic questions are at least partially answered by these documents: how were the decisions in regard to Lenin's journey across Germany reached, and how was the journey conducted? As early as September 1915 a contact man informed the German embassy in Bern under what conditions Lenin would be willing to make peace in case of a successful revolution in Russia. However, it was not until after the overthrow of the Tsar that the plan for Lenin's return developed. The suggestion for the journey across Germany to Sweden, and then via Finland to Petrograd, goes back to a German Majority Socialist Dr. Parvus-Helphand. A number of influential Germans, notably Brockdorf-Rantzau, at that time German minister in Copenhagen, believed that the return of Lenin would further disunity among the revolutionaries open to the charge of being German agents, and indeed the Provisional Government did threaten to try for treason any who chose this way of returning to Russia. Yet Lenin and his colleagues would not only risk German submarines, but also would face the danger of being detained in Britain, if they took the only other route possible. Anxious to get back to Russia without delay, Lenin decided to make the trip across Germany, but laid down careful specifications for the journey. In order to forestall any charge of being accomplices of the Kaiser Lenin's group insisted on paying their own fares, and asked for third class tickets; there should be absolutely no contact with any Germans and the Swiss Socialist, Fritz Platten, was to accompany the transport as a liaison officer.

Negotiations were conducted by the German minister at Bern through various contact men, and arrangements were made by the German Foreign Office in collaboration with Swiss and Swedish authorities. The German High Command consented to the transport, but played a minor rôle in the whole proceedings. A sidelight on the secrecy of the negotiations is the reaction of the Kaiser, who would have liked to supply Lenin's group with the German White Book, and other documents. Since the Kaiser only learned of the journey from the newspapers after Lenin had reached Sweden there was no question of such a violation of Lenin's prescribed seduction.

The documents give a good picture of the conditions under which the journey was made but do not indicate whether the train was actually sealed. Perhaps, as a later account claims, the so-called "seal" might have been only a chalk-mark designating through-passage across Germany. Apparently all train doors were in fact locked except for the rear door, where Platten made necessary contacts with the men in charge of the train. Certain it is that Lenin and his group were scrupulous in maintaining their isolation lest they compromise themselves as tools of Germany. There was no control of passports or luggage of the 32 persons who were in the party. Lenin was gratified that all was handled correctly and so informed his fellow exiles who remained in Switzerland. Later two more transports—one numbering 147 men, 14 women, and 32 children, the other 205 persons, including about 50 women and children—were arranged for, and they crossed Germany under exactly the same conditions. No check was ever made of the members of these transports, and they included revolutionaries of varied political persuasions. Except for a few leaders, who were recognized by the Germans in Bern, the documents do

not reveal the identity of the 430 persons who reached Petrograd from Switzerland via these trains across Germany.

Bowdoin College

E. C. HELMREICH

FREUND, GERALD, *Unholy Alliance*. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1957. Pp. 283. \$6.

Mr. Freund has written a smooth and readable general survey of German-Russian relations from 1918-1926. His account brings to bear on this problem new data not available to earlier writers, such as Professor E. H. Carr and Lionel Kochan. The resulting book can be recommended to the general reader as well as to the specialist, although, unfortunately, this recommendation cannot be unconditional, for the book has a number of flaws which detract from its undoubted value.

The most serious charge which can be leveled against the author is his tendency to make sweeping statements which he either documents insufficiently or fails to document at all. This failing is most noteworthy in Mr. Freund's discussions of military matters and of soldiers. The documentation of Seeckt's motivations and methods in developing the connection with Russia (pp. 94-96) is very thin or non-existent, since Rabenau's statement—to which the lone footnote refers—is brief and not too clear. Again, on p. 112, the author casually remarks that Hasse's Diary is not very reliable without making any attempt to explain or defend this statement—with which the reviewer finds himself in disagreement. On pages 165-66 Mr. Freund makes statements concerning Seeckt's motivation during the period prior to the Beer Hall Putsch which rest on very shaky ground, being in contradiction to the bulk of the material in the Seeckt Papers on this question. Finally, in his conclusion, Mr. Freund states unequivocally that Seeckt was planning an aggressive war against Poland and the West. The reviewer has read all of the documents in this connection which he could find in the Seeckt Papers and found no such evidence. Seeckt certainly saw Germany as being on the defensive for the foreseeable future and was preoccupied with his fears that France would succeed in destroying Germany. In general, he expected another war and assumed that Poland and Germany would be on opposite sides, and that such a war would give Germany the opportunity to regain her lost lands in the East. On the other hand, he did not seem to believe that Germany would be a prime mover in such a war and he certainly seems to have had no plans for a war of revenge. Whenever such plans were suggested by Radek, he coldly rejected them.

Freund's sweeping statements would seem to be connected with a definite prejudice against the German military leaders and a desire to see in them the villains of the piece. In discussing German-Russian relations before the Armistice, he identifies the entire High Command with the schemes of Ludendorff and the annexationists—which scarcely seem any more sweeping than the Franco-Russian plans for the dismemberment of Germany—although there were very strong dissenting voices among the higher officers. The allegations, in the conclusion, as to the motives of Seeckt, exhibit a similar weakness. In the opinion of the reviewer, this tendency leads the author astray and is one of the factors which make Hans Gatzke's excellent recent account of Reichswehr-Red Army collaboration (*American Historical Review*, April, 1958) a much more valuable treatment of this problem.

Aside from questions involving the Army, the author's tone is usually fair, although the title of the book and his rather unclear criticism of Rathenau for signing Rapallo (p. 104f.) seem to indicate a feeling that the Germans should not have dealt with Russia at all, a thesis which would certainly tend to throw some activities of the United States in subsequent years under a like shadow. He

also criticizes the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk as being unfair to Russia, without noting that the Allies did everything in their power to prevent one square yard of the territory taken by this Treaty from returning to Russian control.

Another problem which must be considered is that of sources and their use. It is regrettable that Mr. Freund did not postpone the publication of his book until he was able to exploit those Foreign Office documents upon which Mr. Gatzke's article is based. They would have strengthened the author's documentation in some of the places where it seems weakest. The reviewer was also troubled by Mr. Freund's tendency to use secondary sources to document key points although primary sources were available to him. Thus, on p. 11, he quotes Stresemann from secondary sources, at least one of which was hostile to the leader of the People's Party, rather than from the Stresemann Papers or the *Reichstag* debates; and on p. 43, he uses the militant Independent Socialists Caro and Oehme to document statements of General Groener despite the existence of the Groener Papers. The weakness in documentation regarding military matters has already been indicated, but the need for the Foreign Office documents to buttress the testimony of Hilger can be noted where Brockdorff-Rantzau's dealings with the Russians are concerned.

Lastly, it must be noted that the author is not always careful to be accurate in his factual statements. In some cases the errors are trivial, but they reduce slightly the authority of the book. For this reason it seems useful to mention some of them: The Black Day of the German Army was an incident in the Allied Offensive of 1918, not in the last German one (p. 26). The K.P.D. was certainly weak in 1919, but the Left Independent Socialists were an equally militant and much more formidable threat to the existence of the Weimar Republic (p. 42f.). "Right-wing" seems an odd designation for the German Democratic Party, which championed the democratic republic (p. 51). The K.P.D. remained a legal party after 1919 (p. 53). Dr. Simons mentions in a letter of October 14, 1922, long talks which he had with Seeckt about Russia, apparently in his days in office (p. 85). Mr. Freund's version of the Seeckt-Wirth conversation in the Chancellery regarding Russian matters is misleading. Selchow clearly states that the men concerned were "Under-secretaries," i.e., civil servants rather than parliamentarians, which suggests that Freund was incorrect in believing them to be members of the S.P.D.; further, nothing in the statement suggests that the Russian policy as such was under fire (p. 98). Seeckt's family's nobility was of comparatively recent origin, 1786 (p. 164). Gesler, not Seeckt, was made Dictator on 26 September; Seeckt on 8-9 November 1923 (p. 178).

In summary, this is a good book, which is weakest on the military side.

University of Pittsburgh

HAROLD J. GORDON, JR.

ANDRIOTES, NICHOLAS P., *The Confederate State of Skopje and its Language*. Athens, 1957. Pp. 59.

The establishment of the Federated People's Republic of Macedonia has been viewed with concern by many Greeks, especially Greeks of Macedonia, who have learned to regard "Macedonian" agitation as a threat to Greece's northern frontiers. From the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-78 and the treaty of San Stefano to the end of World War II, the so-called Macedonian movement was associated with Bulgarian expansionism and the realization of the dream of "Greater Bulgaria," whose map was drawn by the Russians at San Stefano. The terrorist activities and the pressure tactics of IMRO in the 1890s and at the opening of the twentieth century did nothing to allay Greek (or Serbian) fears. There was also the precedent of the

extirpation of the Greeks from Eastern Rumelia that was systematically pursued until 1907. The hostilities between the Greeks and Serbs on one hand and the Bulgarians on the other, in 1913 and during the First World War, the provisions of the peace treaties, the incidents and tensions of the interwar period, and the Bulgarian occupation of Macedonia of 1941-44 are too well known to be repeated. After the defeat of Bulgaria for the third time within one generation, Yugoslavia gave her own solution to the Macedonian problem by organizing the Serbian part of Macedonia as a federated republic with Skopje as its capital (August 2, 1944). Thus the remnants of "Macedonian" agitation were cut off from Sofia and compelled to look to Belgrade. The Communist orientation of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, and the alignment of Greece with the West, complicated the situation further, especially in the critical period of 1945-48.

Professor Nicholas P. Andriotes, of the University of Salonica, like most of Greece's political thinkers, regards Macedonia as no more than a geographical concept—an area inhabited by Greeks (Greek Macedonia), Serbs, Bulgarians, Albanians, Turks, Vlachs, and another people who called themselves *Bugari* in the past, and who are currently referred to as Macedonian Slavs and form the majority in the Confederate State of Skopje. The designation of the Bugari as Macedonians, and the official adoption of the term "Macedonia" by the Skopje régime, are, in the opinion of Andriotes, indications of expansionist schemes directed primarily against Greece, which since the wars of 1912-13 encloses "the Macedonia of the Aegean" within her frontiers. The propaganda line from Skopje has repeatedly favored the unification of Macedonia.

Presenting the Greek case against the propagandists of Skopje, Andriotes stresses the Greek character of ancient Macedonian culture, traces the descent of the Slavs (middle of the sixth century A.D.), discusses the assimilation of the Greek-speaking inhabitants of some parts of Macedonia, and describes the language of the Confederate State. This language, according to Andriotes, who is an authority on Balkan linguistics, is not a separate language but a dialect of Bulgarian rather than Serbian, with many Greek and a smaller number of Turkish words. There are lists of the Greek words and an analysis of certain peculiarities of Slavo-Macedonian grammar. The cultural progress of Yugoslav Macedonia and the growth of the University of Skopje are discussed in brief. It is pointed out that under the new régime an attempt is being made to purge the language of the non-Slavic elements, and to introduce Serbian words for modern concepts, much to the consternation of the Bulgarians.

Part of Andriotes' book is a critique of Christo Antonovski, *Egejska Makedonija* (Skopje, n. d.), which is described as "full of inaccuracies." Among the glaring inaccuracies that he cites are the characterization of the Anatolian refugees who settled in Greek Macedonia as Christian Turks, and the excessive number of Armenians in Greek Macedonia (allegedly 100,000). It is not hard to agree with Andriotes that in the hands of political propagandists history is distorted for the sake of expediency. Despite its polemic character and its small size, the book is a necessary defense of basic historical truths that are often mistreated in the scramble of Balkan nationalisms.

University of Texas

G. G. ARNAKIS

THULSTRUP, ÅKE, *Aggressioner och Allianser. Huvudlinjer i Europeisk Storpolitik 1935-39*. Stockholm: Bonniers, 1957. Pp. 640.

In this volume a Swedish student of twentieth century international affairs

offers a 250-page survey of European power politics during the years immediately preceding World War II. The narrative covers chiefly the Rhineland Occupation, the Ethiopian War, Franco's revolt, Anschluss with Austria, the Czechoslovak crisis, and reaches a climax in Stalin's tangled negotiations in 1939 with the West and then with Hitler. Manchurian and Far Eastern affairs are left pretty much to one side; this is a survey of *European* great power diplomacy.

The volume as here printed was submitted as a dissertation, but it constitutes the second part of a larger body, *Det odesdigra 1930-talet*, which the author prepared for "The History of our Time," a series which Bonniers has been issuing since the 'thirties (hence the pagination which here begins with 283).

In the main body of the discourse there is space for little more than a recital of the chronological progression of events, the major currents of public opinion, and the intricate exchanges between the diplomats. Interpretative material is reined in; when the author does offer opinions or indicate reactions these are kept subordinate to the flow of the narrative. Now and then a sharp adjective or adverb betrays the personal orientation of the writer, but the overall tone of the recital is objective. Yet there gleams through the presentation an unmistakable devotion to the democratic West. True, Bonnet and Chamberlain are left with something substantial for which to answer. But the author has no sympathy with any phase of Axis aggression or with the policies of Stalin or Franco (in Franco's case this moderation is worth noting, in view of the sharp condemnation which Francoist policies at times have evoked in various Scandinavian circles). The result is a clear, sober, and meticulous survey, very useful to the general student and the informed layman.

But there is something also for the specialist. The source collections extensively used are British, French, German, and Italian. Equivalent Russian materials are, of course, as yet poorly represented. There is a tightly packed four-page bibliographical essay (among the secondary works, Scandinavian titles are well represented) and a six and one-half page bibliography. Sandwiched between essay and bibliography are seventy pages of footnotes. Regrettably, these are placed together in one section and the absence of any numbering in the text makes use of the footnote apparatus at times very cumbersome. But it would be ungracious not to report also that the notes occasionally turn out to be whole paragraphs, dealing with the extent or the credibility of the sources in question.

The serious student will find most rewarding Thulstrup's retrospective chapter, "Återblick och sammanfattning" (pp. 519-39) in which he concentrates his interpretative observations. One point included here was only fleetingly touched upon in the main survey. This is the claim that President Roosevelt gave his countrymen less leadership than he should have in awakening them to a better realization of the bearing that developments in Europe must later have upon the fortunes of the United States. In this connection, the author's understanding of the dynamics of American politics in the 'thirties and of United States constitutional procedures generally (p. 534) seems less perceptive than do his analyses of domestic developments on the European scene. One could also welcome fuller exposition of the point that Baldwin was determined not to espouse League of Nations policies which in a showdown might leave British naval power ranged opposite to that of the United States.

In summary, here is a competent survey of the four years of international tension that preceded the lethal struggle of 1939-1945, based upon extensive consultation of materials so far available in the way of diplomatic collections, par-

liamentary reviews of foreign policy, personal memoirs, and substantial secondary studies on the period. Included is a ten-page summary in English.

New York University

OSCAR J. FALNE

ERFURTH, WALDEMAR, *Die Geschichte des deutschen Generalstabes von 1918 bis 1945*. Göttingen: Musterschmidt-Verlag, 1957. Pp. 326.

This is the third major work dealing with the German general staff; it was preceded by Walter Görlitz' *Der deutsche Generalstab. Geschichte und Gestalt 1950* (*Journal of Central European Affairs*, vol. 11 (1952), no. 4) and Helmut Greiner's *Die oberste Wehrmachtführung. 1951* (*Journal of Central European Affairs*, vol. 13 (1953), no. 1). Although General Erfurth offers little that is substantially new, he confirms and rounds off the findings of his predecessors. This fact is of importance because Erfurth was, with only brief interruptions, a member of the general staff, rising to the position of Oberquartiermeister V (assistant chief of staff, Historical Division). He also had at his disposal the recently published studies and memoirs of Zeitzler, Guderian, Schweppenburg, Kesselring, Westphahl, Manstein, and Beck (Hubatsch, Walter, "Deutsche Memoiren 1945-1953. Eine kritische Übersicht." *Geschichte und Politik*, vol. 8 (1953), and could make use of important personal contacts (Halder among others).

Erfurth, in writing this vital chapter of recent German history, also pleads the case of the general staff. He sets out, as others before him, to establish its professional competence which was defeated only by Hitler's amateurish and ultimately disastrous interferences. Additionally, Erfurth attempts to justify and exonerate the ethical and political conduct of the military élite. However, this attempt at an *Ehrenrettung* is subject to doubt and criticism.

A restatement of some of the salient facts may help to show that Erfurth pleads a weak case. The Treaty of Versailles imposed severe military restrictions on Germany. The German high command did its ingenious best to evade them. As a result, there were almost always more than 100,000 men under arms ("Zeitfreiwillige," "schwarze Reichswehr," etc.); military aviation and armored weapons were secretly developed in the Soviet Union; the general staff was continued under the innocuous name of *Truppenamt*; and the international military control commission was given a polite run-around. Confronted with the alternative of honoring the treaty obligations or of doing what they considered as their part toward maintaining the "Bestand und Einheit des Reiches," they decided in favor of the latter. However, when Hitler's reckless policies cast the Reich in grave jeopardy, Germany's military leadership, with notable exceptions, chose to remember that the army must remain politically aloof and even acquiesced in the Führer's *Rechtsbrüche* (Röhm Putsch, Austria, Czechoslovakia, etc.). They proceeded with the business of rearmament and with the preparation and execution of wars of aggression.

The record shows that the German military made a grave political mistake and, generally, were lacking in moral strength and courage when the situation demanded them. Since they had been able successfully to impose their will on the civilian authorities of the Weimar Republic, they thought, most erroneously, that they also could control Hitler. They thought they could utilize the National Socialist *Wehrfreudigkeit* to a "reasonable" extent but, in the process, suffered the fate of the Sorcerer's Apprentice. They allowed themselves to be insulted and humiliated (*l'affaire Fritsch*, unwarranted personnel changes in the general staff and the operational command, *Ergebenheitsadresse* after July 20, 1944, etc.), and were weak

enough to succumb to Hitler's charisma or flatteries (Rundstedt was brusquely relieved of his command and coaxed out of retirement no fewer than three times) and, in many cases, were unscrupulous enough to accept his *Dotationen* (Görlitz, *op. cit.*, p. 600; Erfurth names only Brauchitsch, p. 189).

Erfurth, having stated most of the incriminating facts, tries to explain and to rationalize. There is the reference to the mystique of the military oath, although he must admit that, traditionally, this oath was not considered tantamount to a surrender of individual responsibility: "Die Generale in der Zeit der Monarchie fühlten sich nicht nur dem Monarchen, sondern auch ihrem Gewissen und der Geschichte gegenüber verantwortlich." (p. 212). Beck shared this conviction: "Die Geschichte wird die höchsten Führer der Wehrmacht mit einer Blutschuld belasten, wenn sie nicht nach ihrem fachlichen staatspolitischen Wissen und Gewissen handeln. Ihr soldatischer Gehorsam hat dort eine Grenze, wo ihr Wissen, Gewissen und ihre Verantwortung die Ausführung eines Befehls verbieten." (Görlitz, *op. cit.*, p. 469). Erfurth fails to cite this significant statement; instead he seeks the support of Fieldmarshal Montgomery: "'Als Dienerin der Nation steht die Armee über der Politik und das muß so bleiben. Ihre Ergebenheit gilt dem Staat, und es steht dem Soldaten nicht zu, seine Ergebenheit wegen seiner politischen Ansicht zu ändern . . . Das Wesen der Demokratie ist Freiheit, das Wesen der Armee—Disziplin! Die Armee würde die Nation im Stiche lassen, wenn sie nicht gewohnt wäre, Befehlen augenblicklich zu gehorchen.'" (p. 311). However, it is reasonable to assume that Montgomery would distinguish between constitutionally responsible authority and usurpation, between a democratic and a totalitarian régime. Besides, Hitler left the nation in the lurch, and it is therefore doubtful indeed if Montgomery would demand unquestioning obedience in such a case. Instead of quoting the British general, Erfurth would have done well to give full weight to the fateful decision of his fellow officers who chose to disobey and to resist, for they felt responsible for the "Bestand und Einheit des Reiches."

University of Colorado

GERHARD LOOSE

MOLDEN, OTTO, *Der Ruf des Gewissens, Der österreichische Freiheitskampf 1938-1945*. Vienna: Verlag Herold, 1958. Pp. 370. 20 illustrations. 128s.

With the publication of Otto Molden's *Der Ruf des Gewissens*, there has appeared the first full and detailed account of the Austrian resistance movements to National Socialism from the time of the *Anschluss* to the end of the Second World War. The main outlines have, indeed, been known, sketched briefly by Friedrich Engel-Janosi in the July, 1953, issue of this Journal, and developed somewhat more fully in Part II of Gordon Shepherd's recent publication, *The Austrian Odyssey*. Molden presents the story in its multiplicity of detail, and although much will never be known because of the destruction of an immense amount of documentation, he has supplemented the available written record with personal interviews with many of those who took part in the resistance. Moreover both he and his brother, Fritz Molden, played roles of considerable importance in the movement. It would, in fact, seem that the author is somewhat too modest when he gives his book the subtitle, *Beiträge zur Geschichte der österreichische Widerstandsbewegung*; rather it appears likely that future data on the subject will be by way of contributions to the body of material which he has collected.

It is a fascinating, heartbreaking and heroic story which Dr. Molden tells, calmly and with remarkable objectivity. The difficulty of organizing resistance groups in Austria and keeping them alive were almost overwhelming, not only

because a common language with the National Socialists made the maintenance of secrecy extremely difficult, but also because the actions of the years 1933 to 1938 had clearly shown the Gestapo who might be potential opponents. Moreover the position of the government as well as of the Catholic Church in Austria at the moment of the occupation was not clear. Nevertheless, groups representing almost all shades of political opinion did form immediately after March 11, 1938, only to be virtually wiped out in the last months of 1939 and early months of 1940. But the work of organizing resistance, of linking the various groups together to form an all-Austrian movement went on, to culminate in the formation, late in 1944, of a Provisional Austrian National Committee. One thing at least the book clearly demonstrates, and that is that Austrian resistance groups were active from the moment of *Anschluss*, and, thus, long before the Allies' Moscow Declaration of November 1943.

Among the most interesting accounts of individual actions is that of the Austrian side of the conspiracy which on July 20, 1944, hoped to bring about the assassination of Hitler and the overthrow of National Socialism. It is also one of the most melancholy, for it came so close to succeeding—closer perhaps in Vienna than elsewhere—and failed so lamentably. Further, the sections dealing with the activities of Fritz Molden in establishing and maintaining liaison with the allies in Italy, and contact with the West through Bern, as well as those portions in which the author writes in the first person of his own operations, are particularly vivid.

At first glance, the organization of *Der Ruf des Gewissens* appears to be somewhat episodic, a condition which arises inevitably out of the nature of the subject matter. Not until almost at the very end were the various existing resistance groups given some cohesion. Many of them were small, out of contact with other groups, and had been ephemeral, yet are worthy of mention for having played an honorable part in keeping alive the spirit of opposition to the Nazis. All shades of political opinion were represented and it was only gradually that many of them emerged from the spiritually frustrating ambiguity which had characterized Austrian relations with Germany for well over a generation. Only gradually did it become clear to monarchists as well as republicans, to the more authoritarian as well as the more democratic, that the call of conscience demanded not only opposition to the dehumanizing principles of National Socialism, but also a positive Austrian patriotism which could place loyalty to the state above loyalty to the race. This is, perhaps, in the long run, the most significant aspect of all of the Austrian resistance movements—with the exception of the Communists whose loyalty was to something else and who are therefore treated separately. The others, of whatever political persuasion, were able, in the dark and bitter years of struggle, to agree to the proposition that patriotism to Austria was their first duty, and to foster and keep alive a spirit which would make possible the reemergence of an Austria which could call its soul its own.

Wellesley College

HENRY F. SCHWARZ

HELMREICH, ERNEST C. ed., *Hungary*. New York: Praeger (Published for the Mid-European Studies Center of the Free Europe Committee, Inc.) 1957. Pp. xiv + 466. \$8.50.

This symposium is a part of the monographic series on Communist-dominated Central and Eastern Europe. In general, Hungarian authors have demonstrated a politically one-sided approach towards the most vital problems of their native country, and, in a few cases, some of them have not shown familiarity with

scholarly methods. At the same time the non-Hungarian co-workers, who lacked even a minimal working knowledge of Hungarian, were not able to select and utilize fully the all-important source material, and so opened a passage to false generalizations.

Some contradictory statements of the volume should be mentioned as an illustration. For instance, one anonymous writer, dealing with the country's 1946 constitutional law, declares that it was "democratic in structure and spirit" (p. 77), while Randolph Braham, in his study on state security, which touched on the same question, was diametrically opposed to the anonymous writer's views, and was of the opinion that "the principle of class justice" in the 1946 constitutional legislation favored the Communist Party interests (p. 133f.). Mr. Braham, in his otherwise well-prepared treatise, has mistakenly asserted that Gusztáv Illy was "a Moscow-trained general" (p. 147), whereas Gusztáv Illy, as a captain, belonged to Horthy's General Staff, and joined the Hungarian Communist Party in the spring of 1945 in Budapest. Furthermore, another anonymous writer states falsely that *Slovenská jednota*, a periodical for the Slovak minority, was published by the Hungarian government (p. 153). On the contrary, this journal was the mouthpiece of the Slovak opposition party headed by Dr. Emánuel Böhm.

Since the early twenties, teachers' colleges have offered a five-year course for students from fourteen to nineteen, but Vilmos Juhász has spoken of four-year studies for students from fourteen to eighteen. In addition, the much criticized *Levente* (Youth Champion) movement was not founded in 1928 (p. 195), but six years earlier. Nicolas Spulber in his account of the national income and its distribution also made remarks on Mátyás Matolcsy and Varga's 1938 London publication, emphasizing that the same approach was used in Hungary's Three-Year Plan up to 1949 (p. 215). This comparison, and the incorrect listing of the Right wing Varga as "Soviet economist" in the Index (p. 465), creates the impression that the Bolshevik, Jenő (Eugen) Varga, a leading Soviet economist, was the co-author with Mátyás Matolcsy, who as a Fascist war criminal was sentenced to a long prison term in postwar Hungary. Fred S. Pisky, in his introductory statement (The People), complains of the insufficiency of statistical data, stressing that "the details of the 1949 census returns have not been published by the Central Bureau of Statistics" (p. 45). But the same Bureau did publish all details of the census in 15 volumes (*Az 1949. évi népszámlálás. Budapest, Állami Nyomda, 1949-52*). Jan Wszelaki's chapter on industrial development is acceptable until he treats of general politics. For example, a publicly-known Stalinist, István Kovács, a longtime political intimate of Mátyás Rákosi, was placed by him, together with Imre Nagy, in the group of the "moderates" (p. 295).

Ernest Helmreich's objective historical essay as well as Neal Buhlar's comprehensive survey of the 1956 October Revolution on the grounds of the UN report are clearly the best written articles of the book. Two standard works of utmost significance should be added as supplement to the Bibliography (pp. 423-449). Namely, Zoltán I. Tóth's (ed.) *Magyar történeti bibliográfia* (Historical Bibliography of Hungary, 4 v. Budapest, 1950, 1952) containing 46,207 entries, and the best non-Hungarian-language bibliography ever arranged on the subject, *Legal Sources and Bibliography of Hungary* (by Alexander Kálnoki Bedő and George Torzsay Biber, gen. ed. VI. Gsovski, New York, 1956), in which pioneer work brilliant studies are accompanied by a list of the most important laws and decrees enacted from 1945 up to November 1, 1955.

The usefulness of this reference volume will definitely be limited to those who already have an expert knowledge of historical and present-day Hungary.
Washington, D. C.

FRANCIS S. WAGNER

ROZEK, EDWARD J., *Allied Wartime Diplomacy: A Pattern in Poland*. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1958. Pp. 481. \$6.95.

Dr. Rozek's book is a major contribution to modern diplomatic history and a morality tale whose lesson is still to be learned by Americans. As a work of basic scholarship, it makes available the materials in the official Polish government files held by former Prime Minister Mikolajczyk, as well as his personal papers. It thus supplements the documents published by Western governments and the story of Poland as told by Churchill, Sherwood, Truman, and Feis. In his reading of the lesson, Rozek brings to bear the perspective of a young exile from his native land, who has brought under truly remarkable discipline his wholly legitimate sense of outrage and tragedy.

After tracing out the historical background of Polish-Russian relations, the book comes quickly to grips with the issue of Poland after Hitler's attack on Russia, in the context of British and American acceptance of Stalin as a major fighting ally. With ample but skillful use of official documents and the transcripts of high level discussions, the story is traced out in five stages: from August 1941 when amnesty was granted to the hundreds of thousands of Poles in Soviet forced labor camps to the rupture of diplomatic relations between Moscow and the London government in April 1943; the development of the Lublin Committee down to January 1944; the development of the compromise Provisional Government in the course of 1944, on the basis of Polish acceptance of new frontiers; the Yalta decision and the prompt Soviet maneuvers to undermine it and to minimize the role of non-Communist Poles in the Provisional Government; the Potsdam affirmation of free and unfettered Polish elections and the progressive, virtually unopposed Soviet violation of that agreement, down to the final tragedy of the election of January 1947 and Mikolajczyk's escape.

Four main themes give this sequence its shape. First, the Polish view, based on a long history heightened by the events of 1939-41, that only a united show of Western force, on the issue of frontiers as well as of free elections, could yield a free postwar Poland. Second, Churchill's view that the imperatives of alliance in a major bloody war demanded concession on the frontiers to clear the way for a show-down with Stalin, if necessary, on the issue of free elections. Third, the American view—in which Roosevelt's primary responsibility is shared by Stimson, Vandenberg, Truman, and others—that, while a politically free postwar Poland would be an admirable outcome, no risks of ultimatum or of war could be taken to bring it about. Fourth, Stalin's view, that the total domination of Poland was to be sought in salami-tactic stages so long as its pursuit did not risk major war. In a sense the title of the book is legitimate without its limiting sub-title; for the interplay of these approaches to the issue of Poland absorbed about three quarters of all high level allied diplomacy during the Second World War.

While full of admiration for the author's technical skill and scholarly integrity, and while acutely aware of the historical basis in Polish experience for his interpretation, this reviewer would read the lesson in a somewhat different way than Dr. Rozek. He is, I would say, a bit too hard on the British; and does not quite probe to the roots of the American failure. Under the circumstances, Churchill could do no better than to make concessions on the frontier issue and prepare to

fight over free elections; and, although it would not have altered the outcome given the American position, it would have been helpful if this rude necessity had been accepted earlier by the Poles. Under vigorous united leadership, the British and American publics might have been prepared to face Stalin down on the well understood issue of free elections; but they would not have done so on the more obscure issue of frontiers.

Although some Britishers were prepared, like the Americans, to write off Poland and Eastern Europe, Churchill's willingness to face an early postwar showdown on the question of Polish democracy seems well established. The true failure was in the United States; for only a joint Anglo-American position in the form of a virtual military ultimatum could have altered the outcome.

Nor was the problem that Poland lacked in the United States "sympathetic understanding or altruistic friends" (p. 9). Nations do not risk war under such motivation. What was lacking was an understanding of the direct American interest in the military and political fate of Poland. The Soviet treatment of Poland was regarded as a symbol of Soviet intentions in the postwar period, as a domestic political problem due to the presence in the American electorate of Polish-American voters, or as an occasion for diplomatic hectoring and preachment in the Wilsonian tradition. No responsible Americans appeared to understand that the whole balance of power in Western Eurasia would hinge on the outcome of the Polish question and, with it, the difference between victory and dangerous stalemate. If Poland had remained politically free, Moscow would have had to look at Germany defensively, not as a base from which to launch an offensive against the West. It was the Soviet acquisition of military control in Poland which gave Moscow a continuous belt of total control from the Soviet frontier to the Elbe and made Stalin's postwar offensive thinkable. It was the installation of a Communist government in Poland which permitted Stalin to carry forward the development of a Communist empire in Eastern Europe.

Poland was not a symbol. It was the very substance of the problem.

The American war-time and immediate postwar failure on the Polish question stemmed not from a lack of disinterested friendship, but from a lack of understanding of the national interest.

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W. W. ROSTOW

Justice Enslaved. A Collection of Documents on the Abuse of Justice for Political Ends. International Commission of Jurists: The Hague, 1955. Pp. 535.

This book published in English, French and German bears the following motto: "That every state and every citizen shall be free under the Rule of Law."

A. J. M. van Dal, secretary general, signed the preface which explains that "the International Commission of Jurists, established in 1952, aims at supporting and advancing those principles of justice which they believe to have universal and lasting validity." The Commission declares "that wherever such principles are being systematically eliminated or violated, their reinstatement will be sought by exposing the processes of injustice at work."

Furthermore, it is said that "it is against the rule of injustice that the International Commission of Jurists takes a stand, not against any specific political idea. The Commission strives to maintain complete neutrality towards all political parties, groups or ideologies, except those which promote tyranny over men." This declaration is followed by a statement that if the volume applies to countries under

communist rule it is for two outstanding reasons. Firstly, because systematic injustice in these countries has assumed such proportions that it constitutes a direct menace to those legal principles which the Commission is pledged to defend throughout the world. Secondly, because in the countries behind the Iron Curtain there is neither the right nor the means of raising a voice in protest against the flood of injustice.

The asserted aim of the book is to prove the existence of a system under which justice is enslaved to serve the political ends of a ruthless party-clique. It is a collection of documents and depositions of witnesses.

While there are no names of authors mentioned, the preface thanks Messrs. Edward S. Kozera and Karl Vasak of The Hague, Mr. Werner Schulz of Munich, and Mr. Horst W. Rockmann of West Berlin, officers of the Staff of the Commission, and Mr. P. G. Walther Rosenthal for the collecting and arranging of the documents.

The material is divided into four parts, Public Law, Criminal Law, Civil and Economic Law, and Labor Law. The quoted documents concern USSR, Poland, Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania and the Soviet Zone of Germany.

The first chapter of the Public Law part is entitled "Violations of the Fundamental Human Rights," and contains, besides a one-page introduction, sections dealing with the violations of the freedom of opinion and expression, violations of the right of assembly and association, violations of freedom of religion, violations of the right to instruction, violations of freedom of the press and of the secrecy of the mails, corresponding to articles 19, 20, 18, 26, 19 and 12 of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, respectively.

The second chapter, entitled "Restrictions on or Elimination of Free Elections; Violations of Rights and Duties of Duly Constituted Legislative Bodies," corresponds to article 21 of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The violations of articles 4, 9 and 13 of the said Declaration are described in chapter III on "Violations of the Security of Person." Chapter IV, on "Oppression of the Population through Employment and Activity of Informers," lists the transgressions of article 3 of the United Nations Declaration and concludes the first part (pp. 9-107).

The section on criminal law starts with a chapter on the "Administration of Justice," referring to articles 6, 8 and 10 of the U.N. Declaration and subdivided into sections on: (a) the political task of the judicial function. (b) abolition of the independence of the judge, and (c) position of the public prosecutor.

The second chapter of this part deals with "Prosecution for Political Reasons" (articles 7 and 8 of U.N. Declaration) and is subdivided into sections on (a) religious persecution, (b) the conception of espionage in the administration of justice, (c) denial of freedom of expression and (d) other penal means of opposing the political opponent.

The "Penal law Proceedings in pursuance of aims of economic policy" are examined in the third chapter under the headings: (a) sabotage, (b) sentences on account of endangering the economic plan, (c) extension of the meaning "official" with regard to criminal responsibility, (d) criminal responsibility in the economic plan (e) heavy penalties protect public property.

The fourth chapter deals with "Abolition of the Freedom of the Legal Profession and Encroachment upon the Rights of Defending Counsel," (articles 10 and 11 of the U.N. Declaration); while the fifth chapter is entitled "Arbitrary arrest;

Confession and Testimony obtained by Extortion" (articles 7 and 9 of the U.N. Declaration). The sixth chapter on "Inhuman Sentences and Inhuman Execution" concludes the Criminal Law part (pp. 12-299).

The third part on "Civil and Economic Law" starts with "Property Rights" (article 17 of the U.N. Declaration), the latter section being subdivided into an introduction quoting general principles of the communist law texts and two sections, one on confiscation of private property and the second on discrimination against private property. The second chapter then proves "The Supremacy of the State in Contract." Family law is examined in the third chapter concluding this part (pp. 303-402).

The last part, on labor law, refers to article 23, paragraph 4 of the U.N. Declaration and shows in its first chapter the "Trade-Union as an instrument of the State." (a) No independent trade-unions, and (b) no representation of employees' interests.

The second chapter on "Man-Power Direction based on Compulsion" (article 13, paragraph 1 and article 23 paragraph 1 of the U.N. Declaration) is subdivided into sections on (a) restriction on freedom of employment, (b) compulsory transfer of skilled workers, (c) obligation to remain in a post unless authorized to leave.

The "Exploitation of workers through arbitrarily established conditions of work, work-norms and labor competition" (article 23, paragraph 3 and article 24 of the U.N. Declaration) are described in the third chapter, subdivided into sections entitled: (a) working conditions and wages are dictated by the State, (b) exploitation through forced competition, forced self-imposed obligation and forced overtime.

The last chapter shows the "Increased responsibility of workers in matters of discipline and under penal and civil law" and concludes the part on labor law (pp. 405-493).

The documents quoted in this book are chosen from the texts of the law, from what may be called "case law" and from the doctrine. To the first group belong texts of constitutions, codes, laws, decrees and other legislative texts which represent the official stand of the ruling régimes. The "case" material is given in the form of court judgments and depositions of witnesses concerning the decisions and administrative measures of the state and party organs and/or the manner of conducting meetings and other public activities. The official doctrine is drawn from basic official books like "Problems of Leninism" by J. Stalin and from the periodicals published in countries behind the Iron Curtain. The 638 documents are interwoven with short explanatory comments.

This method does not make the book easily readable. In fact, it is rather a mine of valuable information which can usefully serve scholars studying various aspects of the protection of human rights in the area.

It might be added that several acts of injustice committed during the postwar period have been officially branded in one country which shows improvement in this field, namely Poland, after the events of October 1956, which left power in the hands of the group sometimes called "national communists."

Justice Enslaved offers undeniable proof of violation of human rights in the countries behind the Iron Curtain. It may be mentioned that this book produced several beneficial effects, drawing the attention of lawyers and other leading citizens in various countries. An example is the exchange of opinions by Professor

Marian Muszkat, Sir Hartley Shawcross and Aleksander Barchrach, published in Polish in *Prawo i Życie* (Law and Life) in 1956 in Poland.

The documentation assembled in *Justice Enslaved* is of great help to all students of the juridical and social sciences. The cases contained therein show how the legislative texts are applied and permit understanding not only of the mechanism but also of the spirit of the administration of justice behind the Iron Curtain.

The task of drawing conclusions from the submitted reports is left to the reader, the editors abstaining from any comment.

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LOUIS KOS-RABEWICZ-ZUBKOWSKI

SHORTER NOTICES

HINRICHS, CARL, *Ranke und die Geschichtstheologie der Goethezeit*. Göttinger Bausteine zur Geschichtswissenschaft, Band 19. Göttingen: Musterschmidt Wissenschaftlicher Verlag, 1954. Pp. viii, 254. DM 19.80.

Leopold von Ranke has exerted an almost obsessive influence over German historiography; there is hardly another historian whose work has been so minutely and painstakingly investigated, down to the roots and even the roots of the roots. Since Meinecke he has particularly attracted German historians cut off from contemporary inspiration during a period of "inner emigration." Professor Hinrichs' book bears all the hallmarks of scholarship practiced in the heroic, yet somewhat stale mental seclusion of anti-Nazi intellectuals in the last years of the war. Rarely has the *weltfremde Feinmechanik* of German *Geistesgeschichte* been carried to such extremes.

Yet while the book will make tedious reading, it is not without considerable merits as an exercise in historical and philosophical analysis, for the author is at home not only in German romantic thought but in theology as well. Starting with a passage from the *Weltgeschichte* in which Ranke explained the rise of Christianity in terms of the Prometheus myth, Hinrichs traces the changing, but always crucial treatment accorded this myth in German letters from Goethe through all the key thinkers of German romanticism—Fichte, Schlegel, Schelling, Schleiermacher to Hegel—and unfolds in the process much of the strange irrational quests and drifts of philosophical speculation in that period. This extensive and diligent survey, occupying over one third of the book, serves a useful purpose: it gives an unusually intensive reality to ideas and symbols which constituted the inner springs of Ranke's inspiration; it shows how intimately the young Ranke was a product of his time.

The central part of the book then deals directly with the multifarious influences shaping Ranke's philosophy of history. Yet varied as they were, they shared one common source: neoplatonism. It is the special contribution of the study that it stresses the profound influence of this school of thought over the young Ranke. It affected him through many channels, his reading of Herder, Goethe, and Fichte, and more directly through the contemporary expositor of Neoplatonism, Friedrich Creutzer, who corresponded with Gottfried Hermann, the philologist and Ranke's teacher at Leipzig, and again through the theologian Leberecht de Wette at Heidelberg. It is quite astounding to see in Hinrichs' analysis how closely Ranke followed the terminology and symbolism employed by these men (drawn in the last analysis from Plotinus), and how much he breathed their spirit into his historiography. It took a kindred mind, seeking shelter from Nazi

ideology in the haunts of German romanticism, to feel his way into the mystical depths of Ranke's inspiration. But this reviewer, himself strongly impressed by the religious sources in Ranke's philosophy, can only concur in Professor Hinrichs' conclusions and feel grateful for the detailed proofs which he furnishes.

As for the remainder of the book, it constitutes a fairly uninspired exposition of the contents of the *Weltgeschichte* in the light of the foregoing analysis. Yet as a sound and elaborate piece of scholarship it belongs among the indispensable commentaries on Ranke.

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T. H. VON LAUE

BOOMS, HANS, *Die Deutschkonservative Partei. (Beiträge zur Geschichte des Parlamentarismus und der politischen Parteien, Heft 3.)* Düsseldorf: Droste-Verlag, 1954. Pp. 135. DM 11.80.

This is another volume in the series of research publications in parliamentary and political party history directed by a Commission of the Ministry of the Interior of the West German Republic. Like the other volumes its construction is scholarly, its purpose to further the cause of parliamentary democracy among Germans. (See JOURNAL, April, 1955, p. 90)

In this particular volume, the German Conservative party is placed under a microscope and its mental attitudes extracted from its responses to various selected stimuli. It is established that "the traditional connection of the German Conservative party to the Prussian state was (never) broken." (p. 31) The author is at pains to prove incorrect the views of other writers that "Prussian Conservatives in the party did become national . . . and 'überpreussisch.'" (p. 33)

Stimuli are applied in the form of select problems and the responses of party leaders are recorded from the stenographic reports of the Reichstag and the Prussian Landtag. The party, when exposed to the three-class elective system, fights to maintain it. To "define more sharply the Prussian character" of the party (p. 58), several minor stimuli are applied, the policies of State sovereignty, finance, railroad, direct tax, and waterways. The conclusion is that the party "saw its highest political goal in the maintenance of an independent Prussian state within the unity of the Empire." (p. 79)

But how is this compatible with the view of the party that it "stood for the Empire" and was a "national party"? (p. 79) In Parts III and IV the author analyzes the party's conception of the Empire and of the nation, respectively.

To the Conservatives the "affairs of the Empire" were "simply a part of the affairs of the individual states." (p. 95) Therefore, "furtherance of a strong Prussian state for the benefit of the German Empire" was "a positive attitude toward the Empire." (p. 94) Their concept of the nation is shown, by analysis of terminology, to be legal and political, not cultural and "völkisch." (p. 98) Thus "could the German Conservative party in spite of its fundamentally Prussian attitude . . . consider itself . . . a truly 'national party' because its concept of 'national' was so narrow that it simply signified a positive attitude toward the State" (p. 110)

The volume, informative and skillfully executed, is not a history but a clinical examination. This method fails to do justice to the theme.

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HENRY M. ADAMS

PAVLOVIĆ, K. ST., *Vojislav Marinković i Njegovo Doba (1876-1935)*. London: 1955-57, 3 vols. \$1.00, \$1.00, \$1.50.

These volumes are intended both as a personal tribute and an authoritative biography of Vojislav Marinković, Yugoslav Foreign Minister from 1927 to 1932. The author, now an émigré in London, served Marinković in the capacity of private secretary for seven years prior to the Minister's death in 1935.

In the introductory volume Pavlović deals mostly with the background of the Marinković family and with Marinković's early career as parliamentarian and

politician. Volume II deals with the parliamentary strife of the 1920s which culminated in the assassination of Radić and King Alexander's dictatorship. It contains a useful survey of Yugoslav political developments during the years 1924-1928 and ends with a description of Marinković as administrator and his relations with the *corps diplomatique*. The third volume deals with foreign policy and brings the story up to 1932, the year in which Marinković left the Foreign Ministry and (but for a brief interlude) public office in general.

Marinković can be legitimately regarded as one of the more significant figures in the Yugoslav political arena of the 1920s and early 1930s. As Foreign Minister he succeeded in consolidating the Little Entente in the face of economic depression and revisionist pressure in Central and Eastern Europe. Moreover, he played an important role in the development of the Balkan Entente. But his tenure as Foreign Minister followed an already prominent political career which spanned the uneasy transition from Serbia to Yugoslavia. A member of the Serbian Skupština since 1906, he first joined the cabinet under Pašić in 1914. During the war he alternated between service at home and abroad, representing Serbia at interallied meetings in Paris and participating in the formulation of the Corfu Declaration in 1917. He joined the first Yugoslav government in December 1918 as Minister of Commerce and Industry, advancing to the Ministry of the Interior in 1921 and the Foreign Ministry for the first time in 1924. This career is all the more noteworthy because Marinković was not a Radical; in fact, he helped establish the Democratic Party as a powerful, albeit temporary, political instrument of Serbo-Croatian collaboration in the mid-'twenties.

Pavlović's ambitious undertaking would have been a most welcome addition to the sparse literature on interwar Yugoslav politics were it not marred by notable shortcomings. Despite the unique advantage afforded by his position, the author seems too often disposed towards writing his own autobiography rather than a biography of his mentor. He makes use of an unhappy mixture of sentimentality and history, ranging from personal adulation to sweeping (and sometimes tendentious) historical judgment. Distinctions between pure trivia and significant fact are often so blurred that the analytical narrative gives way to the anecdotal. Furthermore, the work suffers from a narrow Serbian political orientation which is more conducive to political debate among exiles than to the interests of historical investigation. One need only cite the author's rationalization of Puniša Račić's homicidal rampage in the Skupština (II, 11-15); his charges of "collective fanaticism of Croatian masses" before World War II (II, 55); his approval of the royal dictatorship which brought down the curtain upon the parliamentary process with the simple contention that the dictatorship changed nothing at all (II, 46f.).

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A SURVEY OF BOOKS WRITTEN AND PUBLISHED BY SERBS IN EXILE (1941-1958)

by Stévan K. Pavlowitch

THE conditions under which books are published by émigrés in the free world, the fact that these appear all over the free world and often in private and limited editions, make it difficult to undertake a systematic survey of books published by any émigré national group.

Two years ago, we started to work on a general survey of books written or published by Serbs in exile since 1941, as a contribution to a general bibliography of Yugoslav books published in exile.¹ By "books," we mean all separate publications, from full-size books several hundred pages thick to pamphlets of a few pages. 467 such publications have been examined and registered so far. At this stage, the survey is not complete, and it is difficult to say when it will be. The books indexed so far do, however, represent the great majority of the works written or published by Serbs in exile since 1941. We also believe that no major work has been omitted.

Out of the 467 books indexed, 46 were published during the Second World War (1941-1944), by the so-called "first emigration": 25 in the United Kingdom, 20 in the United States, and one in Switzerland. They are works published either by the Royal Yugoslav Government in London, or by Serbian-American organizations, and they deal with the 1941 *coup*,

¹This general Bibliography is being published in *Poruka*, London (starting in No. 47, Jan. 1958). A similar Slovene bibliography has been compiled by Zdravko Novak, and published in the 1956 issue of the *Zbornik koledar svobodne Slovenije* (Buenos Aires), p. 209, with supplements in the 1957 (p. 209), 1958 (pp. 199, 212), and 1959 (pp. 268, 269, 273) issues. There still remains to be undertaken a survey of Croatian books for a general bibliography of books written or published by Yugoslavs in exile to be compiled.

In this bibliographical note, written for English-speaking readers, all Serbian names are transliterated phonetically into English. Where an author's own transliteration of his name in a foreign-language publication differs from the one used in this article, that author's own transliteration is also given. Titles of books, periodical publications and organizations, are transliterated into the Latin script according to the Croatian spelling.

the resistance movement, enemy atrocities, and Yugoslavia in general. A notable exception to this trend is the last works of the poet Yovan Duchich.

Since the war and the establishment of the Communist régime in Yugoslavia, the following movement in the number of books published is observable. During the period of political uncertainty which accompanied the actual installation of the new régime, publications in exile fell to 8 in 1944, and 17 in 1945. In 1946, they rose to the record number of 46. This was due to the need to protest against the recently installed régime, and to the flood of new refugees from Yugoslavia, the so-called "second emigration." The 1946 peak was followed by two years of reduced activity (21 titles in 1947, 24 in 1948). From 1949 onwards, Yugoslav émigrés began to "settle," both geographically and economically. In the 1950s, their ranks were further increased, and are still being increased by new arrivals from Yugoslavia, the so-called "third emigration." The number of books written and published rose again. During the last eight years, the annual output has varied from 26 to 34, with a peak reaching 40 in 1952.

France is the country where the Serbian émigrés have remained most conscious of their political status. Moreover, owing to the traditional cultural, political and personal ties between Yugoslavia (especially Serbia) and France, a number of intellectuals (University teachers, diplomatists, journalists) have found employment in universities and research institutions. French was the foreign language most current among the Serbian intelligentsia and bourgeoisie. This accounts for the fact that France is the country which produces the greatest single number of Serbian books. 98 titles have been published in France (93 in Paris) since 1946.

The next country in order of output is the United Kingdom, where 78 books have been published since 1941 (70 in London). 11 of these were published during the war by the Royal Yugoslav Government whose seat was in London. London, the first center of the Yugoslav émigrés, has retained much of its importance in spite of emigration to America and Australia. It remains an important political and cultural center, both the Yugoslav National Committee and the Society of Serbian Authors in Exile being established there.

Owing to the presence and financial resources of the prewar economic emigrants, and to the existence of their well-established Serbian-American organizations and firms, the United States competes with the United Kingdom as the second country in order of output, and will probably outdistance it in 1959. 74 books have been published by Serbs in the United States since 1941,² with 33 titles in Chicago, the seat of most Serbian-American organizations.

71 books were published in Germany, where the main center is Munich (36 titles); 29 in Canada, where the main center is Windsor, Ontario (19 titles); 21 in Australia; and 15 in Switzerland. 34 books were published in Italy and Austria, all except a few during 1946 and 1947 for the use of the

²Serbian-American publications of strictly local interest similar to those published by American Serbs before the War have not been included in this Bibliography.

many Serbian refugees who found themselves in these two countries during the first two or three years of the Communist régime in Yugoslavia.

A few other countries are also represented, with a handful of books each: the Argentine Republic, Belgium, Brazil, Chile, the Netherlands and the Union of South Africa. Finally, there are 18 titles for which we have not been able to discover even the country of publication.

257 of the 467 publications indexed are written in Serbian. 115 of these are printed in Croatian Latin script, owing to the difficulty and cost of printing in Serbian Cyrillic script. The other publications are written in French (92 titles) and in English (91 titles), with a few in German, Portuguese and Spanish. Over 60% of the books (289) have been published by Serbian organizations, or privately by the authors themselves.

The principal Serbian publishers are the "Avala" publishing company of the Serbian National Shield Society of Canada, with its seat at Windsor, Ontario, and the Serbian Religious Library "Svečanik," at Munich, which specializes in the publication of religious books. Two other series must be mentioned here: *Naše delo*, started in 1952 in Paris, which has published a number of works in the field of socio-political analysis; and *Srpska misao*, founded in 1956 in Melbourne, which has published a number of literary and historical works. Various departments of the Royal Yugoslav Government in exile produced a number of books during the War years, and the Y.M.C.A. published 29 Serbian books in the immediate postwar years (1946-1949), for the Yugoslav Displaced Persons, mostly in Italy. One is surprised to see that only 28 titles are cyclotyped or mimeographed.

Three great names of Serbian literature and scholarship appear in the survey, names that had already established their fame before the War. The poet Yovan A. Duchich († 1943), who ended his diplomatic career as Yugoslav Minister in Madrid, spent the final years of his life in the United States, and published there his last works: his biography of Count Sava Vladislavich, a Serbian diplomatist in the service of Catherine the Great of Russia (*Grof Sava Vladislavić*, The Serb National Federation, Pittsburgh, 1942), and his last volume of poems (*Lirika*, Chicago, 1943). The Serbian National Defense Council of America published in 1951 a posthumous collection of literary, autobiographical and philosophical essays by Duchich (*Stanza pored puta. Moji saputnici. Jutra sa Leutara*, Chicago, 1951). The poet and novelist Milosh Tsnyanski (born 1893), now living in London, has published in Paris a volume of poems (*Odabrani stihovi*, 1954).

The great historian and constitutional jurist, Slobodan V. Yovanovich, a former Professor at the University of Belgrade, a former President of the Royal Serbian Academy, and a former Prime Minister of Yugoslavia, who died in December 1958 in London aged 89, published in Paris a study of the modern totalitarian doctrines (*O totalitarizmu*, "Naše delo," Paris, 1952) as a new aspect of Machiavellism.

Some half-dozen poets, who had not made a name for themselves in prewar Serbian literature, have published volumes of poetry since 1941, not to mention those who, without having yet published separate volumes,

publish their poems in Serbian émigré periodicals. Of these poets three should be mentioned: Dragolyub R. Achimovich, now living in South Africa, has published two volumes of poetry (*Balkanska pesma, lirski izlivi i drugi stihovi*, Paris, 1953; *Vedrina, pesme Šarla Defreza prepevane na srpskom*, Paris, 1954); Dragolyub P. Dragutinovich, now living in the United States, has published one cyclotyped volume of poetry (*Pesme*, Pongau, Austria, 1949); and Milan P. Petrovich, also living in America, has published two volumes of poetry (*Iz ropstva u izgnanstvo*, Osnabrück, 1946; *Pesme izgnanika*, "Srpska misao," Melbourne, 1956).

A number of collections of short stories have been published, with themes mostly drawn from the life of Serbian refugees. Yovan Kontich, a journalist and school teacher, has published two such volumes in the United States (*Kroz oganj i suze*, The Serb National Federation, Pittsburgh, 1946; *Putem izgnanika*, Chicago, 1956). Vlastimir S. Petkovich, a journalist now living in Geneva, has published one volume of short stories (*Izvan koloseka*, Perth, Australia, 1954), as well as two longer short stories (*U našim ambarama biće žita*, Chicago, 1957; *Podmorničar Paja Salašev*, Hamilton, Ontario, 1958). Lena Pop-Hristich († 1952) also published a volume of short stories (*Nekad bilo . . .*, "Avala," Windsor, Ontario, 1952). Urosh Stankovich, who lives in Australia, where he actively collaborates in the publication of the *Srpska misao* series, has published a collection of portraits and scenes from his reminiscences of life in the POW camps (*Oflag VI-B*, Dornbirn, Austria, 1947), as well as a collection of children's tales (*Bajke unucima*, "Srpska misao," Melbourne, 1957). No novels have yet been published separately.

Nyegosh, the Montenegrin poet-philosopher-ruler, the Serbian poet *par excellence*, has inspired a number of scholarly works. Professor Lazo M. Kostich, formerly of the University of Belgrade, now living in Switzerland, has published a volume of essays on Nyegosh to commemorate the hundredth anniversary of the poet-philosopher's death (*Iz Njegoševih dela. Analize i interpretacije*, Chicago, 1952). These deal with the historical evidence deducible from Nyegosh's works. Professor Kostich's *Pravni instituti u Njegoševim pismama* ("Srpska misao," Melbourne, 1958) is a study of the poet's work from a juridical angle. Dr. Zhika R. Prvulovich, a theologian and a specialist of Nyegosh, has written a Ph.D. thesis—unfortunately unpublished—as well as a number of articles in periodicals on the philosophy of this poet. Two of these have been reprinted for private circulation (*The Slavonic & East European Review*, XXXII, 79, London, 1954; and *Journal of Theological Studies*, VII, New Series 1, Oxford, 1956).

Professor Milan Markovich (Markovitch), formerly of the University of Belgrade, now of the University of Nancy in France, has contributed a great number of articles to scholarly periodicals in France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy and Switzerland, on the ties between French writers and Serbia, or Serbian writers and France. Many of these have been reprinted for private circulation. Only a selection is listed here: in *Revue de littérature comparée*, Paris—"Alphonse Daudet et les Serbes," Apr.-June 1947,

"Balzac et les Serbes," Apr.-June 1949, "Un prince monténégrin disciple de Chateaubriand," July-Sept. 1949, "Victor Hugo et les Serbes," July-Sept. 1952; "Les arts plastiques et la poésie populaire serbe," in *Atti del quinto Congresso internazionale di lingue e letteratura moderne*, Florence, 1955.

Professor Milutin M. Borisavlyevich (Borissavliévitch), formerly of the University of Belgrade, now a *Chargé de Recherches* at the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique in Paris, is the author of a number of works on architecture and aesthetics, notably: *Les theories de l'architecture*, (2nd edition, Paris, 1951), with an introduction by Louis de Hauteceur, *Secrétaire perpétuel* of the Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques; Spanish edition, Buenos Aires, 1949; *Le nombre d'or et l'esthétique scientifique de l'architecture*, Paris, 1952, with an introduction by Louis de Hauteceur; English edition, London, 1958; *Traité d'esthétique scientifique de l'architecture*, 2 vols, Paris, 1954; *Perspective sans point de fuite*, Paris, 1956. Professor Borisavlyevich has also written many articles in French architectural periodicals, a number of which have been reprinted for private circulation (from *La construction moderne*, *L'architecture française* and *L'urbanisme*, Paris).

The late Bishop Nikolay of Zhicha (who died in 1956 in the United States) wrote two books in English, a catechism of the Eastern Orthodox Church, and a biography of St. Sava, the patron Saint of Serbia (Bishop Nikolai D. Velimirovich, *The Faith of the Saints*, The Serb National Federation, Pittsburgh, 1949; *The Life of Saint Sava*, Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for the United States of America and Canada, Libertyville, Illinois, 1951). Bishop Nikolay also produced, in exile, 11 books in Serbian, a number of which were published by *Svečanik* in Munich.

The historians are mostly interested in the development of the Marxist movement. Yet Dr. Miodrag A. Purkovich, a medievalist, formerly of the University of Belgrade, now in London, has published two important studies on the princesses of the Serbian medieval dynasties (*Princeze iz kuće Nemanjića*, "Avala," Windsor, Ontario, 1956; *Kćeri kneza Lazara*, "Srpska misao," Melbourne, 1957). Dr. Purkovich has made a number of contributions to British and German scholarly periodicals, three of which have been reprinted for private circulation (Miodrag A. Purković, "Two notes on mediaeval Serbian history, 1. The date of the fresco in the church at Sopoćani, 2. Was Stefan Dečanski the younger or the elder of King Milutin's sons?" *The Slavonic & East European Review*, XXIX, 73, London, 1951; "Der Vater des Starez Isaïas," *Byzantinische Zeitschrift*, XLIV, Munich, 1951; "De Théodora, fille d'Etienne Detchanski et de Marie Paléologue," *Byzantinische Zeitschrift*, XLV, 1952). Dr. Purkovich has also written a great number of articles on Serbian history in Serbian émigré periodicals, some of which have been reprinted for private circulation. Another medievalist, Dr. Milosh Mladenovich (Mladenović), of McGill University, has studied the new trends in Yugoslav medieval historiography ("The new Yugoslav historiography and the problem of feudalism in mediaeval Serbia," *Slavic & East European Studies*, I, Montreal, 1956).

Dr. Ivan A. Avakumovich, of the University of Manitoba, who specializes in the history of Marxism, has also written on the history of the first Serbian Insurrection. His bibliography of that insurrection (1804-1813), published in this Journal (XIII, 2, 1953), has been reprinted for private circulation. Professor Milan Markovich has also written a number of articles on the events of 1848 in Serbia, and their links with France. Three of these have been reprinted for private circulation ("Une grande figure de la révolution serbe de 1848, Svetozar Miletitch," *Revue des révolutions contemporaines*, Paris, 1949; "La révolution serbe de 1848 et les français," *Actes du Congrès historique du centenaire de la Révolution de 1848*, Paris, 1949; "La révolution de 1848 et les lettres serbes," *Actes du 4e Congrès international d'histoire littéraire*, Paris, 1950). Radivoje Boyich, a former diplomatist who now lives in Switzerland, has studied the part played by the Archbishopric of Karlovtsi in the defense of the Serbian national idea in Austria (*Uloga srpske karlovačke mitropolije u odbrani srpskog naroda*, Chicago, 1957).

Kosta S. Pavlovich, a former diplomatist, now of the University of Cambridge, is working on the diplomatic history of Yugoslavia between the two World Wars. He has published the first four volumes of his biography of the Yugoslav statesman Vojislav Marinkovich (*Vojislav Marinković i njegovo doba, 1876-1935*, London, 1956-57, with an introduction by Prince Dēmètre Ghika, a former Rumanian Foreign Minister). A fifth volume is in print. Kosta Pavlovich also has to his credit some smaller works and numerous articles in Serbian émigré periodicals on the diplomatic history of Yugoslavia. Dr. Djoko M. Slijepechevich (Slijepečević), formerly of the University of Belgrade, now in Munich, has written a historical monograph on *The Macedonian Question* (Chicago, 1958).

Much research and literature has naturally been devoted to the history of Marxism, in general, in Eastern Europe and Yugoslavia. Dr. Ivan Avakumovich has published, in collaboration with George Woodcock, a biography of Kropotkin (George Woodcock and Ivan Avakumović, *The Anarchist Prince. A Biographical Study of Peter Kropotkin*, London, 1950). His Ph.D. thesis on the Marxist movement in Yugoslavia is still unpublished, but his bibliography of the Marxist movement in Yugoslavia (1872-1944) has been published in this Journal (XV, 1, 1955) and reprinted for private circulation. Dr. Branislav Stranyakovich, who writes under the pseudonym of *Branko Lazitch*, has published three studies on the history of the Communist movement (*Lénine et la IIIe Internationale*, Neuchâtel and Paris, 1951, with an introduction by Professor Raymond Aron of the University of Paris; *Les partis communistes d'Europe, 1919-1955*, Paris, 1955; *Tito et la révolution yougoslave, 1937-1956*, Paris, 1957). Dr. Milorad M. Drashkovich (Drachkovitch), until recently on the teaching staff of the Collège de l'Europe at Bruges, now resident in the United States, has published two important studies in the history of the Socialist movement (*Les socialismes français et allemand et le problème de la guerre 1870-1914*, Etudes d'histoire économique, politique et sociale, III, Geneva, 1953; *De Karl Marx*

à Léon Blum, *le crise de la social-démocratie*, Etudes d'histoire économique et sociale, VII, Geneva, 1954, with an introduction by Professor Hendrik Brugmans, Rector of the Collège de l'Europe).

The study of the social problems of Yugoslavia, before and after the war, has been the subject of a number of monographs. Professor Kayitsa Milanov, formerly of the University of Belgrade, now of the University of Tasmania, has published a social and political analysis of "Titoism" (*Titovština u Jugoslaviji*, Perth, 1952, with an introduction by Professor Slobodan Yovanovich). Dr. Ranko M. Brashich, of the Mid-European Studies Center of the Free Europe Committee in New York, has studied the agrarian structure of Yugoslavia since the Unification (*Taxation in Yugoslavia's Agriculture*, 1953; *Land Reform and Ownership in Yugoslavia, 1919-1953*, 1954; both published by the Mid-European Research Center). Adam Pribichevich, who died in 1957 in Canada, was one of the leaders of the Independent Democratic Party and one of the architects of Yugoslav unification. He knew intimately the problems of the Serbian peasantry with whom he had lived for sixteen years after withdrawing from active politics, and played a leading part in the Resistance during the Second World War. Pribichevich published several books in exile. Two of these are contributions to the study of the social, psychological and political structure of the Serbian countryside (*Od gospodina do seljaka*, "Avala," Windsor, Ontario, 1953; *Selo kao moralni činilac u životu naroda*, "Naše delo," Paris, 1954). The workers' councils in Yugoslavia have been studied by the Socialist and trade-union leader, Dr. Zhivko Topalovich, who now lives in Paris (*Les usines aux ouvriers. L'expérience yougoslave*, Editions du groupe socialiste yougoslave, Paris, 1952), and by Desimir Toshich (Tochitch), a journalist, now residing in London, and who actively collaborates in the publication of the *Naše delo* series ("Les conseils ouvriers en Yougoslavie," reprinted for private circulation from the *Revue d'histoire économique et sociale*, XXXIII, 4, Paris, 1955).

Yovo P. Plamenats (John Plamenatz), Fellow of All Souls' and of Nuffield College, Oxford, although settled in Great Britain before the Second World War, has been included in this survey. A member of the Society of Serbian Authors in Exile, he has published since 1941 a number of studies on political philosophy, and more particularly on Marxism (*Mill's Utilitarianism Reprinted, with a Study of the English Utilitarians*, Oxford, 1949; *The Revolutionary Movement in France, 1815-1871*, London, 1953; *German Marxism and Russian Communism*, London, 1954).

Professor Stevan K. Chirkovich (Tchirkovitch), a former diplomatist and a distinguished jurist, now Professor at the Institut des Hautes Etudes Internationales of the University of Paris, has published three series of lectures given at the University of Paris on problems of international law: *La question des Détroits, Bosphore et Dardanelles, depuis le XVIIIe siècle jusqu'à nos jours*, Paris, 1947; *Les grandes conférences des nations unies et alliées pendant la deuxième guerre mondiale (1939-45) et les principes politiques, juridiques et moraux qui se dégagent de leurs décisions*, Paris,

1947; *La protection de l'individu et des minorités nationales d'après les traités diplomatiques du début du XVIIIe siècle à nos jours*, Paris, 1947; *Le nouveau statut juridique international du Danube et le régime du secteur des Cataractes et des Portes-de-Fer*, Paris, 1956. Professor Chirkovich has also published a great number of articles on international law. Many of these, dealing with law in Eastern Europe, human rights, the victims of war, refugees, national minorities, and the Straits, have been reprinted for private circulation (from the following Paris law periodicals: *Revue générale de droit international public*, *Revue internationale de droit comparé*, *Revue de droit international pour le Moyen-Orient*, *Revue de science criminelle et droit pénal comparé*, *Revue critique de droit international privé*).

Professor Zhivoyin M. Perich (Jivoïn M. Peritch), formerly of the University of Belgrade, († 1954), has written many articles on legal matters (especially Serbian family communities) in Swiss, Belgian, French and Italian law periodicals.

Outside the pale of political and moral sciences, Dr. Milosh Sekulich, a lung specialist now living in London, published in 1953 *The Classification of Pulmonary Tuberculosis* (London); Major Borivoye S. Radulovich, an expert on guerrilla warfare, has written a technical handbook on *La guerrilla en la guerra*, published by the Argentine and the Chilean General Staffs.

As is to be expected, a very great number of the publications indexed are concerned with the political problems of Yugoslavia on the eve of the Second World War, during the War and since the War. It is difficult to decide which among so many publications will one day be used as source material for the historian. One may only mention the most important of these works, which can be considered as first hand contributions to the history of Yugoslavia during the Second World War. Only two leading personalities have published memoirs: King Peter II of Yugoslavia (*A King's Heritage*, Washington, 1954, London, 1954, Paris, 1955), and Konstantin A. Fotich, formerly Yugoslav Ambassador in Washington, who died in February 1959 (Constantin Fotitch, *The War We Lost. Yugoslavia's Tragedy and the Failure of the West*, New York, 1948).

From the many publications dealing with the National resistance movement (as opposed to the Communist), and the Home Army of General Mihailovich, four, very different from one another in aspect and composition, are first hand contributions to the source material for the history of General Mihailovich's resistance movement. A complete bibliography and a selection of articles published in the press of the free world at the time of Mihailovich's execution, compiled and edited by Kosta Pavlovich, was published in 1947 (*General Mihailovich, the World's Verdict. A Selection of Articles on the First Resistance Leader in Europe Published in the World Press*, Gloucester, 1947, with an introduction by F. A. Voigt). A collection of contributions from witnesses, participants and leaders of the Home Army, together with official documents, compiled and edited in a thoroughly scholarly way by Radoye L. Knezhevich, one of the leaders of the Democratic Party and a former minister in the Yugoslav Government, has recently

SOVIETIZATION AND LIBERALIZATION IN POLISH POSTWAR HISTORIOGRAPHY

by *Elizabeth K. Valkenier*

THE decade between the Seventh and the Eighth Congress of Polish historians (one held in September 1948, the other in September 1958) fell into two distinct periods. The first saw the subordination of historiography to the demands of practical politics; the second, the gradual liberation of scholarship from ideological concerns.¹

The first postwar years were relatively free of direct interference. The government did not attempt to prescribe the conclusions of historians, and research suffered mostly from a lack of regular material support. In part this could be explained by the fact that the political front had not been consolidated until the December 1948 unification of the Socialists and the Communists into the Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR) and the demotion of Gomułka a month later.

The sad story of an organized abasement of learning began only after the Seventh Congress had clearly demonstrated the failure of the country's historians to line up with the régime and its policies. And so during 1949-1951 organizational control was established and an ideological offensive was mounted. In the years 1952-1954 historical research and publication were fully planned and centrally controlled, with repression and accusation for those who did not fall into step. The second period began during 1955 when all this administrative effort prescribing methods and conclusions was questioned, for the outcome was obviously unsatisfactory. Ever sharper criticism inveighed against the quality of work that resulted from centralized planning and from the subordination of professional standards to Marxist dogma. But only in 1956 was the distortion of learning in the Stalinist period fully assessed. A number of measures were taken to free historical research from the degrading obligations of the preceding years and to restore a degree of normalcy in the profession.

* * * *

To enlist historians in the service of the régime both the government and Soviet historians exerted persistent and heavy pressure.² The steps taken by the Polish régime were manifold and as thoroughgoing as the situation permitted. Starting at the very bottom, the educational authorities unequivocally based the history program for the school year 1949/50 on historical materialism. Likewise, in 1949 university studies were changed.

¹This article will not attempt to cover Polish historical research since 1948 but will concentrate on the narrower problem of the political and intellectual climate in which historical research had to be carried on. It must be remembered that despite varying degrees of Party pressure much sound and scholarly work was done in postwar Poland. Even the need to buttress conclusions already reached has led, as often as not, to the publication of valuable secondary works and new source material.

²For a more detailed treatment of these early years see Elizabeth Valkenier, "Soviet Impact on Polish Postwar Historiography, 1946-1950," *Journal of Central European Affairs*, XI, 4 (January 1952), 372-96.

For proper indoctrination required courses in Marxism-Leninism and the Russian language were introduced, the number of obligatory lectures greatly increased, and almost no time left to students for independent work. The Soviet system of *aspirantura* replaced in part the prewar training of assistants, and eventually the Soviet academic title of Candidate of Science replaced that of Doctor of Philosophy.

In addition to these changes in the school system, the Party began recruiting its own scholars and writing its own version of history. Members of the Institute of Social Sciences (INS) trained "ideological cadres," published propagandistic monographs, and lectured at lesser Party centers. The Central Committee's Department of Party History (WHP), established in 1946, at first merely collected and arranged archives. But after the Unification Congress and Gomułka's expulsion it began a systematic study of the Party's precursors and of the "patriotic and progressive national traditions which the PZPR inherits and carries on."³ The Party's theoretical monthly organ *Nowe Drogi* in 1950 started to publish a historical supplement, *Zeszyty Historyczne*. Together with *Wiomości Historyczne*, a bi-monthly put out by the Ministry of Education for history teachers, it regularly supplied information and instruction on the current and proposed changes. Their articles reinterpreted the country's past and present and gave lengthy accounts of scholarly life in the USSR which was to serve as the model for the transformation of Polish learning.

While the Party thus expanded its activities, it curtailed those of independent historians. The publication of the monumental *Biographic Dictionary* was discontinued in 1949 because it supposedly catered to bourgeois nationalism and used an unscientific methodology. The Institute of Contemporary History was closed down and recent archival material was made inaccessible to all but a select few because this period now became the exclusive domain of Party historians. Many historical journals published by regional or specialized learned societies were discontinued. For showing a lack of ardor in the ideological crusade, the leading historical quarterly, *Kwartalnik Historyczny*, was given a new Marxist editor, Stanisław Arnold, and its editorial offices were moved from Kraków to Warsaw. Close contacts with the USSR were cultivated, while those with the West were cut off and no Polish delegation attended the Ninth International Historical Congress in Paris in 1950. Communication with the International Committee of Historical Sciences practically ceased, libraries hardly purchased any Western books, and no regular coverage of Western bibliography appeared. Those historians who had specialized in such frowned-upon subjects as diplomatic or political history, the Polish-Lithuanian union, or Western European history found themselves obliged to change fields if they wished to continue research and publication. Quite a few simply sought escape and quiet in editorial work.

But the régime went beyond these measures. What it wanted was a

³Z pracy Wydziału Historii Partii KC PZPR, "Kwartalnik Historyczny, LX, 1 (1953)," 297-302.

wholesale conversion of the profession to Marxism to ensure the services of history in contemporary politics. Early in 1950 a new Ministry of Higher Education was formed to bring reluctant scholars to the side of the régime. The Ministry organized for July 1950 the First Congress of Polish Science, and quite pointedly exhorted historians, together with all other scientists, to renounce bourgeois liberalism and cosmopolitanism for dialectical materialism and cooperation with the Soviet Union. The historians attending the Congress testified to no wholesale conversion to Marxism⁴ and seventeen more months of pressure and hard work were necessary to bring this about.

During that time the Association of Marxist Historians (formed at the Seventh Congress with a membership of eleven relatively unknown individuals) worked out, with the active help of the Soviet *Institut Slavovedeniia* (founded in 1949 to publish Marxist histories of the People's Democracies), a new Marxist periodization of Polish history providing a detailed official version of historical causation and the course of historical development. In practice this cooperation meant fitting Poland's past to the five periods of mankind's development which Soviet historians regard as characteristic for all societies. Skipping over the slave-holding phase, Polish history was divided into four periods wherein distinct types of "production relations" or "socio-economic formations" prevailed. Primitive communalism was said to have lasted to the sixth or seventh century. After a transitional period, feudalism was to extend from the tenth or eleventh century to the mid-eighteenth century. Capitalism, also preceded by a transitional period, extended from 1864 to 1944 when, with the founding of the Lublin government on July 22nd, the last phase began—namely, that of socialism.

In October 1950 seven members of the Association of Marxist Historians visited the *Institut Slavovedeniia* for a conference on the detailed outline of a History of Poland to be published by the Institute. The conference turned out to be a Soviet lecture on what the new comprehensive synthesis of Polish history should be. Instructions included not only the Marxist periodization but also appropriate revisions in the evaluation of events and figures. The Poles tended to agree with all the criticism, seconded most of the demands for change, and from time to time offered only minor revisions of a factual nature.⁵

One example of how disagreement was resolved will show that in the final analysis Polish historians had to fit the history of their country into a pattern preconceived in Moscow. S. Arnold, an eager proseletizer of the Marxist dispensation, had maintained in an article⁶ that the feudal period in Poland should be dated from the beginning of the twelfth century be-

⁴A report of the Social Science Section of the Congress is to be found in *Życie Nauki*, V, 7-8 (1950), 569-79.

⁵The proceedings of the conference, as well as the text of the Soviet outline, appeared in *Institut Slavovedeniia Akademii Nauk SSSR, Kratkie Soobshcheniia*, 4-5, 1951.

⁶"Uwagi o początkach ustroju feudalnego w Polsce," *Przegląd Historyczny*, XLI (1950), 9-20. For Soviet refutation see V. Koroliuk, "Przegląd Historyczny. T. XLI (1950). Istoricheskoe obozrenie," *Voprosy Istorii*, 6 (1951), 118-21.

cause sources testified to the formation of large feudal estates in those years and his conclusions had also found support at the May 1950 meeting of the Polish Historical Association on the new periodization. But during the October 1950 visit he did not convince the Soviet scholars. They argued against such anti-Marxist views and caused Arnold to recant. On the strength of an *a priori* conclusion, they made facts conform to theory since the Polish state was already in existence in the tenth century and as it was, according to Marxist theory, the expression of the class interests of the large estate owners, feudal landownership must therefore have existed by the tenth century. No matter what the sources indicated feudalism in Poland had to be dated from the tenth century.

It would be unfair to maintain that the adoption of the Marxist periodization was nothing more than a mechanical process of fitting facts to theory. As it happened, the reinterpretation of the very beginnings of Polish history within the new framework satisfied both the historians and the authorities. That is to say, it led to much fruitful research at the same time that it lent support to Marxist terminology. Since 1945 Polish medievalists and archeologists had been busy with the early history of the Western lands handed over to Polish administration at Potsdam. The ancestors of modern Poles had lived there before being pushed eastward by the Germanic tribes. This was a spontaneous interest with obvious nationalistic intent, but nevertheless one that offered rewarding study. The régime gave it its blessing and considerable support by setting up in May 1949 the Directorate of Researches on the Beginning of the Polish State "to furnish a scientific background for the thousandth anniversary of the appearance of the Polish state on the historical scene."⁷ Actually research delved much further back than 963, the date traditionally taken as the beginning of Poland's history. And in their eagerness to show the almost pre-historic claim of their country to this territory, Polish scholars willingly accepted the help of two noted Soviet medievalists, B. D. Grekov and B. A. Rybakov, in interpreting archeological finds dating back to the sixth century. With Soviet prompting they went beyond mere classification to seek out the prevailing mode of production. And it became customary to interpret the new findings as evidence of primitive communalism in various stages of decay, of the consequent class differentiation of exploiters and the exploited, and of the emergence of the state.⁸

This shift was of fundamental importance in providing the pattern for Poland's subsequent history in keeping with Stalin's dictum that the dominant mode of production determines the course of a society's development and its political institutions. Although Polish historians could accept this method and its findings for the earliest period with its scanty records, they questioned its application to later eras for which much fuller and more

⁷Whereas in 1948 there were 4 archeological stations, by 1951 there were 26.

⁸Cf. two reports by Aleksander Gieysztor, "Geneza państwa polskiego w świetle nowoczesnych badań," *Kwartalnik Historyczny*, LXI, 1 (1954), 103-36 and "Les origines de l'état polonais," in Académie Polonaise des Sciences, Institut d'Histoire, *La Pologne au Xe Congrès International des Sciences Historiques à Rome* (Warszawa, PWN, 1955), 55-82.

complex sources were available. Thus, while the inclusion of what was hitherto called pre-history in history proper proceeded without friction, the Marxist interpretation of later periods led to a high-handed treatment of facts under administrative pressure and Soviet lecturing.

Seventeen months after the unsuccessful First Congress of Polish Science the Ministry of Higher Education convened the First Methodological Conference of Historians at Otwock (December 28, 1951-January 12, 1952) and henceforth the official version of Marxist methodology was acknowledged as obligatory.⁹ Attended by high government officials, Party activists in the field, Soviet historians, young researchers hastily trained since the war, and established scholars, the Conference simply laid down the law on what was to be the official interpretation of events. The activists explained how history was to be an important means of transforming bourgeois Poles into a socialist nation, and the scholars who attended rather meekly registered their adherence. The atmosphere of the Congress can be gauged from the fact that of nine plenary lectures, three were delivered by Soviet historians and one by a Polish publicist. The opening address on Marxist methodology explained why its politically motivated premises were consonant with true scholarship. Dialectical materialism was not just another historical interpretation but a method which made history an exact science: no longer is history the sequence of chance events, but through dialectical materialism it becomes a process subject to certain well-established laws. The job of a historian is to show the regularity of this development leading to the inevitable victory of socialism over reaction.

In other lectures the chronology, interpretations, and themes of Marxist research and writing (as laid out at the October 1950 meeting at the *Institut Slavovedeniia*) were defined and discussed. On the question of feudalism, the Soviet definition and periodization were accepted with S. Arnold renouncing his "incorrect theories." Poland's union with Lithuania for the creation of the multinational Commonwealth (traditionally one of the glories of the past) was adjudged "reactionary" because it led to the loss of western territory to the Germans and the acquisition of lands later to be claimed by Russia. The kings and ruling classes of those times were to be condemned for expanding eastward rather than westward. The primary importance of the peasant question in the nineteenth century Polish independence movements was also decreed. By definition, only an agrarian revolution could be called progressive in the feudal epoch, and therefore all the Polish uprisings and their heroes were to be reassessed and criticized for not having a truly "progressive" agrarian program. Then there was the entirely new problem of the "formation of the bourgeois nation" on which Stalin had made some pronouncements in 1950. Stripped of all its confusing verbiage it boiled down to a directive to study Polish nationalism in such a way as to show that in the nineteenth century it was not the gentry but the working people who furthered the dream of nationhood. Further-

⁹The papers and discussions of the Conference appear in a two volume publication, *Pierwsza Konferencja Metodologiczna Historyków Polskich* (Warszawa, PWN, 1953).

more, the cooperation between Polish and Russian revolutionaries was to be uncovered and extolled. In the history of the workers' movement only the Communists and their predecessors were to be recognized. All other parties, no matter how popular, were accused of treason to the workers' cause. Poland's resurrection in 1918 was to be ascribed solely to the success of the Russian Revolution. The Western allies had merely schemed to use the Polish question for their own ends and to subjugate the country to their interests. The interwar period was painted as the unmitigated triumph of Fascism in politics and a shameless exploitation by European and American capital in economics. Finally, throughout Poland's history the Catholic Church and the Vatican were said to have played a rôle consistently hostile to the best interests of the nation.

It is interesting to note, at Otwock and throughout the period under discussion here, the alteration in tone when certain subjects were discussed. Whereas differences of opinion about earlier times were generally voiced calmly, the discussion of more modern times was largely given over to pinning labels on nations, classes, individuals, historians, events. There was a diligent search for scapegoats, traitors, and conspiracy on the one hand, and for heroes, correct solutions, and progress on the other. Thus, concerning the new periodization, there was, at Otwock, a rather mild critique of Z. Wojciechowski's theories about the family origin of the state and of S. Arnold's mistakes about the beginning of feudalism. But when it came to the peasant question in the nineteenth century, there was a truly brutal attack on H. Wereszycki, a diplomatic historian, for a book published in 1947. In his political history of Poland from 1864 to 1918 he committed, among other sins, the unforgivable ones of emphasizing the influence of events in the West on the course of Polish affairs and of failing to mention the impact of the October revolution, "that greatest event in human history." And to cap it all, those who led the attack maintained that they sought scholarly and constructive self-criticism, not penitent self-abasement.

* * * *

With the methodological change-over at Otwock, the stage was prepared for the next three years (1952-1954): historiography would play its new rôle within the appropriate organizational setting. The initial discussion concerning the organization of learning had coincided with preparations for the First Congress of Polish Science back in 1950. Some proposals went so far then as to urge a wholesale liquidation of all prewar learned societies in order to make possible a fresh start in relating research to the needs of the Six-Year Plan. But at the Congress it was decided merely to replace the existing Academy of Learning (*Akademia Umiejętności*) with a new Polish Academy of Sciences (*Polska Akademia Nauk*).¹⁰ In set up and purpose the new Academy was a copy of the Soviet *Akademiia Nauk*, meant to guide scientific endeavor in all fields. Its working methods, based on the

¹⁰Actually the old Academy was never disbanded but was left to moulder in Kraków, while the new Academy began to flourish on generous government subsidies in the beginning of 1952.

triple slogan of complexity (or the interdisciplinary approach), planning, and teamwork, indicated that little sympathy or subsidy would be available for research unrelated to the central plans. Although the scholars at the new Academy were supposed to plan their projects themselves, thereby ending the direct interference of the régime, there were still means of exercising covert control. For one, the Academy had to submit its annual plans and reports for approval to appropriate government authorities. And even more telling was the fact that it was neither the individual interest nor the cherished specialization of scholars but the fulfilment of programs considered significant by officials that decided which project would be acceptable.

At the Otwock conference it was suggested that a History Institute be created within the new Academy to answer the "overwhelming need for a nationwide planning of historical research." Under discussion and preparation for almost a year, the History Institute came into existence in January 1953.¹¹ Its founding and the first two years of operation were conducted in a veritable euphoria of bureaucratic activity. The Institute and its branches had an elaborate plan of work mapped out. By the end of 1954 it was to have completed the first multi-volume Marxist history of Poland, to serve as a university text, as well as 65 monographs on various subjects that needed either pioneering research (e.g., the development of "productive forces" in the Middle Ages) or considerable revision (e.g., Polish-Russian relations).¹²

That these plans were based on a rather simple-minded faith in the efficacy of appropriating large funds, setting up sections, appointing editors, and employing a team of researchers was soon enough demonstrated. The completion of the Marxist *History of Poland* was nowhere in sight by the end of 1954. Only a draft of the first volume, up to 1764, had been discussed; hardly more than a detailed outline of the next volume, up to 1864, had been prepared; the section that was to work on the 1864-1918 period was only partly set up; while the one for the years 1918-1953 was not even started. Partly responsible for the delay was the decision of the historians in charge of the project that the detailed outline prepared in 1950 by the *Institut Slavovedeniia*, although acceptable for the upper high school grades, was not adequate as a university text.

In addition to its own research and publication the History Institute

¹¹Its administration comprised the following: director, T. Manteuffel; deputy directors, L. Grosfeld and B. Leśnodorski; scientific secretary, W. Kula; and a scientific council, headed by N. Gąsiorowska, which in addition to professors included representatives from the Council of Ministers and the ministries of Higher Education, Defense, Culture and Arts. At the headquarters in Warsaw two sections—one devoted to Polish, the other to world history—began operation even before the formal opening of the Institute. The Polish history section was subdivided into four units that corresponded to the four socio-economic divisions established by the new periodization. The Institute also opened up (or rather took over from other learned societies) six branches: one in Wrocław for Silesian history, another in Poznań for Pomeranian studies, one in Łódź for historiography, one in Kraków for documentation, and two in Warsaw for the publication of sources and the preparation of a historical atlas. By 1954, the Institute employed 108 historians at its headquarters and branches and farmed out work to 170 more.

¹²"Prace Instytutu Historii Polskiej Akademii Nauk," *Kwartalnik Historyczny*, LX, 2 (1953), 324-36.

was supposed to initiate, aid, and coordinate all historical research throughout the country. Naturally, in keeping with the motivation for the founding of the Academy, coordination was to carry a good deal of control and supervision. But here too the job of planning did not run as smoothly as expected. The Institute never managed to prepare a nation-wide plan, and the less comprehensive annual and biennial plans it did draw up were submitted and approved so late in the year and so irregularly that they could not be followed to the letter.¹³ To add to the confusion, the Ministry of Higher Education sent out its own directives, and the university faculties, as well as learned societies, prepared their own plans, submitting them both to the Ministry and to the Academy.

Other aspects of supervision did not have more tangible effects. At first the Academy had a special Bureau of Learned Societies which merely registered all their activities and publications. But by 1954 the various institutes and sections of the Academy began to enforce ideological conformity throughout their respective fields by setting up in each independent society or scientific journal a Scientific Council or Secretariat. Composed of reliable personnel, these groups transmitted directives and saw to it that compliance was forthcoming. Another bureau of the Academy, that of publications, deprived learned societies of their publishing rights and transferred them to state publishing houses, which thereby acquired the final decision on whether a book would appear in print. Similar and rather crippling control was extended over the history faculties in the universities, which were expected to restrict their activities to teaching.

The fate of the Western Institute in Poznań, a large and vigorous independent society established in 1945, well illustrates the results of this policy. To begin with, most of its regional sections were liquidated and its Wrocław branch was transformed into the Silesian History Section of the History Institute at the end of 1952. The new center discontinued the valuable publications, *Studia Śląskie* and *Studia Staropolskie*, for it was to devote itself almost exclusively to writing a large history of Silesia. Hailed at the time as a significant change-over, the Silesian Section of the History Institute did not live up to expectations despite the benefits of a progressive ideology and working methods of complexity, planning, and teamwork. Five years later it had to be admitted that the Section had failed not only to publish its *History of Silesia* but also anything else of "substantial value."¹⁴ Increased pressure on what remained of the Western Institute brought passive compliance in the form of occasional articles on contemporary problems and citations from the classics of Marxism-Leninism in the Institute's journal, *Przegląd Zachodni*. But in those years passive correctness did not suffice. Representatives of the Academy attended the Institute's annual meeting in 1954 and gave a regular tongue-lashing to the staff.¹⁵ As

¹³Polska Akademia Nauk, *Sprawozdania z Czynności i Prac*, II, 1 (1954), 174-80.

¹⁴"Z prac Zakładu Historii Śląska IH PAN," *Kwartalnik Historyczny*, LXV, 1 (1958), 285.

¹⁵*Przegląd Zachodni*, X, 7-8 (1954), 530-56.

a follow-up two activists from the History Institute, S. Arnold and T. Cieślak, were included on the editorial board of *Przegląd Zachodni*. They put an end to the practice of merely accepting articles for publication and introduced the procedure now used in the editorial offices of all journals and book publishers of intensively reshaping contributions before publication. A Scientific Secretariat was established to see to it that the Western Institute devoted more attention to contemporary subjects, such as alleged American encouragement of West German revisionism. However, the Western Institute was not wholly subdued until the death of its courageous founder and director, Z. Wojciechowski, in 1955 and the appointment of a pliable successor, Professor Piwarski.

Two other important tasks of the History Institute were the publication of a national historical journal and the organization of scientific conferences. *Kwartalnik Historyczny*, the organ of the Polish Historical Association, had a checkered career, since 1945 undergoing several editorial changes. But as the contents came to reflect more and more the officially endorsed views, the editors found it increasingly hard to get enough articles for the journal to appear.¹⁶ Each issue became slimmer in size and appeared less frequently. Finally, both in 1951 and 1952, there was but one issue of some 200 pages for the entire year.

Though its contents were politically correct, such a slim volume obviously could not serve adequately a field of learning in the process of fundamental transformation. And Soviet mentors were not slow to point that out. The quarterly, they said, should become the "fighting organ" of Polish historiography, appear regularly, cover significant nineteenth-century and contemporary problems, and conduct a vigorous campaign against "bourgeois" historians, both native and foreign.¹⁷ Soviet suggestions were carried out scrupulously when, beginning with the 1953 volume, the newly founded History Institute took over the publication of *Kwartalnik Historyczny* from the Polish Historical Association. The quarterly became a crusading journal. Each issue that year followed a well defined pattern. It would open with a lead article, or rather political manifesto, on the meaning of Stalin's works for Polish historiography or on how the writing of history should tie in with the new life of the nation, with quite explicit instructions on what should be proved about this or that particular "key problem." Next came articles which gave a correct Marxist exposition of some of those problems—as often as not some aspect of current affairs that needed historical justification. Thus, an article on the Warsaw workers in the 1830 uprising went on to illustrate the correctness of Engels' thesis about the conservative character of a revolution led by the gentry.¹⁸ Another on the 1925 Concordat sought to demonstrate the anti-Polish nature of Vatican policies.¹⁹ A separate section, entitled "Against Hostile Ideology," made

¹⁶This did not happen to *Przegląd Historyczny*, the other important periodical, which concerned itself with scholarly problems and not with questions of policy.

¹⁷V. Koroliuk, *op. cit.*, 119ff.

¹⁸*Kwartalnik Historyczny*, LX, 4 (1953), 89-109.

¹⁹*Ibid.*, 57-85.

virulent attacks on Western and émigré historians who were said to be in the service of American imperialism. The review section reported very fully on scholarly life and publications in the USSR and in other People's Democracies but covered only "progressive" Western historians. The reporting of scholarly life in Poland was most detailed. The quarterly covered extensively the activities of the History Institute, the numerous conferences it convened, and the work of other centers of learning. This, coupled with careful evaluation of new books and the printing of the outline for the first two volumes of the Marxist *History of Poland*, provided an excellent guide to that learning which had the official stamp of approval. One indication that Polish historians finally had a publication agreeable both to the régime and to Soviet scholars was the fact that, beginning with 1953, *Nowe Drogi* and *Voprosy Istorii* greatly reduced their coverage of the field.

Called "problem sessions," the scientific conferences organized by the History Institute were supposed to depart from the traditional scholarly meetings for the free exchange of opinion. They were viewed by the authorities as the most successful method for publicizing and inculcating the new methodology and interpretations. Devoted to an area like Silesia, an epoch like the Renaissance, or an event like the 1905 revolution, they were widely announced and carefully organized by the History Institute long before the actual meeting. This meticulous advance planning, coupled with close supervision and prompting, was intended to mobilize the proper response from the scholars and to bring about a greater measure of conformity. It was admitted that no new findings, no advance in knowledge would result from such conferences; quite the contrary, they might even be a hindrance by tearing scholars away from their regular duties. But the fact that the problem sessions would hasten the ideological transformation was deemed more important.²⁰

A large "complex" conference on the Polish Renaissance held October 25-30, 1953, is a good example of the rôle assigned to those sessions. Preceded by almost a year of preparatory work, which included smaller subgatherings and several publications, the meeting was attended by linguists, historians of art and literature, and economists, in addition to historians. The Academy personnel in charge of the Conference did not expect a full and final Marxist synthesis of the course of the Renaissance in Poland. Nonetheless they counted on a clean break with some traditional interpretations. Specifically they wanted the following tendencies ended: "the cosmopolitan enslavement to the West" which underestimated the importance of the native sources, the élite concept of culture which underplayed the popular roots of the ferment, the neglect of the socio-economic basis for the changes in the superstructure. Emphasis was to be put on the revolutionary aspects of the period. In short, the session was to make clear the similarities between the course of the Renaissance and of the socialist revolu-

²⁰ Cf. Polska Akademia Nauk. *Sprawozdania z Czynności i Prac*, II, 4 (1954), 34-55, for a revealing discussion on the importance of the problem sessions.

tion in Poland, for the former had liberated man from the binding superstitions of the Middle Ages while the latter set him free from the "jungle of capitalism."²¹ Even though the intent was propagandistic, the Conference was not wholly a parroting of the Marxist theories to the neglect of the source materials. Alongside the schematic pronouncements there were solidly documented and carefully prepared lectures which supplied a good deal of new information on social and economic conditions in fifteenth- and sixteenth-century Poland. Despite plans to the contrary, politics did not smother scholarship altogether.²²

* * * *

The ideological offensive with its excessive planning and supervision did not let up until 1955. Interestingly enough, already in 1954 the noted physicist, Leopold Infeld, recalling that Einstein had not planned to discover the theory of relativity by 1905, asked that a sizable margin be left for unplanned research.²³ Nevertheless the trend among those who publicly represented learning was still for more thoroughgoing planning and for increased political indoctrination.

But during 1955 outspoken criticism began to be heard. Various reports reviewing the achievements of the Academy's three-year existence drew attention to the fact that its bureaucratic approach to research had stifled creative work. For the good of learning there should be more decentralization and the universities and learned societies should have more autonomy.²⁴

While administrative measures were being questioned, other, more fundamental aspects of control also came under scrutiny. The well-known sociologist, J. Chałasiński, caused a great stir by pointing out that the stranglehold of a single Marxist viewpoint was choking creative work.²⁵ The far-reaching implications of Chałasiński's criticism were quickly and firmly answered by the régime's philosopher, Adam Schaff, who foreclosed further debate by asserting that the official version of Marxism cannot be tampered with.²⁶ But others in this famous exchange agreed with Chałasiński that a less rigid application of Marxism would be all to the good.²⁷

Historians did not lead the way in this ferment. Nor did they engage in far-reaching discussions about their immediate problems. Rather they quietly took advantage of the general easing-up in Stalinist rigidity to try a

²¹J. Dusko, "Sesjka Odrodzenia," *Kwartalnik Historyczny*, LXI, I (1954), 331-59.

²²Materials on the historians' contributions are contained in, S. Arnold ed. *Odrodzenie w Polsce: Materiały do Sesji Naukowej P.A.N. v.I. Historia*. (Warsaw, PWN, 1955).

²³Polska Akademia Nauk, *Sprawozdania z Czynności i Prac*, II, 4 (1954), 52.

²⁴W. Świętosławski, "O warunkach wzmożenia pracy twórczej," *Nauka Polska*, III, 3 (1955), 19-27. H. Jabłoński, J. Dembowski, "Kierunki rozwoju Polskiej Akademii Nauk w latach 1956-1960," *ibid.*, III, 4 (1955), 1-10.

²⁵"Zagadnienie kultury współczesnej w humanistyce polskiej," *ibid.*, III, 2 (1955), 125-46. It should be noted that Chałasiński took the lead for his argument from a Soviet article on schools in sciences (*Literaturnaia Gazeta*, Jan. 11, 1955) which postulated that different trends are necessary for the development of the pure sciences. But the Pole carried the argument much farther by applying it to the social sciences.

²⁶"O badaniach kultury i szkołach w nauce," *Przegląd Kulturalny*, Sept. 21, 1955.

²⁷W. Bienkowski, "W poszukiwaniu prawdy," *ibid.*, Oct. 19, 1955.

saner approach to Marxism that would permit a partial return to professional standards. Whereas in the period of ideological offensive Marxism was indiscriminately invoked to defeat the bourgeois, solve all problems, and dispel all doubts, in 1955 care was taken to remind historians that Marxism was a subtle and precise tool for scholarly research. The slow process of dethroning dialectical materialism from its exclusive position started with a campaign to restore scholarly attributes to Marxism itself. How slow and roundabout the process was in its very beginnings could be seen in the reception of A. Schaff's work on *The Objective Character of the Laws of History* that appeared in 1955. Although this book had the imprimatur of the Central Committee as the authoritative exposition on how to write partisan yet "scientific" history, it was not hailed as a revelation or even acknowledged as a guide. There was only an embarrassing silence in the historical publications—nobody was willing or felt obliged to praise it, but neither was anyone ready to criticize it for what it was.

In *Kwartalnik Historyczny* critiques began to appear that mildly reproved propagandistic interpretations and tried to reconstitute the importance of facts. Two critiques concerned an article on the uprisings in Silesia at the end of World War I that had been published in the preceding period. Since it dealt with recent history, the discussion was all the more significant because it did not turn on differing interpretations of scanty sources but the outright falsification of events within the memory of many people. The original article had described and evaluated the three Silesian uprisings purely in terms of what they contributed to the Communist revolutions in Russia and in Germany.²⁸ It was not the evaluation that was challenged but rather the supposition that the full story was presented by relying on citations of Marxist material rather than on original sources to prove a point. Both articles listed in detail numerous omissions, oversimplifications, and falsifications. A new note, testifying to the revulsion against the obligatory Soviet brand of "internationalism" was the objection of the second critic to the denigration of the national sentiment that had animated the Silesian Poles simply because such strivings did not contribute to the course of the Bolshevik revolution.²⁹

Other criticism in 1955 of the two Marxist histories of Poland being prepared in Warsaw and in Moscow similarly tended to emphasize the multiplicity of the historical process rather than its regularity, and to object to "presentism"—namely, judging the past wholly in terms of present-day values rather than of the very different ideas that prevailed then. The overt purpose of this criticism was to restore to Marxism its scientific character which had been lost sight of during the preceding six years.

A meeting in April on the first part of the second volume of the History Institute's *History of Poland* was striking in that the discussion did not

²⁸K. Lapter, H. Zieliński, "Powstania śląskie," *Kwartalnik Historyczny*, LXI, 1 (1954), 60-102.

²⁹K. Popiołek, "Na marginesie artykułu . . . 'Powstania śląskie,'" *ibid.*, LXII, 1 (1955), 162-83. T. Jędruszcak, "W sprawie drugiego powstania śląskiego," *ibid.*, LXII, 4-5 (1955), 175-90.

concern itself chiefly with the achievements of this first full-length Marxist work but with the necessity to supply well-documented and full description for its many over-hasty judgments. One historian, J. Topolski, questioned the basis for placing the beginning of capitalism in the period covered by the volume (1764-1795). The authors ascribed this development to socio-economic differentiation in the countryside; but more proof was needed, Topolski pointed out, to show that the appearance of landless peasants meant there were rich peasants able to hire their labor. Until many other aspects of this problem were looked into and cleared up, the appearance of landless peasants could just as well be a sign of a general pauperization. The author of the bibliographical section, C. Bobińska, was sharply rebuked for giving a purely political evaluation of this period's historiography. Over and over it was pointed out that the scholarly contribution of each historian should be noted, and not just his class bias or viewpoint.³⁰

What augured well was that Polish historians displayed similar attitudes toward their Soviet colleagues. In March 1955, a delegation of three historians from the *Institut Slavovedeniia* came to Warsaw to discuss the two works they had under preparation—the second volume of a History of Poland and an anthology of progressive Polish political thought. Reports on the meetings indicate that they were real working sessions and not an ideological training course as was the case in previous Soviet-Polish meetings. During the conference on the anthology, for example, relatively few references to the “scientific and political” value or the “bold” new formulations of the Soviet work were heard. Instead the participants concentrated on those matters that were debatable, incorrect, or inadequately documented. Frequent requests were made to stick closer to historical truth and context. Thus, there were objections to a too literal application of Engels’ description of the 1830 uprising as a “conservative revolution.” It was pointed out that the insurgents displayed a wide range of political opinion, including radicalism, and that the “limited” democratic stand of a section of the bourgeoisie could not be lumped together with the opinions of outright reactionaries from the same class. Quite new was the suggestion that the Soviet authors not confine themselves to the interaction between Russian and Polish progressive thought but that they deal with the influence of West European currents as well.³¹

While the influence of Soviet scholarship was being scaled down, contacts with Western historians were being resumed. A hand-picked delegation attended the Tenth International Congress of Historical Sciences in Rome in September 1955. Even though it seemed to other historians that the Poles were intransigently Marxist, this visit had a profound effect on the ten professors who, after almost seven years of total isolation, came into contact with Western scholars.³² Their impressions and conclusions soon

³⁰“Dyskusja nad okresem 1764-1795 w ujęciu podręcznika Historii Polski,” *ibid.*, 315-22.

³¹“Dyskusja nad radzieckim wyborem pism postępowych myślicieli polskich,” *ibid.*, LXIII, 3 (1955), 199-204.

³²For a report by the Polish émigré historian, O. Halecki, see “Poland at the Tenth International Congress of Historical Sciences,” *The Polish Review*, I, 1 (Winter 1955), 5-22.

appeared in print. It was evident that in sizing up Western achievements, trends, and methods the Polish delegates had to take a critical look at their own preparation and performance. They admitted failure to meet Western scholars in discussion with a wide range of arguments, analogies, and illustrations. And the conclusion was that a thorough knowledge of developments abroad was an absolute necessity for any future Polish delegation to an international gathering. To assure this, an appeal to the Polish Academy of Sciences and to the Ministry of Higher Education was made to widen scholarly contacts with the West through extensive exchange of literature, travel grants, and a systematic coverage of developments in foreign countries and research centers.³³

* * * *

With its attack on the crippling effects of Stalinism, the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU had an immediate repercussion among Polish historians. Before Spring 1956 adverse comments had been isolated and somewhat tentative; after the Twentieth Congress widespread criticism of the practices under Stalinism became the rule.

Although the debate started in Moscow, it never became as searching there as it was in Poland from the very outset. The editorial on the Twentieth Congress in the March issue of *Voprosy Istorii* exposed and denounced falsifications, but at the same time it gave Soviet historians new prescriptions for illustrating the changed Party line. Its authors did not hesitate in one sentence to bemoan the level to which history had sunk under Stalin and, in the next, to propose that a fuller, yet politically correct, history of the working class movement was essential for Communist tactics at home and abroad. With very few exceptions in Poland, discussion of past malpractices stressed above all the importance of historical truth and the problem of scholarly ethics. Nevertheless, until the peaceful political revolution in October, and in spite of tremendous changes and undeniably greater freedom of discussion, well-marked limits in the scope of public debate were observed. Circumspection was noticeable in the rather general terms of criticism; also, no radical changes in the existing institutional framework and personnel were proposed. As in the preceding months the emphasis, though much bolder and by now general, was on restoring to Marxism its true "scientific" character.

More important than talk, however, were various definite steps taken to remedy the situation. The meeting of the Scientific Council of the History Institute (June 25-26) drew up a lengthy list of past defects and future needs of Polish historiography; the meeting of the social science professors with the Minister of Higher Education (May 3-5) decided on alterations in the university curriculum; the General Assembly of the Academy (June 11-12) proposed changes in the organization and planning of research; and,

The Polish contributions (in French) have been published in Académie Polonaise des Sciences, Institut d'Histoire, *La Pologne au Xe Congrès International des Sciences Historiques à Rome* (Warszawa, PWN, 1955).

³³"Niektóre spostrzeżenia i wnioski z X Kongresu Nauk Historycznych w Rzymie," *Kwartalnik Historyczny*, LXII, 1 (1956), 3-12.

curiously, the exoneration of the Polish Communist Party in Moscow opened up prospects for a less distorted approach to modern history.

The meeting of the Scientific Council of the History Institute centered around W. Kula's outspoken report, "Our Scientific Policy."³⁴ It sharply evaluated the process of inculcating Polish historiography with Marxist methodology and proposed some essential reforms. Among the eleven shortcomings enumerated by Kula were: the lack of lively and thoroughgoing discussion; attempts to "pretty up" the sources leading to outright falsification; the complete neglect of ancillary sciences which deprived historians of essential tools; the scandalous state of general history along with the artificial separation of events in Poland from the course of European history; the "vulgar" application of dialectical materialism which concentrated on proving the regularity of historical laws thereby overlooking the multiplicity and variety in events; the simplified political approach which read the needs and problems of the present into the past; the negative, pessimistic attitude toward the nation's past which denigrated instances of beauty and greatness. Kula's suggestions for reform showed a new concern for the actual training of historians and the working conditions of the researcher. He did not indulge in any talk about the scholar's obligation to society, instead he stressed the historian's primary responsibility to the source material. Students were to get a thorough training in the ancillary sciences. The various research centers were advised to do painstaking work on sources so as to put a stop to meaningless generalizations meant to prove some *a priori* Marxist theory. The History Institute should end its monopolistic control over most research outlets. Nor were the numerous meetings and deadlines the proper conditions for scientific work. Increased foreign contacts and travel abroad were also suggested to put an end to the seven years' isolation.

Kula tried once or twice to justify his criticism by referring to the directives of the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU, but the discussion following his report did not keep within bounds by merely deploring the wrong application of politics. Other speakers went much further; they denounced the mixing of politics and learning altogether and cited even more deplorable examples of pressuring historians and history into patterns predetermined either in the Soviet Union or in the ministries in Warsaw.³⁵

At Sopot the professors' meeting with the educational authorities on the reform of university studies foresaw changes for the 1956/57 school year which assured that many points regarding the training of the young generation raised by the historians a month later would be put into effect. Students were to be given more autonomy in the choice of courses, more time for independent work, and a better training in fundamental disciplines. The number of obligatory lectures was to be greatly reduced; the number of elective courses as well as free time were appropriately increased; required courses in Marxism-Leninism and in the Russian language were to be discontinued. Instead courses in the ancillary sciences and in Western lang-

³⁴The text of Kula's speech is in *ibid.*, LXIII, 3 (1956), 151-66.

³⁵Report on the meeting, *ibid.*, LXIII, 6 (1956), 171ff.

uages were to be introduced and the course of study for a Master's degree was to be lengthened from four to five years.³⁶

Likewise, the meeting of the Academy's General Assembly promised relief to scholars. The tone of the gathering was set by Jan Dembowski, the Academy's president; he saw the Twentieth Congress as opening a new phase in the postwar development of Polish learning by challenging hitherto sacrosanct political and scientific authorities. "We too," he said, "have broken with the cult of authorities, both our own and foreign." Participants agreed heartily that the Polish Academy of Sciences should be free of the dictates and directives of the régime and offer scholars its facilities and coordination, not its close supervision. On the other hand Adam Schaff maintained that the Party would not give up its prerogative to "shape the scholars' attitude," to guide research, and to supervise trends in learning. The only mistake in past practice that he was willing to acknowledge was the arrogation of the legitimate right to plan and organize by illegitimate commandeering. But his was a minority opinion in a gathering that was overwhelmingly in favor of restoring autonomy to scientists and their institutions. Accordingly the General Assembly passed a number of resolutions to be put into effect after the summer.³⁷

There was even hope for the most deplorably distorted period of history—that of modern Poland. Here the prospects for change arose when the Twentieth Congress publicly (and posthumously) reversed the Comintern's orders of 1938 to liquidate the Polish Communist Party (KPP) on charges that it was honeycombed with spies and police agents.

Several reasons accounted for the particularly difficult situation in this area of historical studies. Naturally the United Polish Workers' Party was anxious to have historical justification for its advent to power. Thus, as already mentioned, beginning with 1949 it excluded reputable scholars from research on the history of the working class movement, independent Poland, and World War II, entrusting these subjects to Party historians exclusively. There were many uncomfortable facts about the Party's predecessors that led its historians to wreak havoc with facts and evidence. The dissolution of the KPP, capped by the liquidation of the leaders then residing in Russia, was but a chapter in a devious story that began with Rosa Luxemburg's theoretical disagreements with Lenin, went on to the Communist backing of Piłsudski's May coup, and ended with Gomułka's heresy. Tortuous arguments had to be used to build up a weak Communist movement into the heroic and patriotic vanguard of the nation and at the same time to deal properly with the numerous deviations. By 1955, as elsewhere in the field, the time came for critical reappraisal. That fall a discussion on Truth and Falsehood in History was held by Party historians at which the work of the Department of Party History (WHP) and other "correctors" of documents was criticized. As the proceedings of this meeting were never made public there were no

³⁶*Ibid.*, 177-80.

³⁷*Nauka Polska*, V, 4 (1956), 147-69.

immediate repercussions, but the 1956 exoneration of the KPP, blaming Beria for its dissolution and defamation, brought change.

In May 1956, *Nowe Drogi* printed a plea for a more objective study of the Polish workers' movement.³⁸ It was followed by two other articles which argued for a less summary treatment of the Polish Socialist Party and of the non-Communist resistance during World War II. In June, after consultations with leading non-Party specialists, the Party historians adopted a resolution, "On the Most Pressing Tasks of the Party in History." It called for a better training of modern historians, admission of non-Party historians to the field, reintegration of Poland's history with that of the rest of the world, opening of contemporary archives to all qualified researchers, and it condemned the WHP for its practices.³⁹ Thereupon the director of the WHP, Tadeusz Daniszewski, wrote a public confession in the Party daily. Although the twenty-seven original works published by the WHP had helped the Party in its policy, they "overlooked the necessity of extensive scholarly research," and "simplified complex problems." As for the publication of sources, the director did admit that some texts had been "corrected," while others simply had embarrassing sections deleted without any indication to the reader. Daniszewski agreed that such practices deserved severe censure. Forthcoming publications, he promised, would observe scholarly ethics, and some of the past ones, like the resolutions of the KPP, would reappear in fuller editions.⁴⁰

One could well doubt a return to impartiality in the writing of contemporary history as a result of these pronouncements. Nevertheless, the exoneration of some Communist figures and policies was extremely important, for it signalled the loosening-up of the political approach for the rest of the field and made possible an extensive rehabilitation of other national figures, movements, and policies of earlier times.

* * * *

Poland's peaceful revolution in October 1956 ushered in genuine liberalization. Prior to October the Marxists in charge of the writing and study of history had attempted, through critical evaluation of the Stalinist period, to revivify the dialectical method. After October the rank and file historians began publicly to criticize the prevailing philosophy itself. It was the monopoly of Marxism rather than its methodology, they maintained, that was responsible for the lamentable situation in historiography. As this shift coincided with the new régime's cultural policy that tolerated non-Marxist schools, dialectical materialism now had to contend with other interpretations.

Various reforms after October alleviated the degrading position of historians and put an end to the questionable methods of research foisted upon them. In consequence, the basic work of reconstruction, as well as

³⁸J. Kowalski, "O szersze spojrzenie na dzieje ruchu robotniczego," *Nowe Drogi*, 5 (1956), 29-41.

³⁹"Z prac organizacji partyjnej w Instytucie Historii PAN," *Kwartalnik Historyczny*, LXIII, 4-5 (1956), 530-34.

⁴⁰"O działalności wydawniczej Wydziału Historii Partii," *Trybuna Ludu*, July 21, 1956.

wider and freer research, became possible. Some activists who were most responsible for harnessing history to politics were removed from their executive positions. Decentralization within the Polish Academy of Sciences, and outside as well, was introduced. Periods and aspects of Poland's past that had become taboo in 1949 were talked about again. Historians of prohibited subjects or unorthodox views were readmitted to teaching and research. Some valuable historical publications that had been discontinued were undertaken anew. And contacts with the West were reestablished throughout the profession, while the tenor of relations with Soviet historians grew freer of political overtones.

Polish historians declared their independence at the same time as the Eighth Plenum of the United Polish Workers' Party, standing up to Khrushchev, did away with the worst aspects of Soviet domination and removed the most unpopular Communist figures. The seventieth anniversary gathering of the Polish Historical Association was held in Warsaw October 19-21, 1956. For the past four years the annual meetings had been so-called problem sessions conducted together with the History Institute. Breaking with this practice, the meeting returned to the traditional democratic forum for open and general discussion. As might be expected, the course of current political events influenced historians in their demands, and protests against various limitations on the freedom of research grew from day to day. Only at the final session was the text of the new statute changed to declare full autonomy of the Association from the centralistic History Institute, as well as an unhampered right to independent contacts with other historical groups in Poland and abroad.⁴¹

The plenary sessions heard Professors Manteuffel and Serejski report on the 70 years of the Association with highly critical comment on the last decade,⁴² adopted the new statute, and called the Eighth Congress of Polish Historians for September 1958. Meetings of each of the five subsections discussed its particular needs and problems and passed appropriate resolutions. The subsection on world history asked that political history be not abandoned for socio-economic studies; that Poland's history, especially in the nineteenth century, be not studied apart from European history; that some twenty scholars in European history be permitted to work in their field and to publish; and that a wide exchange of scholars, students, publications, and information be resumed with the West. The subsection on recent Polish history exposed some of the numerous malpractices of researchers in this period and stressed that they should strive to regain public confidence. To assure scholarly standards, its resolutions demanded that non-Party historians should be permitted to work in the modern period and all the archives be opened to qualified persons. The subsection on regional history enumerated a number of conditions for the resumption of active research, publication, and discussion in the provincial centers. The subsection on archives and the ancillary sciences requested the unification of

⁴¹Report on the meeting, *Kwartalnik Historyczny*, LXIV, 1 (1957), 156-63.

⁴²Text of report, *Przegląd Historyczny*, LVIII, 1 (1957), 3-23.

hitherto scattered archives, as well as their accessibility, and the resuscitation of iconography, cartography, textual criticism, etc. The last subsection on training and teaching stressed chiefly the need for new text books to replace the inadequate volumes either translated from Russian or marked by the Stalinist approach and for better teaching methods based on the experience of pedagogues rather than the desires of politicians.

The resolutions of the Polish Historical Association led to tangible improvements, starting with the reorganization of the Polish Academy of Sciences and its History Institute. The events of October hastened the transformation of the Academy requested by the June 1956 General Assembly. Before October a commission had been formed merely to consider the June recommendations; in November it was charged with preparing a new program for the Academy. When the General Assembly met again in January 1957, it approved the recommended changes and elected a new president, T. Kotarbiński, a noted philosopher untarnished during the Stalinist period, to replace Jan Dembowski. Thenceforth the Academy was to function as an autonomous organization of scholars whose task was to support and encourage learning. The component organizations of the Academy were also to be fully autonomous, and connections with the Ministry of Higher Education were to be severed.⁴³

Appropriate changes took place in the History Institute. To replace the Scientific Council with its appointed membership, a new Council was elected to operate independently of the Scientific Secretariat of the Academy's Presidium. In the election of new directors for the Institute the political appointee, Leon Grosfeld,⁴⁴ was dropped. The Institute let it be known that it was going to encourage and welcome initiative from below. The Polish Historical Association became a full co-partner of the Institute. The Association's president, S. Herbst, was included on the editorial board of *Kwartalnik Historyczny* which the Institute had controlled since 1953. Together the two organizations devoted much care to activating research, publication, and debate in university and provincial centers that had become moribund during the period of centralism.⁴⁵

The direct rôle of the Party in historiography also underwent some changes. The historians of modern Polish history met December 5-6, 1956. Because the events of October removed from the Party the stigma of Gomułka's nationalist deviation, the situation in the field could be discussed with additional frankness. Interestingly enough, some young historians trained in the Party's Institute of Social Sciences were among the most outspoken critics. Aside from such matters as the accessibility of contemporary archives and books held on index, and the reintegration with the profession of those historians from the Institute of Social Sciences and the University chairs of Marxism-Leninism (both in the process of being closed down), the most concrete proposal discussed was the transformation of the Department of

⁴³*Nauka Polska*, 1, 1957, 3-38.

⁴⁴"Prace Rady Naukowej Instytutu Historii PAN," *Kwartalnik Historyczny*, LXIV, 3 (1957), 208-11.

⁴⁵S. Herbst, "Zadania i perspektywy dalszej pracy PTH," *ibid.*, LXIV, 2 (1957), 64ff.

Party History (WHP) into the Institute of Party History (ZHP).⁴⁶ This new institution opened in January 1957. Even though T. Daniszewski became its director, there was likelihood of some improvement since the ZHP was supposed to function only as a research center leaving propaganda and popularization to other Party bodies. It dismissed some thirty poorly qualified staff members, instituted full cooperation with non-Party historians, and began to publish a new quarterly series, *Z Pola Walki*, devoted chiefly to source material.⁴⁷

Among other changes of importance was the reorganization, as of September 1957, of history departments in the universities according to more traditional concepts of chronology and subject matter rather than Marxist periodization. Moreover, many professors who had been deprived of teaching positions or kept in obscurity during the Stalinist era were reinstated, some of them even to the chairmanship of a department.⁴⁸ Important publications discontinued in 1949 for political reasons were resumed. Chief among them was the *Polish Biographic Dictionary*, seven volumes of which had appeared from 1930 to 1949. In 1957 it was decided that, far from being a source of "unscientific hero worship," such a dictionary was indispensable for basic information as well as for "strengthening the national tradition." The History Institute's Documentation Center in Kraków was given the job of reediting the seven volumes and of publishing the subsequent ones under the editorship of K. Lepszy.

Contacts with the West that began in 1956 increased. Young historians now traveled abroad, and several teams of scholars visited West European libraries and archives. Relations with Soviet historians reflected the Polish historians' newly gained autonomy. Before 1956 relations not only bore the unpleasant marks of dependence but were also confined to official visits with discussions on prearranged subjects. Those stiff encounters first lost the character of indoctrinating sessions, as was already noted, and, after October 1956, gave way to direct collaboration between universities and individuals.⁴⁹ What made these contacts worthwhile and lively was that Polish researchers could use Soviet archives, especially those in the former Polish territories that now formed part of the Ukrainian and Belorussian republics, and Soviet historians now also used Polish archives. Moreover, Soviet authorities turned over to Poland the archives of the Polish Socialist Party and of the Polish section of the Communist International that had been kept in Moscow. As a result of the freer exchange of opinion and information, a fuller and less politically motivated second edition of the first volume of *Istoriia Polshi* was put out by the *Institut Slavovedeniia* in 1956;

⁴⁶"Narada historyków w sprawie badań nad historią okresu popowstaniowego i najnowszego," *ibid.*, 220-26.

⁴⁷"Zakład Historii Partii przy KC PZPR," *ibid.*, LXV, 1 (1958), 273ff.

⁴⁸"Reorganizacja katedr," *ibid.*, 261-73.

⁴⁹In 1952 only 33 Polish scholars traveled abroad (both to Eastern and Western Europe). By 1956 their number grew to 728. As for foreign visitors, only 15 came in 1952, but 265 had visited Poland by October 1956. *Nauka Polska*, 1, 1957, 118.

and a joint meeting was held in Warsaw March 15, 1957, on how to improve the second edition of the second volume.⁵⁰

The effects of these changes on the work of historians were multifarious and it is impossible to describe them all. While the major shifts in interpretations and the choice of subjects will be noted in the discussion of the Eighth Congress, some other salient characteristics of the post-October reconstruction should be mentioned here. The articles and reviews now appearing in the pages of historical journals made clear that the period of uncertain groping for some way out of the impasse had come to an end. For both critics and scholars it was settled that the criterion of historical truth was once again going to be the basis of their work. The painstaking work of reconstruction replaced condemnation and exposure of past malpractice.

As the chief periodical, *Kwartalnik Historyczny* firmly supported the current reorientation in historiography. At times it devoted more than half its contents to reports on scholarly developments at home and abroad. On one occasion it gave over more than two-thirds of an issue to verbatim reports of many speeches at the April 1957 conference on the trial edition (the so-called *makieta*) of the second volume of the *History of Poland* prepared by the History Institute.⁵¹ It was as though this issue was meant to emphasize the opportunity for all historians to discuss and criticize the new synthesis of the country's history. For the first time in years the quarterly printed articles on historical methodology based on logical analysis and not on political concepts. These closely reasoned essays defined the limits between verifiable facts and unfounded hypothesis or explained the nature of causality in an obvious attempt to check the excessive reliance on hasty generalizations and "the iron laws of history." Others attempted to define more objective standards for evaluating periods which had been subjected to especially crude ideological reinterpretation.⁵² Detailed reviews of books by authors hitherto lauded as Marxist innovators undertook the basic job of reassessing the post-1948 output. Unlike earlier attempts at reform, they were not confined to lamenting the ill effects of dogmatism but pinpointed oversimplifications and falsifications. Some, making use of both prewar and postwar works, pointed out the inadequacy of a purely economic interpretation. Others showed by extensive references to sources what in fact was said or written and what had been made out of it by unscrupulous historians.

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The Eighth Congress of Polish historians met almost two years after the decisive break with Stalinism (September 14-17, 1958). Since, in the intervening months, what needed to be said in criticism of former practices had

⁵⁰"Dyskusja nad II tomem *Istории Polshi*," *Kwartalnik Historyczny*, LXIV, 3 (1957), 212-22.

⁵¹*Ibid.*, LXIV, 4-5 (1957), 1-216.

⁵²A. Malewski, J. Topolski, "O wyjaśnieniu przyczynowym w historii," *ibid.*, LXIV, 2 (1957), 3-25. A. Malewski, "Zagadnienie idiograficzności historii," *ibid.*, LXV, 2 (1958), 164-79. T. Jędruszcak, "O kryteriach oceny dziejów Polski w okresie międzywojennym," *ibid.*, 484-96.

been said and steps to remedy the situation had been taken, the Congress did not blaze any new trails. Rather it illustrated the shifts in interpretation and coverage resulting from the numerous measures taken since October 1956, and the degree of normalcy prevailing in the profession under the current cultural policy of the Party.

The Congress opened with an address by S. Żółkiewski, the Minister of Higher Education. While abjuring administrative pressure on learning, he nevertheless felt obliged to stress the political rôle of historiography. This was in keeping with the Party policy for cultural matters, based on the one hand on the pious hope that Marxist scholarship can flourish without authoritarian prodding, yet faced, on the other, with the necessity of reiterating that, all things considered, Marxist scholarship is what the régime will support. What followed demonstrated that in these circumstances objective scholars, convinced Marxists, and fellow travelers felt free to argue pretty much as they pleased. Some upheld Marxist methods and officially endorsed interpretations out of sincere conviction; others paid lip service for expediency's sake; still others ridiculed them or voiced basic disagreement.

Speaking for the historians, T. Manteuffel, the director of the History Institute, gave a harsh evaluation of the political atmosphere of the preceding decade and the effect it had on the working conditions of historians. Aside from this address, which resulted in a bitter exchange with T. Daniszewski, the director of the Institute of Party History, there was little public settling of accounts, for it was admitted that "we all have something on our conscience." Rather, attention was turned to remedy the damages of the Stalinist period through detailed factual reports assessing various aspects of Polish historiography and suggesting needed improvements and amplifications.

Of the five other plenary sessions, two were given over to pre-nineteenth century history (K. Tymieniecki discussed the beginnings of feudalism; M. Małowist, the economic conditions of fifteenth- and sixteenth-century Europe); while three were devoted to the touchy problems of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (S. Kieniewicz discussed the "organic work in partitioned Poland"; H. Wereszycki, the uprisings; and H. Jabłoński, the resurrection of Poland in 1918). Of the nine section meetings, four covered the chronological subdivisions of Polish history, while the others were devoted to ancient, economic, military, and legal history and to the ancillary sciences.⁵³

There was no questioning of those aspects of Polish postwar historiography that represented real gains. These included studies on the political, economic, cultural, and ethnic links of the Western territories with the rest of Poland; the beginnings of the Polish state; the formation of social classes;

⁵³Two mimeographed volumes containing outlines or shortened texts of all the contributions were distributed to all that had signed up to attend the Congress. Eventually, complete texts of the lectures as delivered, as well as the principal voices in discussion, will be published. Resolutions of the Congress have appeared in *Kwartalnik Historyczny*, LXV, 4 (1958), 1031-34.

the development of agriculture, handicrafts, and industry; the conditions of the peasants and the workers. But those interpretations that had flouted both scholarship and nationalist sentiment underwent a reformulation. Basic tenets of dialectical materialism that had held sway from 1949 to 1956 were modified; namely, the primacy of economic and social history to the neglect of political and cultural developments; the popular masses as the motive force in history and the prime subject of study; the anti-national rôle of the propertied classes; the severing of Polish history from that of the rest of Europe, and its connection with that of Russia; the reading of current notions of progress and reaction into the past; the neglect and ridicule of foreign and native "bourgeois" historians; and Marxist periodization inflexibly based on socio-economic categories.

The wisdom of retaining the five socio-economic categories as the basis of periodization was questioned in the first plenary lecture. By defining feudalism in its narrower institutional sense, K. Tymieniecki demonstrated that when the term is applied to a span of some ten centuries it loses precision and leads to superficial thinking. He also reminded the audience that Engels based his theories on Morgan, whose findings had been largely superseded by modern scholarship. However, Tymieniecki's suggestion seemed to be going too far, for Manteuffel cautioned that any general departure from the accepted Marxist usage would only result in confusion.⁵⁴

The primacy of social and economic history was challenged by a number of contributions on diplomatic history. One, by W. Czapliński, specifically opposed the apportioning of only 40 pages out of 200 devoted to the years 1576-1648 in the first volume of the *History of Poland* to questions of foreign policy, and proceeded to show the importance of wars and diplomacy during that period. Intellectual history of various periods was also discussed, more from the viewpoint of reflecting general European trends than of being the superstructure of a certain economic base.

The popular masses and their fate were no longer treated as the decisive factor in history. In a lecture that caused most comment and applause, H. Wereszycki discussed the nineteenth-century Polish uprisings as an international problem. In an outright denial of the official doctrine that it was the social program which determined the outcome of each uprising (and as vindication of the stand for which he had been attacked at Otwock), he argued that it was the international situation, and not the lack of support among the peasants, that had doomed each revolt. Just as the rôle of the masses was being reduced to more reasonable proportions, so the propertied classes and former rulers were no longer treated as traitors to the nation. In his plenary talk on "organic work" during 1840-1890, Professor Kieniewicz defended the motivation of the upper classes for their guarded

⁵⁴It must be pointed out, though, that while Marxist periodization is still officially endorsed and was retained for the *History of Poland*, it has been repeatedly attacked in print and no longer holds the field exclusively, as indicated by the reallocation of university chairs. Moreover, Manteuffel himself published, late in 1958, a book on the Middle Ages in Europe (*Średniowiecze powszechne*) which goes up to the end of the fifteenth century, thus departing from the traditional Marxist watershed, the English revolution.

cooperation with the occupying powers. Though not revolutionary, their work did strengthen the nation for gaining independence by contributing to economic progress, safeguarding the Polish character of the population, and deepening the national consciousness.

Similar concern induced a more impartial approach to Polish interwar history. K. Grzybowski defended the record of Polish parliamentarism against the previously fashionable theory that Fascism prevailed after 1918. Likewise, in a dispassionate discussion of Minister Beck's policy, he was absolved of the charge of wilful treason. Through statistics H. Altman showed that the position of the workers was by no means as deplorable as it was said to be in post-World War II studies and that Polish labor legislation appeared fairly progressive when compared to what prevailed in the rest of Europe. The evaluation of past events or programs by current political criteria was eschewed, and non-Communist parties and figures were no longer pictured as servile agents of foreign imperialists or domestic capitalists. Thus, J. Dutkiewicz deviated from the postwar practice of emphasizing the conservative character of the 1830 uprising by showing to what extent its program was revolutionary for the times; K. Dunin-Wąsowicz admitted that the peasant movement had played a progressive rôle in the countryside; and Cz. Małajczyk asked that the part played by the non-Communist underground during the German occupation be fully studied and acknowledged.

Even though there was no separate section on world or European history, practically each lecture attempted to reintegrate its specific subject into the course of European history and historiography. This in itself, rather than any outright criticism or correction of the previous treatment of Polish-Russian relations, tended to redress the balance. At the same time there was frequent citation of Western and Polish authors who, not so long ago, were apt to be dismissed as "bourgeois" propagandists. Even the work of Polish émigré historians was acknowledged, the point being made that while their political activities may be questioned their scholarly achievements cannot be ignored.

Subjects that were taboo until 1956 were now being broached and studied. There was a talk by Jan Pachoński on the contribution of the Polish legions in the Napoleonic armies, a departure from the former effort to break the strength of the "Napoleonic legend." Another "legend," the Jagiellonian, was also revived and objectively treated by S. Kuczyński in a lecture on the program of the first kings of that dynasty. In other speeches the importance of Poland's cultural mission in her eastward expansion was emphasized, although the postwar theory that this expansion meant the loss of territories in the West was still stressed. There were no contributions on Church history or on the rôle of the Church in Polish history.

Although the work of the Eighth Congress was marked by a general return to scholarly methods and traditional interpretations, the effect of these revisions was least noticeable in modern history. Here the voices of Marxist and Party historians still predominated. But despite the persistence of many old slogans and judgments, the trend toward objectivity was also

apparent in this field. Blanket indictments were used with much greater circumspection and they were decked in scholarly trappings. For example, in the discussion of the Polish question during the two world wars by H. Jabłoński and H. Turlejska, Russia's policy was the only one deemed to have given Poland a real chance of independence. There was no attempt, however, to pass over in silence the moves of the Entente or the Western allies on behalf of Poland—except that their motivation, unlike that of Russia, was always subjected to skeptical scrutiny. As was to be expected, extravagant claims for the Communist Party and its rôle were still made. But the only pronouncement in the true Stalinist manner to be heard at the Congress came from a visiting East German historian, F. H. Gentzen, when he deplored signs of chauvinism among his Polish colleagues and attacked Western preparations to unleash an atomic war.

The lively discussion that followed most lectures showed that many were not afraid to stand up for their beliefs and standards. While some older scholars pointed out numerous half-truths uttered by younger or more politically inclined historians and demanded a complete renunciation of falsified notions, the latter countered with sharp arguments against returning to more traditional interpretations or "meaningless objectivism." As far as the audience was concerned, some 1400 people (half of them history teachers), there was little doubt, to an outside observer, that its sympathies lay overwhelmingly with the objective and more traditional approach.

* * * *

It is still perhaps too early to assess what the future holds for Polish historians. However, the Eighth Congress seemingly marked a watershed in the liberal period after October 1956. Even though the Party daily, in summing up the Congress, made only cursory reference to some "unjustifiable" pronouncements,⁵⁵ a much harsher evaluation was made at closed Party meetings. At the Twelfth Party Plenum in October 1958, several speakers pointed out that some historians had spoken not merely in the revisionist but in an outright hostile vein and insisted that the Party simply tell scholars what it wants, assuring compliance through administrative pressure. But Gomułka refused to resort to such measures and advised that more acceptable methods of persuasion—such as verbal argumentation—be relied on. Similar talk was heard at the Third Party Congress in March 1959. But even though administrative measures were again abjured, it is clear from the Party's current concern for bringing about voluntary compliance of scholars that the post-October license and freedom in expression and criticism is going to be curtailed. There is no question of returning to the pre-October situation; still, there can be little doubt that some historians, when lectured about the need to build up Marxist learning, will not feel free to study and teach the social sciences objectively and empirically in the Western sense of these terms.

COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, NEW YORK

⁵⁵*Trybuna Ludu*, September 27, 1958.

ERZBERGER'S POLITICAL OPERATIONS: A CASE STUDY*

by Klaus Epstein

MATTHIAS Erzberger, the prominent leader of the Left wing of the *Zentrum* Party, developed a broad range of activities during the First World War. He ran a propaganda office directed at neutral countries, and an intelligence network gathering information from behind enemy lines. He sat on several boards connected with Germany's war-time economic organizations, while also serving as a director of the Thyssen steel firm. Bethmann-Hollweg sent him on important diplomatic missions to Rome, Vienna, Bucharest, Sofia, and Constantinople. Erzberger described many of these activities in his memoirs published in 1920.¹ The book was amazingly frank in view of the early date of publication, but Erzberger naturally concealed many of his projects and contacts. He had won an unenviable reputation as a ruthless busybody who possessed close but ill-defined relations with men in authority, and was reluctant to offer supporting materials to his numerous enemies.

Erzberger's contacts, the nature of his activities, and the frequent discrepancy between his extensive effort and rather meagre results, are best revealed by an episode he mentions only briefly: his attempt to secure military operations against Serbia in the spring of 1915.² The following account is based upon research in the Erzberger Papers, recently deposited in the Koblenz *Bundesarchiv*, and the Karl Bachem Papers in the Cologne *Stadtarchiv*.

Erzberger's interest in the Balkan question was stimulated by a visit to Vienna and Budapest in June 1915. He had just returned from Rome, where he had attempted unsuccessfully to prevent Italy's entry into the war; in Erzberger's view, because Austria had refused to make adequate diplomatic concessions in time.³ It was feared that Rumania would soon join Italy in declaring war against the Central Powers, and Erzberger pleaded with Count Tisza, the Magyar Premier, to prevent this by recognizing some of the just grievances of the Rumanians in Transylvania. His efforts were again completely unsuccessful, because Tisza was convinced that the "cowardly" Rumanians would not dare to fight. His forecast proved right in the short run when the Rumanians were impressed by the great German victories on the Eastern front in May 1915.⁴

The Balkan situation proved very difficult for the Central Powers, even with Rumania remaining neutral. Germany did not possess any direct territorial link with her Turkish ally, then hard-pressed at Gallipoli. Serbia controlled the Middle Danube Valley and was a thorn in Austria's southern flank. Bulgaria was friendly to the Central Powers, but was unwilling to

*This study, originally prepared as part of my biography, *Erzberger and the Dilemma of German Democracy* (Princeton, 1959), is here published as a separate article because of its monographic character.

¹M. Erzberger, *Erlebnisse im Weltkrieg* (Stuttgart, 1920).

²*Ibid.*, p. 59.

³*Ibid.*, ch. II. File 34 of the *Erzberger Papers* deals with this problem.

⁴Erzberger, *Erlebnisse*, p. 40, 103ff.; Count Stefan Tisza, *Briefe 1914-18*, edited by Oskar von Wertheimer (Berlin, 1928), pp. 228-34.

join their side until they were ready for a massive assault upon Serbia that would yield Macedonian territories for herself. Rumania controlled a crucial strip of territory between Hungary and Bulgaria. She was unwilling to allow munition transports across her boundaries, thus isolating the Central Powers from friendly Bulgaria and allied Turkey.

Turkey was in dire need of German military support throughout the summer of 1915. British and French troops had landed on both sides of the Dardanelles, and the defending army suffered from a shortage of ammunition. The Turkish economy was too primitive to sustain the needs of modern war, and the fall of Constantinople seemed likely unless strong German support arrived rapidly. The Turks urged the Central Powers to attack Serbia and to bring Bulgaria into the war. Erzberger became a vigorous champion of this policy.

The German Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg, and his Foreign Secretary, Jagow, both believed in the imperative importance of helping the Turks. They wrote memoranda to Erich von Falkenhayn, the Chief of the General Staff, urging the paramount political importance of a campaign against the Serbs; but Falkenhayn, then preoccupied with his Russian victories, considered the Balkans a marginal theatre of war, and refused to release troops from what he considered to be more important operations.⁵

Erzberger wanted Bethmann to threaten resignation if his views were overridden in a matter of such great political importance, but the Chancellor could not be won to this course. A direct appeal to Falkenhayn proved fruitless.⁶ Erzberger then decided to approach Count Hertling, the Bavarian Premier, whom he knew from years of common *Reichstag* work. The Bavarian Premier was *ex officio* chairman of the largely dormant Foreign Affairs Committee of the *Bundesrat*.⁷ Erzberger urged him to use this institution to serve his purpose. The crucial paragraph of Erzberger's seven-page letter to Hertling (July 5, 1915) put the argument as follows:

In this matter [compelling Falkenhayn to start a Serbian campaign] great pressure must be applied, and I wish to ask Your Excellency for support. My own view is that the Chancellor and the Foreign Secretary must not hesitate to offer their resignation if their opinion does not prevail in this crucial matter, upon which everything depends. But the two gentlemen cannot be persuaded to take this extreme course. They confine themselves to writing pointed state papers and refuse to go further. I think that the Supreme Command could be forced to subordinate its military view to the overriding political considerations if Your Excellency, as chairman of the *Bundesrat* Committee on Foreign Affairs, would summon a special meeting at which the matter could be discussed and unanimous Committee support be secured for the Chancellor and the

⁵Bethmann and Falkenhayn both allude to their differences but do not enlarge upon them. T. von Bethmann-Hollweg, *Betrachtungen zum Weltkrieg*, II (Berlin, 1922), p. 13, and E. Falkenhayn, *Die Oberste Heeresleitung 1914-16 in ihren wichtigsten Entschliessungen* (Berlin, 1920), p. 48.

⁶Erzberger to Falkenhayn, June 25, 1915, *Erzberger Papers*, File 23.

⁷See the monograph by Ernst Deuerlein, *Der Bundesratsausschuss für die auswärtigen Angelegenheiten, 1870-1918* (Regensburg, 1955).

Foreign Office. One should not hesitate if necessary to appeal to the decision of the Emperor. Would it be possible for H.M. the Bavarian King to undertake further steps in this matter?⁸

Hertling rejected Erzberger's rather far-fetched suggestion.

Erzberger's next plan was to mobilize the various party leaders for a direct appeal to the Emperor that would persuade him to order the Serbian campaign. He proposed that a parliamentary delegation should go to Pless, the Silesian headquarters of the Supreme Command where the Emperor was staying. Westarp for the Conservatives, Bassermann for the National Liberals, and Kämpf for the Progressives were willing to go; Erzberger did not consult the Socialists, as their participation would only have angered William. The plan was vetoed by Peter Spahn for Erzberger's own *Zentrum* Party, on the ground that it was both intrinsically hopeless and exceeded the constitutional duties of the *Reichstag* party leaders.⁹ Erzberger, who had had many previous quarrels with his leader, regretted Spahn's veto of the proposed action, and was angered by Spahn's failure to give him an opportunity to explain the entire matter. He was able to see Spahn, who held a judgeship while being party leader, for only ten minutes on July 21 as the latter had to catch a train for Frankfurt to perform his judicial duties next morning.¹⁰

Erzberger's next step was to write a letter to the Emperor directly. William had given him a friendly interview in connection with Italian affairs on March 1, 1915, and had invited Erzberger to stay in touch with him.¹¹ The letter, dated July 26, 1915, is an excellent summary of the case for a Serbian military operation:

Your Imperial and Royal Majesty may permit the undersigned to raise a matter of the greatest importance for our German people.

When Your Majesty demanded on the fourth of August [1914] that the *Reichstag* deputies persevere in their support of the war no matter how difficult the situation should become, the undersigned shared the pledge; but he also feels himself obligated to turn to Your Majesty in a pressing matter [bearing on the implementation of this pledge].

The victories of our brave armies are unparalleled in world history. With a single small exception [parts of Alsace] our Fatherland has been cleared of the enemy, while we hold valuable territories of our opponents in our possession as pledges for a satisfactory peace settlement. From a political point of view there is only one weak spot in our position: that the *Dardanelles* will be forced to capitulate because of lack of muni-

⁸Erzberger to Hertling, July 5, 1915. *Erzberger Papers*, File 32.

⁹Memorandum by Karl Bachem on talk with Erzberger July 20, 1915. *Bachem Papers*, File 90.

¹⁰Memorandum by Karl Bachem, July 21, 1915. *Bachem Papers*, File 90. Bachem gives Spahn's schedule for July 21, 1915, as follows: leave Frankfurt by train for Berlin at 6:00 A.M., arrival 3:00 P.M.; meeting of Budget Commission all afternoon; meeting with Bethmann at 6:00 P.M.; departure for Frankfurt, 8:00 P.M., where he presided at a court session next morning. Karl Bachem was a close friend of Spahn's with little sympathy for Erzberger; but he admits that Erzberger had a genuine grievance, and that party affairs could not be efficiently conducted by one in Spahn's position.

¹¹Erzberger, *Erlebnisse*, Ch. IV. Karl Bachem, *Vorgeschichte, Geschichte und Politik der Zentrumsparthei*, VI (Cologne, 1926-32), p. 18.

tions, that Constantinople will be conquered and that all of *Turkey* will fall to the Entente Powers. The consequences of these events would be of incalculable gravity. Russia would realize the fulfillment of the political testament of Peter the Great: the Russian Cross would be raised on Hagia Sophia, the Holy Sites would fall under Russian control, a real 'holy war' would be preached in every Russian village, Russia would gain an outlet for its wheat and other exportable surpluses while securing unlimited access to Entente war equipment. This would allow Russia to raise new armies to replace those lost in her military debacle. In Italy those two faithless traitors, Sonnino and Salandra, could revive the already flagging war spirit by pointing out that the prospect of winning a share of the Turkish booty justified their policy of entering the war on the side of the Entente Powers. French fighting spirit would be stimulated by the acquisition of Syria. England would secure Egypt, Arabia and Mesopotamia, and would turn the Caliph into a satellite by bringing him to Mecca. In short, the Entente will to continue the war would be immensely enhanced.

The fall of the Dardanelles and of Constantinople would, at the same time, bring deep discouragement into the ranks of our own people, a discouragement that could not be cancelled by our military victories in other theatres. The German name would fall into complete discredit in the entire Moslem world, which at present looks with admiration and confidence towards Your Majesty. The road to Egypt, the best way of mortally injuring England, would be blocked. Our policy of peaceful penetration of the territories from the North Sea to the Persian Gulf in the years following this war would be frustrated. The destruction of Turkey would, moreover, prolong the war for a considerable period. The result would be the further disintegration of Europe and an astronomical increase in our tax and debt burden. When every nation will be impoverished through the prolongation of the war, it will be impossible for the German victor to impose any considerable indemnities upon the defeated enemies. The respectful undersigned [*ehrfurchtsvoll Unterzeichnete*] realizes, of course, that all these considerations are already familiar to Your Majesty.

The only way of preventing the realization of these gloomy forebodings is the rapid start of military *action against Serbia*, in order to secure a safe and permanent territorial connection with Turkey. The attainment of this goal would open up a promising road to peace, leading by way of Belgrade and Constantinople to St. Petersburg. Russia must be made to realize the futility of both her reason for entering the war (supporting Serbia) and her main war aim (conquering Constantinople). Germany can then offer Russia the privilege of free passage through the Dardanelles under German guarantee. From a political point of view this action would be sure to lead to a quick and honorable peace for Germany.

The undersigned is aware of the fact that military objections have been raised against undertaking the proposed action against Serbia. But he is certain that no one in Germany would understand if half a million men could not be found for this important operation among the eight million German soldiers mobilized—of course, not while the present big battle [in Poland] continues, but immediately afterwards. No one under-

estimates the military difficulties of a Serbian mountain campaign, but our incomparable army, which crossed the difficult Carpathian Mountains, could certainly crush Serbia. The confidence that this can be done is universal. The Serbian campaign seems all the more imperative in view of the impertinent and inpuident [*ungezogene*] attitude of the United States towards Germany, of which the latest reply of President Wilson [in the *Lusitania* question] is the clearest proof.

The hope of securing for Turkey an adequate supply of German munitions by way of diplomatic negotiations with Rumania is no longer warranted. Nor can this goal be attained by a combination of smuggling, deceit, and bribery.

I beg Your Majesty to order, on the basis of the considerations outlined above, the early commencement of a campaign against Serbia in order to save Turkey and to create a permanent line of connections with her, guaranteeing the free flow of munitions.

May I add my assurance to Your Imperial and Royal Majesty that these lines have been inspired only by deep concern for our people and its army and Emperor.¹²

Erzberger received the Emperor's gracious thanks through an *aide-de camp*. Bethmann was delighted by Erzberger's independent support of his views. He could tell William truthfully that Erzberger had acted completely upon his own initiative.¹³ Erzberger's further efforts are apparent from a long conversation with Carl Bachem, the influential Cologne editor, of which the latter took detailed notes. They give the flavor of Erzberger's conversational manner:

I [Bachem] asked Erzberger about the *Serbian matter*. Erzberger: We have worked on it with high pressure since Monday (July 26), especially by influencing the Empress through her court ladies. I have good contact with *Countess Schlieben*, a lady in waiting to the Empress, and with *Countess Brockdorff*, the *Hofmeisterin* (business manager) of the Empress, through *Baroness Schröder* (the German-American wife of the Hamburg cavalry officer Baron von Schröder).

The Chancellor has also worked for a Serbian campaign. I myself have written to the Emperor, without consulting Bethmann or Jagow but supporting what I knew were their views. My letter was very effective. Falkenhayn complained to Bethmann about my approaching the Emperor directly. Bethmann replied: 'It's all news to me, I must ask Erzberger to give me a copy of the letter.' Then Falkenhayn: 'Leave the matter alone if you know nothing about it.'

The upshot was a conference on Thursday, July 29, among Falkenhayn, Bethmann and Jagow, which was also attended by Wangenheim, the German ambassador to Turkey (who had secured permission to take two months sick leave at Nauheim, and was taking it at this time because he expected the fall of the Dardanelles and did not wish to be in Constantinople when the Entente forces arrived). Falkenhayn was convinced [of the necessity of the operation] and promised to begin the Serbian campaign immediately after completing the present operation in Poland, which would last another eight to ten days. A precise plan has been

¹²Erzberger to Emperor William July 26, 1915. *Bachem Papers*, File 90.

¹³Memorandum by Karl Bachem on talk with Erzberger, Aug. 13, 1915. *Ibid*.

worked out. The end of the Eastern campaign would free twenty army corps, and Serbia could be crushed with these.

I asked: Can we be sure of Bulgaria, that it will allow the passage of munitions when we have cleaned up Serbia and arrive at the Bulgarian frontier?

Erzberger: Yes. An agreement with Bulgaria was signed last Wednesday (July 28). Her territorial demands have been satisfied, and she will receive a loan of 500 million marks. In return she will march against Serbia with 150,000 men. At first we demanded that she march with her entire army, but then we agreed that two divisions should be placed opposite Kavalla to guard against possible Greek attack, and two divisions in the Dobruja in case of Rumanian difficulties. The rest of the army will enter Serbia in accordance with a plan of operations worked out by Falkenhayn.

I asked: What will happen with *Rumania*?

Erzberger: Nothing. We will refuse to negotiate with her any further; she has placed herself between two stools and will get nothing. Serves her right. We will refuse to buy her grain henceforth. What we need in foodstuffs we can get from Bulgaria. Rumania has just completed its harvest and is suffocating with grain. May it rot.

I asked: How do things look at the Dardanelles?

Erzberger: I hope the Turks can hold out until we have broken through Serbia and can rush the prepared munitions supplies to them. The Turks can at present produce 800 shells a day, for guns ranging up to 24cm in calibre. That is something, but not much. They produce one bullet daily for every soldier in the army. That is still less. Our submarines are performing a valuable service. [German submarines had gone into the Mediterranean.] If the operation against Serbia succeeds rapidly I think the Dardanelles will hold out until we can help.¹⁴

Erzberger's efforts for a campaign against Serbia came to nothing when Falkenhayn went back on his promise as soon as reports from Constantinople showed that the Dardanelles situation was no longer desperate. The campaign was postponed until October 1915. Its successful outcome at that time vindicated Erzberger's assessment of the military factors involved.

The entire episode is indicative of Erzberger's perseverance and resourcefulness. When aroused on a subject he was never at a loss for a variety of steps to make his views prevail. He did not hesitate to press his views upon Bethmann, Jagow, Falkenhayn, Hertling, the various party leaders, and even the Emperor himself. His efforts were not crowned by success in this instance, but they show how he secured the reputation of being the busiest busybody in the *Reichstag*. The rumors concerning his contacts with men in authority were substantially correct, though they rarely led to the results that he desired. His great historic rôle came only in July 1917, when he defied the Emperor, Chancellor, Supreme Command, and established leadership of his own *Zentrum* Party, to make himself the spokesman for the popular demand for a negotiated peace.

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¹⁴Memorandum by Karl Bachem on talk with Erzberger, July 31, 1915. *Ibid.*

THE COMMUNIST LEAGUE OF YUGOSLAVIA IN FIGURES

by Ivan Avakumovic

IN the considerable postwar literature on Yugoslavia little attention has been devoted to the numeric strength and composition of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY), or the Communist League of Yugoslavia, as its official title has been since November 1952. The reports of the secretaries of the Central Committee of the CPY to the Party congresses in 1948, 1952 and 1958 do, however, provide useful material on the subject, which is also discussed occasionally in the Belgrade periodical *Komunist*.

The CPY numbered something between 1,000 and 3,000 members when Marshal Tito joined the Politbureau in 1934.¹ It claimed 6,000 to 8,000 members at the time of the Fifth Party Conference in October 1940. The Party continued to expand after that date, and when Hitler invaded the Soviet Union it consisted of 12,000 members and 30,000 in the Communist youth organization (SKOJ).

The struggle against the occupying power and the civil war against Mihailović's Četniks took a very heavy toll of the Communist cadres. Ten of the twenty-nine members of the Central Committee, including two members of the Politbureau, lost their lives, as did three-quarters of the prewar militants. Nevertheless, the years 1941-1944 turned out to be a propitious recruiting period. Party membership rose to

141,066	May 1945	779,382	June 30, 1952
189,558	1946	700,030	1953
468,175	Jul. 1948	654,669	end of 1954
530,812	Dec. 1948	624,806	end of 1955
607,443	Dec. 1950	635,984	June 1956
704,617	Dec. 1951	755,066	Dec. 31, 1957

The vast increase in Party membership since the CPY came to power opened its ranks to thousands who joined it for motives that were hardly altruistic. It produced a new type of Communist who, as Marshal Tito pointed out, was not the same as before the war. Cases of loose morals, malversation on a large scale and religious influence were reported in the Party press. More serious were the prevalent slackness, bordering on apathy, among those who belonged to the Party; and their desire not to build socialism, but to obtain small privileges or protect themselves against certain unpopular economic measures introduced by the Communist government. That was the case, according to *Komunist*, of a large number of peasants who joined the CPY during the collectivization drive (1948-1952) only to

¹A thousand members according to the Communist historian, J. Marjanović, *Potsetnik iz istorije Komunističke partije Jugoslavije* (Belgrade, 1953), p. 43; 2200 according to *Komunist*, April 18, 1958; 3,000 according to the Comintern weekly *Inprekorr* (French ed.), March 9, 1935.

²No. 4, 1955.

abandon it when the government permitted the dissolution of collective farms and "economic pressure decreased to some extent."³

A high turnover in Party membership was understandable in those circumstances. This was admitted in the report of the Central Committee to the Seventh Congress in April 1958 which stated that a "very dynamic policy of enrolling members was in force, as well as the falling-off of those who could not find their way under new conditions." The same source described the ex-members as those who "were inactive in the work of primary organizations,⁴ who were introducing indiscipline, as well as those who were carriers of anti-socialist behavior and outlook." The periodic tightening of discipline led to the expulsion of 286,784 members between 1950 and the second half of 1956.

<i>Expelled from the CPY</i>		<i>Joined the CPY</i>	
1950	58,348	1951	43,924
1951	8,508	1952	119,911
1952	43,687	1953	25,096
1953	72,467	1954	20,669
1954	56,179	1955	24,889
1955	34,181	1956 (first half)	25,689
1956 (first half)	13,414	1957 (first half)	46,000

In their campaign for new members the Party leaders had three objectives in mind: to increase the percentage of women, of young people and workers in the CPY. The success of their first objective may be seen from the following figures:

<i>Percentage of women in the CPY</i>		<i>Number of women in the Central Committee of the CPY</i>	
1948	19.9	1948	5 out of 105
1952	16.9	1952	6 out of 109
1954	16.3	1958	7 out of 135
1957	16.3		

The need for rejuvenating the CPY was recognized by the aging Party leadership:

<i>Average age of member of the Politbureau</i>		<i>Average age of member of the Central Committee</i>	
1940	35	1948	36
1948	43	1952	42
1952	47	1958	45
1958	52		

The emphasis on youth meant that over sixty per cent of those who joined the CPY in 1956 and 1957 had not yet reached their twenty-fifth birthday. In 1957 about forty per cent of the total membership was under thirty. Even so, the young Communists form a relatively small section of

³*Ibid.*

⁴There were 26,809 primary organizations in the CPY in 1957. Of these 13,974 were in the villages, 7,620 in business and industrial enterprises, 1,097 in institutions, 414 in the secondary schools and 305 in the universities, while 3,399 were on a territorial basis.

their generation⁵ though they occupy nearly all the leading posts in the Communist-dominated youth organization.⁶

A great effort was also made to increase the proletarian element of the CPY.⁷ The extent to which the leadership succeeded may be gauged from the percentage table below.

	<i>workers</i>	<i>peasants</i>	<i>others</i>
1948	29.53	49.41	21.06
1952	32.14	42.39	25.47
1954	28.3	22.65	49.05
1956	31.36	17.66	50.98
1957	32.29	17.32	50.39

The decline in the percentage of peasants in the CPY after 1952 is due, to some extent at least, to different criteria used by the Central Committee to establish the occupation of Party members. Until 1953 well over 100,000 ex-peasants and ex-workers were classified as "peasants" and "workers," though they were employed in various branches of the state apparatus. A special directive rectified this anomaly and unwittingly drew attention to the extent to which even the rank and file of the CPY, like that of all other Communist parties in power, consisted of officials.

UNIVERSITY OF MANITOBA

⁵90,984 Communists were active in the People's Youth which had 1,171,720 members at the beginning of 1958. Nearly half a million young peasants remained outside this organization. Roughly one student out of seven holds a membership card of the CPY.

⁶Nine-tenths of the delegates to the Congress of the People's Youth in 1958 were Party members.

⁷13.97 per cent of the employed workers belonged to the CPY in 1957.

NOTES

The 1958 Vienna Sudetendeutscher Tag

The announcement of the extensive Sudeten German ceremonies planned for May 1959 in Vienna called forth sharp reactions in Prague. A series of public lectures by scholars and political figures preceded the actual Sudetendeutscher Tag. These lectures were scheduled from April 29 to May 15 and were held in the University of Vienna.

From May 16 to 20, the tempo increased markedly. Separate meetings for the many Landsmann-schöfen representing various parts of Czechoslovakia were held in numerous Gasthäuser in Vienna. On May 17 at 9:30 a. m., three religious services were held: Roman Catholic, Lutheran, and Old Catholic. At 11 a. m., the Austrian Chancellor and Dr. Lodgman-Auen addressed an assembly on the Heldenplatz. Afternoon meetings at 5:00 p. m. and 7:30 p. m. closed the Tag. It was estimated that some 300,000 Sudeten Germans attended the various meetings.

The Czechoslovak government took official cognizance of the Tag by sending to Vienna on April 15 a note protesting the coming meetings and the participation of Austrian officials in these meetings. The action of the Austrian government was regarded as an "unfriendly act" and inconsistent with Austria's position as a neutral state.

The Austrian cabinet considered the Czechoslovak note in a full session on the following Tuesday, April 20, and, rejecting the charges of abuse of neutrality, insisted on the propriety of permitting a Widershensfest of former Sudetenlanders. In the Czechoslovak press there thereupon appeared a series of editorials bitterly accusing the Austrian government of intending to support "former Nazi murderers." On May 6, M. Klicka, the Czechoslovak Ambassador to Pankow, made a statement at a press conference, accusing the Austrian government of breaking the Staatsvertrag and committing an act of aggression against a neighbor state in allowing such a "revanchist" meeting to take place. The Moscow *Pravda* took the same line.

On May 20, after the meetings in Vienna, Prague sent a second and very sharp note to Vienna, accusing Chancellor Raab and Interior Minister Helmer of misrepresenting the historical facts behind the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans from Czechoslovakia and of violating Austrian neutrality by permitting the meetings of the "revanchist" Sudeten Germans in Vienna. On May 23, at a state ceremony in Prague, in honor of an official Bulgarian delegation, the President of Czechoslovakia, M. Novotný, made a speech in which the Austrian government was sharply criticized for its action in the matter of the Sudetendeutscher Tag. The Austrian Ambassador, Dr. Ender, then left the room. The head of the Bulgarian delegation, Todor Zhivkov, replying to M. Novotný's address of welcome, remarked *inter alia* that the Austrian policy "deserved to be pillioned."

Vienna

S. H. THOMSON

* * * *

We welcome a new publication, *Problems of the Peoples of the USSR*, published by the League for the Liberation of the Peoples of the USSR (the Paris Bloc). It is a quarterly. The first number contains six well-written articles of a general nature on nationalities and Soviet colonialism. The publishers promise to be more specific and factual in subsequent issues. The scholarly calibre of the first issue indicates that this new publication will soon occupy a very respectable place in the Slavic field. We extend our best wishes.

EDWARD ROZEK

BOOK REVIEWS

GÖRANSSON, SVEN, *Den Europeiska Konfessionspolitikens Upplösning, 1654-1660: Religion och utrikespolitik under Karl X Gustav (Die Auflösung der europäischen Konfessionspolitik in den Jahren 1654-1660)*. Uppsala: Uppsala Universitets Årsskrift 1956:3, 1956. Pp. 356. 34.00 Kr.

Sven Göransson is a Swedish church historian who is rapidly gaining an enviable reputation as a scholar, a worthy disciple of Gunnar Westin, to whom he has dedicated *Den Europeiska Konfessionspolitikens Upplösning, 1654-1660*. Göransson describes the impact of religious fanaticism upon the foreign policy of Sweden during the reign of Charles X. He exhibits a depth of interest combined with an objectivity which characterized Westin as he roamed over time and place in efforts to relate church history to the multiplicity of historical forces.

Göransson's volume is a courageous, fresh, and objective approach to a period of history which has long challenged the imagination of Swedish historians. The rise of Sweden as a world power parallels the expansion of the Reformation, the Counter-Reformation, the emergence of stronger national states, and the Religious Wars. Young men saw visions and old men prophesied. It was an age of intense religiosity when great faith was placed in the Book of Revelations. John Amos Comenius and Mikuláš Drabik were certain of the Christian mission of Charles X and Sweden as the weapons of God against anti-Christ in cooperation with Oliver Cromwell. The Apocalyptic concept of Sweden as an agent of God reached its peak among the Reformed during the years 1656-1658, though it was resisted in the Netherlands.

The work completes a trilogy by Göransson. The first volume described the Biblical concept of Sweden's mission in international affairs from 1645-1648, particularly as it was related to the religious question in the prolonged peace negotiations at Westphalia. By the Treaty of Westphalia both Sweden and France secured important voices in the affairs of the Holy Roman Empire of German Nations. It became impossible for Sweden in the years after 1648 to dissociate itself from the religious strife in the Empire, and Göransson concerned himself with this matter in a second volume which covered the years 1648-1654. Now, in a third book, Göransson describes the Apocalyptic concepts of Protestants of Sweden's mission in the exciting, restless, and war-filled reign of Charles X leading up to the Treaty of Oliva, when Sweden was at the height of its power.

The Treaty of Westphalia had profoundly altered the international picture. The Austrian House of Habsburg, which many Protestants still regarded as Anti-Christ, was no longer a serious threat to the Swedish Empire, its Spanish branch had failed to sustain the power of Spain, and its leadership in the affairs of Europe had been transferred to France, an ally of Sweden during the Thirty Years' War. The Calvinists had with difficulty secured the same rights as the Lutherans and Catholics in Germany, and the rise of Prussia provided Saxony with a rival for the leadership of the German Protestant princes. The pope no longer played an important rôle in international politics. The old Protestant concepts of the Habsburgs and the pope as Anti-Christ and of the Roman Catholic Church as the Harlot lost propaganda value. Yet, religious fanaticism existed and interest grew in prophecies and the Book of Revelation in particular.

In this setting the Puritan Revolution brought Oliver Cromwell to power in England. It provided powerful propaganda for the more fanatical elements of the Protestants—those who saw in Cromwell an instrument of God. Events occurred which seemed a fulfilment of revelations and prophecies.

Modern historical writing abounds in political, social, and economic interpretations influenced by relative degrees of determinism, which have eliminated both personal and religious elements as significant historical forces. To one Swedish historian the foreign policy of the Vasa dynasty was determined by the transition of Sweden from a rural to an international economy. Göransson seeks to correct certain distortions created by the secularization of history. He does not deny the validity of past interpretations; he wishes simply to refocus the picture. He appears to be an environmentalist who is fully aware of the hazards involved in discovering and analyzing religious forces and their influences. He differentiates between fiction and fact as he examines the nature and intent of religious propaganda in international politics. He has rendered an important service to historical scholarship by reevaluating old and new interpretations on the basis of primary sources viewed in the light of contemporary historical criticism.

Augustana College

O. FRITIOF ANDER

EDER, KARL, *Der Liberalismus in Altösterreich; Geisteshaltung, Politik und Kultur*. (Wiener Historische Studien, Vol. III). Vienna: Verlag Herold, 1955. S 78.

Professor Eder's work deals with an unquestionably important subject, the evolution of a political ideology as reflected in Austrian political and social history. As a contribution to this recently activated field of research, it has to compete with such studies as Fritz Valjavec's studies on Josefinismus, Georg Franz's *Liberalismus die deutschliberale Bewegung in der Habsburgischen Monarchie*, and Eduard Winter's *Der Josefinismus und seine Geschichte*. Of these works Eder's is topically the most comprehensive, though even within its recognized space limits not nearly comprehensive enough to do justice to the subject beyond the Austro-German orbit. Eder is also unquestionably more objective than Winter and sincerely concerned with doing justice to the evaluation of intellectual and political currents at variance with his own traditional interpretation of imperial Austrian history.

At the same time this study is just as clearly the least sophisticated among those noted above. This is less obvious in the simple and straightforward historical narrative of the book, yet somewhat disturbing where the work broadens out to discuss the intellectual and social currents, particularly those of the second half of the nineteenth century. It is not the opinions of the author which are at fault here. Whether one agrees with them or not they are entirely legitimate. The problem is rather that of the inadequacy of *cliché* appraisals of cultural traits and social phenomena, including quite a few unintentional, outworn exaggerations. Readers may disagree as to whether the author has done full justice to Austrian liberalism; but they may well agree that he could and should have made a better case in defense of his own views.

Much of this may have to do with an opinion stated with commendable frankness in the introduction:

Historically seen, there is only a Liberalism of the individual lands and peoples. The effort to discover the common features of the concept behind the territorial and national nuances, and with their help to try for a generally valid definition is bound to come to naught. (page 11)

Admittedly, to find a common denominator of an empire-wide Austrian Liberalism is very difficult, though, contrary to the opinion of the author, perhaps not more difficult than "to lay bare and to find the deepest roots of World Liberalism." Nevertheless it is the firm belief of this reviewer that a definitive, stimulating and original study of Liberalism in the Habsburg empire would have to be based on

a concentrated effort to establish the common grounds of liberal thought and action in the monarchy.

With the qualifications outlined above, the informative merits and honest efforts of this unpretentious book should be readily acknowledged.

Rutgers University

ROBERT A. KANN

RÖSSLER, HELLMUTH, *Zwischen Revolution und Reaktion. Ein Lebensbild des Reichsfreiherrn Hans Christoph von Gagern*. Göttingen: Musterschmidt, 1958. Pp. 321.

Professor Hellmuth Rössler of Darmstadt has written here a sympathetic and understanding biography of one of those political anachronisms of the era of Talleyrand, Napoleon, and Metternich—hereditary *Reichsfreiherr* Hans Christoph von Gagern, father of three fighters in the War of Liberation, of whom two (Friedrich and Heinrich) were especially active in the postwar university student *Burschenschaften* and in the national revolutionary movement of 1848. While the Baron vom Stein distinguished himself in the service of the king of Prussia and of Germany, and Goethe in Weimar, while Marschall von Bieberstein served the Duke of Nassau, and von Gentz and Metternich the Habsburgs, von Gagern served a succession of West German princes of lesser rank, principally the dukes of Nassau, and the House of Orange. After having represented the House of Orange in Vienna and Paris through 1814 and 1815, he served as envoy from the grand Duchy of Luxemburg in the first Frankfurt Diet of the Confederation of 1815.

Hans Christoph von Gagern will be judged by many to have been an anachronism also in a second sense: one of the last tenacious believers not only in the power of reason but in the efficacy of personal negotiation, the significance of the well-chosen word, the usefulness of personal friendships in diplomacy, and the negotiability of unwritten obligations owed by those whom he had at one time or another accommodated. He knew the right people. Rössler calls him the last representative of the old Europe and of its unshakable belief in the goodness of man. His faith in man seems to the reviewer, however, to have been tempered by his opinion that man needed to be managed and guided by men of superior intelligence, understanding, and adaptability. Such reasonable men could, he thought, direct and control the elementary forces that move both mountains and men.

Von Gagern was less adaptable than Talleyrand, with whom he had to work in Paris through the period of mediatization and to follow Napoleon to Berlin and Warsaw—less crusty than vom Stein. With only a modest inheritance to support him in the rather exalted social and political status to which he was born, he developed virtually into a professional journeyman diplomat, an envoy and negotiator extraordinary, who took good care of the interests of the others of his class (including vom Stein's Nassau/Lahn property) and of the dukes and princes who employed him. Sometimes he carried several such portfolios simultaneously.

As a gradualist, Hans Christoph eventually differed sharply in opinion from his Forty-eighter sons. His faith in the magnanimity and educability of the princes and in the ultimate perfectability of the Confederation of 1815 was greater than theirs. His ideal of a political democracy was really an enlightened and benevolent aristocracy. He feared egalitarianism and submergence of the individual in a democracy more than in an autocracy. One could reason with a prince. His envisioned Germany was a greater one including Austria, with a Third Germany of the upper middle Rhineland—of which he was a native and had always been

a part—holding the balance between Prussia and Austria, and also between Germany and France.

This is an excellent biography of an interesting man. It is also a book about the Third Germany, about which Goethe and von Gagern thought much alike, although neither could materially influence the course of major events. Both are perhaps most interesting today as the prototypes of the upper-middle Rhinelander who considers himself at once a good German and a good European. The President and Chancellor of the Federal Republic and some of their cabinet ministers have shown that one can be both, as von Gagern was.

Recent additions to a manuscript otherwise completed several years ago are printed as inserts in slightly smaller type, but fit in well. The publisher has, as usual, done his work in good workmanlike fashion.

The University of Wisconsin

CHESTER V. EASUM

SAILE, WOLFGANG, *Hermann Wagener und sein Verhältnis zu Bismarck. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des konservativen Sozialismus* (Tübinger Studien zur Geschichte und Politik, herausgegeben von Hans Rothfels, Theodor Eschenburg und Werner Market, No. 9). Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1958. Pp. 167.

Dr. Saile has made a substantial contribution to our knowledge and understanding of the three aspects of Hermann Wagener's personality and career that give him his place in history: first, as editor of the *Kreuzzeitung* and one of the intellectual leaders of Prussian conservatism in the 1850s and 1860s; second, his introduction into conservative thought of ideas which led ultimately to the "welfare state"; and third, as an associate in attitudes and politics of Bismarck.

The original plan for the work grew from an interest in the roots of the "socialist monarchy." It was, however, impossible to carry these studies further because the documents on German social legislation were not accessible and the Wagener papers were no longer in the *Reichsarchiv*. Instead, Dr. Saile was allowed to use letters and memoranda at Friedrichsruh which showed facets of Wagener's thinking and many details of his connection with Bismarck.

Wagener was born on March 15, 1815 in the March of Brandenburg, the son of a country pastor. In early manhood, he came to be associated through tastes and ideas with members of the landed aristocracy, notably with Moritz Blankenburg and Hans von Kleist-Retzow. Early in his studies, he learned from C. L. von Haller's *Die Restauration der Staatswissenschaften* that all men were not born equal and that it was the right of the stronger to rule. He outgrew, however, Haller's idealized feudalism and took over from F. J. Stahl the concept of the moral state with its emphasis on divine authority for ethics and law. In religion, he shifted from the Lutheranism of his youth to active membership in the Irvingite sect. Like Bismarck, he was influenced by religious attitudes and slogans, but he too separated religion and practical politics. His reactionary friends were often shocked by his unscrupulous choice of means. As Dr. Saile puts it: "The Irvingite ardor that burned within him gave him something of the character of a mercenary of the church militant. He fought for the faith but not with the weapons of the faith." (p. 23).

On the other hand, like Bishop Ketteler, he came to the conclusion that the masses might be lost to the rising leaders of socialism. He insisted that the state must meet the menace of the new doctrines by itself taking measures to solve the social problem. The evidence available does not show a direct line from Wagener's memorandum of 1856 (p. 40) to the social insurance legislation of a generation later. But it seems clear that Wagener's attempt to make social action by the gov-

ernment a tenet of conservative politics helped create the "climate of opinion." It is also not established that Wagener was directly responsible for the meetings of Bismarck with Lassalle in 1863, but he was in agreement with them in their hostility to liberalism and liberals.

When Wagener and Bismarck first became personally acquainted could not be exactly determined, but the Revolution of 1848 made them political associates and personal friends. From 1854 to 1862, their actual contacts were few. As Dr. Saile emphasizes, the development of Wagener's ideas and his rise to influence and significance in the conservative party took place in complete independence of Bismarck and along different lines: Bismarck in foreign affairs, Wagener in internal and social policy and tactics. When Bismarck came to Berlin as Minister President, Wagener reestablished personal contacts. He provided Bismarck with analyses of the political situation, with recommendations for dealing with the opposition; and he served as a useful tool for the dirty work of political action (p. 100f.). At the time of the founding of the empire, Wagener was involved in railroad promotion and his speculative activity was exposed by Lasker in the Reichstag in 1873. The commission of investigation showed his moral, if not legal, guilt. Bismarck made some effort to protect him but was unable to keep him as *Vortragender Rat*. For a time, he continued to serve the Chancellor unofficially, but the intimate relationship was past. Wagener's demands for financial aid came close to blackmail and in 1877, the breach became complete (p. 125ff.).

The appendix prints 17 documents from the Friedrichsruh archives. The bibliography is excellent. There is no index.

University of Minnesota

LAWRENCE D. STEEFEL

MARDAL, MAGNUS, *Sverige og den Engelske Trelasttoll 1817-1850*. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1957. Pp. 226.

During the period here covered, Northern trade policies, British as well as Scandinavian, were intermittently under diligent review in diverse quarters. The subject of this study is British tariff policy on timber, with particular reference to differential rates applying to dimensions of modest size, since these rates were of most interest to Norwegian exporters. In this inquiry the author has considered a variety of topics: advantages in rates given to competing lumber supplies from Canada; growing competition from some timber interests in Sweden (the Gothenburg demands); the hostility of several shipping interests, British as well as Swedish; and the overall structure of trade and tariff policies in Norway as well as in Sweden. (Each country erected its own tariff legislation.) To these are added consideration of the Swedish-Norwegian Union's rather complicated Cabinet arrangements and its staffing of the joint diplomatic and consular services, which for the period under review were chiefly Swedish in personnel.

The latter circumstance gave rise to the widespread opinion in Norwegian circles that Norwegian interests were seriously neglected. Mardal's study settles one question of fact—those interests were not neglected. There were occasions, he shows, when Norwegian interests were subordinated to Swedish, but on the long term basis it is clear that the foreign services of the joint kingdoms kept Norwegian interests well to the fore of negotiations (even when local Norwegian timber interests no longer pressed firmly for revision of the rates). Impressive in this connection were the endeavors of the envoys in Britain, such as Stierneld and Björnstjerna.

But why should policies of interest primarily to Norwegians conscientiously be kept to the fore by a service personnel essentially Swedish? Mardal finds the

answer in a complex of reasons quite beyond the trade stream of a single commodity. The issue over the rates on timber served as a fulcrum across which to press for issues of wider scope, such as liberalization of the general Swedish tariff structure or of the trade and maritime policies of the Scandinavian kingdoms as a unit. In the efforts to reduce the rates on lumber from Norway some elements in Sweden saw an opportunity to bend the Swedish-Norwegian Union's general foreign policy in a westward direction, away from a neutral orientation, not to mention a pro-Russian one. At the close, the author logically, though somewhat abruptly, takes the reader to the brink of the negotiations that led to the integrity Treaty of 1855 (the November Treaty).

While, therefore, the point of departure in this monograph is the debate over a limited tariff question, the center of gravity lies in a wider area of Swedish-Norwegian tariff policy and foreign relations. Mardal's delving into archival materials is extensive—in Oslo, in Stockholm, and in London. The sources have been used with caution and the spirit of the discourse is marked by commendable candor. Frequent resort to phrases such as "I hold . . ." or "I believe . . ." keeps the reader well aware of the author's position on the points discussed. His monograph, within the boundaries set, is a probing study of the bearing on wider public issues of one segment of North European trade policy.

New York University

OSCAR J. FALNES

HOSTETTER, RICHARD, *The Italian Socialist Movement. I: Origins (1860-1882)*. Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Co., 1958. Pp. xii, 444. \$6.50.

Delving into relatively unsampled larders in the Biblioteca G. G. Feltrinelli and other Italian libraries, Professor Hostetter has found rich fare to serve in this first course of a projected three-volume history of the Italian Socialist movement since 1860. His initial tome is an effort to summarize the experiences that produced the characteristic premises of the Italian Workers' Party, chartered in 1892. Forebear of present-day Italian Marxist currents, that party was "an organic progression from an earlier experimental epoch, full of false starts, ideological confusion, and dissension." (vi)

With commendable impartiality and skill Hostetter has delineated and evaluated in seventeen thick chapters the rôle of the "unconstitutional Left" from 1860 to 1882—an era which brimmed with jousting ideologies and personalities. First he summarizes the social situation at the advent of the Kingdom, giving special attention to the Piedmontese Societies of Mutual Aid and the Mazzinian labor traditions, and then turns his spotlight on Carlo Pisacane, the Neapolitan "federalist" who was the period's first "social revolutionary." He concludes that Pisacane's ideas came too soon to make any major breach in the ranks of Italian republicanism, which were still attuned to Mazzini's political gospel that assigned higher priority to national unity than to social reform, and that extolled class harmony rather than its opposite.

Chapters IV through XI concern chiefly the tortuous struggle of Michael Bakunin (who arrived in Italy in January 1864) and his local disciples in the anarchistic "Alliance" (Errico Malatesta, Andrea Costa, Carlo Cafiero, *et al.*) against the Mazzinians on the one hand and against the authoritarian Communists of Engels and Marx on the other for leadership of the Italian proletarians of town and country and for control of the "First International." The Paris Commune of 1871 Hostetter sees as a turning point because the religious-minded Mazzini's hostility to that supposedly "socialist" experiment lost him the support of the younger radicals, thereby making it easy for Bakunin's skillful thrusts to knock him

(and Garibaldi too) *hors de combat*. Thereafter Engels blundered by indulging in excessive denigration of Bakunin, while the latter shrewdly consolidated his strength in the Romagna and won a victory at the decisive Rimini Congress of August 1872. Hostetter goes on to describe the anarchistic "propaganda of deeds" in the tragicomic insurrections of 1874, near Bologna, and of 1876 in the *Mezzogiorno*, and to explain how they hastened the decline of the Anarchist International. The death of Bakunin (1876), the advent to power that year of the Constitutional Left, the expansion of the suffrage in 1882, and the growth of an industrial workers' movement in Lombardy all helped induce Costa and Cafiero by 1882 to switch their allegiance to the Marxist formula of political struggle, thereby ushering in a new phase of the Italian Socialist movement.

Hostetter's book is remarkably free of typographical errors, includes a helpful index, and has footnotes at the bottom of the pages. He appears to have made good use of contemporary newspapers and periodicals as well as of such "ground-breaking" studies as those of Nettlau, Angiolini, Michels, Nello Rosselli, Valiani, Manacorda, Della Peruta, and especially Aldo Romano—who has now published three of his nine-volume Marxist *Storia del Movimento Socialista in Italia* (Rome: Fratelli Bocca, 1954-). Hostetter dissents frequently but courteously from the latter, and makes clear his own liberal bias when he pointedly suggests that in Italy this topic deserves "far greater catholicity of approach than has characterized socialist historiography since the Second World War." (vii). For background information he turns often to reputable Liberal historians like Chabod and Cilibrizzi, but does not cite even once such "classical" interpreters of the era as Croce and Volpe. Though the author's style is usually felicitous, he might shorten to good effect some of the indented quotations and occasionally Italianate sentences. He should employ consistently the preferred English forms: "Savoyard" for "Sabauda"; "Babouvism" for "Babeufism"; "Torinese" for "Turinese"; "Leghorn" for "Livorno"; "Apulia" and "Apulian" for "Puglia" and "Pugliese." These are, of course, minor flaws in what, on balance, is a valuable, critical contribution to the literature on this subject.

Having sampled Hostetter's *antipasto*, this reviewer hungrily awaits the remaining courses.

Vanderbilt University

CHARLES F. DELZELL

HAUSER, OSWALD, *Deutschland und der English-Russische Gegensatz, 1900-1914*. Göttingen: Mutterschmidt Verlag, 1958. Pp. 288. DM 22.50.

Mr. Hauser's *Habilitationschrift* published under the auspices of the German Research Association and the *Göttingen Bausteine zur Geschichtswissenschaft* undertakes to reexamine the basis for the deterioration of Anglo-German relations during the hectic days prior to World War I. His *leitmotiv* is that Anglo-German naval rivalry was the overriding cause for the political alienation between the two states, and that a reasonable delimitation of the German naval construction program was a *sine qua non* for any possible political reconciliation. He attempts to dispel the fatalistic resignation that an armed clash between Germany and Great Britain was inevitable. Instead, he firmly believes that if the German Emperor and the *Aussenministerium* had pursued a more astute policy and had abandoned their "all or nothing" foreign policy objectives, British leaders, driven to despair by Russia's expansionist ambitions in the Middle and Far East and her repeated breaches of faith following the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, would have looked favorably toward a limited understanding with Germany that might well have altered the course of history.

Mr. Hauser supports the generally accepted view that the critical turning point

in Anglo-German relations was the failure of the Haldane Mission. At that time Anglo-Russian friction in regard to Persia and the Dardanelles had reached such a serious stage that only vain ambitions coupled with extreme diplomatic ineptitude on the part of the German Government prevented a *rapprochement* with Britain. He repeatedly emphasizes that the German leaders must share the major responsibility for forcing a reluctant Britain back into the embrace of the Russian Bear and so bringing about the ironic spectacle of British leaders condoning publicly what they privately deprecated. Despite repeated soundings by responsible Britons, German leaders continued to predicate their diplomacy on the mistaken belief that they could only neutralize England and break the "encirclement" by the Triple Entente through the creation of an overwhelming naval force. It goes without saying this policy had directly the opposite effect upon British leaders, who could view Germany's actions only as a threat directed against themselves. Thus, mutual misunderstanding of motives proved to be of decisive importance.

In general, there is little with which one can take serious issue in Mr. Hauser's thesis. His scholarship is sound, his sources, mostly based on governmental archives, memoirs and other diplomatic papers of that period, are the best available today, and his interpretation of historic events does not seriously clash with prevailing views.

Yet one may well question some of Mr. Hauser's assumptions. Even without the issue of Anglo-German naval rivalry, it is doubtful that England could have stood idly by following the outbreak of hostilities on the continent and permitted German hegemony to be established on the continent following the possible defeat of France and Russia. British security demanded a balance of power. To have upset it completely would have jeopardized British vital interests.

There is also a regrettable overreliance by Mr. Hauser upon exclusively diplomatic sources to the extent of virtually ignoring economic, political and social forces which helped shape foreign policy in these respective countries. While the author is aware of this deficiency, it is clear that no definitive study of this period is possible without thoroughly exploring this aspect.

The real value of this study is the insight it provides into current German historical interpretation of these critical years of history. It is encouraging to note that German critical research is once again of the high caliber of the Weimar Republic.

Kansas State College

WERNER BARTH

Russian Thought and Politics: Harvard Slavic Studies, Vol. IV, Hugh McLean, Martin E. Malia and George Fischer, eds. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1957. Pp. 513. \$7.50.

The new volume of *Harvard Slavic Studies*, dedicated to Professor Michael Karpovich, whose thirty years of teaching were celebrated last year at Harvard, is composed entirely of contributions by his former students. In his introductory article Philip E. Mosely relates Professor Karpovich's life story and academic work. Born in 1888 in Tiflis, Michael Karpovich studied at Moscow University under V. Kliuchevsky, M. Bogoslovsky and D. Petrazhitsky, and graduated in 1914, presenting a thesis on Alexander I and the Holy Alliance. After some years of work with the government in Petrograd, he was offered the position of secretary of the Russian Embassy in Washington, and in the summer of 1917 he came to this country. During the course of his diplomatic career, M. Karpovich became interested in American academic life and in 1927 he was invited to teach Russian history at Harvard, where he succeeded in founding a new school of American scholars special-

izing in Russian history. The abundance and high quality of the research carried on by his students bears witness to the success of the educational work of this eminent historian. His own research was devoted primarily to Russia in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, with particular emphasis on intellectual development in the prerevolutionary era.

Since the volume under review is a symposium composed of contributions ranging from "Leskov and his Enigmatic Man" (H. McLean) to "The Sovietization of Uzbekistan" (H. Dienerstein), the reviewer feels obliged to limit this note to those contributions on topics which are particularly close to his own research or scholarly interest. In "Russian National Character, Some Eighteenth-Century Views," Hans Rogger studies Fonvizin, Novikov, and some other prominent publicists of the late eighteenth century. He comes to the well-founded conclusion that in that particular era Russians—or, as this reviewer would prefer to put it, the Russian Westernized class—were still in search of a tradition and of national values. It is too bad that Mr. Rogger disregarded the work of the historian Shcherbatov and the memoirist Bolotov, who often touch upon the Russian character and destiny in their writings. Nor does he mention the works of the Russian traditionalists, such as Pososhkov or the Denissovs, the latter being the leaders of the Old Believers, whose ideas on Russia's "particular destiny" were later vigorously developed by the Slavophiles and the *pochvenniki* in the nineteenth century.

Richard Pipes' penetrating study of Karamzin forms a natural sequel to Rogger's contribution, since the thought of Russia's first popular historian laid the foundation for the Westernized Empire's subsequent national tradition. Pipes demonstrates that Karamzin was to a large degree the transplanter onto Russian soil of certain Western ideas, particularly those of Montesquieu, and that the basis of his political theories was "enlightened legalism." According to Karamzin's tenets, the greatest danger to Russian civil order, law and prosperity was anarchy and the revolutionary movement. Pipes considers that Karamzin's apprehensions were justified to a large degree, in view of the nearly contemporaneous events of the Pugachev rebellion, the disintegration of the Polish anarchistic monarchy and the Terror in revolutionary France.

"Schiller's Impact on Russia's Left," in which Martin Malia develops a very convincing hypothesis on the origin of the utopian and abstract character of the Russian intelligentsia, is perhaps one of the most important contributions not only to the volume under review, but also to the whole historical literature on the development of the Russian intelligentsia. According to Malia, Schiller's vague and unrealistic treatment of liberty and beauty took deep root in the minds of Russian leftist intellectuals of the second quarter of the last century—Herzen, Ogarev, Bakunin, Belinsky *et al.*—all of whom matured intellectually during the period of Schiller's greatest popularity in Russia. Professor Malia writes,

Long before it was a fact, or even a political movement, the Russian revolution was an ideal fantasy in the heads of a few sensitive young men of 1830 and the 1840s. This is not to say that Schiller in any sense caused the movement. The cause was in that "cursed Russian reality" which haunted Belinsky so. But Schiller's delicately balanced combination of the aspiration to revolt with ideal substitutes for revolt, was what suited the best the mood created by the repressive atmosphere of the early years of Nicholas I. And its aesthetic education was the first education in the Utopia of nascent Russia's left which that atmosphere created.

Continuing Mr. Malia's viewpoint, one may perhaps conclude that the entire

Weltanschauung of the Russian intelligentsia, with its opposition to the realities of the time, as well as its abstract unconcrete approach to the world, was rooted in the utopian interpretation and assimilation of Schiller's treatment of artistic and political values.

The author of a recently published book on Russian liberalism, George Fischer, has contributed to the volume an interesting essay on Peter Struve, an early Russian Marxist little known in this country who, after 1905, became a national conservative thinker. It is a pity that Fischer treats Struve more as a Marxist and to a large extent neglects him as an original precursor of an extremely healthy movement which resurrected Russian "liberal-conservative" and national thought.

Very controversial is, in the mind of this reviewer, Robert Daniels' presentation of "Lenin and Russian Revolutionary Tradition." Claiming that Lenin was "Marxist only on the tip of his tongue," Daniels certainly makes an interesting discovery—one which probably leaves most of his readers rather skeptical.

Of considerable interest for specialists in both Russian and "East-Central" European history are the exhaustive articles by S. J. Zyzniewski on "Milieutin and the Polish Question," by M. K. Dziewanowski on "The Polish Revolutionary Movement and Russia, 1905-1907," and by C. Jay Smith, "Miliukov and the Russian National Question," all of which widely contribute to an understanding of the national problem in Russia and in Polish-Russian relations during the last decades of the imperial régime. R. P. Browder's "Kerensky Revisited" attempts to rehabilitate the former head of the Provisional Government. Browder accuses Kerensky's critics of making the latter the scapegoat for the disaster of 1917, and comes to the conclusion that his enemies "denied the magnitude of his role at the birth of the revolution because of the part played in its demise." In "The Socialist Revolutionaries and the Peasantry after October," O. H. Radkey tries to prove that when the Socialist Revolutionaries "lost the soldiers [of the former Russian imperial army] they lost the peasantry too, and so the revolution." Mr. Radkey's finding would be convincing if he were able to prove that the fate of the revolution was decided either in the countryside or by the organized peasantry and that the peasants, not the urban population, played the decisive rôle in those fatal years. The success of the Socialist Revolutionaries in the election to the Constituent Assembly, as well as the success of the so-called "green"—agrarian—movement, in which the S.R.'s ideas and often their leadership predominated, tends rather to prove that the peasants remained faithful in a high degree to their agrarian leaders even after October. The Communists actually won over not the peasants but only the command in the peasant soviets. For many American readers quite a new picture of General Peter Wrangel, one of the ablest White military leaders of the Civil War, is sketched by D. Treadgold in a very instructive article, "Wrangel's Leftist Policy from Rightist Hands," in which he demonstrates that despite Wrangel's pro-monarchistic personal feelings, he tried to carry through in 1920 a quite progressive social program in southern Russia.

Further contributions to this valuable symposium were made by Firuz Kazemzadeh, H. S. Dienerstein, S. W. Page, L. Twarog, A. P. Mendel, R. E. MacMaster, R. Matlaw, N. Riazanovsky, F. Barghoorn, H. McLean, R. Thaler, S. Monas, M. Raeff, and J. L. Sullivan, most of which are characterized by excellent scholarship and are of great interest to all students of Russian history.

Stetson University

SERGE A. ZENKOVSKY

Germany and the Revolution in Russia: 1915-1918. Documents from the Archives of the German Foreign Ministry, Zeman, Z. A. B., Ed., New York: Oxford University Press, 1958. Pp. xxiii, 157. 25sh.

This collection of documents throws some new light on the tangled relations between the Imperial German Government and some of the Russian revolutionary groups during the First World War. It shows that contacts existed as early as 1915 and that Berlin assisted these groups with considerable financial contributions. It also reveals the great difficulties which any belligerent government faces in evaluating reports on the size and effectiveness of underground organizations on enemy territory.

A number of the documents deal with the arrangement of the fateful journey which took Lenin and some of his associates from Switzerland across Germany and Sweden back to Russia after the collapse of the Tsarist régime. They make clear that the German High Command (Ludendorff) played a rather subordinate rôle in these negotiations. While the Army's permission was needed and granted for the trip, the initiative on the German side lay clearly with the Foreign Office (see also the recent study of Werner Hahlweg, "Lenins Reise durch Deutschland im April 1917," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, V (1957), 307-33, which is based on these and other Foreign Ministry documents).

Another fact which emerges is that the "sealing" of the railroad car which took Lenin and his party across Germany was primarily in the Russians' interest. They did not wish to expose themselves to charges of treason and thus refused to have any contact with Germans while traveling on German soil. As an additional protection against such charges Lenin insisted that the car be granted extraterritorial status.

There is no evidence in these documents that the German Government considered the support of the Bolsheviks a political risk. Apparently it was only concerned with ensuring, with their help, Russia's withdrawal from the war. It continued to provide the Bolsheviks with large sums of money after their seizure of power and urged neutral states to recognize the new Soviet Government for the express purpose of strengthening it. It was much concerned with the growing resistance against the Bolsheviks and was worried lest the terror with which the latter tried to fight the opposition might not be effective. "The pressure exerted by the Bolsheviks' mailed fist is enormous," the Counsellor of the German Legation in Moscow reported in June 1918. "People are being quietly shot by the hundred. All this, in itself, is not so bad, but there can no longer be any doubt that the physical means with which the Bolsheviks are maintaining their power are running out."

Fittingly, the last document reprinted here suggests a number of steps to be taken in order to protect Germany against any ill effects which might result from the collapse of the Bolshevik régime.

Ohio State University

ANDREAS DORPALEN

BANGERSKIS, RUDOLFS, *Mana mūža atminas* (Memoirs of my life), Vol. I. Copenhagen: Imanta, 1958. Pp. 401. \$4.80.

The author, general Rudolfs Bangerskis, was a notable Latvian professional soldier who died February 25, 1958, at the age of 80, soon after the first volume of his *Memoirs*, planned in three volumes, was published by the active and well-known Latvian publishing-house Imanta.

Bangerskis' excellent military education acquired in the Petersburg War Academy, an achievement rare in itself since he was the son of a rather poor Lat-

vian peasant and not a member of the Russian upper-class society, and his distinguished military career, which led him to the Manchurian battle-fields of the Russo-Japanese war during 1904-06, made him later one of the outstanding leaders of the Latvian Rifle Regiments which, during the so-called Christmas Battles of 1915, acquired legendary fame. After the Russian October Revolution of 1917 he became commander of a division, later of a corps of Kolchak's army which fought the Red Army and was finally defeated by it. During the independence of Latvia, Bangerskis occupied various military posts, being for about four years Minister of War. In 1943 Bangerskis was made Inspector General of the so-called Latvian Legion which formed a part of the German military forces then fighting the Red Army. He remained in this post until May 2, 1945, when the English troops captured Lübeck (Germany) where at that time the headquarters of the Latvian Legion was located. After being held as an internee by the English, he was released by them on June 20, 1946. The remaining years of his life he lived rather quietly, emerging only now and then into the open.

Obviously, an account of Bangerskis' life is almost tantamount to a military history of Latvia, which was founded in the aftermath of a war (1918) and which perished during the last days of the Second World War after having been occupied since 1940. At the same time it throws light on the military history of Russia, both the Russia of the Czars and that of the Soviets.

The most valuable part of the first volume of Bangerskis' reminiscences, therefore, is that wherein he describes his part in the events of the First World War, particularly in the aforementioned Christmas Battles.

In a frequently terse and concise style, characteristic of the author, Bangerskis manages to give a most lucid account of what actually happened. He does not try to interpret the actions of the big powers involved in the war but shows only his own rôle the events, leaving it to the reader to correlate his actions with those of other military leaders and with those of the Russian army as a whole.

Herein lies, in the opinion of the reviewer, the charm and the strength of the book, which thus can serve as a reliable secondary source even though the author himself (p. 218) stresses that he writes from memory strengthened only by the data given in his military service book and by some letters. Maps, battle sketches, facsimiles and now rarely obtainable pictures enhance the value of the book.

It is to be hoped that Bangerskis had the chance to finish the whole manuscript, which should be still more valuable, since the unpublished parts of it must touch on matters of major importance to everyone interested in the emergence of the Red Army during 1918-1920 and in the defeat of the German military forces on the East-European battle-fields of the Second World War, especially in the history of the relations between the German General Staff and the Latvian Legion, which till now have been touched upon in the available literature only incidentally.

A condensed version of Bangerskis's complete memoirs in a major language would be a welcome gift to all military historians.

New Haven, Conn.

B. JEGERS

JAKSCH, WENZEL, *Europas Weg nach Potsdam. Schuld und Schicksal im Donauraum*. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1958. Pp. 524. DM 15.80.

"Jaksch," says the publisher on the cover of this bulky volume, "has been a fighting democrat all his life, and reckons with opposition. He is ready for the heated discussion which this book will undoubtedly provoke."

Wenzel Jaksch was the last leader of the Sudeten-German Social Democratic Party, which soon after 1918 pledged its loyalty to the Czechoslovak state, and dur-

ing the Munich period vigorously opposed the machinations of Hitler and Henlein. An exile in London during World War II, he rejoined his fellow-citizens in Germany after the war, and is at present a member of the Bundestag. His book thus gives an account of events in which he played a rôle not without significance. However, to this central account covering the period from 1918 to 1945, he adds a historical introduction which goes back to 1848, and a conclusion in which political theorizing takes a prominent place. Without reflecting in any way upon the value of his cause, it must be admitted that Jaksch's political career was in practical terms a failure: Henlein succeeded in luring the vast majority of the Sudeten Germans into his camp, and Dr. Beneš together with the Allies succeeded in transferring these Germans into Germany. It is thus not surprising that this book is neither a memoir, nor a historical treatise, nor yet an essay in political theory, but partakes of all three and includes everything that Jaksch feels it necessary to say on the subject.

If the author ever leaned towards historical materialism, there is no sign of it here. As his title suggests, he rejects determinism, and refers to Marx only in connection with the self-determination of nations. His Austro-socialism (after Renner), modified by some of Spann's and even Strasser's ideas, combines with strong criticism of many members of the Second International to indicate that Jaksch pursues his own independent way.

He is perceptibly embarrassed while treating the period of his own "activism" in Czechoslovakia. Admitting that Czechoslovakia was "the center of gravity for German anti-Hitlerian exiles" and that the Sudeten Germans enjoyed the advantages of a "flourishing educational system" and an "active local government," he nevertheless dissociates himself from the idea of a Czechoslovak state. In characteristic fashion he finds his scapegoat in the person of Dr. Edvard Beneš. He is perhaps right despite misquotations in accusing Dr. Beneš of deceptive methods at the Paris Peace Conference; and there is some justice in his criticism of the activities which resulted in the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans from their homeland. These points apart, it seems probable that his view of the pre-Munich period has been colored by his almost traumatic experiences in London: certainly the amount of new first-hand evidence he offers to support his argument is disappointingly slender.

According to Jaksch, Beneš was a great conspirator, who in fact directed not only Czechoslovak but also French and British diplomacy. He was helped from without by successive generations of interested parties, ranging from Seton-Watson through Wickham Steed and Bruce Lockhart to Elizabeth Wiskemann and A. J. P. Taylor. This "Anglo-Czechoslovak conspiracy for the falsification of European history" he sees as the cause of catastrophe involving whole nations. Beneš was even responsible for the conversion of Churchill into a friend of Moscow.

In fact the author goes so far as to call the Czechs natural allies of Hitler, prevented by Germans from participating in the great victories of the first years of the war. The assassination of Heydrich he views as a tactical move by the Beneš government; the Czech slave laborers in the Reich as willing and free helpers of Berlin. Mgr. Tiso, all evidence notwithstanding, was not responsible for the loss of a single human life. (Presumably the same argument could be advanced on behalf of Hitler.) Jaksch reaches the heights in his extensive treatment of the Czechoslovak Legion in Siberia: here his only source is a pamphlet by Sakharov, which was fabricated in Berlin in 1936 under the auspices of "Volk und Reich."

On the other hand, as a participant in and commentator on German and Sudeten-German politics, Jaksch makes more interesting reading. Throughout his book he offers mature pronouncements which merit careful study by all those who

have some say in the future of the tragic Danube basin. "In the relations between the German nation and non-Russian Europe," he writes, "there is a conflict between strong resentments born in the recent past and the older all-European ties. On both sides, superficial judgment must give way to deeper insight. The Germans must prove that they have put aside the monocle of haughtiness as well as the aspiration to dominate other nations. . . . [European] unity can be founded only upon respect for the natural rights of the weaker and the example of moderation by the stronger."

Ottawa, Ontario

BORIS ČELOVSKÝ

HALPERN, JOEL MARTIN, *A Serbian Village*. New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1958. Pp. 325. \$6.00.

This book is a sociological portrait of Orasac, a Serbian village in the heart of legendary Sumadija, the Valley Forge of the Serbian national resurrection. It was there that in the beginning of the nineteenth century Black George, the founder of the Karageorgevich dynasty, led the most successful Serbian uprising against the Turks.

The book, a completed and rewritten doctoral thesis, contains thirteen chapters, a glossary of Serbian words used in the text, and a selected bibliography of the most important Serbian literature on the subject as well as English and American materials. The first two chapters cover the history as projected in the setting of Serbia and Yugoslavia with special emphasis on the nineteenth and twentieth centuries' political and social developments. That part of the study is clear, objective and informative, helpful to any reader who is interested in the cultural transformation of an Ottoman *pashaluk* which, through a modern semi-independent kingdom with the rise to power of Peter I Karageorgevich, became an independent democratic kingdom. Other chapters deal in a specific and technical way with the analytical description of the social, economic, cultural and political community that, from Ottoman backwardness through the pre-World War I period, entered between two wars into the modern era, when the industrial revolution, by the exploitation of the local mines, started to corrode the old patriarchal *zadruga* life. This study concludes with the presentation of changes brought about by today's Communist experimentation with peasant individualism and its tradition, thus giving more than 150 years of the history of a village.

This dramatic evolution, signifying the end of the classical *zadruga*, its patriarchal tradition (with all its cultural, religious and even sexual behavior) is projected by a young and conscientious writer who spent a year in the heroic and proud Shumadintsi. The book was written not only scientifically, using the methods of contemporary social science and anthropology, but in an impressively readable manner, so that it can be comprehended even by those whose scope is limited. The subject is vitalized by the original autobiographies written by young, middle-aged, and old inhabitants of Orasac, who tell much about the changes that have taken place, about the *zadrugas* and the *gazdas* in the process of dying. The quality of this section of the study is due to the particularly keen choice made by the author in selecting the writers. Thus one senses the significant difference between what an outspoken independent peasant admits and what is said by the opportunist who has joined the Party and pipes the official tune.

The present organization of the Village Council, with Party members in key positions, leaves no doubt that the peasantry has not yet made up its mind to yield to forced or voluntary collectivism. But for how long? "To be a peasant villager," as Dr. Halpern intuitively writes, "is most basically a state of mind reinforced by

common residence." If the common residence is altered by Communist violence and aggressive application of industry, as is already happening in Orasac and elsewhere, the peasant villager will gradually be forced to adjust to the industrial modernism that has already, as Philip Mosely once observed, opened the tightly closed community to the outside world.

What Orasac thinks of the outside world at large is brilliantly reported in one of the most substantial chapters. Orashatchani, though they fought the Germans twice, do not hate but respect them for their efficiency,—more so than they do the Italians and the French. To them America is "a kind of bounteous paradise where all good things come true." In the Yugoslav world the Orashatchani, like all the Shumadintsi, feel, first and foremost, Serbs. They consider the Moslems "Turks," though they are Slavs. "Serbs regard Croats as a different people," Dr. Halpern writes. "However, chiefly because of their Roman Catholic faith. . . . As far as the Slovenes are concerned, they are regarded as complete strangers . . ." This is an essential observation, since the author feels the national issue is still an organic weakness of Yugoslavia.

This book, written in the best tradition of the American social sciences, is a serious and constructive contribution to the better understanding of the Balkan peasantry in the midst of dynamic changes. The study has received the Clarke F. Ansley award given annually by Columbia University.

Fairleigh Dickinson University

BOGDAN RADITSA

ARNEZ, JOHN, *Slovenia in European Affairs: Reflections on Slovenian Political History*. New York, Washington: League of the Catholic Slovenes of America, 1958. Pp. 204. \$3. (obtainable c/o author, 322 2nd St., N.E., Washington 2, D. C. or from Studia Slovenica, Box 4531, Washington).

Since the publication in 1939 of Dragotin Lončar's rather narrowly defined treatise, *The Slovenes: A Social History*, there has not been a single serious study in either America or England on the remarkable people of northwestern Yugoslavia. Lončar's work, moreover, was but the second publication in English devoted to Slovenia. In these facts there is perhaps a certain irony, for the Slovenes themselves are among the world's greatest bibliophiles. The present work provides the student and scholar with solid and useful material. One may add that the volume is only the first of a series, *Studia Slovenica*, that is being produced by a small circle of learned, Slovenian-born Americans.

The author commences with a geopolitical survey, in which the expansionistic urges of Germany and Italy are emphasized as seen from a patriotic Slovenian viewpoint. Thereby the reader is introduced to what seems to be the book's most significant individual thesis. A brief discussion of the complicated and controversial questions of the early medieval settlement of the Slovenes, their Christianization, the ducal installation and feudalism follows. The next section concerns itself with Slovenia from the time of Napoleon's *Provinces illyriennes* to the collapse of the Habsburg monarchy. The author may perhaps overstress the extent of French influence in promoting Slovenian national feeling (or South Slavism, for that matter) since this topic has been debated. On the other hand, his fundamental conclusion—the ultimate folly of the Imperial Austrian Government in failing to satisfy the national aspirations of its Catholic Slavs—seems basically tenable. Certainly, Friedrich Funder, editor of the old, Catholic *Reichspost* of Vienna, would agree wholeheartedly with him, to judge by the journalist's reminiscences, *Vom Gestern ins Heute*.

The position of Slovenia under the Karadjorević régime is sketched lightly

with a few appended pages on the Istrian and Carinthian boundary questions. The three central chapters, which discuss the Italian and German occupations, the Communist seizure of power and the immediate postwar period, are the most intriguing parts of the book—and the most valuable. The tragedy of Slovenia, caught between the hammer of Communist ruthlessness and the anvil of Fascist-Nazi persecution, is told straightforwardly. The writer shows how the Communists, after failing to entice the other parties into the intended trap of a common resistance front, murderously attacked the latter, eventually forcing them to accept arms from, and cooperation with, their other inveterate enemies, the Italians and the Germans. The book thus serves to counteract the, at best half-true, "collaborationist," "Quisling" interpretation of this period of Slovenian history, cunningly fostered by official Yugoslavia and spread in the United States by the writings of the late, blindly idealistic Louis Adamic. However, one feels that the author's presentation could have been somewhat strengthened by drawing attention to the parallel with the outlook of Mihailović (the lie-low, conserve-strength approach) and by examining whether the policy of the Catholic and other parties could not possibly have been different from what it was. Conceivably, some historians may wish to take issue with Arnez for his attribution of Allied military support and consequent Communist (*sic*) triumph solely to the influence of the admittedly naive British Military Mission and of the left wing of the Foreign Office.

Regarding contemporary Yugoslavia, the author concludes that Tito's exploitation of Slovenia for the purpose of raising the living standards of the rest of the nation has caused great resentment and that a resultant feeling of frustration has turned the Slovenes against a "totalitarian and centralistic Yugoslavia." Hence, Slovenian nationalism, once the least offensive of all Yugoslav varieties, has been greatly stimulated. The study contains two final chapters, one a succinct and helpful summary of Slovenian political groupings, and the other an updating of the border questions. The author does not have the space to expose the complexities of the Carinthian Slovenian nationality conflict (or of the Trieste struggle either). While his main point—German nationalist pressure as the cause of the dwindling of the Slovenian ethnic group—is not at all incorrect, this reviewer is inclined to believe that several other causes have been equally important.

Interestingly, this book was printed in Klagenfurt by the Slovenian Catholic minority's St. Hermagoras Press. Accustomed to working in the Slovenian tongue and, under certain circumstances, in the German also, the Press faced difficulties in preparing an English-language text. Although an *errata* sheet has been inserted, there are still some uncorrected typographical slips. For the most part, the English style is simple and lucid, but a few, unedited Slovenianisms do remain, unfortunately near the beginning in particular. The organization of the book is well thought-out, clear and neatly balanced. The use of sources, in all pertinent languages, is judicious, exhaustive and up-to-date (although one misses a bibliography). The volume belongs on the shelves of every library that aims to have a basic Yugoslav collection.

New Jersey State College, Glassboro

THOMAS M. BARKER

WEBER, HERMAN AND LOTHAR PERTINAX, *Schein und Wirklichkeit in der DDR, 65 Fragen und die SED*. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1958. Pp. 303.

The purpose of this book is twofold. It attempts, first, to point out the inner contradictions of Stalinism and to further the isolation of the Stalinist apparatus in the Socialist Unity Part of Germany (SED) from the sincere socialists of the rank and file. Second, it tries to give a tool to the students and young people in West Ger-

many who come into actual contact with their generation in the German Democratic Republic so that they can understand the categories in which the young people in the "Zone" are trained to think.

As this reviewer knows from his own experience during several visits to Germany, there is certainly a constant need of educational tools for understanding, discussion, and effective argumentation with people of all kinds from the other side of the Iron Curtain. This book, whose authors are trained Marxists and who come from the Eastern Zone after having broken with its political system, should be quite useful for that purpose. Desiring it to be a handbook for discussion, the authors have organized their material into brief questions, grouped around six major topics: the application of the theory of Marxism-Leninism (one-third of the book); the political, the economic, the social, the cultural development in the German Democratic Republic, and the development and character of the Socialist Unity Party.

By far the best part of the book is the first. The main thesis of the authors here takes the line (like M. Djilas in his *The New Class*) that Stalinism is nothing but the ideology of the new ruling bureaucracy—ideology in the original Marxist meaning of the term, i.e. a system of ideas which has the function of hiding the real interests and purposes of the ruling class.

For the historian and political scientist, *Appearance and Reality in the German Democratic Republic* is only of limited value. Of special interest, however, are the excerpts from the opposition group around Professor Wolfgang Harich, now in prison (pp. 281-284). The book is often rambling and frequently repetitious. The reference to the quotations (and the book abounds in them in spite of its polemic against frequent quotations by the Communists to silence an argument) is often careless (e.g., Lenin, Works, Vol. 13). One might also take issue with the authors' assertion that Stalinism was essentially the dialectical outgrowth from Leninism, dialectical in the sense of being based on the negation of essential fundamentals in Lenin's theoretical and practical position (p. 67f.). The book is most effective, it seems to this reviewer, when it can contrast appearance and reality in the German Democratic Republic with original positions of Marx and Engels or even with the starting point of the Russian Social Democratic Party itself. Two examples must suffice. The several references to Engels' frequent warning that nationalization does not mean socialization (p. 202) are very telling. Even more so is the quotation (p. 278) from the resolution of the First Party Convention of the Russian Social Democrats in 1898: "How much does the Russian working class lack and how much is it deprived of! It has none of the rights which its comrades abroad enjoy freely and without molestation. It has no part in the government of the country, no freedom of speech and of the press, no freedom to organize. . . . For the Russian proletariat, these basic political rights are as essential as fresh air is necessary to breathe freely."

Cornell College

ERIC C. KOLLMAN

RITTER, GERHARD, *Lebendige Vergangenheit. Beiträge zur historisch-politischen Selbstbesinnung*. München: Verlag R. Oldenbourg, 1958. Pp. 331. DM 21.

In 1944 Professor Ritter published a volume of essays with the title *Lebendige Vergangenheit*, in which four of the essays now published appeared. Before the edition could be distributed, it was destroyed by war; one copy reached the United States and was reviewed in the *American Historical Review* for 1945-46 (Vol. 51, pp. 711-12). Now in honor of Professor Ritter's seventieth birthday a second *Lebendige Vergangenheit* has been brought together, containing four of the older essays (nos. 3, 5, 6, 9 in the new volume) and seven others from the period since

1945. Instead of research papers by students, a volume of which appeared in honor of Professor Ritter's sixtieth birthday, this *Festschrift*, presented by friends and students, is "a very carefully considered choice" of Professor Ritter's own essays of "historical-political self-reorientation" (*Selbstbesinnung*). Writings and speeches of a publicistic nature have been rejected for the volume, which contains in Part I nine historical-political problems and in Part II two additional essays dealing with the writing of history and with the university in public life. It is said about the essays that "each has its own problem and seeks from it to illuminate a piece of the past. But all the problems have developed from the direct, passionately troubled experience [*Miterleben*] of our present, and the historical period since 1789, which the essays treat, becomes of itself a living past" (Jacket). These problems include such ones as "Rise and Nature of the Rights of Man" (no. 1), "General Character and Historical Foundations of the Nature of Political Parties in Germany" (no. 3), "The Political Problem of Militarism in Germany" (no. 7), and the last two, "About the Problem of Contemporary Historiography" (no. 10) and "The Idea of the University in Public Life" (no. 11).

Most of the essays were originally speeches and/or papers read before societies and special groups, and they have been revised to appear in the volume under review. Thus the essay on political parties (no. 3), given in 1928 before a session of the Organization for the Advancement of Political Science and printed in 1929, has been reworked. It starts in the new version by saying that the former German party system collapsed completely in 1933, works backward from this date, and closes with a sentence about the parties under the Bonn Republic. The essay should be interesting to the German reader; but in a revised version it cannot clearly provide a reviewer with a glimpse of the early Ritter, who is not represented here by any other writing from the 1920s. Similarly one of two essays from the 1930s, that on colonial policy, considered weak in argument by the review of 1945-46, has been revised, apparently toward a broader, more realistic interpretation of the policy than the interpretation of 1937. In sum, then, the essays characterize the Ritter of the late 1930s. Politically considered, they should be useful to the German public; Professor Ritter in good times and bad takes his Germany very seriously and, in accordance with his message in the last essay, seeks to use his knowledge to illuminate the chaos left from the 1933 to 1945 period in Germany.

A complete bibliography of Professor Ritter's writings completes the volume and runs from pages 316 to 331. Few European historians can have produced more or covered a larger field. It is from the more important of these works that Professor Ritter must be judged rather than from a few essays "for self-orientation." Especially from them must his handling of history be judged rather than from his discussion of the subject in what appears to be one of the most important essays in this volume, "About the Problem of Contemporary Historiography." In this essay he writes in behalf of cultural history. He hedges, however, by fearing that most historians are not in a position really to write this kind of history, and in holding to the great importance of political history in modern times. "Never," he concludes, "was the confusion of political concepts, the insecurity, even the helplessness of politicians greater than in our time. Should historical experience such as political history assemblies be expendable in such a situation?" (page 271). Presumably, Professor Ritter's orientation is generally historical-political and the "living past" for him largely the political past.

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PAULINE R. ANDERSON

Das Dritte Reich und Europa: Bericht über die Tagung des Instituts für Zeitgeschichte in Tutzing. Mai 1956. Munich: Selbstverlag des Instituts für Zeitgeschichte, 1957. Pp. 182.

In May 1956 the Institut für Zeitgeschichte at Munich, which within the few years since its establishment has made so many notable contributions to the serious study of recent history, brought together 58 scholars for an international symposium on the theme: "The Third Reich and Europe." In attendance were leading experts in contemporary history from nine countries—the German Federal Republic, France, Great Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, Austria and the United States. (Professors C. V. Easum, Franklin Ford, and C. G. Haines were the Americans present.)

The sessions were spread over four days. On the first and last days there were formal lectures by two German professors of the older generation—Theodor Eschenburg of Tübingen and Theodor Litt of Bonn. The core of the program came on the other two days, with papers by G. Castellan (Paris) and Th. Vogelsang (Munich) on the relations of the military and political leadership in totalitarian states; by E. Anchieri (Institute of Political Science, Padua) and J. B. Duroselle (Paris) on the impact of Nazism on the foreign policies of other states before 1939; and by J. Joll (Oxford), P. Kluge (Munich), L. de Jong (Amsterdam) and J. Matl (Graz) on Nazi occupation policies, particularly in their relation to collaboration and resistance as historical problems. At each of these sessions, the set papers were followed by comments and discussion from the floor.

The proceedings (except for the concluding address by Professor Litt which has been printed elsewhere) have now been published in an attractive volume. Included are not only the formal papers, but the tape-recorded extemporaneous comments of the participants as well. Naturally, not everything spoken on the spur of the moment bears the mark of deathlessness, and some of the participants, seeing their words in cold print, must be wondering why they said anything at all. Still, it was a wise decision to print the informal discussion, because it not only conveys the atmosphere of the gathering and adds to the readability and interest of the volume, but includes some of the most valuable substance as well.

One does not look to a volume of this sort for a consistent development of a particular theme or for the first results of original research. One looks for a focusing on what is problematical and debatable, and if issues are sharply drawn, so much the better. Consequently in turning to this book, the first question which one asks is: What do a group of historians, drawn from the countries west of the Iron Curtain, and presumably representing the various points of view now current in the West, argue about when they consider Europe in the days of Hitler? To some degree, it must be confessed, they debate some rather hackneyed questions in a fairly hackneyed way. Was the Reichswehr political or non-political? Did Neville Chamberlain want to divert Hitler eastward? This familiar ground was gone over again once more without turning up anything very remarkable.

The problem of collaboration however, was a different matter. The subject was introduced by James Joll who undertook to present, in a sympathetic way, the conclusions reached by the revisionist historians of Vichy. In general, Joll's analysis pointed to the conclusion that *attentisme*—i.e., the policy of playing for time without making irrevocable commitments to either side—not collaboration, was the policy of Vichy. This ignited the Gallic fire of Henri Michel, historian of the Resistance and editor of the *Revue d'histoire de la deuxième guerre mondiale*, who biting rejected any fine distinctions which tended to obscure the—in his

mind—firmly grounded fact that unadulterated collaboration had been at various times the policy of Vichy.

This discussion was carried a long step forward in the paper by L. de Jong. Taking the tension between resistance and collaboration as his theme, Professor de Jong's paper was notable for its exceptional mastery of the relevant material and for its subtlety of analysis. Very interesting also, although on an entirely different plane, was the contribution of Josef Matl, who holds the chair of Slavic studies and European History at Graz University. Professor Matl discussed the problem of the resistance in the Balkans from the point of view of an expert who served during the war as a German intelligence officer in Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Albania and who only regrets that men like Neubacher and Glaise-Horstenau had not been able to set the line of Nazi Balkan policy.

Matl's was a lonely voice in this gathering, however. In fact, one of the striking impressions left by the volume is the freshness of view and the critical judgment with which precisely the German historians examine their recent history. In this respect the contributions to this symposium of the men associated with the Institut für Zeitgeschichte and its publication, the *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte*—Kluke, Krausnick, Vogelsang and Eschenburg—stand out particularly.

Washington, D. C.

PAUL R. SWEET

Gutachten des Instituts für Zeitgeschichte. Institut für Zeitgeschichte. München: Im Selbstverlag des Instituts für Zeitgeschichte, 1958. Pp. 439. DM 19.80.

Historians who know the uniform excellence of the *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* will welcome this collection of 69 expert opinions on National Socialism by such well known contributors as Hans Buchheim, Martin Broszat and Helmut Heiber. The *Institut für Zeitgeschichte* in Munich has as part of its official duties, the preparation of just such *Gutachten* as these for the use of German courts and other decision-making authorities involved in restitution or pension cases arising out of the Nazi era.

Both in breadth of coverage and depth of insight this book comes up to the levels we have come to expect of the studies published as *Veröffentlichungen des Instituts für Zeitgeschichte*. Naturally, it is impossible in the short scope of even the longer opinions (40-80 pages) to achieve the perspectives and the literary excellence demonstrated in some of the individual studies published by the Institute, but even a medium length opinion such as Buchheim's "War die katholische Kirche eine vom nationalsozialistischen Regime verfolgte Organisation?" contains pithy and significant historical judgments. On the whole, the opinions of five pages and over are more satisfying to scholarly readers than the all-too-numerous two page entries, which provide at best reference-book material (e.g. "Die Sonderstellung der Juden in Oberschlesien zwischen 1933 und 1937").

The work is divided into ten sections: general persecution, Jewish persecution in Germany, Jewish persecution abroad, offices and organizations of the Third Reich, police, NSDAP, paramilitary organizations, non-National Socialist organizations, Poles, and German borderlands—ethnic German organizations. Among the underlying legal and historical questions discussed are the inclusiveness of persecution in respect to types of organization and person, the character of the persecutions, the legal position of various persecuting and prosecuting agencies of Party and state, the technical meaning of specific Nazi expressions like *Sonderbehandlung* and *Schulungshaft*, the central rôle of the Führer, the leading rôle of the Nazi Party and of the SS (*Schutzstaffel*), German responsibility for antisemitic persecution in Rumania, Hungary and Slovakia, and the uses to which ethnic German organiza-

tions were put before and after 1939. The opinions are thoroughly footnoted, with very little dependence on secondary material. Besides the widespread use of Nüremberg documents and testimony not in the printed collections, the notes contain numerous references to material in the Institute's archives.

Two areas of profound interest emerge from the welter of legalistic detail: the permanently revolutionary process of National Socialism and the techniques employed by Germany's satellites to maintain some independence while securing advantages from German protection. Hans Buchheim makes the largest contribution in the first area, not only in pages (185), but also in substance. Neither the destruction of the state apparatus nor the evolution of a dualism of state and Party is National Socialist; the Party was to become (and to a large extent did) what the Catholic Church of medieval Europe claimed to be *vis-à-vis* the state: the soul and the conscience of society. Thus, no equilibrium of Party and state or even Party and German society was thinkable. Hitler, Bormann, Heydrich and Goebbels embody this doctrine. The rôle of ideology appears now in a slightly different light; ideology is not "merely" a weapon of conquest: it is the current expression of some German *task* such as expansion, "solution of the Jewish question," or autarky. Heydrich's and Himmler's SS was to form both a diabolical Holy Inquisition and a Society of Jesus, to purify the Party as well as the state and society.

It is mainly to Martin Broszat that we owe new intensive insights into the workings of the ill-termed "puppet" governments of satellite Rumania, Hungary and Slovakia. In 120 pages of solid, yet extremely interesting narrative, Broszat indicates how much wily politicians like Antonescu, Horthy and Durčanský could accomplish in the interests of their own people even in the face of German tanks. Their antisemitism was in direct proportion to German pressures, and even Jews often owed their lives to the skillful bartering carried on by dictators for whom the often-employed term fascist does not seem to apply as well as it does to Hitler. A reevaluation of these régimes, particularly in comparison to each other, is one of the tasks Dr. Broszat has set for us. Needless to say, neither Broszat nor Buchheim, or any of the other contributors makes any effort to wipe away the guilt of collaborators with Hitler and his revolutionary cohorts. But the impersonality of scientific inquiry and a spirit of wanting to see justice done combine in these *Gutachten* to form a tribute to the new Germany.

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ROBERT KOEHL

DAVISON, W. PHILLIPS, *The Berlin Blockade: A Study in Cold War Politics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958. Pp. xiv, 423. \$7.50.

From the Soviet point of view, the blockade of Berlin, which was in full force just ten years ago, must have looked like an operation that could not fail. Against determined blockade by land the position of the Western Allies in Berlin was, on the face of it, untenable. The Soviet Government not unnaturally concluded (so it has been surmised) that it could force the Allies either to abandon plans for the economic recovery and political union of West Germany, or to get out of Berlin altogether, leaving it in the Soviet sphere.

The story of the spectacular Soviet failure to achieve either of these purposes is the subject of the pioneering work which has now been published by Phillips Davison. Perhaps Mr. Davison would object to the word "story," for he is a social scientist by training and mindful of his analytical responsibilities. Be that as it may, the book (except for the last two chapters) may be described as "straight history," and it is none the worse for that, for among its outstanding qualities are its clear

chronological framework and the orderly economy with which tangled narrative problems are handled.

Following two introductory chapters, which skillfully survey the history of Germany and of Berlin in the period 1945-1948, the remainder of the volume is focused on the period of the blockade itself (June 1948-May 1949). In the last two chapters, "Why Berliners Resisted" and "Public Opinion and Political Decision," the methods of contemporary social science and of public opinion research are given their fling.

Since the account of the international negotiations is based chiefly on the memoirs of American participants and on a few *ad hoc* official publications of diplomatic papers, it obviously has its limitations in any definitive sense. On the other hand, by extensively using newspapers as well as various surveys and samplings of German public opinion, the author has been able to present a picture of the atmosphere of propaganda in which negotiations were taking place which would have been difficult to achieve within the framework of conventional diplomatic history. It should be remarked that there is no straining for effect, and there is no need for it, since the drama is intrinsic in the story.

Among Davison's notable conclusions are the following:

Truman, Clay, and Ernst Reuter made the decisions upon which ultimate success depended while their advisers were still divided. If they had waited for agreed positions to be formulated by orderly staff procedures, it would probably have been too late.

Along with the technicians of the airlift the local political leadership in Berlin played the key rôle. In taking a firm stand against concessions to the Russians, the Berlin leaders showed the way to the Berlin rank and file and to the Allied leaders. In a similar fashion the Allied leaders in Berlin, and particularly General Clay, showed the way to their political superiors at home.

In West Germany, too, the political leadership was ahead of public opinion. After the first enthusiasm wore off, the West German public, preoccupied with personal economic problems, tended to become apathetic toward the Berlin situation.

The Soviets did not use negotiations primarily for the purpose of solving difficulties by bargaining, but as occasions for propaganda. Western negotiators were frequently at a disadvantage because of the, perhaps partly unconscious, assumption that agreement on something should emerge from every negotiation.

The volume is one of the RAND Corporation studies produced under a program sponsored by the U. S. Air Force. It is admirably put together in the technical sense.

Washington, D. C.

PAUL R. SWEET

Collectivization of Agriculture in Eastern Europe, Irwin T. Sanders, Editor. Louisville: Univ. of Kentucky Press, 1958. Pp. 214. \$5.00.

In 1955, the Ford Foundation financed a Conference on Collectivization of Agriculture in Eastern Europe at the University of Kentucky. The reviewed book presents the proceedings of this conference.

In Chapter 1, the broad historical setting of Eastern Europe in World Affairs is established. This, as far as the reviewer is concerned, is by far the most valuable contribution. In it, Prof. E. O. Kraehe, an eminent specialist in nineteenth-century German history, reviews the complex and explosive diversities of the area.

Native Americans are conditioned by the "melting pot" philosophy of getting along with people of different national extraction. They cannot understand the

"rationale" behind the inherent animosities that exist between East European national and religious groups. These people will appreciate Kraehe's fascinating tableau of who-hates-whom. The U. S. State Department should put it into a pocket size reference chart and give it to official emissaries being sent to Eastern Europe.

In Chapter 2, Prof. I. T. Sanders, the editor of this volume, who also teaches Sociology at the University of Kentucky and who has done much work on the Balkan peasantry, analyzes three major attributes that distinguish a peasant society from a modern American farm community (soil rootedness, family centeredness, village orientation). This discussion is supplemented by an excellent appendix on *Peasantism* by Prof. R. E. Wakeley, a sociologist from Iowa State College. On one single page, Wakeley succeeds in enumerating some of the "mysterious" intangibles that mold a peasant's overall attitude.

In Chapter 3, Philip E. Mosely from the Council on Foreign Relations explains how collectivization of agriculture fits into the overall strategy of Communism. He points out that Marx and many of his followers, including the Mensheviks in Russia, never thought of collectivization of agriculture as a necessary means for carrying out the revolution. In fact, Marx was sure that only highly industrialized countries, such as Germany and England, would be the first ones to go Communist. The Bolsheviks disagreed. Thus, Lenin's major departure from Marx was his theory that in areas lacking a large industrial proletariat the peasantry could well serve as the basis for a mass revolutionary movement. This doctrine has led the Communists to attach the utmost importance to agrarian areas.

Having established the philosophical and socio-political setting, we move to the core of the book. Chapters 4 through 7 contain discussions about collectivization in the satellites. Nicholas Spulber, Professor of Economics at the University of Indiana and author of the recently published monumental volume, *The Economics of Communist East Europe*, presents a good discussion of the Hungarian and Rumanian situation. Prof. Jozo Tomasevich from San Francisco State College deals with Yugoslavia. Branko Peselj, from the Mid-European Studies Center, contributes a general feature on Mechanization of Agriculture in the Balkans.

A discussion of the East German situation is conspicuously absent. This is a most unfortunate omission. Albania is taken care of in a page and a half because information is hard to come by, and because "peculiarities of topography and native socio-economic organization . . . [would make] . . . comparison with the remainder of the Soviet bloc . . . unsafe." (p. 97)

The essay on Poland and Czechoslovakia was written by Ernest Koenig, Economist with the U. S. Department of Agriculture. His is a most stimulating piece of analytical work. Koenig accepts the thesis that collectivization has been adopted primarily because such a form of farm enterprise makes it easier for the government to control and collect agricultural surpluses needed for economic development. In other words, this way peasants can be forced to finance most of rapid industrialization.

A parallel thesis concerns the economies of scale in agriculture. Postwar land reforms have split up many large estates into inefficient small farms. As far as the Communists are concerned, the necessary land consolidation can only be done by means of collectivization. Koenig maintains that, in the long run, this institution can only be justified if losses in production arising during the formative period can be compensated for by later, superior achievements. He shows that this has so far not been the case, since, with the possible exception of grain production, the material achievements of collectives have fallen short of those of private farmers. Thus,

collectivization has "contributed neither to agricultural progress nor to the well-being of the peasantry . . . the social effort and labor devoted to this enterprise appear largely wasted." (p. 120)

Koenig's analysis is good as far as it goes; but it does not go far enough. Figures showing stagnation of the aggregate agricultural production should have been matched with statistics on output per unit of labor. This, I believe, would have shown increases in labor productivity. With the tremendous exodus of youth from agriculture it could hardly be otherwise. So that, if one considers the contribution made by satellite agriculture to the industrial labor force, collectivization would probably no longer look like a miserable failure. In fact, in terms of year-to-year increases in the Gross National Product, satellite economies are not doing so badly. The net capital investment, expressed as a percentage of G.N.P. is impressive. With a higher rate of growth, it is merely a question of time before Russia and her satellites catch up with the West.

This possibility has not even been acknowledged. True, E. O. Stillman, in writing about Bulgaria, reluctantly gives the Red régimes a backhanded compliment. He admits that somehow or other, "Communist society . . . for all its massive strains and tensions . . . is extraordinarily stable. It has survived in the Soviet Union for 38 years, surmounting ordeals which led its warmest admirers, as well as critics to prophesy imminent dissolution. The postwar history of Eastern Europe is remarkable less for the chronic malfunctioning of the system imposed by the Soviets than for the ability of the satellite régimes to maintain their rule over sullen and hostile populations for better than ten years."

The above theme, buried obscurely on page 87, should have been carried as a motto of each and every chapter. It would have helped to offset the adverse evidence. In other words, we can no longer afford to pretend that the Soviet system will fall apart of its own weight, just because the performance of agriculture and other sectors of socialized economies do not measure up to Western concepts of "efficiency." Sputnik has taught the West that Communists get results, their means notwithstanding.

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FRANK MEISSNER

DJILAS, MILOVAN, *Land Without Justice*, Introduction and Notes by William Jovanovich. New York: Harcourt Brace, 1958. Pp. xvi, 365. \$5.75.

Milovan Djilas is a Montenegrin, the son of an army officer, and according to his own statement he was won over to Communism in his seventh year. He wrote this book, as well as the better known analysis of Communist élites, *The New Class*, during the two years between his first trial, in January 1955, and his imprisonment after a second trial, in December 1956. It purports to be an account of his life and education in Montenegro until he left home at the age of eighteen to attend the University of Belgrade, but it bears little resemblance to a formal autobiography. *Land Without Justice* is in essence a loosely organized collection of reminiscences: childish recollections of World War I, tales of his family, present and past (one of his ancestors was an outlaw whose murder started a blood-feud), boyhood friends and enemies. He devotes a chapter to his adolescent love-affairs, although elsewhere he speaks approvingly of austere Montenegrin reserve. Some of these subjects are discussed in rather disconcerting detail; for example, he devotes some fifty pages to character sketches of his school teachers in Kolašin and Berane. Before finishing the book the reader may feel that he is being subjected to interminable story-telling by a man with too much time on his hands.

Djilas evidently believes that he himself is both a philosopher and a poet; many chapters of this book are concluded by assertions or rhetorical questions

which he apparently considers significant, if not profound. Here are some examples: "Man is not simple, even when he is of one piece. That piece has many corners and sides." "A man can fight everything except his own times." "Man is born only once and in one place. There is only one homeland." Many of these philosophic interjections seem trite, superficial or by no means self-evident. His strenuous attempts at poetic imagery often seem to be that and nothing more, although here, of course, the quality of the translation becomes a factor; in this connection it would be interesting to know whether Djilas actually wrote "Chetnik warlords," as the translation has it, or referred to Austria-Hungary as an "omnipotent empire," even as viewed through the eyes of an Austrian officer.

In the course of analyzing his own character Djilas tells us how he made his choice of basic values for life in the following passage: "It seems impossible in life to have something both useful and beautiful. So men are divided. Some are for the useful, some for the beautiful. I placed myself on the side of beauty." These are strange words from Tito's longtime henchman and former vice-president of Yugoslavia; Djilas asks us to believe that far from being a materialist, or even a utilitarian, he is an idealist at heart, who turned to Communism only in protest against injustice and, presumably, in search of beauty; nor was he disillusioned until he had served Tito and Moscow as a ruthless party activist for twenty years.

He is less vulnerable when dealing with Montenegro itself, of which he writes with love and understanding; he is not blinded by sentimentality when he calls his home a "savage land," where only "cleverness, heroism and sacrifice were recognized as virtues," or lists three great Montenegrin qualities as "bravery, loquacity and hospitality;" and he is perfectly frank in his description of yet another traditional Montenegrin characteristic: ferocity.

In view of Djilas' historic importance it is perhaps inevitable that this collection of anecdotes and opinions should be something of a disappointment, for the events which made him a world-figure were still to come, and those events cannot but interest us more than the adventures of a little boy in Montenegro long ago. Subsequent installments of this autobiography, should they appear, will almost certainly be of more value to us.

Dartmouth College

JOHN CLINTON ADAMS

SHORTER NOTICES

BUBER-NEUMANN, MARGARETE, *Von Potsdam nach Moskau. Stationen eines Irrweges*. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1957. Pp. 480.

Margarete Neumann is known to American readers for her moving book *Under Two Dictators*, published in 1949, which told of her experiences in the concentration camps of the Soviet Union and of Nazi Germany. The present book is an autobiographical account that takes us back to her childhood and youth, to her short-lived marriage to the son of Martin Buber (hence the reason for her hyphenated name), but which deals mainly with her life with Heinz Neumann, one of the leaders of the German Communist Party, in Weimar Germany and in the USSR up to the time Neumann was purged by Stalin in 1937.

The history of the record of the German Communist Party still remains to be written, and a sordid record it will no doubt prove to be. The present work will be of value to the future historian of the KPD not for its revelations of a political nature, nor for its acute analyses of party politics, but rather for some of the human-interest aspects of the KPD leadership during the Weimar period. This is not the work of a penitent ex-Communist like Ignazio Silone. For the author the villain is not the Communist movement but the devil, Stalin, and so-called Stalinism.

Margarete Neuman begins her account with an interesting picture of the German youth movement, with its protests, is naturalism, paganism, nationalism and mysticism. It is absorbing to watch how she drifts into the Communist Party without any ideological background or motivation. In her attempt to explain why German intellectuals were attracted towards Communism she cites the alleged flaws of democracy, the fight against fascism, but above all the "failure of the S.P.D." There are interesting and human pen portraits of the every-day life of the KPD leaders Heinz Neumann, Willi Muenzenberg, Leo Flieg, Walter Ulbricht and Ernst Thälmann, with an especially long section as a sort of apologia for Heinz Neumann. Madame Neumann substantiates the now accepted thesis that it was Stalin's deliberate policy to keep the German Communists from possible successful revolution because he held it would be against the national interests of the Soviet Union. She recounts a conversation between Stalin and Neumann in 1931 in which Stalin asked: "Don't you believe, Neumann, that if the Nationalists should come to power in Germany, they would be so taken up with the West that we could build socialism in peace?" (p. 284) Manuilsky is quoted directly to substantiate the same facts.

The most dramatic and absorbing section of the book is the last part, in which she presents a lively portrayal of the life of visiting Communist functionaries from abroad in the Soviet Union. The most moving passages describe how the noose is drawn around Heinz Neumann, how his entire life and security, even outside the USSR, come to depend on the good will of the Comintern in Moscow, how his former friends and comrades move away from him as he falls "into disgrace," and how he and his wife can do nothing but sit in their hotel room in Moscow and wait—for the moment that finally comes during the night of April 26, 1937 when three NKVD officers appear at their door with the words: "Neumann, get up, you are under arrest."

Queens College

KOPPEL S. PINSON

LERSKI, JERZY JAN, *A Polish Chapter in Jacksonian America: The United States and the Polish Exiles of 1831*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1958. Pp. xi, 242. \$5.00.

The saddest thing for a scholar, as he sees his life drawing to a close, is to scan the new generation coming on and find no one rising to carry forward his work. When Mieczysław Haiman passed from the active scene a few years back, we may well imagine him doing so with just this feeling of regret, for then it seemed as if no one, at least no one from his own American Polonia, was waiting to go on with

the task he had so long devoted his life to—that of revealing the Polish strain in our national American life and culture.

Now it is apparent that any regret Mr. Haiman may have felt when he laid down the tools of scholarship was unfounded, as within our universities we see a whole generation arising, dedicated to the exploration of that "Polish Chapter" in our history of which Dr. Lerski gives us a small sampling in the work noted above. One of the new generation is Dr. Joseph Wytrwał of Detroit, and he is typical, doing his work with sobriety and detachment, displaying little of that understandable but somewhat offensive piety which marked all too often the work of some of Mr. Haiman's contemporaries, if not his own.

Lerski does not, of course, come from that American Polonia of which Wytrwał is a product, and so we as a nation cannot take credit for him, nor for the scholarly way in which he has gone at his task, and the quietness and fairness of his judgments. As a Pole from Poland, European rooted and trained, with none of the touchiness that so often characterizes the American of Polish origin in the field of Polonica-Americana, he has given us the story of a band of exiles who came to our shores in the wake of the November Uprising of 1830, as nearly "as it really happened" as is possible. He has used every scrap of source material there is, and has erected on a solid foundation a most fascinating edifice and an absorbing story.

The first work on Polish literature written by a native of Poland on American soil, and published here, was the slim, pathetic little *Remembrances of a Polish Exile* by Antoni August Jakubowski, written in Albany, New York, and published with the aid of a distinguished Presbyterian divine, the reverend William Buell Sprague, in 1835. The author of the *Remembrances* is perhaps the most attractive figure of all those occupying a place in Lerski's work, and the only one whose memory has grown ever more fragrant with the years. Most of the exiles, if they wrote, did so in bitterness, or to plead the cause of Poland politically. Jakubowski was beyond bitterness, and his plea was for interest in Poland's literary and spiritual heritage. Major Józef Hordyński, the very earliest of the exiles to arrive, having landed in Boston on November 7, 1831, is a case on the other side. His *History of the Late Polish Revolution* is all but forgotten, and mention of him evokes no pleasure, as does that of Jakubowski.

The largest installment of the exile company to reach here came in 1834, from Trieste, with Jakubowski one of their number. In all, 300 victims of the storm arrived, and to follow their fate is to trace a pattern that has become classic in the annals of our country. First there was the period of the "gold in the streets" hope, the "gold" in this case consisting of a parcel of land promised for colonization in Illinois. Following this, there was the period of slow awakening, in which the exiles were gradually brought to realize that they, and their fate, were far, far from being the main problem and concern of the American nation. Both in Paris and here, American sympathy was great, and vocal, but there was daily life to be lived; and the exiles soon discovered that their hosts, far from ever dreaming of adjusting themselves to European ways and prejudices, expected the Europeans to adjust to theirs. Each wave of arrivals on our shores has had to learn this bitter truth: that Europe was past, and a continent was to be conquered here, a continent that was the future.

Dr. Lerski has told the story of the slow attrition that set in, and of the falling apart of the exile band, the gradual drifting away, with each individual having to find his own level, and told it so well, with such complete truth based on one hundred per cent documentation, that his small work may be considered a model in its field.

Alliance College

MARION MOORE COLEMAN

JUVA, EINAR W., *P. E. Svinhufvud. 1861-1917*. Helsinki: Söderström, 1957. Pp. 520

This is the first of a projected two-volume biography of a leading Finnish

statesman, written for the Svinhufvud Memorial Foundation by a distinguished historian. Inasmuch as the Svinhufvud archives were destroyed, Professor Juva has been compelled to rely largely on Svinhufvud's published memoirs and the biographical studies of Erkki Räikkönen and others. Useful, too, has been the recently published account of the Finnish Diet during the years 1907-1916 by Uuno Tuominen (Volume 5 in the History of the Finnish Diet: *Autonomian ajan yksikamarinen eduskunta, 1906-1916*). The paucity of personal records has resulted, as Juva himself admits, in an incomplete picture of Svinhufvud's childhood and student days.

Svinhufvud's career to 1917 is summed up in the poet Eino Leino's characterization of him as "the guardian of the law." Born into a noble family in 1861, Svinhufvud studied history and law at the University of Helsinki, and commenced his legal career at Turku in 1888 as a minor court official. He abstained from politics until he, along with a score of other jurists, was removed from office in 1902-03 for refusing to sanction illegal Russian decrees. Even before his removal he had made his position clear to a friend: "If the question should arise concerning the stand our judges ought to take with respect to those post-1899 decrees which have violated our constitution, my opinion is that the judges must remain faithful to their oath of office, follow only the constitution of the country . . . and refuse to obey anti-constitutional measures." (p. 186)

Svinhufvud then went to Helsinki to practice law and there became more closely identified with the resistance against Russian oppression. With the short-lived restoration of freedom in 1905, Svinhufvud resumed his judicial career, serving in several large rural districts where he won a reputation as a learned and fair, if somewhat patriarchal judge. Väinö Tanner, who studied in Svinhufvud's court, recalled that "one could rely on the judgments he rendered, for they always revealed his conscientious sense of fair play." (p. 465) Equally distinguished was Svinhufvud's contribution to the new unicameral diet which he had helped to create in 1906; nine consecutive times, from 1907 to 1912, he was elected its chairman. He not only established important precedents for his successors in the office, but used it repeatedly as a forum to speak out against the resumption and intensification of Russian illegality.

Svinhufvud's uncompromising stand finally forced the Russian governor-general to order his arrest in November 1914. He was exiled to Siberia, where he remained until the outbreak of the Russian revolution. The present volume closes with his triumphal return to Finland in March 1917.

If in this account the subject sometimes seems to get lost in the welter of complex political and legal developments, it is nonetheless a first rate contribution to Finnish history during the Russification era. One looks forward with real anticipation to the concluding volume, scheduled for publication in 1961.

Heidelberg College

JOHN L. KOLEHMAINEN

GOLAY, JOHN FORD, *The Founding of the Federal Republic of Germany*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958. Pp. xii, 299. \$5.00.

To what extent is the constitution of Western Germany an adequate defense against the rise of a new Hitler? How much influence did the occupation powers exert on its formation, and was this influence helpful or harmful? These are the major questions Mr. Golay, Dean of Faculties at Roosevelt University, undertakes to answer. In spite of the title of his work—which may not have been entirely of the author's choosing—it is less a full-scale historical study of the establishment of the new Republic than a careful analysis of the formation of its constitution, technically known as its Basic Law.

A short description of the conditions which led to the decision to draft the document is followed by successive chapters on the federal structure of the new state, its executive arm, its electoral law, and the basic rights guaranteed its citizenry. The work concludes with a short tribute to the political maturity of the

German people, as the author sees it, and appendices giving the English text of the 146-article constitution and biographical sketches of the leading figures in the Parliamentary Council which adopted it.

As a former Deputy American Secretary of the Allied Secretariat in Berlin and later the Secretary-General of the Allied High Commission in Bonn the author has first-hand, detailed and intimate knowledge of most of the events of which he writes. He has also searched the available literature and given us a thorough, workmanlike treatment of his topic. The chapter on federalism, by far the longest of the five, makes a very good case for the concluding verdict: "The federal order of the Basic Law, as it finally took form, is essentially a German construction. . . . The Allied influence on the Basic Law was comparatively slight." (p. 108) In this section the author also clearly indicates that the policy of the occupation authorities in pressing the drafters of the German document to accept an American pattern of "vertical" federation (with duplicating powers and functions)—on the theory that decentralization of power made for democracy—was unwise and, in one instance, overzealously supported by General Clay. (p. 107) The later chapters persuasively expound the thesis that, while no constitution can be entirely proof against the rise of a dictator, in that respect the 1949 document is a distinct improvement over the Weimar Constitution produced by those who thought such a paper protection could be effective. (p. 137)

On one minor point a slight correction would seem to be in order. In discussing the hotly-contested question of "parents' rights" to have confessional schools made available for their children the author implies (p. 197) that the non-denominational type of elementary school was the usual one in many parts of the country. It is true that opinion on this question shifted markedly after 1933, so that denominational schools were not reestablished after the collapse of the Nazi régime. But in 1931 four-fifths of all publicly-supported elementary schools in Germany were under denominational control. The effect of the 1949 Basic Law was therefore to confirm and perpetuate a notable departure from earlier practice in this area. Occasionally, too, the reader may have difficulty in following the main lines of development in a necessarily involved story. But such small imperfections are much more than balanced by the really excellent treatment of the complicated questions of federalism and of the general issue of basic rights.

Washington, D. C.

MARSHALL KNAPPEN

KOEHL, ROBERT L., *RKFDV: German Resettlement and Population Policy 1939-1945. A History of the Reich Commission for the Strengthening of German-dom*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1957. Pp. 263. \$6.50.

Professor Koehl acknowledges in the preface to this twenty-sixth publication of the Harvard Historical Monographs that his study is in more than one respect a sequel to this reviewer's *European Population Transfers: 1939-1945*, published in 1946, and to the late Eugene Kulisher's *Europe on the Move*, which appeared in 1948. It is devoted to a specific and significant aspect of the momentous movement of population inaugurated in 1939 by Hitler's Third Reich: to the aims, structure and activities of the *Reichskommissariat für die Festigung des deutschen Volkstums* (RKFDV), headed by Heinrich Himmler. The preface rightly stresses that "neither Schechtman nor Kulisher places much emphasis upon the peculiarly National Socialist character of the organization which the Germans created and entrusted with the task of 'fighting the biological war of population on Germany's frontiers,' nor were Schechtman and Kulisher able to make use of the Nüremberg [trials] materials now available." Professor Koehl therefore rightly believes that his study, which is an attempt to concentrate attention upon the German government agency responsible for waging "the biological war," "may be used to supplement and enrich the works of these writers."

The bulk of his research has been based on unpublished materials gathered for and used by the prosecution and defense at Nüremberg in the United States

Military Trials Numbers Eight and Eleven. These materials include numerous captured documents, some signed by the personal hand of Hitler or Himmler, and testimony, evidence, and statements by both victims and perpetrators of the Reich's population policy. Marshaling these first-hand sources with skill, understanding and purpose, Professor Koehl presents a broad and fascinating picture of the sinister machinery and the men behind it, which were entrusted with the implementation of the Hitler-Himmler scheme of ruthless shifting of ethnic groups as a means toward erecting a continental empire. This scheme represented "a version of imperialism which combined very ancient patterns with ultramodern techniques." It collapsed pitifully in the wake of the general collapse of the Nazi régime in 1945.

Koehl describes in considerable detail the emergence, development, activities and progressive disintegration of the RKFDV. He himself is unnecessarily apologetic about the "complexities of the text" and the minute handling of the sample documentation. His monograph is not destined for an average lay leader, to whom such complexities would appear as an annoying obstacle, but for trained students of social and political processes, who will certainly appreciate both the abundance of sources and their conscientious and critical analysis. It is to the author's credit that his monograph is not limited to a dry description of the administrative buildup and actual functioning of the RKFDV, but gives a lucid and convincing ideological, political and personal background of this institution's evolution from "consolidation" (1939-1941) through "efflorescence" (1941-1942) to "withdrawal and rout" (1943-1945).

Koehl's study successfully fills a gap in the existing literature on the German transfer and resettlement policy.

New York City

JOSEPH B. SCHECHTMAN

THILENIUS, RICHARD, *Die Teilung Deutschlands. Eine zeitgeschichtliche Analyse.* Hamburg: Rowohlt Verlag, 1957. Pp. 195.

This paperback book is an original, written especially for Rowohlt's German Encyclopedia, a series edited by Professor Ernesto Grassi of the University of Munich and listing among its contributors such distinguished names as Robert Oppenheimer, David Riesman, Carl Burckhardt and Karl Loewith. The author, Richard Thilenius, was a minor civil servant during the Third Reich and assistant defense lawyer for von Neurath at Nuremberg. He now heads the Bonn Bureau of the *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, a leading German daily.

The book is, though highly condensed and packed full of facts, very well written and reads easily. Considering that the subject is so loaded with emotion and so close, in time and "space," one cannot but pay respect to the objectivity with which the story is presented. Only very rarely will even a highly critical reader take exception to a statement or an interpretation by the author. It is also reassuring that the book, while dealing mainly with the period from 1945 to 1950, has a lengthy first chapter (40 pages, more than one-fifth of the book) which discusses Hitler's plans and actions concerning a New Order for Europe. Contrary to many of his fellow-citizens, Thilenius is aware and asserts that "the real history of the division of Germany does not begin in 1946, or in 1941, when in the camp of the Allies for the first time serious considerations were given to the future policy toward Germany, but on March 15, 1939." (p. 9) He also wants his readers to remember that already in 1937 Hitler emphasized the idea of a mass expulsion of human beings (two million from Czechoslovakia, one million from Austria). This first chapter concludes: "The whole burden of responsibility for having helped this monster (Hitler) to gain power over Europe rests on the German people. Only against this background, the background of what was, in the name of Germany, inflicted upon Europe or was in store for her, will we be able to see in the right perspective what has happened to us." (p. 46)

The most useful parts of the book, aside from the first chapter, are the dis-

cussion of the Saar Question and of the thorny reparations problem. Important in the author's general treatment is the emphasis that the division of Germany into zones of occupation was not intended as a preliminary step for the eventual political division of Germany. The author takes a remarkably realistic political attitude with respect to the future of the Eastern boundaries of Germany. "Only the fate of the region west of the Oder and the boundary of upper Silesia is open for negotiation. For the Western powers have never even hinted at an approval of the cession of this area." (p. 79)

In the otherwise very satisfactory bibliography the two important American documentary collections, *Occupation of Germany, Policy and Progress, 1945-46*, and *Germany 1947-49: The Story in Documents* (Washington, D. C., 1950) should not have been omitted.

Thilenius states that he wrote this book not merely to spread factual knowledge but also to further critical judgment, as the indispensable precondition for successful political action toward ending the division of Germany. He has succeeded admirably in writing a factually correct and politically responsible treatise.

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HUNGARY AND HUNGARIAN EXILES: LAWS AND POLICIES*

by George Ginsburgs

WITH the defeat of the Axis powers in World War II the principal single cause of refugees and displaced persons was eliminated, although the consequences of the racial and economic policies of Nazi Germany and its allies continued to persist long after the final victory of the United Nations. The problem of refugees had already become a serious one after World War I, and the Second World War saw it assume the proportions of a major international disaster. Long after 1945 hundreds of refugee and D.P. camps throughout Europe still offered shelter and asylum to thousands of uprooted individuals whose personal legal status was often very dubious and whose national allegiance was generally very questionable. Gradually the character of this populace in exile changed. The majority of the refugees and displaced persons of World War II origin were repatriated or resettled, only to be replaced by a new wave of fugitives streaming from behind the Iron Curtain. The new exodus was of markedly different composition from the one it supplanted and its members came under a different set of international and domestic laws.

All the states absorbed into the Soviet system have contributed to peopling the refugee camps of Western Europe; all the satellite governments have adopted very similar political and legal counter-measures to combat the problem of fleeing dissidents. The choice of Hungary as the subject of this study is not meant to single it out as in any way an exceptional case in the general policy of the Soviet satellites towards refugees from their territory. On the contrary, it is believed that the pattern of behavior of the Hungarian Government may be viewed as typical of the other Iron Curtain régimes, while still presenting certain distinctive features which set it apart from the others. In particular the present choice was motivated by the two

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following considerations: 1) from the very beginning of the postwar period Hungary was noteworthy in that it "provided one of the largest quotas of displaced persons in proportion to its population";¹ and, 2) the recent revolutionary eruption in Hungary provoked a new mass exodus from the country, bringing the ever-smoldering problem again into acute and tragic actuality.

Three major periods must be distinguished in the official policy of the postwar Hungarian Government towards refugees and displaced persons of Hungarian origin. The first phase covers the years up to 1948, the second lasts from 1948 until the events of October 1956, and the final one from October 1956 until the present day. The three vary considerably and must be analyzed separately.

First Phase

The period prior to 1948 preceded the adoption of the comprehensive Citizenship Act LX of December 24, 1948. These were the years of piecemeal legislation of a frankly pragmatic and experimental nature designed to deal as rapidly as possible with the multiple and often considerably confused problems posed by the widely differing types of Hungarian exiles found abroad at the close of military hostilities. Originally drafted by the first postwar governments of Hungary as democratically inspired measures intended to implement the United Nations' order to purge the country of its former fascist rulers and to punish its leading war criminals, these legislative steps were gradually, particularly after 1947, infused with a narrower political content. The growing influence of the Communist faction in the Government soon imbued them with a character essentially identical in substance, purpose and ideological inspiration with the early citizenship policies of the Bolshevik régime in Soviet Russia,² thus effectively harnessing them to the Party's plans to maximize its control and eliminate the opposition.³

At the end of the war the great bulk of Hungarians abroad was concentrated in Germany and Austria where their numbers were estimated at between 800,000 and 1,000,000,⁴ with a sprinkling of them in other countries as well. Besides a group of students and workers who went to Germany and Austria well before the German defeat and who failed to qualify as refugees

¹J. Vernant, *The Refugee in the Post-War World* (New Haven, 1953), p. 70.

²For the citizenship policies of the Soviet Government, see the author's "The Soviet Union and the Problem of Refugees and Displaced Persons, 1917-1956," *A.J.L.L.*, pp. 325-361 (1957).

³For an analysis of the citizenship problems of the postwar East European States by a Soviet jurist, see S. I. Rusinova, "Voprosy grazhdanstva v evropeiskikh stranakh narodnoi demokratiï," (Questions of citizenship in the European countries of the people's democracy), *Voprosy Sovetskogo Gosudarstva i Prava* (Problems of Soviet State and Law), 176-207 (Uchenye zapiski Leningradskogo Gosudarstvennogo Universiteta, No. 201, Leningrad, 1955).

⁴J. Vernant, *loc. cit.* According to some authors the number of Magyar refugees exceeded 1 million, e.g., J. Kosa, "A Century of Hungarian Emigration, 1850-1950," *The American Slavic and East European Review*, Vol. XVI, No. 4 (December, 1957), p. 512f.: "In the years from 1941 to 1950 more than 1,000,000 people were forced, in one way or another, to leave Hungary."

or deportees under standards of both domestic and international law,⁵ five main categories of uprooted individuals of Hungarian nationality could be distinguished among the exiles: 1) left-wing (Socialist and Communist) and democratic elements who were forced to leave Hungary after the collapse of the abortive Communist coup of 1919, the inauguration of the White Terror and the gradual drift of Horthy's dictatorship into fascism; 2) deportees and stateless refugees of the 1938-1944 period, mainly Jews denationalized by the racial laws; 3) members of the pro-Nazi government of Hungary and of militant pro-Nazi organizations who fled with the retreating German army; 4) expellees of Hungarian ethnic origin forced to leave the territory of Hungary's neighbors and expellees of non-Hungarian origin, but Hungarian citizenship, exchanged or expelled from Hungary; 5) anti-Communist, but not pro-Nazi, escapees from the advance of the Red Army and Soviet military occupation.

Each of these groups became the subject of widely differing international and national laws; each of them acquired a different legal status and suffered a different fate; each one of them must be approached and studied individually.

A. Group I:

In line with the obligations assumed by the Hungarian Government through the signing of the Armistice Agreement of January 20, 1945, the new régime took upon itself the responsibility for annulling within the shortest possible time the discriminatory legislation adopted by its wartime fascist predecessors. By virtue of Article V of the Armistice, it was agreed that:

The Government of Hungary will immediately release, regardless of citizenship and nationality, all persons held in confinement in connection with their activities in favor of the United Nations or because of their sympathies with the United Nations' cause or for racial or religious reasons, and will repeal all discriminatory legislation and disabilities arising therefrom. The Government of Hungary will take all the necessary measures to insure that all displaced persons and refugees within the limits of Hungarian territory, including Jews and stateless persons, are accorded at least the same measure of protection and security as its own nationals.⁶

In accordance with these terms the Hungarian Provisional Government issued, in February 1945, a decree "ordering the liberation of all anti-fascist prisoners in Hungary."⁷ Ordinance No. 9590, 1945, annulled the deprivation of citizenship in the case of persons penalized on account of their socialist opinion or activities.⁸

⁵Those of this group who were still in W. Europe at the time were, after 1948, almost all registered by I.R.O. as *bona fide* refugees.

⁶For the text of the Hungarian Armistice, signed in Moscow, Jan. 20, 1945, see *New York Times*, Jan. 22, 1945, p. 4.

⁷*Ibid.*, February 20, 1945, p. 4.

⁸United Nations, *A Study of Statelessness* (New York, August, 1949), p. 164.

As a result of these measures, those leftist and liberal elements that had had to flee from Hungary in order to escape persecution for their political beliefs and who had automatically lost their Hungarian citizenship through the operation of the provision of the Citizenship Act of 1879 depriving of Hungarian citizenship all Hungarian nationals absenting themselves from Hungary beyond a certain period, were enabled to return from exile and to seek reinstatement in their citizenship. This applied equally to the leaders and rank-and-file members of the various democratic and Socialist parties who had escaped to the West after the triumph of the pro-fascist forces in their homeland and to the colony of Hungarian Communists who had found political asylum in Moscow and who returned in the wake of the Red Army with plans for taking over the apparatus of government.

Most of the individuals belonging to this category appear to have found their way home shortly after the end of hostilities.⁹ Some, however, seem to have chosen to stay away from their motherland. It is they who seem to constitute the group of 1,600 non-Jewish Hungarians listed by IRO statistics for July 1, 1947, as *bona fide* refugees in receipt of international assistance.

B. Group II:

The second group of exiles comprised the deportees and individuals rendered stateless by wartime legislation, and whose fate the Hungarian Government also undertook to alleviate under the terms of the Armistice Agreement. A great majority of them, both among the refugees and displaced persons, were Hungarians of Jewish ethnic origin, whose Hungarian citizenship had been affected by the racially inspired laws of May 24, 1938, and May 3, 1939.¹⁰ A small number of them succeeded in escaping from the discriminatory practices prevalent in wartime Hungary into neutral countries.¹¹ Most of the others perished in the extermination camps, but a few survived and were found after the war in Germany and Austria where they had been deported by the Germans and latter-day Hungarian authorities. Out of the 9,600 Hungarian refugees accounted for in IRO statistics for July 1, 1947, 8,000 were Jews.¹²

In order to facilitate the solution of this problem, the Hungarian National Provisional Government of Col. Gen. Béla Miklós, in accordance

⁹Many of the democratic leaders who returned from the West were "eliminated from public life," some were later deported to the Soviet Union and a number became refugees once again after the Communist take-over of their homeland. See S. D. Kertesz, *Diplomacy in a Whirlpool* (Notre Dame, 1953), pp. 117-120.

¹⁰United Nations, *op. cit.* 142, n. 38.

¹¹E.g., J. P. C. Carey, "Some Aspects of Statelessness Since World War I," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. XL, No. 1 (February, 1946), p. 117, gives the number of 200 former Hungarians (Jews) in neutral Switzerland. Also see J. Kosa, *op. cit.*, p. 509: "By 1935 the rising tide of Nazism and anti-Semitism in Hungary induced many persons to leave the country. As a strange inconsistency, the same government which enacted the laws against the Jews did everything to block their emigration. In this respect the Hungarian government took a more severe stand than Germany itself. Because of the restrictions imposed by the authorities, there was no mass emigration of Jewish people but only a leakage. This leakage, though, continued until 1941, when the deportation of the Jews began."

¹²J. Vernant, *loc. cit.*

with the obligations assumed under the provisions of the Armistice Agreement, repealed all anti-Jewish laws passed by the former régimes. Radio Moscow quoted the order, decreed in March 1945, as declaring void all sentences passed under the anti-Jewish laws and demanding that "all persons sentenced or arrested under these laws must be freed."¹³

From the very beginning this category of persons was treated by the United Nations and the world at large in full accordance with international rules and agreements concerning *bona fide* refugees, both under UNRRA's and, later, IRO's terms of reference with regard to assistance to the victims of the Nazis.

C. Group III:

Just prior to the entry of the Soviet troops into Budapest in December 1944, Szálasi's "Arrow Cross" Government decreed the evacuation of the chief public services and various other administrative bodies, and there followed in their train a great number of civil servants, active members of the "Arrow Cross" Party, gendarmes and members of the "Levente" paramilitary organization. To these must be added troops belonging to the Hungarian army under the command of German officers who retreated with the German forces and were soon taken prisoner by the Allies, and numerous soldiers' families.¹⁴

Of all Hungarian exiles, individuals in this category were the least qualified for the status of refugees and displaced persons. International assistance was denied to them by UNRRA and, for a long time, by IRO too. For many years they were classified as ineligible for all forms of international material and legal aid. A considerable number of persons from this group were surrendered by Western authorities to the Hungarian Government in the immediate postwar years for punishment as war criminals and national traitors. Thus, in 1946, the United States military administration handed over as war criminals 200 persons, including two former ministers and certain generals.

Particularly harsh measures were enacted by the Budapest régime against individuals denounced by it as criminals of war, collaborators, Nazis and traitors. They were specifically barred from reentry into the country and from pardon under various amnesties proclaimed by the Government. As early as March 1945, it was reported by TASS that the Hungarian Minister of Agriculture, Imre Nagy, had announced that before October all estates and property belonging to "war criminals and enemies of the people" would be confiscated without compensation."¹⁵ Law VII/1946 authorized investigation and prosecution for crimes against the interests of the State and Republic, the recall of individuals from abroad in connection with such proceedings and the denationalization, under Laws X/1947 and

¹³*New York Times*, Mar. 28, 1945, p. 8.

¹⁴J. Vernant, *loc. cit.*; E. M. Kullischer, *Europe on the Move: War and Population Changes, 1917-1947* (New York, 1949), p. 272.

¹⁵*New York Times*, Mar. 18, 1945, p. 10.

XXVI/1948, of those who failed to obey the order to return, with confiscation of their property.

The label of war criminal, originally reserved for certain well specified elements, was soon extended by the Hungarian authorities to cover all persons opposed to the dominant Communist influence in Budapest. It gradually lost all meaning and was indiscriminately applied to all militant and anti-Communist Hungarians in exile as a term of opprobrium and a futile means for securing their surrender by the West. Contacts with exile organizations were proscribed and imputed as major crimes to the defendants in the various purge trials staged behind the Iron Curtain, including Hungary.¹⁶

With the worsening of East-West relations the remaining members of this category gradually were granted the status of internationally recognized refugees, with consequent assistance towards rehabilitation and resettlement. Apart from a few individual defections, repatriation has been rare from amongst the persons in this group.

D. Group IV:

a. *Expellees from Hungary*

At the Potsdam Conference (July 17-August 2, 1945) the representatives of the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union, among other decisions, also reached an agreement on the transfer of remaining German populations from Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary into Germany proper. The Allied Control Council for Germany, which was charged with the execution of the program, announced on November 20, 1945, a preliminary resettlement plan under which was to be effected in an orderly and humane manner the transfer of 500,000 Germans from Hungary and their resettlement in the four zones of Allied occupation. The transfer was scheduled to begin on December 1, 1945, and was to be completed before August 1946.

The plan was carried out, but only very slowly.¹⁷ By July 1946, 118,000 Germans were evicted from Hungary. The Hungarian Government blamed the United States military authorities in Western Germany for the delay, accusing them of deliberately hampering the transfer, and started to concentrate the ethnic German elements in special zones in Hungary in order

¹⁶See, *László Rajk and his accomplices before the People's Court* (Budapest, 1949), p. 73; *Tito-Fascist Kidnappers before the Court*, Budapest, Nov. 15-17, 1952 (Budapest, n.d.), p. 62.

¹⁷The initial delay appears to have been due to the strong opposition of the Hungarian Government to the whole expulsion scheme. For its views, see the Note Verbale of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry to the British and United States Political Missions in Budapest Concerning the Expulsion of the Germans from Hungary, Dec. 15, 1945, and the Note of the Hungarian Government to the British, Soviet and United States Governments Concerning the Expulsion of the Germans from Hungary, Dec. 1, 1945, *Hungary at the Peace Conference of Paris*, Vol. I (Budapest, 1947), p. 4f. Later, faced by the indifference of the Western Allies and the increasing pressure of the USSR exercised both directly and through the growing influence of the Hungarian Communists, the Budapest Government submitted to the plan. See, S. D. Kertész, "The Expulsion of the Germans from Hungary: A Study in Postwar Diplomacy," *Review of Politics*, 15, 179-208 (1953).

to provide room for Hungarians who were expected to come into the country by exchange of populations with neighboring Czechoslovakia. In July 1947, the Soviet Government permitted the transfer of 60,000 ethnic Germans from Hungary to the Russian zone of occupation in Germany.

In addition to their concentration in special relocation centers prior to expulsion the *Volksdeutsche* were gradually deprived of their remaining civil rights. In the August 1947 elections to the Hungarian Parliament, 170,000 so-called "Swabians" were excluded from the electoral registers pending expatriation. All in all, 178,000 Germans have been transferred from Hungary to Germany, not counting those fugitives who fled before the organized expulsion.¹⁸

Those who fled or were later expelled by Hungarian authorities were deprived of their Hungarian citizenship by the ministerial decree 7.970/1946, proclaimed on July 16, 1946.¹⁹ Their property was confiscated by a series of administrative acts and transferred to the Soviet military administration as enemy assets to be counted as war reparations (decree 11.700/1945, December 23, 1945; decree 6.280/1946, June 2, 1946; decree 9.040/1946, August 2, 1946).²⁰

The *Volksdeutsche* who escaped or were resettled in Germany were rapidly absorbed into the German economy and citizenship and quickly ceased to present an international problem. At no time did they achieve the status of refugees, eligible for assistance and rehabilitation from international agencies. Those ethnic Germans, however, who fled into Austria, failed to qualify for Austrian citizenship and who were not evicted into Germany, raised more difficulties. Though partially settled and absorbed into the Austrian body politic, elements from among these former Hungarian citizens of German ethnic origin still harbored desires to return, provided generally pre-Communist conditions were restored. Few availed themselves of the Hungarian Government's offer, published in April 1951, to readmit Germans expelled from Hungary after the war if they had near relatives in the country. Lately some of the more militant *Volksdeutsche* organizations in Austria have been accused by the Hungarian Government of actively participating in the events of October 1956, thus reopening a long quiescent question.²¹

b. Exchange of population

Major exchanges of populations of their respective ethnic origin took place between Hungary and two of its neighbors, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. Of the two, the arrangement with Czechoslovakia proved by far the more difficult one.²²

An early Yugoslav attempt unilaterally to remove the Magyars from its

¹⁸E. M. Kulischer, *op. cit.* 282, 285.

¹⁹For text of decree, see *Magyar Közlöny*, 1946, p. 134.

²⁰For text of decrees, see *ibid.*, p. 134f.

²¹*The Truth About Hungary, Facts and Eyewitness Accounts* 11 (Moscow, 1957).

²²For a description of the vicissitudes of the Hungarian-Czechoslovak *pourparlers* on exchanges of their respective minorities, see S. D. Kertész, *op. cit.* (note 9) 122-125.

territory met with a Hungarian protest. Finally an agreement was concluded in September 1946, which provided for the exchange of equal numbers (not exceeding 40,000) of Magyars from Yugoslavia and Serbs, Croats and Slovenes from Hungary.²³ The Magyarized Slavs lost their Hungarian citizenship upon expatriation, but rapidly acquired that of their new homeland.

On February 27, 1946, an agreement was reached for an exchange of equal numbers of Hungarians from Czechoslovakia and Slovaks from Hungary. Due to a great disparity in the numbers of the respective minorities, however, 500,000 (according to Czechoslovak sources) to 650,000 (according to Hungarian sources) Magyars in Czechoslovakia versus about 100,000 Slovaks in Hungary, the arrangement wholly failed to resolve the problem. Czechoslovakia finally decided to exchange 100,000 Magyars for Slovaks from Hungary, to "return into the Slovak community" 200,000 individuals considered as Magyarized Slovaks, and to transfer to Hungary the remaining 200,000. The Hungarian Government opposed the scheme, refusing to accept the additional numbers of Magyars with the plea that they would ruin her economy and protesting against the denationalization of those who would remain in Czechoslovakia.

The Peace Treaty with Hungary, February 10, 1947,²⁴ Article 5, referred the parties to direct negotiations in order to resolve the problem of excess Magyars who would not be exchanged under the arrangement of February 27, 1946. It was also postulated that, should no agreement be reached within six months after the entry of the Peace Treaty into force, Czechoslovakia could refer the question to the Council of Foreign Ministers for a final solution. With regard to the Magyars who would remain in Czechoslovakia the Peace Treaty obligated Czechoslovakia to respect their full human and civic, but not their special minority, rights. Slovaks from Hungary transferred to Czechoslovakia were deprived of their Hungarian citizenship. The Czechoslovak law of April 12, 1946,²⁵ granted to Czechoslovaks returning from Hungary full economic privileges and legal rights. By virtue of the Constitutional Law of September 13, 1946,²⁶ returning Czechoslovaks were granted Czechoslovak citizenship from the date of their arrival in Czechoslovakia.

²³E. M. Kulischer, *op. cit.* p. 292f.

²⁴Text in *Sbornik deistuyushchikh dogovorov, soglashenii i konventsii zakyuchennykh SSSR s inostrannymi gosudarstvami* (Collection of treaties, agreements and conventions concluded by the USSR with foreign States and in force) (Moscow, 1956), Vol. VIII, pp. 54-88.

²⁵*Sbirka Zákonů*, 1946, No. 37, Item 75.

²⁶*Ibid.*, Item 77. Magyars returning to Hungary from Czechoslovakia were similarly reintegrated into the Magyar community through simplified procedures. Thus, Law VIII/1945 on elections to the National Assembly (*Két Év Hatályos Jogszabályai, 1945-1946* (Budapest, 1947), pp. 36-54), as amended by Law XXIII/1947 (1947. *Év Hatályos Jogszabályai* (Budapest, 1948), pp. 84-89), prescribed in its Art. 4 (2) that such individuals would enjoy the right to vote. Its various provisions deprived of their electoral right persons who had occupied official posts in the various pro-Nazi wartime régimes and also those who had fled to Germany or other territory occupied by the Germans if they had failed to return by October 31, 1945 (Art. 5 (17)).

The question of a total exchange of respective minorities was never settled through diplomatic channels and the absorption of Czechoslovakia into the Communist orbit effectively silenced the dispute.

E. Group V:

This category proved to be the most difficult, numerous and persistent of all those considered. It provided the highest percentage of Hungarian exiles found in Western Europe at the close of the war, more than half a million individuals, most of them members of the upper and middle classes of prewar Hungarian society fleeing before the Red Army.

The great majority of this panic-stricken mass returned to their homes soon after the end of military hostilities. Their constantly dwindling numbers were, however, soon replenished by a new exodus caused by the internal political changes in Hungary's régime. Beginning in 1946 a new wave of clandestine departures over the Western frontiers and resignations of consular and diplomatic personnel abroad marked the consolidation of Communist rule in Budapest. The first to escape in search of shelter from Communist oppression were mainly politicians and active members of the Smallholders Party. They were soon followed by Socialists, mostly peasants and workers, and other anti-Communist elements,²⁷ thus increasing again the numbers of Hungarians in exile. Most of these were registered as *bona fide* refugees after 1948.

Policies

The main efforts of the Hungarian authorities following the end of the war were directed at securing an early solution of the Hungarian refugee problem through a program of mass repatriation. In this they were greatly aided by the Allied military administration in Western and Central Europe which was then doing its best to encourage the repatriation of refugees from the East.

On the whole the repatriation scheme must be regarded as generally successful. A Hungarian repatriation mission was authorized to go into Germany in order to expedite the return of refugees and the number of Hungarian exiles, originally estimated at between 800,000 and 1 million at the end of the war, rapidly decreased. Already in June 1945, a Hungarian Red Cross report mentioned only 400,000 Hungarians as "being housed in camps or dispersed throughout Germany and Austria, 130,000 of whom had been registered by the Hungarian Red Cross delegates."²⁸ IRO statistics for July 1, 1947, account for 9,600 Hungarian refugees, of whom 8,000 were Jews, and, in addition, in May 1947, Hungarian refugee sources gave the number of Hungarian displaced persons still living in the United States zone of Germany as 23,000, although it is not known how many of these could be classified as true refugees.

²⁷J. Vernant, *op. cit.*, p. 71; J. Kosa, *op. cit.*, p. 513: "It was estimated that between 1946 and 1950, i.e., during the time when the middle class fled from Communism, about 40,000 new Hungarian refugees joined those who already were in the Western countries."

²⁸J. Vernant, *op. cit.*, p. 70.

All in all, the numbers of Hungarians abroad consistently diminished during the immediate postwar years, due primarily to serious repatriation efforts. Most of the individuals composing Groups I and V found their way home. On the contrary, persons in Group II, from the very beginning recipients of international assistance as *bona fide* refugees and mostly composed of Hungarian Jews reluctant to return to the scene of their woes, sought resettlement overseas rather than repatriation. Their numbers, however, were not at first very considerable.

Gradually the policy of the Hungarian authorities changed. Repatriation having accounted for a majority of Hungarian exiles, the remainder represented a hard core of dissidents adamantly opposed to the new régime at home and refusing to return at any cost. Difficulties soon developed between the Hungarian repatriation mission and the émigrés and, following an incident involving American soldiers escorting a refugee train and Hungarian officials, the activities of the repatriation mission in the American zone of occupation were ordered terminated on April 5, 1948. The following year the same step was taken by the British occupation authorities in their zone. In any case mass repatriation had already come to an end by then. Between July 1, 1947, and December 31, 1951, only 1,608 Hungarians sought to return to their homeland.

The Peace Treaty with Hungary, February 10, 1947, in its Article 3, had noted with satisfaction the measures implemented by the Hungarian Government in pursuance of the obligations assumed under Article V of the Armistice Agreement. It also reaffirmed Hungary's duty to complete the program of liberating individuals imprisoned for racial and religious reasons and because of their sympathy for the United Nations' cause and not to adopt in the future any similar discriminatory policies. Even then, however, the nationality policy of the Hungarian Government was already undergoing a drastic revision.

With the end of mass repatriation clearly in sight and with the victory of Communist rule in Hungary assured, the attitude of the Budapest Government towards those Hungarians in exile who refused to return home and those who had just recently fled the new Soviet-patterned domestic reforms gradually stiffened. Law VII/1946,²⁹ which had instituted investigations and prosecution in cases of war criminals charged with endangering the State and Republic, was indiscriminately applied to all other militant anti-Communists residing abroad. First Law X/1947 and then Law XXVI/1948 reflected the new and harsher approach of the Hungarian Government to the problem posed by its intractable émigré elements.

Under Law X/1947,³⁰ passed on March 31, 1947, promulgated and put into effect on April 3, 1947, the Minister of the Interior was empowered to deprive of their Hungarian citizenship those Hungarian nationals residing in foreign countries against whom an investigation was in progress for con-

²⁹For text of Law VII of March 23, 1946, on the protection of the democracy and the republic, see *Két Év Hatályos Jogszabályai, 1945-1946*, pp. 63-65.

³⁰Text in *Magyar Közlöny*, 1947, p. 8; 1947. *Évi Országos Törvénytár*, p. 27f.

travening Law VII/1946 safeguarding the interests of the people's democracy, if, after having received the Ministry's summons to return to the country, with a time limit of 30 days for those living in Europe and 60 days for those overseas, they failed to return to Hungary and report to the proper authorities. The summonses were to be delivered to the subject individuals by the official representatives of the Hungarian Government in the country of their residence and were to be made official by publication in three consecutive issues of *Magyar Közlöny*, the official Government journal. In cases where the subject's address was unknown or the summons could not be delivered for any other reason, the person could be deprived of his citizenship 60 days after the third publication of the ministerial order in *Magyar Közlöny*. The provisions of this act could also be applied to those persons residing abroad who, prior to the enactment of this law, were suspected of violating Law VII/1946, had been ordered to return to Hungary by the Minister or Ministry of the Interior and had failed to do so by the date of this act's promulgation.

Law XXVI/1948,³¹ passed, published and put into force on May 1, 1948, superseded Law X/1947. It was more comprehensive in scope and stringent in its denaturalization provisions. According to its terms, the Government could deprive of Hungarian citizenship all persons who failed to return to Hungary and report to the Hungarian authorities after having been ordered to do so, within 30 days for those residing in Europe and 60 days for those living overseas, after the third publication of the order in *Magyar Közlöny* (it was to be published in three consecutive issues of the journal). If the address of the Hungarian citizen whose return was desired was known the order was to be delivered to him simultaneously with its first publication in *Magyar Közlöny* through the official representative of the Hungarian Government in the country of his residence. But it was expressly stipulated, too, that the fact of the order not being personally delivered in no way affected the denationalization proceedings.

The decree of denaturalization was to be published in the Official Gazette and entered into force on the date of its appearance (Art. 3). It also applied to the person's wife and minor children if the decree so specified (Art. 4). Persons deprived of their citizenship in accordance with this act or Law X/1947 could be reinstated in their citizenship only with the consent of the Government. Confiscation of property was envisaged in the case of individuals denaturalized under this act and those previously denationalized by Law X/1947 and earlier legislation (Arts. 6, 7 & 8).

The exact purpose of the denaturalization decrees is not known. The measures would seem, however, to pursue a two-fold objective. In the first place, the threat of statelessness and confiscation of property could well pressurize the less determined individuals among the émigrés into returning home. In the second place, a *de jure* loss of citizenship would turn these exiles into *bona fide* refugees, eventually eligible for international assist-

³¹Text in *Magyar Közlöny*, 1948, p. 4; 1948. Évi Országos Törvénytár, p. 277f.

ance, thus facilitating their resettlement overseas and their absorption into a new way of life. In this manner the ever-present threat posed by these uprooted opponents of the régime would be eliminated, or in any case greatly diminished, both by the distance factor and by their assimilation into new homelands, allegiances and citizenships.

Of the two possible results of the policies implemented by the Hungarian Government the second one, although the less desired by the authorities, seems to have been the more expected, even by them. Wide-spread deprivation of citizenship did not bring about any appreciable increase in the numbers of repatriates. It did serve as a spur to increased resettlement of Hungarians overseas.

In addition to normal repatriation and to denaturalization of certain specific classes of refugees (usually followed by efforts to emigrate on the part of those thus rendered stateless), the Hungarian authorities also undertook to secure the return of certain war criminals, or persons suspected and accused of war crimes, for their trial and punishment by competent judicial organs. As has already been mentioned, the American military administration surrendered 200 war criminals to the Hungarian Government in 1946. The last of these were delivered on January 18, 1946, although, according to official Hungarian sources, the American member of the Allied Control Commission in Hungary, on June 12, 1946, promised to extradite an additional 30 Hungarian war criminals and, on December 18, 1946, the surrender of a further 20 was agreed upon, but neither ever took place.³²

In spite of the breakdown of negotiations and the halt of further extraditions to Hungary, the Hungarian Government has incessantly pressed for further surrenders. Thus, for example, in its Note Verbale No. 109.611/11-1947 (November, 1947) it requested the extradition of 470 individuals accused of war crimes.³³ From time to time additional applications for the extradition of individuals or large groups have been submitted with no success. Besides real war criminals, officials in the West suspected, with some justification, that many of the individuals whose surrender was demanded under the guise of war criminals were simply political opponents of the régime who succeeded in escaping from Communist oppression and permitted them to enjoy the safety of non-extraditable political asylum.

Second Phase

Whereas the immediate postwar years proved to be for all Soviet satellites a period of crisis, uncertainty and experimentation on the road to the final establishment of the so-called people's democratic régimes, starting with the middle of 1947 and particularly in 1948 there opens a phase of apparent stability. Internally the Communist Party now seemed to be firmly in control, its enemies dead, in prison or in exile. This was the beginning of a

³²*Documents on the Hostile Activity of the United States Government against the Hungarian People's Republic* 255, 268 (Budapest, 1951), (henceforth abbr. as *Documents*).

³³*Documents* 263; for a partial list of war criminals whose extradition the Budapest Government requested, see *ibid.* 258-262.

period of outward calm, of "socialist reconstruction and reform," and of very real consolidation of the Communist hold over the entire area. According to Soviet publicists, these were the years of the final victory of the dictatorship of the proletariat, of the "restriction" of its class enemies, of the transformation of the laws of the East European States into socialist law filled with a socialist content and accurately reflecting the class interests of the toiling masses.³⁴ In line with other legislative revisions, comprehensive new "socialist" Laws on Citizenship were adopted throughout the Soviet orbit.

Externally, too, this was a period of stabilization. As of July 1948, there were 10,789 Hungarians carried on IRO's books.³⁵ With the ever widening split between East and West IRO assistance and protection were soon being extended beyond the original provisions of its Charter to cover other expatriate elements besides anti-Nazis and victims of Nazism, despite the violent opposition of the Soviet bloc both in the United Nations and outside that organization to the entire idea of international assistance to refugees other than to ensure their immediate repatriation home.³⁶ Thus, from April 1, 1948, onwards IRO registered 53,000 non-Jewish Hungarian refugees, whereas prior to 1948 almost all the Hungarian refugees in receipt of IRO aid had been Jewish. All in all, during the years 1947-1951 the figure for Hungarian refugees processed has been estimated at approximately 100,000 (half of whom were said to be Jewish). Of these, between July 1, 1947, and December 31, 1951, 62,871, including those of Jewish ethnic origin, were resettled. The statistics of the West German Government made a return, according to a 1953 publication, of 17,570 Hungarians living in the Federal Republic, of whom between 9,000 and 10,000 were regarded as refugees³⁷ (of this total 2,600 lived in camps). In Austria, according to official calculations, there were at the time 9,200 Hungarian refugees, while, according to Hungarian refugee sources, the number of exiles of that nationality amounted to 14,000. According to the governments of the countries concerned, there were, too, 10,000 Hungarians in France, 2,000 in Belgium and 200-300 in Yugoslavia.³⁸

On the whole, by 1948, the Hungarian colony in exile had achieved a measure of stability which it retained throughout the period. Its members received recognition as *bona fide* international refugees through registration with IRO and thereby became eligible for all types of aid, including assistance with emigration. Repatriation had come to an almost complete standstill and gradual resettlement now proved to be the main means toward

³⁴S. I. Rusinova, *op. cit.*, pp. 191-193.

³⁵United Nations, *op. cit.*, p. 8, citing IRO, "The Refugee Problem," 1948, p. 4.

³⁶J. G. Stoessinger, *The Refugee and the World Community* (Minneapolis, 1956), pp. 69-82.

³⁷J. Vernant, *op. cit.*, p. 72; cf. R. Ristelhueber, *The International Refugee Organization* (International Conciliation, April 1951, No. 470), p. 189: "One of the largest of the remaining European groups are the 9,000 Hungarians, three-quarters of whom are Jewish."

³⁸According to J. Kosa, *op. cit.*, p. 513: "The whole Hungarian refugee mass, after discounting those who returned to Hungary or who renounced their Hungarian ethnic affiliation, could not be estimated as more than 120,000."

the final solution of the problem posed by this uprooted population and the only way to decrease its numbers. Fresh escapees from home were not very numerous. According to Austrian officials the number of Hungarians entering that country did not reach a hundred a month; Hungarian refugee sources estimated the arrivals at between 150 and 200. "The number of those who crossed into Yugoslavia is unknown but it is not apparently very large: a dozen a month."³⁹

It is in this general atmosphere of optimism at home and a not unfavorable *status quo* abroad that the Hungarian Government proceeded to adopt its Citizenship Act LX of December 24, 1948.⁴⁰

The new law superseded all previous legislative measures on questions of nationality. It replaced: the still operative provisions of Act L/1879, on the acquisition and loss of Hungarian citizenship; Law IV/1886, on the grant of citizenship to immigrants repatriating *en masse*; Article 24 of Act XVII/1922, on the functions of the Minister of Internal Affairs with regard to the allocation of a citizen to an administrative-territorial unit, an act which, according to the provisions of the Peace Treaty of Trianon (1920), was the decisive factor in the determination of a person's citizenship; Article 66, paras. 2, 6 and 4 of Law II/1939 (para. 4 had already been annulled by the adoption of Article 12, para. 2 of Act. I/1946); Law XIII/1939, amending and supplementing the law of 1886; Article 9 of Act XIV/1939, stipulating deprivation of citizenship for crimes against the economic order; the Presidential decree No. 5070/1945, on temporary certificates of Hungarian citizenship; Article 7 of the Presidential order No. 9590-1945, concerning the citizenship of returning political (leftist) émigrés. In addition, Article 31 in effect annulled the provisions of the fascist Law IV/1939 (according to which women of Jewish ethnic origin could not acquire Hungarian citizenship through marriage), by affirming that a woman who by virtue of Article 3, para. 1 of said Act IV/1939 had been unable to obtain Hungarian citizenship by her marriage, was now deemed by virtue of the present Act to have acquired such citizenship through that marriage. Moreover, children who, because of said Law IV/1939, could not acquire the Hungarian citizenship of their father, even though recognized as legitimately born, with the entry into force of the present Act were to be recognized as Hungarian citizens.

Besides consolidating all earlier legislation affecting the citizenship status of Hungarian nationals, the new law also finally put some uniformity into

³⁹J. Vernant, *op. cit.* p. 71.

⁴⁰For text of the law, see 1948. *Év Hatályos Jogszabályai*, pp. 109-114; for text in Russian, see N. P. Farberov (ed.), *Konstitutsiya i Osnovnye Zakonodatelnye Akty Vengerskoi Narodnoi Respubliki* (The Constitution and Basic Legislative Acts of the Hungarian People's Republic), pp. 107-121 (Moscow, 1951) and V. L. Israelyan, *Konstitutsiya i Osnovnye Zakonodatelnye Akty Vengerskoi Narodnoi Respubliki*, pp. 154-169 (Moscow, 1954); for text in English (unfortunately badly marred by errors), see United Nations, *Laws Concerning Nationality*, pp. 219-226 (United Nations Legislative Series ST/LEG/Ser. B/4, New York, 1954).

For an analysis of the provisions of Law LX/1948, see P. Szigeti, "Notes sur la Loi hongroise LX de 1948 sur la Nationalité," *Journal du Droit International* (Clunet), 1957, Vol. 84, No. 2, pp. 378-390; L. Sömjen et al., *Magyar Allampolgársági Jog* (Hungarian Citizenship Laws), (Budapest, 1949).

the hitherto rather haphazard policy of the Hungarian Government with regard to its exiles. In effect, by now the remainder of the refugees beyond Hungary's borders, whatever their original motivations for escaping from home and whatever their original classification in one or the other categories defined above may have been, were all united by a common bond: their refusal to return to a Communist homeland and their opposition to the new régime in Budapest. The new law recognized this basic fact, grouped them all together and formulated an identical policy towards them all, no longer drawing distinctions between the various groups.

With regard to the deprivation of citizenship the new law provided that the Minister of the Interior could strip of his Hungarian nationality any person who, without the permission of the Government, entered the public service of another State (Art. 16). It also decreed (Art. 17) that:

1. The Government on a proposal made by the Minister of the Interior may deprive of his Hungarian citizenship a person who:

(1) Accepts from the Government of any foreign State or from any organ thereof or from a foreign political organization, without the permission of the Hungarian Government, any office or mandate of a political character or becomes a member of a foreign organization having a political character or takes part in the activity of such an organization; or,

(2) On going abroad contravenes or evades the statutory provisions relating to departure from the country.

2. The decision of the Government shall extend to the wife and minor children of a man deprived of his citizenship if the decision contains a statement to that effect.

3. The property of a person deprived of his Hungarian citizenship by virtue of this article shall be confiscated. The confiscation is to be carried out in accordance with the provisions of articles 6 to 8 of Act XXVI/1948.

4. The declaration of the Government shall be published in the Official Gazette. The decision shall become operative on the date of such publication.

5. Act XXVI/1948 to deprive of Hungarian citizenship certain persons resident abroad and to confiscate their property shall not be affected by the provisions of paragraph 1.⁴¹

Provisions for normal expatriation, too, were included. According to Article 14 the Minister of the Interior was empowered, upon application made by the party, to release from allegiance to Hungary any person who was not in arrears with any tax or other public dues and who was not subject to a sentence imposed by a Hungarian criminal court, with the added proviso that if the applicant was a man over seventeen years of age, but under forty-two, the concurrent permission of the Minister of National Defense was mandatory.⁴² The law also stipulated (Art. 20) that any person who lost

⁴¹According to J. Vernant, *op. cit.*, p. 72: "Several hundreds of ex-civil servants and politicians hostile to the régime became stateless as a result of those provisions."

⁴²*Ibid.*: "Some twenty persons a month receive permission to emigrate for good; they are usually old people regarded as economically unproductive and unlikely to injure the interests of the régime by their residence abroad."

his citizenship through the operation of Articles 16 and 17 could be re-naturalized by the Government on the proposal of the Minister of the Interior, with a waiver of the usual residence requirement (permanent residence in Hungary without interruption for three years prior to making his application, Art. 4 (a)).

In addition to these clauses on deprivation of citizenship, the only other aspects of the 1948 Citizenship Act pertinent to the subject of this study are contained in a few articles reflecting special conditions connected with the territorial rearrangement of Hungary as a result of its defeat in World War II and some provisions which seem calculated to underline the "socialist" orientation and content of the new law.

According to para. 1 of Article 26, former Hungarian nationals who lost their Hungarian citizenship due to the invalidation of the statutory provisions referred to in the Armistice Convention (primarily laws extending unilaterally Hungarian citizenship to residents of territories annexed by Hungary immediately prior to and during the war from its neighbors and which were ordered returned to their former owners), were recognized as Hungarian nationals as of January 20, 1945, if between January 1, 1948, and the date of entry into force of this Act their permanent place of residence was in Hungary. The provisions of para. 1 were also extended (by para. 2) to those former Hungarian nationals who lost their citizenship by virtue of the statutory provisions referred to in para. 1 and to those who lost their citizenship as a consequence of their being prisoners of war or deported by the fascists or obliged to leave Hungary on account of their socialist (Communist and Social-Democratic), anti-fascist or democratic activities, and who settled permanently in Hungary after January 1, 1948, on the condition that this took place not later than 6 months after the cessation of the reason for their forced absence.

Irrespective of the provisions of Article 26 persons were also to be regarded (Art. 27, para. 2) as Hungarian nationals who, on January 1, 1948, had a permanent place of residence in Hungary, and who, following the forced absence defined in Article 26, para. 2, returned to settle permanently in Hungary after January 1, 1948, but not later than 6 months after the cessation of the reason for their absence. Finally, it was also stipulated (Art. 30) that, independently of all other clauses

those former Hungarian nationals who, on account of their Socialist (Communist or Social-Democratic), anti-fascist and democratic convictions and activities, including revolutionary activity in 1918-1919, left Hungary, either voluntarily or under pressure from the authorities, are recognized as Hungarian nationals if they have returned to Hungary before September 15, 1948, even if by virtue of any other statutory provisions relating to citizenship they appear to have legally lost their Hungarian citizenship.⁴³

⁴³An added "socialist" flavor was imparted to Act LX/1948, too, by its Art. 27, para. 3, recognizing as Hungarian citizens persons who, prior to Sept. 1, 1939, had had to seek employment abroad as a consequence of the economic crisis of the capitalistic system or

In order to put a stop to the much diminished, but still constant, flow of illegal departures from the country,⁴⁴ the Hungarian authorities, shortly after the passage of Law LX/1948, undertook an extensive program aimed at rendering the State's frontiers impassable to all crossings except at certain chosen border stations. In April 1949, a prohibited zone 50 kilometers deep was established along the Western frontier, the townships of Sopron and Körömend being left as free enclaves. Similar action was taken along the Yugoslav border where, on May 31, 1950, a prohibited zone 15 kilometers deep was established, with enclaves for the townships of Szeged and Nagykánszsa. In several sectors of the Western frontier trees were cut down, minefields were laid and barbed wire fences were put up.⁴⁵

Besides attempting effectively to curb, or if possible put an end to, illegal frontier passages, the Hungarian Government at the same time increased its pressure on those who had already made good their escape. The atmosphere of relative permanence which by now permeated the refugee camps had led the expatriates into banding in various organizations actively engaged in anti-Communist activities of one type or another. Therefore the principal efforts of the Budapest régime, during this period, were directed at: 1) discrediting and, 2) disorganizing the émigré movement.

The first objective it sought to achieve by denouncing, at every possible opportunity, all émigré associations as fascist bands of war criminals, traitors, collaborationists, spies, subversives and common gangsters.⁴⁶ It objected vociferously every time that a foreign government tendered any émigré organization some measure of official recognition or encouragement.⁴⁷ It opposed the activities of the International Refugee Organization for providing the refugees with the attractive alternate course of resettlement overseas to repatriation home and for administering the hundreds of camps which Budapest persisted in denouncing as centers of espionage and subversion directed against it. In particular it protested vehemently against the United States Mutual Security Act of 1951, arguing that

the text of the Act clearly shows that the appropriated hundred million dollars are allotted with a purpose to support among others spies and traitors living in Hungary as well as the war criminals and fascists who absconded from Hungary, to use them for committing hostile activities against the Hungarian people, and the present democratic régime of Hungary.⁴⁸

as a consequence of unemployment and who by January 1, 1948, had not returned to Hungary, if these persons applied within one year of the entry into force of this Act to the Minister of the Interior for the recognition of their Hungarian citizenship.

⁴⁴Law XLVIII punished persons who left or attempted to leave Hungarian territory without permission with confinement or a term of imprisonment of up to five years.

⁴⁵J. Vernant, *op. cit.*, p. 71.

⁴⁶*Documents* 255-258.

⁴⁷E.g., Note of the Hungarian Legation in Washington to the U. S. State Department, June 15, 1948, *Documents*, p. 303f.

⁴⁸Protest of the Hungarian Government to the United States Government against the Organization of Subversive Agents and Spy Gangs and the Financial Support Accorded to Them, December 1, 1951, *Documents* 312-314; Statement of the Government of the Hungarian People's Republic, Nov. 24, 1951, *ibid.* 315-323.

Not content with verbal objections, the Hungarian Government also resorted to more direct and concrete means. Throughout 1949 and 1950 Hungarian officials besieged Western authorities with individual and collective applications for the extradition of individuals whom they accused of multiple war crimes. Usually the lists named persons active in émigré activities, sometimes former war criminals it is true, but more often merely militant anti-Communists. The demand for the surrender of these accused claimed that the Allies were legally obligated to honor the requests, the duty to do so supposedly having been imposed on them by the Moscow Declaration of 1943, the London Agreement of August 8, 1945, and the unanimous Declaration of the United Nations General Assembly of February 14, 1946, recommending the return of war criminals for trial at the *loci* of their crimes.⁴⁹ The United States' replies denying the requests for extradition pointed out that no authority or duty to surrender existed in the absence of a valid treaty of extradition expressly covering the cases in point, that the crimes which the Hungarian diplomatic démarches imputed to the accused individuals were not envisaged by Article 1 of the Extradition Convention of July 3, 1856, that the Moscow Declaration was "not a formal treaty within the meaning of existing United States legislation"⁵⁰ and that, in some of the cases, "the evidence submitted in support of the allegations" was "regarded as insufficient to establish a *prima facie* case."⁵¹ Austria, in turn, evaded the responsibility for honoring or rejecting those requests which were addressed to it from Budapest by pleading the excuse that American military authority had "reserved the competence in this matter . . . for themselves."⁵² When this tactic failed, the Hungarian Government sought to secure the surrender of some individuals under the guise of extraditing them for common crimes, such as embezzlement and defalcation, also with little success.⁵³

Following the failure of its extradition scheme the Hungarian régime then launched a re-defection campaign, similar to that of the other Iron Curtain governments, except that it was more limited in scope than that of the other satellites. The World Union of Hungarians was re-organized and designated as the Hungarian repatriation agency. A statement by the Union over Radio Budapest, May 20, 1955, instructed refugees to contact the nearest Hungarian diplomatic representative for information and aid in going home.⁵⁴ The propaganda campaign urging émigrés to return was given new impetus on November 1, 1955, with the establishment of a radio

⁴⁹Notes of the Hungarian Legation in Washington to the U. S. State Department, July 20, 1950, and Oct. 24, 1950, *Documents* 264, 267-269.

⁵⁰Note of the U. S. State Department to the Hungarian Legation in Washington, Aug. 10, 1950, *ibid.*, 265-266.

⁵¹Letter of Headquarters of U. S. Forces in Austria, Legal Division, to the Hungarian Legation in Vienna, Oct. 18, 1949, *ibid.*, 272.

⁵²Note of the Austrian Foreign Office to the Vienna Legation of the Hungarian Republic, Feb. 10, 1949 (*In re Pálffy-Daun*), *ibid.*, 271.

⁵³Note of the Hungarian Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the United States Government against the Prevention of the Extradition of Hungarian Common Criminals Residing in the United States Occupation Zone of Austria, July 21, 1950, *ibid.*, 273-274.

⁵⁴*News from Behind the Iron Curtain*, Vol. 4, No. 10, pp. 5-7 (1955) (henceforth abbr. as *N.B.I.C.*).

station, *Szülőföldünk* (*Homeland*), broadcasting exclusively to Hungarians abroad, and in particular to Magyar refugees in Western Europe. On November 3, 1955, the station announced a regular "message" program that would be beamed to Hungarians in the West to help them locate the whereabouts of their relatives in Hungary and to solve other problems connected with repatriation.⁵⁵

On the whole the re-defection drive appears to have been aimed less at achieving mass repatriation to the motherland than at demoralizing and disorganizing the émigré movement by such defections of personnel within its ranks as would, and did, take place, particularly in cases involving exiled leaders. In view of the limited scope of the campaign and the approach used by the authorities it seems safe to conclude that they probably did "not anticipate a snowballing movement for return; more strategic" was "the unsteady effect of *any* return on the morale of other émigrés and on anti-Communist movements and organizations."⁵⁶ Besides having adverse results on the régime's opposition abroad, the successes of the scheme, carefully magnified by official propaganda, were also "directed toward curbing unrest at home and popularizing the régime internally."⁵⁷

In order further to encourage the defection of refugees from Western Europe the Hungarian Government also embarked upon a cautious and judiciously selective program of amnesties. In April 1950, the Presidium of the Hungarian People's Republic promulgated an amnesty for Hungarian nationals who had fled the country as a result of the war or because they had been "led astray by enemy propaganda," but who "realize today that they cannot prosper except in their homeland," on the condition that they return to Hungary by October 4 of that year. The provisions of the amnesty did not extend to war criminals, members of the Sztójay and Szálasi Governments formed under the German occupation, or to those who had enrolled in the Gestapo or had been deprived of their nationality after the war. The original deadline for the repatriation period was subsequently prolonged, although the amnesty was said to have had only negligible results.⁵⁸

That same month, on April 1, the Government issued another decree under which Germans expelled from Hungary after the war would be allowed to return with fully guaranteed equal rights. An official spokesman of the régime explained that they would be ensured suitable employment and would enjoy equal treatment with the Magyars and that returning German peasants would be allowed to hold up to 4 hectares of land. The measure applied to all persons with near relatives in Hungary, a condition fulfilled by a substantial portion of the *Volksdeutsche* minority forced to leave the country after 1945. Applications for repatriation were to be submitted at the Hungarian mission in Berlin before September 25, 1950, re-

⁵⁵*N.B.I.C.*, Vol. 5, No. 1, p. 44 (1956).

⁵⁶*N.B.I.C.*, Vol. 4, No. 10, p. 9 (1955).

⁵⁷*Ibid.*, p. 7.

⁵⁸*J. Vernant, op. cit.*, p. 72.

ardless of whether the applicants were living in Eastern Germany or Western Germany or in any of the Western countries.⁵⁹

The somewhat milder policy inaugurated by the régime on the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the country's liberation from the Germans and reflecting the Party's increased confidence in its power lasted approximately until the end of 1951. On October 6, 1951, the Government published a further extension of the previous amnesty. Hungarians who left the country illegally could return without consequences until April 4, 1952. Like earlier measures the prolonged pardon did not affect major political figures or those deprived of Hungarian citizenship.⁶⁰ In November 1951, a new wave of deportations from Hungary's borders with Austria and Yugoslavia and from the major cities into the countryside marked a return to a harsher line; the result was a marked increase in the number of refugees leaving the country.⁶¹

From that date and until 1955 the succeeding Cabinets in Budapest showed no overt interest in the plight of Hungarian refugees. With the death of Stalin, the power struggle within the Kremlin with its inevitable reverberations in the régimes of the satellites, the thaw which set in in 1953, the Government's attention was concentrated on the unrest inside the country, the widespread reforms which were being tried, and the constant re-shuffling of the members of the ruling clique. By 1955 the new line had crystallized sufficiently for the Government to proclaim, on April 4, another amnesty, revolutionary in that it was directed only at political offenders residing abroad, "war criminals and criminals guilty of anti-people acts who left the country prior to April 4, 1945," provided they chose to return to Hungary before April 4, 1956. This external decree promised that criminal proceedings would not be instituted against returning émigrés unless they played a leading rôle in the "Arrow Cross" régime, or committed any "capital war crime or crimes against the people." No immunity would be enjoyed by those who had held the posts of "Minister, political Under-Secretary, prefect or General under the so-called Sztójay Government or the Arrow Cross terror." Nor would pardon be granted individuals who were involved, in Hungary or abroad, "in the illegal execution or torture of people," or who, as Hungarian citizens, "joined the German Hitlerite-fascist security service—the Gestapo." Criminal prosecution would not be initiated either for unauthorized use of passports or for illegal crossings of the frontier, or for other crimes committed in connection with these offenses" against any Hungarian citizen living abroad, provided the offenses had been perpetrated prior to January 1, 1954, and on the condition that the citizen return to Hungary not later than April 4, 1956. Pardon was also decreed for those Hungarian nationals who left the country legally, but whose travel documents expired before January 1, 1954, and who had failed to return by then.⁶²

⁵⁹*New York Times*, April 2, 1950, p. 44; *Chronology of International Events and Documents*, 1950, pp. 212, 240.

⁶⁰*New York Times*, Oct. 7, 1950, p. 22.

⁶¹*Ibid.*, Nov. 28, 1951, p. 10; Feb. 24, 1952, p. 3, Mar. 3, 1952, p. 4; Mar. 17, 1952, p. 13.

The thaw which had begun after Stalin's death was given even greater impetus in the Soviet Union and throughout the rest of the Soviet empire, including Hungary, of course, as a result of the Twentieth Party Congress in Moscow. A somewhat more liberal attitude was evidenced in Budapest in its 1956 policies, beginning with the extension of the external amnesty of the previous year. On April 5, 1956, Radio Budapest announced that the April 4, 1955, amnesty for Hungarian nationals abroad who chose to return home which was scheduled to end on April 3, 1956, would be prolonged until April 4, 1957. At the same time the terms of the earlier decree were made more inclusive. It was now to apply to crimes committed after leaving the country, such offenses, for example, as constituted the guilt of "those who were working in various émigré organizations, for the [Western] press, or held various posts within the hostile propaganda machinery." These persons now were pardoned "provided that they repent their deeds, give up their criminal activities and apply for permission to return."⁶³

A few months later the Hungarian authorities took another step towards the relaxation of former controls. On May 10, 1956, Budapest, first among the satellites, announced that it planned to dismantle the "Iron Curtain" obstacles on its Austrian border.⁶⁴ On August 15, Premier András Hegedüs announced that all of the "technical" barriers on the frontier with Yugoslavia had been removed "except for a short section under water," whereas on the Austrian border half the barrier had already been removed and the remainder was expected to be cleared by the end of September.⁶⁵ In a speech at Szeged, on August 26, he added that the population which had been forced to leave Yugoslav border regions after 1949 would now be permitted to return, that the Government had "authorized the local councils to give the people monetary help, not exceeding 5,000 forint, and to grant them loans not exceeding 10,000 forint to help them return and resume their work," and that the régime was also seeking an agreement with Yugoslavia authorizing travel in the border zone without passports.⁶⁶

These measures marked the last effort of the Communist régime in Hungary to inaugurate a relatively freer post-Stalin era. Although at no time

⁶²*N.B.I.C.*, Vol. 4, No. 5, pp. 2, 50-51 (1955). The previous day an internal amnesty was published providing for the remission of sentences of political offenders "who did not have leading posts in the reactionary régime prior to the liberation and in cases where it could be assumed that the pardon would permit those individuals who were freed to become useful members of our society." Pardon was extended to all such persons regardless of the length of their sentence, except if the crime was committed "with hostile intentions or because it was a consequence of an obviously deceiving trick of enemy-spread propaganda." *Szabad Nép*, April 3, 1955.

⁶³*N.B.I.C.*, Vol. 5, No. 5, p. 54 (1956).

⁶⁴*Ibid.*, Vol. 5, No. 6, p. 55 (1956).

⁶⁵*Szabad Nép*, Aug. 16, 1956.

⁶⁶*N.B.I.C.*, Vol. 5, No. 10, p. 54 (1956). With regard to this problem *Magyar Nemzet*, August 27, 1956, noted that in the period when relationships between Hungary and Yugoslavia were strained property along the frontier had been expropriated without compensation. Now, it said, the former owners were again working the land, but their title had not, as yet, been restored. Other inhabitants of the frontier areas, the newspaper observed, had been called Titoists and deported merely because they had relatives in Yugoslavia and of these only 3 who were Communists had been rehabilitated to date.

did it succeed in putting a full stop to illegal crossings of the border or in ending frontier incidents involving fleeing dissidents, the stream of escapees had, during that period, dwindled to a mere trickle. The outbreak of the October revolution and the failure of the uprising upset all hopes of gradually gaining even greater concessions from the Government by peaceful means and only succeeded in reversing the then current trend towards a more liberal state of affairs.

Third Phase

The collapse of the October revolution in the face of the assault of Red Army troops sparked another mass exodus reminiscent of the worst moments of World War II. Due to the very nature of the problem final statistics on the number of escapees from the holocaust are still not readily available, but it has been reported by reliable sources that during the period between the beginning of the uprising and June 27, 1957, 174,277 Hungarians had left their country and crossed into Austria, and that, as of June 18, 1957, a further 19,383 had sought asylum in Yugoslavia.⁶⁷

By August 1957, 142,700 of the above-mentioned had departed from Austria and 7,800 had left Yugoslavia.⁶⁸ As of June 5, 1957, 6,404 Hungarians were reported to have gone back home.⁶⁹ The others, besides those still remaining in Austria, were being rapidly and efficiently resettled in 34 different countries. In February 1958, it was estimated that about 10,000 Hungarians who fled after the Soviet occupation of Budapest in 1956 still found shelter in European refugee camps, 9,000 in Austria and 600 in Italy. In addition, a further 10,000 were living outside camps in Austria and about 400 in Italy.⁷⁰ On December 18, 1957, official Yugoslav sources reported that by the middle of January 1958, the problem of Magyar refugees in the country was expected to be solved,⁷¹ and their optimism was born out when, on February 27, 1958, the Office of the United Nations Commissioner for Refugees issued a statement to the effect that of the 19,857 Hungarians who had by that date fled into Yugoslavia 16,374 had found permanent homes in other countries, 2,773 returned voluntarily to Hungary and the remaining 710 were integrated into Yugoslavia or unaccounted for.⁷²

From the very first day of its assumption of power the new régime in Budapest had to contend with the problem posed by the plight and the

⁶⁷*United Nations Review*, Vol. 4, No. 2 (August, 1957), p. 19.

⁶⁸*Austrian Information*, published by the Austrian Information Service, Vol. X, No. 14 (Aug. 24, 1957), p. 2; cf. *United Nations Review*, loc. cit.: "Official estimates set the number of Hungarian refugees still in Austria as of June 27 at 28,318 and, as of June 18, at 9,949 in Yugoslavia."

⁶⁹767 from Switzerland; 434 from France; 257 from Germany; 160 from the United States; 13 from Italy; 17 from Belgium; 3 from Portugal and 1 from Canada, in addition to 4,752 from Austria. The number of returnees from Yugoslavia was not included since it was not known with any certainty at the time; *Austrian Information*, Vol. X, No. 12 (June 22, 1957), p. 5. Communist sources give a very exaggerated estimate of 20,000 returnees.

⁷⁰*New York Times*, Feb. 15, 1958, p. 2.

⁷¹*Ibid.*, Dec. 19, 1957, p. 6.

⁷²*Ibid.*, Jan. 28, 1958, p. 5.

mere presence of these thousands of refugees so close to its borders. Attempting to consolidate its still very shaky position and in order to placate the widespread opposition to its enthronement by Soviet tanks, the Kádár Government at first spoke in a generally conciliatory tone. Although it denounced the revolution as a fascist *putsch*,⁷³ inspired by world-wide imperialism, carried out by gangs of counter-revolutionaries, reactionaries, ex-Nazis and common criminals, armed and supported by the West and primarily the United States, in the early days of its inauguration with Soviet help the régime appealed for support from all Hungarians.

However, soon thereafter, owing to its greater feeling of security, the Hungarian Government began to draw, in principle, an ever-widening line between its policies toward the two categories of individuals it professed to detect among its opponents: (1) the so-called militant and conscious counter-revolutionaries; and, (2) the ordinary individuals duped into fleeing abroad or even into taking active part in the rebellion. The first group, according to Communist sources, embraced pro-Nazi Hungarian émigrés in West German and Austrian refugee camps,⁷⁴ former fascists within Hungary itself⁷⁵ and *Volksdeutsche* elements of former Hungarian nationality plotting to return;⁷⁶ these were accused of being the inspirers, organizers and active executors of the October coup. The second group was described as composed of all those whose activities on behalf of the revolution or whose illegal departure from the country the régime chose to explain by their being tricked by enemy propaganda. The label was attached in particular to the under-age escapees. Needless to say, officially the main efforts of the Budapest Government in trying to make its peace with the new expatriates were aimed essentially at persons whom it classified as belonging to the second group and who, it claimed, constituted an overwhelming percentage of all refugees from the October events. In effect, however, the efforts of the authorities to represent the mass, spontaneous uprising as merely a limited politically-inspired coup carried out by a clique of conspirators with no true following among the people, and to draw a dividing line between the former and their innocent dupes were belied by the very fact that the Government's measures, its amnesties and promises of pardon and repatriation offers, were addressed equally to all Hungarians, making no such distinc-

⁷³For Communist literature on the Hungarian events, see V. Zakharchenko *et al.*, *Budapest, Oktyabr-Dekabr 1956g* (Budapest, October-December, 1956) (Moscow, 1956); L. Tolkunov & M. Odincts, *Vengriya segodnya* (Hungary today) (Moscow, 1957); Z. Savelin, *Zagovory—oruzhie reaktsii* (Conspiracies are weapons of the reaction) (Moscow, 1956); *Kontr-revolutsionnye sily v Vengerskikh oktyabrskikh sobytiakh* (Counter-revolutionary forces in the Hungarian October events) (published by the Information Bureau of the Council of Ministers of the Hungarian People's Republic) (Moscow, 1957).

⁷⁴See, Statement by the Vice-Chairman of the Hungarian Information Bureau, *The Truth About Hungary*, p. 8.

⁷⁵Cf. "Suffice it to mention that there were over 300,000 former active adherents of the fascist party—gendarmes, S. S. men and Horthy officers—living freely in Hungary, which until 1945 had closely bound up its fate with Hitler Germany," *ibid.*, p. 54.

⁷⁶*Ibid.*, p. 11; also E. Priester, *Vengerski reportazh* (Report on Hungary) (tr. from German by A. Galkin & O. Nakropin) (Moscow, 1957), p. 23.

tion between different types of refugees as were, for example, validly made in the post-World War II era.

The first efforts of the Kádár Government were directed at stemming the flow of illegal departures of young people alarmed by the deportations of the Freedom Fighters, actual and suspected, to the Soviet Union. Thus, as part of its propaganda campaign Radio Budapest, on November 24, 1956, broadcast a statement supposedly made by four young men who had been stopped on their way to Austria and who allegedly explained their decision to emigrate as being due to "alarmist propaganda."⁷⁷ In addition, Radio Budapest announced on November 27, 1956, that the Government would shortly publish an amnesty for Hungarian citizens who left the country illegally during or after the revolt.⁷⁸ The next day Hungarian authorities called on Austria to aid them in returning refugees who fled across the frontier and promised officially not to prosecute them if they returned. In particular the Foreign Ministry requested Austrian officials to send back Hungarian youths under 18 who had allegedly fled the country "chiefly in the spirit of adventure" or "under compulsion."⁷⁹ Radio Budapest gave added support to the Government move by claiming that the youths whose return was sought were high-school students who in some cases had been lured away and in others "taken away by force by counter-revolutionary elements."⁸⁰

On November 29, 1956, the decree of amnesty hinted at earlier was in effect made public. It stipulated that no criminal proceedings would be initiated against persons who crossed the frontier between "October 23 and the day on which the decree comes into force—providing they voluntarily returned to Hungary not later than March 31, 1957."⁸¹ On December 3, Radio Belgrade announced that diplomatic negotiations had been conducted in Belgrade between representatives of Yugoslavia and Hungary on the matter of Hungarian refugees who had crossed the border after October 23. It was agreed that "all refugees who, of their own free will, wish to return to Hungary, will be repatriated December 7-9, 1956, at the frontier crossings of Horgos and Kotoriba The other Hungarian refugees will be treated in conformity with their wishes."⁸² The previous day, Ferenc Munnich, Minister of the Interior, in another effort to influence the refugees into repatriating, had renewed his offer of a pardon declaring that the Government had the problem of dealing with thousands of persons who had been misled by Western radio stations and who "hesitate between returning home and the misery that awaits them in the West." As an added inducement to ensure the return of the émigrés and as a threat to those who would persist in staying abroad, the Minister hinted that the Government

⁷⁷*East Europe*, Vol. 6, No. 1, p. 20 (1957); see, Statement by Head of the Militia Administration in Budapest, *The Truth About Hungary*, p. 95.

⁷⁸*East Europe*, Vol. 6, No. 1, p. 21f. (1957); *New York Times*, Nov. 29, 1956, p. 17: "Another decree offering a general pardon for 'several other crimes' is in preparation, the radio said."

⁷⁹*East Europe*, Vol. 6, No. 1, p. 21f. (1957)

⁸⁰*New York Times*, Nov. 29, 1956, p. 17.

⁸¹*East Europe*, Vol. 6, No. 1, p. 22 (1957).

⁸²*Ibid.*, p. 43.

was preparing a decree turning over the dwellings of fugitives to "victims of the rebellion."⁸³

True to its word, on December 11, 1956, the Budapest radio broadcast a Government announcement that the State would take control of the property of all persons who had left Hungary since the start of the rebellion, October 23, and sell it if they were not back by March 31, 1957, the deadline set by the amnesty of November 29.⁸⁴

Concessions, crackdowns and strenuous efforts to stop the large-scale egress of Hungarians from the country marked official policy during the early months following the revolt. Gradually a harsher attitude made itself felt. Thus, refugees arriving into Austria towards the end of the year told of reports concerning a new law, rumors of whose proximate announcement were circulating at home. It would impose severe punishment on Hungarians who attempted to flee to Austria. Until then fugitives caught on their way to the border by Hungarian or Soviet guards had been, as a rule, detained for a few hours and then turned back. Under the reported new measures, allegedly published on New Year's Eve, but not immediately put into effect, the punishment for attempted border crossings would be 6 months' imprisonment for women and sentences for men that would vary with the prisoner's age and occupation.⁸⁵

The hardening of the official line towards the émigrés was also purportedly detected by Western officials in the increasingly slower pace of the repatriation process. Julius Raab, the Austrian Foreign Minister, in a radio address, described the plight of 250 Hungarians in a West German refugee camp who wanted to go back but were delayed because they had been refused admission to Hungary until each case had been carefully examined by the Hungarian officials.⁸⁶ Hungarian sources denied the allegation, stating, somewhat unconvincingly, that "all Hungarian citizens are readmitted . . . as soon as it is confirmed that their return is voluntary."⁸⁷ In order to show its good faith the Hungarian Government requested from the Austrian authorities permission to send a repatriation mission to interview Magyar refugees in the various refugee centers in Austria. The request was granted by Austria, although similar requests were denied by other receiving countries, and the mission undertook a tour of the camps, with little success however. Simultaneously, a Hungarian memorandum addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, January 11, 1957, reaffirmed the Hungarian Government's desire to see the return of the refugees, promising that they could do so without hindrance and that they would "in no way suffer harm or molestation."⁸⁸

In the same breath, Hungarian sources stepped up their attacks on Western efforts to alleviate the plight of the fugitives. Hungary charged

⁸³In an interview with *Népakarat*, cited by *New York Times*, Dec. 3, 1956, pp. 1, 3.

⁸⁴*New York Times*, Dec. 12, 1956, p. 2.

⁸⁵*Ibid.*, Jan. 3, 1957, p. 9.

⁸⁶*Ibid.*, Jan. 21, 1957, p. 1.

⁸⁷*Ibid.*, Jan. 23, 1957, p. 10.

⁸⁸*Ibid.*, Jan. 12, 1957, p. 2.

that the West violated international law in its treatment of the refugees, demanded that the runaway children be returned to their parents, declared that adults were prevented from returning and asked that the refugees be informed of the Hungarian amnesty valid until March 31, 1957, the terms of which, Budapest charged, were kept secret from the exiles by the camp administrations.⁸⁹ Domestically, too, the tightening process proceeded apace. In February, the régime began to re-erect the Southern border zone where obstacles had been removed in 1956, before the revolt. This measure was apparently aimed at curbing the increasing flow of fugitives into Yugoslavia. On February 4, the Ministry of the Interior announced that all persons remaining in or entering the Southern frontier counties of Baranya, Bács-Kiskun, Csongrád, Somogy and Zala would require police permits and that anyone found without a permit would be arrested. The Chief Prosecutor emphasized that anyone caught attempting to cross the border, even for the first time, would be handed over to the courts for criminal punishment.⁹⁰ Finally, as the last step in this series of measures aimed at reasserting full government control over all population movements abroad, a new decree was passed. Announced by Radio Budapest on February 6, 1957, it stipulated that all persons issuing propaganda in favor of illegal departures would be liable to imprisonment for periods ranging from 6 months to 5 years. Similarly, persons regularly "assisting illegal frontier crossings on a business-like basis" were made liable to jail sentences of one to ten years, and anyone in possession of information pertaining to such offenses who failed to inform the authorities ran the risk of a two-year prison sentence.⁹¹

The denunciation of the Austrian Government's conduct by Budapest continued. In a Note of February 21, the Hungarian régime blamed Austria for the tension existing between the two countries and, on March 7, the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs accused Vienna of such crimes as failing to ensure the return of children who had fled from Hungary and of delaying visits of the Hungarian repatriation missions.⁹² Again, on October 9, 1957, another Note from the same source on the repatriation of Hungarian children now in Austria was published in Budapest. "The problem of Hungarian children torn away from their parents and deprived of supervision and education demands a speedy solution. Any delay involves grave consequences as far as the fate of these children is concerned," said the communication.⁹³

Two additional measures were soon added by Budapest to its growing roster of repressive measures directed against Hungarians in exile. The amnesty was scheduled to expire on March 31, 1957. On March 29, the régime decided not to extend it in its original form. In its place a new

⁸⁹*Ibid.*, Jan. 20, 1957, p. 1.

⁹⁰*Népakarat*, Feb. 2, 1957.

⁹¹*East Europe*, Vol. 6, No. 3, p. 38 (1957); Radio Budapest reported on March 26 that the Zala county police had arrested six members of a "gang" that had helped people flee to Austria last November, *ibid.*, Vol. 6, No. 5, p. 41 (1957).

⁹²*East Europe*, Vol. 6, No. 5, p. 11 (1957)

⁹³*International Affairs*, 1957, No. 11, p. 12.

repatriation law went into effect on April 1, dividing the refugees into three categories. Those who had left the country between Oct. 23, 1956, and Jan. 31, 1957, and had registered themselves for repatriation with any Hungarian legation abroad prior to March 31, would be given full amnesty from prosecution. Youths of less than 18 years of age who fled between Oct. 23, 1956, and April 1, 1957, would be wholly exempted from criminal proceedings only if they had not reached the age of 18 at the time of their arrival home. All others who left Hungary illegally between Oct. 23 and April 1 and who announced after April 1, their intention to return, would be judged on the merits of their case.⁹⁴

As a final resort the Government took the drastic step of enacting measures enabling it to revoke the citizenship of exiles who took part in the October events. Without a dissenting vote Parliament, on June 6, 1957, approved a law revising the Citizenship Act of 1948 and "presumably directed against refugees who left the country after Soviet troops crushed the revolt." During the discussion of the new law, a former Premier, Lajos Dinnyés, "asked that the government use its powers . . . to cancel the citizenship of several prominent Hungarian exiles. He proposed that similar action be taken against 'those who live on territory that enjoys extraterritorial rights.'"⁹⁵ The new measure appears to envisage individual cancellations of citizenship and there has not been, as yet, any known case of its use against a refugee of the 1956 uprising. Nor have the Government's new powers of denaturalization been exercised against Cardinal Mindszenty, the obvious target of Dinnyés' remarks.

The adoption of this amendment to Act LX/1948 was the last step completing, at least for the time being, the edifice of the present régime's legal policy *vis-à-vis* the exiles of the October revolution.

Conclusions

Conditions are far from being settled yet on the Hungarian refugee front and a further crystallization of the official line must still be expected. Even now the Budapest Government still faces the problem of how to deal with a rather large contingent of Magyar exiles strewn all over Europe, 50,000 of whom, both of old and recent vintage, were counted in 1957 by the Zellerbach commission of the International Rescue Committee. However, by now the essential aspects of the official policy have had sufficient time to be formulated; at the present moment, it is, by and large, possible to judge what future developments may take place in this field and to analyze what is considered to be the typical behavior of the Hungarian Government in the rôle of a satellite régime faced with a crisis involving large-scale political migrations from its territory.

In the first place, it must be noted that mass repatriation as an official policy *de facto* implemented in good faith is valid only during a well-specified and limited time period: immediately after the crisis which pre-

⁹⁴*Népszabadság*, March 29, 1957.

⁹⁵*New York Times*, June 7, 1957, p. 11.

precipitated the exodus. First, at this moment the régime is somewhat shaken and attempts a conciliatory gesture. Second, and this explanation strikes us as the more logical one, immediate repatriation right after the mass flights of the citizenry is much more likely to bring back into the country those who, in effect, fled because of panic or fear or even because of a strong sense of personal hostility to the prevailing order without thereby being militant, irreconcilable and politically articulate opponents of the régime, liable to be troublesome if they were to return and be reintegrated.

When immediate repatriation has, by and large, brought home all the essentially inoffensive elements, the repatriation process which is then put into effect becomes more selective and more difficult, since it would now involve people who are more likely to be recalcitrants, who have pondered long on the desirability of their returning, who are more liable to have been active opponents of the régime and are thus possibly more dangerous if they were to be readmitted. This pattern made itself clearly evident both after World War II and after the October revolution, and seems to be one of the fundamentals of the satellite régimes' policies *vis-à-vis* their refugees.

After the early stream of voluntary returns had spent itself, the line of the Government's approach gradually hardened. Not only was the new repatriation policy selective, in practice, if not in theory, but it would seem, too, that measures were actually adopted to ensure that some elements would not in any case seek to return. In spite of its official claim to the effect that it wanted all Hungarians to come back home, it is evident from the post-October 1956 developments that the mass, total readmission of fugitives, apart from the immediate ebb at the close of the fighting, was not the sole (although it seems to have been the principal) feature of the Budapest régime's plans.

Various reasons, besides the one always in vogue that the rulers of the Communist orbit are uniformly ruthless whenever they can be and "soft" only when they are forced to be by a temporary lack of power, have been advanced in order to explain both the original leniency and the subsequent harshness of the Government's policy with regard to the Hungarian émigrés. In the first place, the official Party newspaper admitted, as early as December 1956, that there was an acute unemployment crisis within Hungary and conceded that although the mass departures of refugees from Hungary were "painful" they did ease the unemployment problem to a certain extent.⁹⁶ This could perhaps serve to explain in part the Hungarian authorities' reluctance to encourage and support mass returns. Another suggestion, a not unlikely one, has also been advanced to the effect that Soviet and Hungarian authorities may have allowed refugees to escape in large numbers in order to rid the country of militant opponents of Communism.⁹⁷ Should that be true unopposed expatriation would then appear to serve the régime as a temporary, controlled safety-valve and would help clarify the mystifying and inexplicable passivity, not to say indifference, of Kádár's

⁹⁶*Népszabadság*, December 24, 1956.

⁹⁷*New York Times*, December 27, 1956, p. 4.

native and Soviet border guards with regard to the refugees for a certain period of time after the decisive crushing of the uprising. In such a case the Government would, of necessity, not show great enthusiasm for a mass return of those whose departure it had witnessed with relief and, in fact, abetted, at least until such time as its control would be securely reestablished and reasserted throughout the land.

Finally, a third reason may perhaps be the valid one. A few months after the relative stabilization of its power the Hungarian Government undertook a large-scale repression of all its opponents, genuine and fancied. The mass arrests, trials and convictions of Freedom Fighters shocked world opinion and provoked indignant reaction to the terror spread by the Kádár régime. It would seem, therefore, that, while not willing to let those militant enemies of Communism who might choose to return go entirely unpunished and yet not wanting to stir up even more world opinion against further death sentences already so liberally dispensed by its special tribunals,⁹⁸ the Hungarian Government would have been rather pleased to bar these opponents from returning, thus saving itself the trouble of either prosecuting them in spite of public opinion or taking the not-inconsiderable risk of re-introducing these dissatisfied elements into a still agitated body politic.

In any case, whatever the true reason or reasons for its behavior after the revolt, it must be admitted that following the first voluntary repatriations the official line became such as hardly to encourage further returns and that, with time, the trend has only persisted further in that direction. The discontinuance of the amnesty after such a short while, the new denaturalization measures, domestic declarations of intent unconditionally to bar any pardon for those convicted for their activities during the rebellion,⁹⁹ stepped-up repression and harsher crackdowns, all these appear to be part of a pattern aimed at making clear, among other things, that repatriation would be foolhardy and that resettlement and reintegration of the exiles overseas would be rather welcome.

In short, the Government's policy with regard to its citizens in exile appears to vacillate between the two poles of desire to see the effective repatriation of the fugitives and the deep-seated fear of jeopardizing its domestic security. Officially, of course, repatriation is publicly endorsed at all times as the only general and only valid solution for the problem of refugees; simultaneously, however, measures are adopted in order to assure that the repatriation will be of such a nature as not to create undue difficulties for the régime internally. On the whole, the slogan of repatriation is too valuable not to be given full play by the authorities. The propaganda value of a "return home" campaign, both in its external and internal effects,

⁹⁸Set up on December 11, 1956, these summary courts were abolished by a Decree of the Presidential Council of November 3, 1957, *East Europe*, Vol. 6, No. 12, p. 42 (1957). Meanwhile, however, the regular courts had been reorganized on the old pattern especially for dealing with the cases of so-called "counter-revolutionaries," *Magyar Közlöny*, June 15, 1957.

⁹⁹*New York Times*, April 27, 1958, p. 4.

is much too great to be neglected. However, although the drive generally opens with a sweeping and apparently genuine effort to return as many Magyars as possible to the fold, this only lasts for a comparatively short while, gradually tapering off into a strictly selective policy of readmissions conditioned by the terms of not very generous amnesties or individual redefections. The scope of the official pardons reflects the state of the régime's internal security and its self-confidence. Thus, leading political opponents of the Party's ideology have been consistently barred from returning. Following World War II, this was done openly under the guise of the anti-fascist purge, and even the thaw-inspired amnesty of 1955 did not relent with regard to statesmen and politicians of the pre-Communist era. Nor has the Party ever readmitted those it forced to flee and then denaturalized after gaining ascendancy in the country, although it sought from time to time to put an end to their anti-Communist political activities abroad by demanding their extradition on charges of war crimes and sometimes even common crimes.

With regard to the fugitives of the October events the Government's policy has, of necessity, been less blunt. Claiming as it did that the uprising was a political coup engineered by a small band of conspirators, mostly outside the country (presumably Horthyists, traitors, and war criminals already divested of their Hungarian citizenship by the 1947-1948 legislation, which definitely excluded them from the country and thus in effect rendered them quite immune to any further decrees of the régime), and that the majority of refugees had fled in fear or panic, Budapest was thereby estopped by its own claims from: (1) making any distinctions in principle among the mass of refugees on some political basis: (2) raising any political obstacles to the total return of the escapees. This did not, however, force the Party into forsaking the principle of selective and screened repatriation, for it sought to achieve the same results by threatening returnees with criminal prosecution in accordance with freshly passed, draconic laws on "crimes against the people," its promises of amnesty being both restricted (except for a while during the revolt) and untrustworthy, as the fate of Imre Nagy tragically proved.

This apparent lack of enthusiasm for continued repatriation on the part of the Hungarian authorities was strikingly illustrated in the course of the United Nations Social and Humanitarian Committee's proceedings. On November 5, 1957, the Hungarian representative, Janos Péter, somewhat unexpectedly rose to commend the report read to that body by Dr. Lindt, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and, without dwelling at length on the details of the revolt, only mentioned, *en passant*, the problem posed by the 18,000 refugee children under 14 years of age "who ran away from home in an exodus caused by what amounted to hysteria."¹⁰⁰ His main plea, tactfully stated without the usual bluster, was for greater

¹⁰⁰*Ibid.*, Nov. 6, 1957, p. 10.

authority and resources for the agency in order to assist it in the repatriation of those who expressed their intention to return.

A few days later, Hungary went even further and, on November 11, deserting the rest of the Soviet bloc (which, incidentally, abstained from voting rather than vote against the proposed measure), voted in favor of continuing the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, whose main efforts were even then concerned with resettlement and not repatriation. The Hungarian spokesman praised the operations of the agency as not politically biased, and renewed, without much conviction, his plea that Dr. Lindt's office hasten its efforts to repatriate the remaining refugees from the revolt.¹⁰¹

Although it did pay lip service, in rather vague and general terms, to the idea of wholesale voluntary repatriation, the principal concern of the Hungarian authorities seems to have been centered on the future fate of its under-age escapees. In its various diplomatic *démarches*, too, the Hungarian Government, as has already been noted, stressed in particular the return of its minors. Otherwise little pressure was exerted, both on various occasions when amnesties were promulgated before the revolt and after the uprising, to achieve large-scale repatriation. Return home seems to have been a formula used mainly for propaganda purposes, in order to bring about individual defections from the West which would disrupt the organized *émigré* movement, but not to cause a mass reflux of elements who could possibly pose a threat to the régime.

In the final analysis it would appear that the Government's concern has, throughout all these years, always remained the same: to eliminate the centers of anti-Communist activity carried on by *émigré* organizations close to its border. Whether this was achieved by the repatriation of those exiles which the Government viewed as essentially politically neutral rank and file membership, or by the re-defection of key leaders or by the extradition of major figures or by resettlement of the fugitives overseas or otherwise at some distance from its borders, seems to have been in truth quite immaterial to the régime except from the standpoint of publicity and public opinion. Propaganda-wise, of course, the rulers obviously favored the early return of those they regarded as basically uncontaminated, apolitical and rehabilitable rank and file citizenry, coupled with the infrequent successes of its re-defection appeals. International projects for the resettlement of the Magyar refugees have not encountered major objections from Budapest, although official sources there have repeatedly made claims that many participants of the last exodus have attempted to return but have been prevented from doing so by Western authorities,¹⁰² a version apparently calculated to placate some of the unrest at home.

The experience of the October revolution distinguishes Hungary from the other satellites of the Soviet Union and in some respects modifies the area's general approach to the ubiquitous problem of refugees escaping

¹⁰¹*Ibid.*, Nov. 12, 1957, p. 5.

¹⁰²*The Truth About Hungary*, p. 22.

from it. Basically, however, the pattern is the same throughout the bloc: relatively easy and massive repatriation in the early years, followed by a gradual tightening up culminating in extensive denaturalization legislation, modified from time to time by narrowly-defined and selective amnesties and offers of readmission with qualified immunity from prosecution. In the years up to 1956, the policy of the Hungarian Government followed this general line without deviations, although minor variations were always tolerated within the orbit in order better to enable each satellite régime to handle the particular aspects of its problems. Thus Budapest's repressive measures were somewhat less stringent than those of Bulgaria, whose geographic isolation and whose comparatively small contribution to the refugee population seems to have enabled it to adopt the most drastic penal provisions (death sentence for the fugitive; prison terms, deprivation of property and civil rights and compulsory divorce for his relatives), against so-called "desertion of the homeland."¹⁰³ However, its re-defection campaign and its amnesties were more limited in scope than those of the other satellites, except Romania, and its frontier barriers were, and are now again, the most formidable section of the Iron Curtain.¹⁰⁴ In spite of minor modifications of detail the policies of the Soviet bloc after 1947 with regard to its refugees were essentially a reincarnation of the approach used by the Kremlin towards the problem of Russian fugitives in the years 1917-1939,¹⁰⁵ and still remain at that stage except in the case of Hungary.

All the states of Eastern Europe have been a source of refugees from Communism. However, only the Soviet Union and Hungary have as yet been faced by a massive and spontaneous repudiation of "socialism" by large segments of their populations: the USSR right after the war when millions of refugees and displaced persons from its territory resisted repatriation, Hungary after October 1956. In both instances the governments have had to deal with the new problem of escapees from a "socialist" order, workers and peasants and Party-members, rather than so-called class enemies of the toiling masses. Moscow reacted by insisting on total repatriation, opposing all international resettlement schemes, protesting all international assistance which might result in the perpetuation of the refugee centers. It did not, however, bring back to life its earlier drastic denationalization decrees. Budapest has passed new denaturalization laws, but has, as yet, not used them; it, too, has loudly embraced the repatriation slogan but, being in a much more precarious situation than the Kremlin, it has not opposed the idea of resettlement, apparently seeking to liquidate by any means émigré concentration points close to its borders. In both cases, the general approach has, on the surface, been one of "go slow," as compared to the ruthless line *vis-à-vis* earlier departures, perhaps because of the very mag-

¹⁰³*N.B.I.C.*, Vol. 4, No. 10, p. 3 (1955).

¹⁰⁴For a general survey of the satellite régimes' policies with regard to refugees of their nationality, see the article "Emigré Go Home," *N.B.I.C.*, Vol. 4, No. 10, pp. 3-13 (1955).

¹⁰⁵For an analysis of Moscow's policy during that period see the author's article in 51 *A.J.I.L.*, pp. 325-344 (1957).

nitude of the problem, or because of the adverse publicity engendered by such a wide-scale repudiation of the new order, or because by the very logic of their own propaganda claims the respective Governments were estopped from openly proscribing persons whose very presence abroad they chose to explain by a misguided feeling of fear or credulity.

The official attitude of the Hungarian Government towards its refugees has, therefore, been one of apparent moderation since October 1956. Although its policy has gradually become harsher since the first days of the uprising, and although the potential of an even harder approach is ever-present in the form of actual resort to the new decrees permitting the authorities to deprive exiles of their citizenship, Budapest has not, as yet, reverted to the extremes of its postwar anti-refugee policy. In the future it is probable that the Hungarian Government will undertake additional measures. It has already, in principle, washed its hands of the remaining refugees by providing for the means of their denaturalization at a moment's notice, thus laying the grounds for a possible proximate step in that direction and, meanwhile, providing the escapees with added incentive to emigrate. In this latter respect it has indeed been fortunate. The spontaneous reaction of the outside world has, by and large, guaranteed the solution of the major aspects of the problem of Magyar exiles by resettling and integrating the great bulk of them. This has considerably diminished the threat posed to the régime by the discontented forces of its citizens in exile, compactly organized so close to its frontiers. At present the problem of Hungarian refugees, although far from completely closed yet, is no longer a critical one for the Hungarian Government. Following the latest denaturalization legislation, it is probable that the latter will be gradually put into effect, then the re-defection campaign will be slowly resumed in order to keep the émigré movement off balance if possible, and, from time to time, selective, limited and not too generous amnesties will be proclaimed with the intent of appeasing resistance at home and further disorganizing opposition abroad.

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT LOS ANGELES

COAL IN POLAND'S ECONOMY AND FOREIGN TRADE

by Stanley J. Zyzniewski

THE single, most influential factor affecting Poland's economic development since the Second World War has been the production and distribution of its coal. Given the vast resources located within its postwar boundaries, Poland now disposes of more than two-and-a-half times the amount of coal it did before 1939; as the major source of fuel and energy, as material for the production of industrial goods, and as the most prominent commodity of its foreign trade.

Vital as the production and export of coal has become to industrial expansion, it also has a particular significance in Poland's foreign economic relations. Those economic imbalances which the Government since 1956 has striven to redress were in part fostered by the notorious coal agreement of 1945 between Poland and the Soviet Union. Furthermore, recent developments have indicated to what extent the industrial plans of neighboring Czechoslovakia and East Germany are dependent upon steady exports of Polish coal. This dependence, in turn, is a manifestation of the more vigorous trend towards regional economic coordination that has recently evolved within the Soviet bloc. The significance of Polish coal exports in this respect should not be underestimated.

In the final analysis, any prognosis of Polish economic stability and of industrial trends within Eastern Europe cannot ignore the overall rôle of Polish coal exports. This article first attempts to present a review of the salient features of Polish coal production and export since 1945 before attention is given to the major problems currently affecting the Polish coal industry and to those aspects that are related to the rôle of Polish coal exports in Eastern European economic development.¹

Frontier changes following the last World War placed Poland among the leading world producers and exporters of coal. Various estimates of the amount of Polish coal reserves differ, due partly to a paucity of data, different classifications and incomplete explorations. Some sources of the United Nations place total reserves at approximately 193 billion tons, much of which is located in the basins of Upper and Lower Silesia. More than half of these reserves (about 100 billion tons) are in the Upper Silesian Basin and are of a quality that makes this region comparable in importance to the Ruhr and Donets basins.² In any event, the immensity of Polish

¹The absence of much official data on certain aspects of Polish coal exports (such as directional distribution) imposes some limitations and impels occasional reliance upon secondary sources. Some general inferences are designed to illustrate orders of magnitude rather than detailed conclusions.

²Based on information found in U. N., *European Steel Trends in the Setting of the World Market* (Geneva, 1949), 116; *idem*, *Transfer of Electric Power Across European Frontiers* (Geneva, 1952), 177f., as cited by N. Spulber, *The Economics of Communist Eastern Europe* (New York, 1957), 320; J. Krynicki, *Problemy handlu zagranicznego. Polski* (Warsaw, 1958), 286. V. H. Winston, "The Polish Bituminous Coal-Mining In-

reserves is partly illustrated by the production and trade data of 1957. In producing about 5.5 per cent of the world total for that year, Poland ranked sixth in volume, behind the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, West Germany and Mainland China, respectively.³ Its exports of coal during that year, however, surpassed those of Mainland China.

The Early Postwar Years

The significant expansion of Poland's production and export of coal since the war has not always resulted in increased benefits for the Polish economy. Non-economic considerations occasionally replaced the commercial self-interests of Poland. An examination of the distribution of Polish coal immediately reveals that coal exports have likewise served as payment for Soviet economic tutelage and as an instrument for the establishment of an economic bloc. These non-economic motivations are obviously related to the spread of Soviet political power and the polarization of international relations.

The sweep of Soviet power across Poland and Eastern Europe had a decisive influence upon the disposition of Polish coal. Soviet economic policy towards Poland and other East European states immediately after the end of hostilities was of a bifurcated nature. On the one hand, action was taken in line with the Soviet aim of promoting "friendly" governments, frequently accompanied by parallel economic actions (emergency deliveries of foodstuffs and materials, etc.). Simultaneously, the relatively fluid state of political conditions (therefore, uncertainty as to final results) and the enormous need of the Soviet Union for its own domestic recovery prompted Soviet authorities to adopt a program of massive dismantlement of equipment in the areas they occupied, as well as to engage in a series of exploitative practices designed to alleviate Soviet internal needs. These apparently paradoxical features of Soviet economic policy toward Eastern Europe and Poland can best be explained as products of short-term improvisations.⁴ The effect upon the disposition of Polish coal was most significant.

Soviet support and acts that facilitated the incorporation of former German coal fields of Silesia into the boundaries of the new Poland were obviously beneficial to the Polish economy. In addition to increases of other raw materials, the sizable increment in coal reserves is evidenced by 1937 data showing that the output of coal that was within what were to be

dustry," *American Slavic and East European Review*, XV, No. 1 (February, 1956), 41, estimates that "probable total reserves at depth not exceeding 4,500 feet may be roughly established at 100 billion tons. This figure could be increased by the undisclosed reserve tonnage of the newly discovered Volhynian fields."

³Główny Urząd Statystyczny P. R. L., *Rocznik Statystyczny, 1958* (Warsaw 1958), 504. References to coal exports in this paper are restricted to hard, bituminous coal unless otherwise specified.

⁴A more detailed exposition of Soviet foreign economic policy towards Eastern Europe at this time is found in the author's "Soviet Foreign Economic Policy," *The Political Science Quarterly*, LXXIII, No. 2 (June, 1958), 210-214; and a more specific analysis of this policy as it affected Poland appears in the author's "The Soviet Economic Impact upon Poland," *The American Slavic and East European Review*, XVIII, No. 2 (April, 1959), 205-225.

Poland's postwar boundaries was over 78 per cent more than within her prewar frontiers.⁵ Any program for rapid, economic recovery appeared greatly enhanced by these additional reserves and larger exports of coal could capitalize upon the huge postwar demand.

The collapse of Germany, along with a dearth of traditional Polish exports, naturally induced some redirection of Polish trade towards the Soviet Union immediately after the war. Polish recovery was initially dependent upon U.N.R.R.A. activities and Soviet trade, and its imports could for the most part be counterbalanced by exports of raw materials (predominantly coal) and some finished goods converted from imports. Consequently, more than 25 per cent of Polish coal production was channelled to the Soviet Union in the remaining months of 1945.⁶

The recovery of Polish coal production itself was quite rapid throughout 1945 and 1946, and the extraction of coal by 1946 surpassed any of the prewar annual levels. At the start of that year, when the January decree of nationalization placed mining under governmental control, over 184,000 were employed in coal mining and the monthly output exceeded 3.5 million metric tons.⁷ Yet the full value of this recovery could not be fully realized because Soviet exploitative devices had been in effect.

Along with the now familiar claims on German assets and the definitions of war booty that ostensibly justified extensive dismantlement in Eastern Europe, one of the more conspicuous examples of Soviet economic exploitation during these years was embodied in the Soviet-Polish reparations agreement of August 1945.⁸ Its major clauses stipulated that as compensation for German assets remaining in Poland's "western lands," and also for the delivery to Poland of 15 per cent of all German reparations due the Soviet Union, specific quantities of Polish coal would be shipped annually to the Soviet Union at concessionary prices: 8 million tons in 1946, 13 million tons in each of the four subsequent years, and then 12 million tons annually for the duration of the Soviet occupation in Germany. This agreement, in effect, not only redirected huge amounts of Polish coal from other, more profitable markets, but also resulted in a huge financial loss because of reduced prices.⁹

On the eve of the Three-Year Plan for reconstruction, at the end of 1946, total production of coal amounted to approximately 67 million tons,

⁵U.N.R.R.A., *Operational Analysis Paper*, No. 35, p. 6. as cited by T. Alton, *Poland's Postwar Economy* (New York, 1955), 26. Another comparison reveals that in 1944 the newly-acquired fields in Upper and Lower Silesia had produced over 37 per cent of all coal extracted in the whole area that was to be in the new Polish state. V. H. Winston, *loc. cit.*, 52.

⁶Cf. Appendix at the end of this article for these and subsequent references to Polish coal production and exports.

⁷F. Topolski, "Poland's Coal Industry," *Changing Epoch* (London, 1947), 5.

⁸Texts of these agreements have been reprinted in the *Bulletin of the U. S. Department of State*, XIV, No. 348 (March 3, 1948).

⁹S. Mikołajczyk, *The Pattern of Soviet Domination* (New York, 1948), 157f., has asserted that the price paid for these "reparation" deliveries was about \$1.25 a ton, at a time when Scandinavian market prices ranged between \$12 and \$16 a ton.

of which 28 per cent (about 19 million tons) had been exported. Four-fifths of these exports were directed to markets in the Soviet sphere of influence. The Soviet Union alone absorbed over one-fifth of what Poland produced, or almost three-fourths of what it exported.

It was soon apparent, though, that the original quotas of "reparation" deliveries established in the 1945 agreement were unrealistic. An initial modification was made in March 1947, and, when the progress of Poland's Three-Year Plan made it obvious that further reductions were necessary, these concessionary shipments were finally scaled down to 6.5 million tons annually. But the unrealistic price remained.

The Three-Year Plan of reconstruction adopted from 1947 to 1949 was initially designed to raise economic output to its prewar levels. Before its completion, however, external pressures generated by the polarization of international relations were to condition further the pace and direction of economic development and, with it, the disposition of Polish coal. Broadly speaking, the start of the cold war in 1948 included the Soviet determination to consolidate its position in Eastern Europe. A major objective was the erection of a tractable economic bloc whose members were to industrialize intensely along Soviet lines and likewise strive towards autarky. This *sine qua non* of Soviet strategy to strengthen the "socialist camp" likewise portended some shift in Soviet economic policy in that, alongside its earlier exploitative practices, it was now impelled to extend credits to bloc members to facilitate industrialization. Moreover, the appearance of the Council for Mutual Economic Aid (CEMA) as an answer to the West's Marshall Plan symbolized the Soviet intention of substituting East-West trade with intra-bloc trade and bloc self-sufficiency. The immediate portents for Poland were a faster tempo of industrialization and a further redirection of its foreign trade. These naturally affected the production and distribution of Polish coal.

The Polish economy, reshaped through nationalization and the acquisition of new territory, achieved the broad goals projected by the Three-Year Plan. Agricultural production and overall industrial output reached prewar levels, although the pattern of the latter differed in that light industry remained below 1938 production.¹⁰

The production of hard coal in the first two years of the plan slightly exceeded the established quotas, and by 1948 had surpassed the new regions' prewar levels. But indications of a growing shortage appeared in 1949 as extraction for that year fell 5 per cent below the plan. Various factors were responsible and these remained unresolved in the following years. The greater number of mines in Poland now required a larger working force, and at the start of 1949 the number of underground workers in this mining sector exceeded by 157 per cent those employed in 1937. But this labor force was not increased significantly throughout the three-year period. Moreover, productivity was considerably below that of prewar levels: output per

¹⁰T. Alton, *Poland's Postwar Economy* (New York, 1955), 150.

manshift in coal mines at the end of 1948 was about 1.8 tons, only 75 per cent of the 1937. Investments for new equipment remained relatively inadequate for modernizing or replacing machinery. Consequently, only 28 per cent of the hewing operation in 1948 was mechanized and transport of coal to the surface was virtually unmechanized.¹¹

The export picture of Polish coal during the Three-Year Plan period differed significantly from the prewar pattern in at least two ways: there was comparatively less coal available for export and a sharp change in the directional flow of these exports had occurred. In 1937, approximately 31 per cent of the coal extracted was assigned for export, but by 1949, this share had risen only 4 percent at a time when production had almost doubled.¹² Although this lag in export increases may be partly explained by the enormous needs of reconstruction, it was also influenced by an unrealistic price policy that made internal purchases of coal exceedingly cheap, thereby encouraging wastefulness in consumption and in the manufacture of other export goods whose prices could not cover the real costs of coal that had been used. This shortcoming in price policy was to plague Polish economic planning consistently and, despite attempts at rectification, it remains a current problem.

More than 203 million tons of coal were extracted during these three years and over 69 million tons (or about 34 per cent of production) were exported. But the directional pattern of these exports was in flux until 1949 when it became increasingly evident that Polish coal exports were to contribute significantly to Soviet plans for an economic bloc.

Much of Polish trade in the first two years after the war was understandably directed towards the Soviet Union, but on the eve of the cold war, as some of the traditional outlets in the West were re-established, a larger share of its exports was drawn in the latter direction. By 1948, it has been estimated that Soviet imports of Polish coal had fallen to less than 28 per cent of total Polish exports, as compared to its 1947 share of 45.7 per cent.¹³ Meantime, exports to East European states under Soviet influence had expanded so that over 15 per cent of Polish coal exports in 1948 went to these countries, a substantial increase over the prewar share of less than 4 per cent.

Once the emergence of the cold war stimulated the Soviet Union towards more energetic action in the creation of an economic bloc, an immediate response occurred in the pattern of Polish coal trade. The provisions of a five-year, Soviet-Polish trade agreement signed in 1948 led to the subsequent arrest and reversal of the declining Soviet share, both in Polish trade and coal exports, that had developed since 1946. Soviet imports of

¹¹Cf. U. N., *Economic Bulletin for Europe*, I, No. 3 (1949), 16; Winston, *loc. cit.*, 54; *Przegląd Gorniczy*, No. 2 (1956), 45.

¹²Cf. Krynicki, *op. cit.*, 268.

¹³A statement in *Vneshniaia Torgovlia*, No. 9 (1949), 3, gave the Soviet share in 1948 as 29 per cent (or over 7 million tons) of exports, but this likewise included coke. The share of the Soviet bloc, percentage-wise, in Polish coal export from 1945 to 1954 has been compiled by V. H. Winston, *loc. cit.*, 54.

Polish hard coal amounted to almost 8.5 million tons in 1949, or more than one-third of Polish coal exports.¹⁴

Concomitantly, a redirection of Polish trade and coal exports followed the announced formation of CEMA in 1949 and the series of agreements on economic cooperation and trade signed between Poland and other bloc members during that year. The East European share of Polish coal exports jumped to more than 23 per cent at the end of 1949, with the largest shipments going to the more industrially advanced states of Czechoslovakia and East Germany. The latter states and the Soviet Union, then, absorbed more than half of all Polish coal shipments at this time.

This amply illustrated the extent to which Polish coal was now subject to the interests of the bloc as a whole; it absorbed almost 18 per cent of Polish production during these three years.

There is little doubt that this sharp redirection of Polish coal exports entailed considerable financial sacrifice. One Polish source indicates that total coal exports of over 69 million tons from 1947 to 1949 earned approximately \$848.8 million dollars, with the resulting average price per ton being about \$12.30.¹⁵ On the other hand, Polish coal exports to Sweden in these same years exceeded 7.6 million tons, for which Swedes paid approximately 477.8 million Kroner, or about \$132.7 million, thus making the average price per ton around \$17.30.¹⁶ This example alone conveys the general magnitude of financial loss to Poland stemming partly from "reparation" deliveries to the Soviet Union and from bilateral pacts with other members of the bloc.

The Six-Year Plan Period

Poland's first prolonged effort toward rapid industrialization modelled after the Soviet pattern was begun in 1950. Although the Six-Year Plan aimed at a speedy overall development of the economy, it was particularly concerned with the expansion of industrial production. Consequently, about 61 per cent of centrally planned investment was to be allotted to industry, transportation and building enterprises. The larger shares were to be divided among the metallurgical, engineering and chemical sectors, followed by a necessary expansion in the supply of fuels, ores and materials required for such a program.¹⁷

Polish planners projected an increase of 35 per cent in coal output by the end of this period, or approximately 26 million tons more. Half of this increase was to come from eleven new mines and thirty-six new seams

¹⁴This and data in the following three paragraphs are derived from information presented in J. Krynicki, *op. cit.*, 271; H. V. Winston, *loc. cit.*, 56; *Przegląd Gorniczy*, XIII, No. 4 (April, 1957), 167f.; *Sveriges Officiella Statistik Handel* (Stockholm: Kommerskolligium), 1945-1955 issues.

¹⁵*Przegląd Gorniczy*, XIII, No. 4 (April, 1957), 167.

¹⁶From 1946 to 1949, conversion rates placed 3.6 kroner to one dollar. Any attempt to explain this difference as part of transportation costs places an unrealistically high premium on shipping.

¹⁷U. N., *Economic Bulletin for Europe*, IX, No. 3 (1957), 24f.

that were to be exploited. Yet no significant expansion in the labor force was contemplated. It was assumed that new investments, rationalization and a better-skilled labor force would raise labor productivity sufficiently to account for most of this increase. Output per manshift was to be raised by about 38 per cent over that of 1949 and this would reach 1,700 kilograms by 1955, or a total daily output of about 331 tons.¹⁸

The serious shortcomings common to all East European industrialization programs during these years likewise marred the Polish record. The expansion of the economy was ostensibly impressive by the end of 1955. Defects in planning and implementation had led, nonetheless, to serious imbalances that soon affected productive capacity, the standard of living and Poland's trade position. Over-optimism about the rates of growth and relative costs, technical miscalculations, external pressures for expanded armaments production and the effects of the West's embargo—all contributed to a series of "bottlenecks" and wasteful disproportions of such a size that the Government in 1954 had to acknowledge that some modifications of the plan were necessary. This coincided roughly with the Soviet inauguration of the "New Course" shortly after Stalin's death.¹⁹

Coal mining was a particular sector of the economy where the defects of the plan were amply illustrated. Production fell below previously established goals, impeding both internal expansion and foreign trade increases, upon which the former depended. The overall industrial capacity expanded by about 285 per cent, but extraction of coal had risen only by about 28 per cent (i.e., a total volume increase of 20.4 million tons in lieu of the planned 26 million tons, or 7 per cent below fulfillment).²⁰ The causes of this failure were multiple, including insufficient investments, an unrealistic price policy, inferior technical calculations and low labor productivity.

A lag in plan fulfillment began as early as 1951, due in no small way to inadequate investments belatedly made. Only 16 per cent of the 86 billion złoty invested by the Ministry of Heavy Industry from 1951 to 1955 was related to coal mining, and less than 4 per cent of all Polish imports of machinery was mining equipment. The first new seam was opened only by 1952. This slow pace of investment and mechanization precluded a steady supply needed for continued industrial expansion.²¹

¹⁸*Ibid.*, 26; *Gospodarka Planowa*, No. 9 (1957), 24; *Dziennik Ustaw*, No. 37 (1950), 432 and *Zycie Gospodarcze*, March 16-31, 1950, 264f., as cited by T. Alton, *op. cit.*, 172f.

¹⁹For more detailed accounts see O. Halecki, ed., *Poland* (New York, 1957), 250-444; J. Montias, "Unbinding the Polish Economy," *Foreign Affairs*, XXV, No. 3 (April, 1957), 470-485; "The Polish Economy Since 1950," *Economic Bulletin for Europe*, IX, No. 3 (November, 1957), 21-48, and the author's "The Soviet Economic Impact Upon Poland," *The American Slavic and East European Review*, XVII, No. 2 (April, 1959), 211-214.

²⁰*Handel Zagraniczny*, No. 11 (1957), 9; *Economic Bulletin for Europe*, IX, No. 3 (November, 1957), 45; U. N., *Economic Survey of Europe for 1955*, 172.

²¹Mechanized cutting and hewing operations accounted for less than 36 per cent of production in 1955, while loading was only 16 per cent mechanized. Full production from a new seam is achieved in six years, and that of a new mine up to 12 years. By 1955, only six of the originally planned eleven mines were opened. Cf. *Gospodarka Planowa*, No. 9 (1957), 24f.; *Przegląd Gorniczy*, No. 12 (1954), 419 and No. 2 (1956), 45.

The failure of labor productivity to increase output compounded strains. The mining force showed little enthusiasm for greater effort in the face of high consumer prices, severe labor discipline, "voluntary" work on Sundays and deteriorating working conditions. Output per manshift continued to decline steadily so that at the end of the plan period average production was only 1,684 kilograms, as compared to 1,800 kilograms in 1950. In the final analysis, the daily rate of coal extraction in 1955 averaged only 85.5 per cent of the planned 331,000 tons.²²

Moreover, an unwise price policy prevailed. Inter-regional equalization of costs encouraged wasteful consumption and was not reflected in the prices of manufacturers absorbing considerable amounts of coal. This situation led to export of products which brought less revenue than would have been collected by the simple export of coal.²³

Attempts by the Government to arrest these harmful trends included a new schedule of raised coal prices which, striving to cover costs and encourage rationing of particular grades, applied various boosts which averaged out to an increase of 33 per cent. Simultaneously, though, wage increases to stimulate productivity tended to offset price boosts and by 1955 coal production costs had risen by 70 per cent. A new drive, begun in 1954, sought to make more coal available for internal priority needs and export purposes. In the final analysis, however, the Six-Year Plan drew to an unsuccessful end for the coal mining sector. Adverse trends had not been averted, although the accumulated impact was to be felt later.²⁴

Against this background of greater internal consumption and underfulfillment of planned production, Polish coal exports during the Six-Year Plan likewise failed to reach established goals. Although the share of coal in total export earnings continued to grow (from about 30 per cent of export trade in 1950 to more than 40 per cent in 1955), coal exports, nonetheless, declined in relation to total production from 34 per cent in 1950 to less than 26 per cent in 1955. Actually, less than 92 per cent of planned exports of both coal and coke was realized during this period, resulting in a loss of revenue amounting to \$200 million.²⁵ Poland's ability to import machinery and equipment for continued industrialization was naturally affected, especially since decreased exports made themselves felt more in non-bloc trade. Coal exports to bloc members, on the other hand, actually climbed despite these difficulties.

Consequently, the Polish loss of revenue and subsequent economic difficulties stemming from this course cannot be solely ascribed to a falling

²²Cf. *Gospodarka Planowa*, No. 9 (1957), 24; V. H. Winston, *loc. cit.*, 58-62; O. Halecki, *op. cit.*, 325-327; *Statistical Yearbook of the Polish People's Republic*, 1957 (Washington, 1958), 82.

²³The export of coal at one time could bring in a dollar at an average cost of 8 zloty, while an equivalent income from steel exports cost 15-20 zloty, and that from steel products cost 30-50 zloty. J. Montias, *loc. cit.*, 475.

²⁴Cf. Alton, *op. cit.*, 237f.; Krynicki, *op. cit.*, 249-271; Winston, *loc. cit.*, 57-68, for additional details.

²⁵*Handel Zagraniczny*, No. 2 (1957), 8f.

rate of extraction and greater internal consumption. Continuing shipments of "reparation" coal to the Soviet Union until the end of 1953, along with the sharp re-direction of coal exports to bloc members and away from western markets, were likewise contributory factors. Coal exports to bloc members certainly could not acquire for Poland those imports of advanced industrial equipment for which an export surplus in Western Europe could cover. And it is doubtful whether the price of these coal exports to bloc members reflected world market prices.

Polish export of coal became a major source of fuel and energy for bloc members. Whereas in 1948 deliveries to Soviet bloc countries comprised 43 per cent of all coal exports, this share exceeded two-thirds of all Polish coal exports during the plan period. Czechoslovakia and East Germany alone absorbed more than 30 per cent, while the Soviet Union received almost a third of all Polish coal exports.

With plan underfulfillment and expanding internal requirements, priority commitments of coal to bloc members reduced exports to the West European market. Shipments declined from the 10.6 million in 1950 to 6.9 million in 1953, followed by a rise to 7.9 million in 1955.²⁶ This decrease occurred at a time when the price of coal had risen considerably, partly a result of conditions created by the Korean War.²⁷

Additional sacrifice of revenue continued with "reparation" shipments to the Soviet Union to the end of 1953. Approximately 26 million tons of the total 49 million tons of coal delivered consisted of these shipments. When, in 1953, the Soviet government renounced further German reparations as of 1954, the Polish government, in turn, was released from its obligation. A general estimate of the Polish loss in revenue arising from this 1945 agreement on coal exports exceeds \$650 million.²⁸

Recent Developments

The serious economic imbalances that had developed by 1956 could not be ignored completely by the Government when it announced the new Five-Year Plan, to begin in 1956. Some slight shifts in emphasis were adopted,

²⁶In 1949, about 64 per cent of the coal production was allotted to meet internal needs. This share rose to more than 74 per cent in 1955. Cf. *Economic Survey of Europe in 1957*, Chapter VI, 9 and 39; Krynicki, *op. cit.*, 269f.

²⁷The overall average of Polish coal export prices in Western Europe between June, 1950 and December 1952 was more than \$18 a ton. Soviet exports of hard coal to Finland from 1951 to 1955 inclusively averaged about \$24.00 per ton. Cf. *Economic Survey for Europe in 1953*, 231; *idem*, in 1957, Chapter VI, 54.

²⁸A dearth of data allows only a rough approximation of Polish losses in this transaction. It may be assumed that "reparation" shipments from 1946 to 1953, inclusively, were in the vicinity of 52 million tons. Cf. J. Montias, *loc. cit.*, 479f.; J. Dolina, *Poland's Economic Relations with the Soviet Union, 1945-1955*, unpublished M.A. thesis (Columbia University, 1957), 73, as cited by J. Wszelaki, *Communist Economic Strategy: The Role of East-Central Europe* (National Planning Commission, 1959), 126. Accepting Mikołajczyk's revelation that the Soviet price for this coal was \$1.25 per ton, Polish receipts would amount to \$65 million, to which may be added another \$60 million in German reparations received in 1946 and 1947. By way of comparison, Polish coal exports to Sweden from 1946 to 1953, inclusively, amounted to 18.6 million tons, for which Sweden paid the equivalent of \$325 million, or an average of about \$17.40 per ton throughout the period.

whereby the share of investments for heavy industry was modestly reduced to the advantage of the housing, building materials and agricultural sectors. An improvement in living standards was a declared aim and the investment program was shaped towards the completion of projects already begun. This initial version of the plan likewise scheduled a 16 per cent increase in coal production by 1960, to reach a total of 110 million tons.²⁹

The minor palliatives and slight planning adjustments, however, were inadequate for arresting the growing economic crisis that developed in 1956. Industrial capacity failed to increase according to plan. A changed political climate and increased popular pressures compelled the Government to extend further concessions, such as wage increases, but these failed to improve the overall need to raise living standards. Broadly speaking, those crucial branches affecting either foreign exchange or the standard of living fell short of planned goals and compounded the economic dilemma.

The coal sector partly illustrated these problems. Production had increased less than 1 per cent over the preceding year.³⁰ More important, a serious loss of foreign exchange occurred as the Government, striving to allay some public discontent, allocated more coal for internal consumption and less for export. In failing by more than 5 million tons to export the planned quota of 24.5 million tons of coal, it incurred a loss of foreign exchange exceeding \$100 million that could have covered a larger import surplus. Moreover, this contributed to the disruption of Czech and East German industrial programs as coal imports were reduced.³¹ This deterioration both in the rates of coal extraction and export was a major factor which, connected with non-economic developments, paved the way for Gomulka's emergence in October 1956 and a further revision of the Five-Year Plan.

The efforts to rehabilitate the economy since 1956 rest essentially upon an extension of those trends begun earlier, i.e., a slower pace of industrial expansion and greater attention to those sectors of the economy where the serious imbalances and "bottlenecks" had mushroomed. Continued industrialization still lies at the heart of the Five-Year Plan but the new economic policy has striven towards a balanced retrenchment and an im-

(Compiled on basis of data in the 1945-1955 issues of *Sveriges Officiella Statistik Handel*, published by the Swedish Kommerskollegium). More specifically, Polish coal exports to the West European market from June 1950 to June 1953 averaged out to \$17.85 a ton, which would have resulted in a revenue of about \$465 million had the 26 million tons of "reparation" coal been available. *Economic Survey of Europe in 1953*, 231. Considering the fraction paid by the Soviet Union, the Polish loss can be estimated to be more than \$430 million, to which may be added more than \$250 million for the preceding four years (after deductions of reparations received and token Soviet prices), when the general export price of coal hovered around \$14 per ton. The magnitude of the Polish loss from this 1945 arrangement, then, ranges from \$650 million to \$700 million.

²⁹*Economic Survey of Europe in 1956*, Chapter I, 11-15, Chapter II, 4, Appendix, 44.

³⁰Output of both coal and lignite in 1956 was 97.6 million tons, or about 1 per cent above the preceding year but also 1 per cent short of the planned goal. *Ibid.*

³¹Czechoslovakia and East Germany imported slightly more than 5.9 million tons in 1956, a reduction of 1.5 million tons from the previous year, with East Germany bearing the greatest loss. Soviet imports fell by about 2.1 million tons. *Statistical Handbook of the People's Republic of Poland*, 1957, 246.

provement of Poland's trade position. Different measures dealing with rates of investments for different sectors, administrative decentralization, labor incentives and a better standard of living have so far produced varying results and are beyond the purview of this paper. One of the more crucial efforts has been the attempt to vitalize the coal industry and expand coal exports.

Generally speaking, the Soviet awareness of the magnitude of Poland's economic crisis by the end of 1956 was partly responsible for changes in the nature of Soviet-Polish economic relations. These changes included a more equitable rearrangement of economic ties and the assertion that trade would adhere to world prices. Moreover, the November 1956 agreement also included a re-evaluation of previous Polish coal deliveries. A Soviet acknowledgment of losses sustained from 1945 was cited as the justification for the cancellation of Polish debts amounting to approximately 525 million dollars. The significance of this act was not that it was a complete redress of economic grievances, or even for the loss in the coal exports, but that it seemed a portent of future relations, i.e. "socialist equality" at least in financial transactions.³²

The fall of coal production and export was of particular concern to East Germany and Czechoslovakia as well, prompting both governments to grant credits to Poland in 1957 in order to facilitate a smoother flow of coal and lignite required by them. East German credits of \$100 million in April were to aid Polish expansion of lignite production and were followed by Czech credits of \$65 million in October to promote mechanization of Polish coal mining.³³

The new version of the Five-Year Plan which appeared in 1957 included measures for energizing the coal-mining industry. Guided by the general concept that the rate of industrial output had to be slower than originally assumed in order to relieve "bottlenecks," a larger share of the investments has been assigned to coal-mining. The average annual rate throughout the plan period is to be 22.6 per cent of total industrial investments, an increase over the 18.2 per cent made in 1955. This is to expedite greater mechanization and an expansion of mining. The revised goals set 105 million tons as the production target for 1960, an 11 per cent increase over 1955. Export of coal, however, is not to expand commensurately in that a greater share is projected for internal requirements; 92 per cent of 1955 coke and coal exports was set as the goal.³⁴ Moreover, organizational

³²See *Trybuna Ludu* of April 19, 1957, statement of N. Trampczynski, Ministry of Foreign Trade.

³³In 1956, coal and lignite comprised 76 per cent of Polish exports to East Germany and 82 per cent to Czechoslovakia, Cf. *Handel Zagraniczny*, No. 10 (1957), 2; *Economic Survey of Europe in 1957*, Chapter VI, 56.

³⁴Hard coal exports alone were to reach about 17 million tons, so that during the Five-Year Plan the Government anticipates exporting only about one-half of the 150 million tons exported during the Six-Year Plan, thereby losing more than \$100 million annually in foreign exchange. Cf. *Economic Bulletin for Europe*, IX, No. 3 (1957), 37-41; *Przegląd Gorniczy*, No. 4 (April, 1957), 171; K. Secomski, *Premises of the Five-Year Plan in Poland, 1956-1960* (Warsaw, 1958), 37-39.

improvements and better working conditions and incentives are to step up labor productivity. These, along with various measures aimed at fuel economy, make up the program for coal-mining during this period.

The momentum of deleterious trends continued throughout 1957, however, both in production and export. The former fell by almost 1 per cent below the previous year. The greatest impact was in the export field as the internal retrenchment process consumed over 5 million tons more. Coal exports fell to 14 per cent of production, a considerable drop compared to the share of previous years. Although this decline was partly felt in Polish trade with Western Europe, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe bore the brunt of the decreases.³⁵

This continuing decline throughout 1957 was partly explained by the new policy of abolishing prison and military labor, as well as "voluntary" Sunday shifts. But its roots were in steadily declining labor productivity, despite wage increases in 1956 and 1957. Output per manshift declined to 1684 kilograms by 1955 and fell to 1619 kilograms in 1957, below the 1948 levels. Wage increases apparently had little effect so long as the scarcity of consumer goods and foodstuffs prevailed. The miner's average monthly wage in 1957 had risen to 2,546 złoty, as compared to 1,909 złoty in 1956 and 1,716 złoty in 1955. But these increases contributed to higher mining costs, so that by 1957, 63 per cent of the 127 establishments under the Ministry of Coal Mining were operating at a deficit.³⁶

Reflecting the slogan—*wegiel, nasza waluta* (coal, our valuta)—a variety of measures for undoing some of the losses caused by a drop in exports have been repeatedly proposed.³⁷ Prominent among these has been the exhortation for more fuel economy and the use of other sources for domestic purposes. A greater exploitation of peat is urged, especially in the eastern regions. The expansion of lignite mining has been advocated. Known reserves of 32 billion tons lie in Poland, the third largest in Europe. But postwar extraction has increased only 11 per cent. With all such projects, however, time and investments are two major obstacles for any speedy solution. The aforementioned expedients—along with development of water power, electrification of railroads and replacement of obsolete power plants, elimination of unnecessary railroad freight transportation and mechanization—will not permit Poland to emerge out of its coal crisis during this plan period.³⁸

³⁵Coal exports to Western Europe dropped from 7.4 million tons in 1956 to 6.3 tons in 1957. The Soviet Union, however, received 5 million tons less of Polish coal that year than it did in 1955, while Czechoslovakia and East Germany, largest of East European importers, endured a drop of more than 2.6 million tons from the previous year. Cf. *Economic Bulletin for Europe*, X, No. 2 (1958), 49; *Rocznik Statystyczny*, 1958, 287.

³⁶Cf. *Rocznik Statystyczny*, 1958, 91-93 and 96f.; *Statistical Handbook of the People's Republic of Poland*, 1957, 274f. and 278f.; *Gospodarka Planowa*, No. 2 (1957), 1.

³⁷See, for example, *Wojsko Ludowe*, No. 8 (1955), 43-56; *Gospodarka Planowa*, No. 1 (1958), 32-36; *Handel Zagraniczny*, No. 8 (1957) 25f. and No. 12 (1957), 6f.

³⁸For example, the caloric value of brown coal is one-third that of hard, and extraction requires different machinery, the investment of which is estimated to be a minimum of 7.5 billion złoty (\$1.5 billion at official conversion), with more than five years needed before full production. Nonetheless, the need to meet continually rising fuel requirements

Unfortunately for Poland, the decline in coal prices since 1956 has added to a reduction of foreign exchange. Two successive warm winters have enlarged West European reserves. Also, Poland must now compete with American coal exports, whose major inroad occurred at the time of the Korean War and when the Six-Year Plan compelled a substantial redirection of Polish coal towards Eastern Europe.³⁹ To these considerations must be added the gradual replacement of coal by water power and oil as a source of fuel and energy in Western Europe. This trend is fairly discernible and its greater impact may occur within a generation.⁴⁰

Data for 1958 indicate that the hard climb back towards more coal exports made some progress. Gomulka's speech on Miners' Day on December 3, 1958 revealed that labor productivity in 1958 had risen by 5 per cent. Production increases added about 900,000 tons to the total annual output.⁴¹

The golden times of high coal prices passed quickly after 1956, but efforts to improve quality, make prices attractive⁴² and seek long-term agreements contributed to increased coal export in 1958. An announcement from Węglukoks, the Polish coal syndicate, declared that 16.2 million tons of coal had been sold abroad, 8.7 million tons of which went to "capitalist" states.⁴³ This represented a rise of 21 per cent above exports of the previous year, as well as a 38 per cent increase for non-bloc sales.

Conclusion

The pressures and distortion to which postwar production and export of Polish coal have been exposed stemmed from three major factors: trade relations with the Soviet Union, the establishment of a Soviet-type economic

impelled the Third Party Congress meeting in March 1959 to approve the plan for large-scale exploitation of brown coal deposits in Lower Silesia and the Poznań area in the period ending in 1965. The plan anticipates open mining to expand production sufficiently whereby fuel for more than 28 per cent of Poland's electric power will be provided, as compared to 1.6 per cent in 1958. This would mean that the projected rise of 84 per cent in electricity output would be achieved with only an 11 per cent rise in demand for bituminous coal. See *Trybuna Ludu*, March 24, 1959 and *East Europe*, VIII, No. 6 (June, 1959), 11.

³⁹Favorable coal prices until 1956 took up some of the slack in Polish coal exports to Western Europe. About 5 million tons less coal was exported in 1956 than in 1954 but revenue increased as West European prices leaped to around \$25 per ton. *Handel Zagraniczny*, No. 10 (1957), 2.

⁴⁰West European imports of coal in the 1951-1954 period had fallen by approximately 15 per cent from the 1937-1938 levels. Further details about such changes in the various coal markets are in *Gospodarka Gornictwa*, No. 1 (1956), 10-13 and No. 9 (1956), 262ff.

⁴¹Meantime, the average miner in 1958 worked 270 days, as compared to 305 days in 1954, when "voluntary" overtime and extra shifts prevailed. *Trybuna Ludu*, December 4, 1958; *East Europe*, VIII, No. 1 (January, 1959), 51. Incentive payments to miners had also increased. In 1957, these comprised only 0.8 per cent of wage funds in mining and electric power. The share rose to 2.9 per cent in 1958. *Economic Survey of Europe for 1958*, Chapter I, 16.

⁴²Poland reduced coal prices in 1957 and March 1958 to bring them in line with American prices. *Economic Bulletin for Europe*, X, No. 2 (1958), 49.

⁴³*Zycie Warszawy*, September 26, 1958. Traditional importers who purchased more than a million tons included Finland, Austria, Denmark and West Germany. A five-year contract and a three-year contract were concluded with Austria and Argentina for Polish coal supplies to the respective railroad systems.

These developments have led to a significant change in the rôle of coal both with regard to the Polish economy and to its relation with East European industrialization.

The relatively rapid recovery of the coal-mining industry immediately after the war proved to be a mixed blessing. The full benefits did not accrue to the Polish economy, as "reparation" deliveries entailed a considerable loss of revenue. Moreover, Polish commercial interests were further sacrificed with the onset of the cold war when increasing quantities of Polish hard coal were channeled to other members of the Soviet bloc as part of Stalin's program for attaining regional autarky.

These losses from essentially non-economic considerations were further compounded by Poland's adoption of a centrally planned program of rapid industrialization which emphasized, as it had earlier in the Soviet Union, an inordinate concentration upon the expansion of heavy industry and gave only minimum attention to the extractive and agricultural sectors. Such faulty planning, which encouraged technical miscalculations and much waste, brought on a crisis in the coal-mining industry. Headlong industrial expansion without regard to equilibrium among investment, prices and labor productivity in coal-mining, and between the pace of coal production and industry, could not continue after 1955. The full impact of imbalances was felt by 1957 when both production and exports slumped alarmingly.

Efforts to rehabilitate the coal-mining sector that have been made since 1956, however, must now take into account the new circumstances and demands that previous policies had produced.⁴⁴ These are connected both with Polish and East European industrialization. A change of emphasis in the rôle of coal has occurred. Poland's rapid industrialization, on the one hand, has expanded internal consumption to the extent that it remains highly doubtful that coal exports will ever regain the dominant position of earlier years as a major source of foreign exchange. Current planning does not anticipate that coal exports in 1960 will equal those in 1955, let alone 1950. The export objective includes a more diversified composition in the attempt to reduce the balance of payments deficit, and this trend is likely to continue.⁴⁵

system and the imposed redirection of coal exports to Eastern Europe.

⁴⁴Currently, 13 bituminous mines are reportedly under construction, with 7 additional mines to be started, 6 of them for coking coal. *East Europe*, VIII, No. 6 (June, 1959), 7, 11. Production for 1965 is scheduled to be in the vicinity of 113 million tons.

⁴⁵Increased agricultural production has permitted a larger export of food products to replace a fraction of the deficit caused by the drop in coal exports. Current directives are aimed at securing a greater share of exports for machinery and industrial equipment. About a 10 per cent increase in this category was registered in 1958. Export possibilities of coal chemicals are likewise given greater attention now. Moreover, with the price of coal continuing to remain unattractive, there is a trend toward exporting more coke to the Soviet bloc and Western Europe. Unfortunately, from the Polish standpoint, this is somewhat limited inasmuch as the present resources of coking coal is only about 7 per cent of total coal resources available. Cf. K. Secomski, *Premises of the Five-Year Plan in Poland*, 62f.; *Economic Survey of Europe for 1957*, Chapter VI, 24 and Table XXXIII; *East Europe*, VIII, No. 4 (April, 1959), 46.

Nonetheless, coal exports will retain a particularly significant position in Poland's trade during the next years, in that sales in Western Europe continue to have a direct bearing upon Poland's ability to accumulate hard currency that may be applied to cover imports either designed to improve living conditions or facilitate continued industrialization. Yet, coal sales in the West will be limited in accordance with Poland's recently acquired rôle as a major supplier for East European industrialization. Imposed as it originally was by ideological considerations, a certain degree of East European economic collaboration has developed. A greater energy in this direction exhibited by CEMA since 1955 bespeaks increased regional coordination.⁴⁶ Polish coal exports play a significant rôle, as illustrated by 1956 data. The East European states, excluding Poland, produced only 26.5 million tons of hard coal but consumed 35.7 million tons. Polish coal exports covered 68 per cent of the imports of these countries.⁴⁷ Continued efforts at economic complementarity among members of the Soviet bloc will increase the crucial rôle of Polish coal exports. This will obviously act as a restraining force upon any abrupt economic reorientation that any Polish government might entertain, even if given that option. It is one of the important threads from which the fabric of East European economic coordination is being knit. Due to these new circumstances created by past errors and sacrifices, Poland's production and disposition of its hard coal have entered a new phase of development.

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⁴⁶Permanent secretariats established in September 1957 to expedite the regional allocation of major resources among bloc members include one located in Warsaw to deal with coal. This budding "international division of labor" has been discussed in *Economic Survey of Europe for 1956*, Chapter II; *idem for 1957*; *Bulletin of the Institute for the Study of the USSR*, V, No. 9 (September, 1958), 31-38; A. H., "Economic Integration in the Communist World," *The World Today*, XIV, No. 11 (November, 1958), 495-506.

⁴⁷The Soviet Union, although exporting hard coal to Eastern Europe as well, continued to remain a net importer until 1958 when a small export surplus occurred. Cf. *Economic Survey of Europe for 1957*, Chapter VI, 39f., and *Economic Survey of Europe for 1958*, Chapter I.

APPENDIX

	1945	1946	1947	1948	1949	1950	1951	1952	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958
Production	20,183	47,288	59,130	70,262	74,081	78,001	81,992	84,437	88,437	91,619	94,475	95,149	94,092	94,981
Exports	5,490	13,483	17,566	24,626	26,836	26,449	25,882	25,135	24,247	24,284	24,029	19,187	13,357	16,200
(a) To Bloc	5,355	9,536	10,083	10,590	10,056	15,737	15,529	17,192	17,367	17,462	16,256	12,423	6,875	7,600
(b) To USSR	5,240	8,888	8,028	6,746	8,749	8,600	7,500	7,500	8,406	8,967	8,210	6,140	3,201	4,000

Compiled from data in:

G.U.S., *Wiadomości Statystyczne* 1947, 77 and 82; and 1948, 81.

Handel Zagraniczny, No. 8 (1957), 25, and No. 3 (1958), 38.

Gospodarka Gornictwa, No. 2 (1956), 35ff.

Przegląd Gorniczy, XIII, No. 4 (April, 1957), 167f.

Rocznik Statystyczny, 1958, 68 and 278.

J. Krynicki, *Problemy handlu zagranicznego Polski* (Warsaw, 1958), 271.

O Halecki, ed., *Poland* (New York, 1957), 325.

U.N., *Economic Bulletin for Europe*, IX, No. 3 (1957), 46; X, No. 2 (1958), 2.

U.N., *Economic Survey of Europe in 1957*, Chapter VI, 9, 37, 41, 55.

U.N., *Economic Survey of Europe in 1958*, Chapter I, 25.

H. V. Winston, "The Polish Bituminous Coal-Mining Industry," *American Slavic and East European Review*, XV, No. 1 (February, 1956), 53.

East Europe, VIII, No. 4 (April, 1959), 46.

THE BRITISH POLICY TOWARD THE BALTIC STATES 1918-1920

by Edgar Anderson

THE overthrow of the legal government in Russia by Bolsheviks in November 1917, and the subsequent inauguration of peace negotiations between them and Imperialist Germany impelled a series of nations formerly subjugated by Russia to declare their independence. These nations based their declarations on the rights of peoples to self-determination as proclaimed by the hard-pressed Western Powers in their attempt to disrupt the empire of their adversaries. These rights were not meant for the nations under the Russian rule, but the Allies could not demonstrate a lack of integrity regarding the principles they had proclaimed. They did not, however, want to disrupt the empire of their former ally because they believed in a seemingly unavoidable collapse of the Bolshevik régime and its replacement by a friendly government. If they were to turn their principle against the Russian empire, they would probably endanger the stability of their own empires.¹

For the time being they had to reckon, however, with the fact that the Bolshevik Government had suspended all hostilities between Russia and Germany. As the Germans could now turn all available forces against the Western Powers the latter tried to enlist and support any pro-Allied elements they could find in the East in order to restore the rapidly vanishing Eastern Front. They made a decision to this effect on December 22, 1917, and therefore were silent about the possible application of the principle regarding the self-determination of nations.²

In January 1918, the British *chargé d'affaires* in Russia, Francis O. Lindlay, met the first representatives of Estonia and Latvia, who tried to ascertain the attitude of the British Government toward their claims to independence. This was the first British contact with the diplomats of the nascent Baltic republic. Lindlay advised his government that "the question of the future of the Baltic provinces should be given serious consideration. . . . Without them Russia would hardly continue to be a great western power while their access to Germany would . . . increase the latter's strength." This possibility had to be avoided and the Baltic Provinces "had to be retained by Russia, failing which they should be independent and

¹Great Britain, Royal Institute of International Affairs, *The Baltic States—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—A Survey of the Political and Economic Structure and the Foreign Relations of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania* (London, 1938), pp. 19, 22, hereafter referred to as *Baltic States*; Ewald Uustalu, *The History of the Estonian People* (London, 1952), pp. 158f., 162; Malbone Watson Graham, *New Governments of Eastern Europe* (New York, 1927), p. 281; United States of America, Department of State, *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, Russia, 1918*, II, pp. 822-825, hereafter referred to as *Foreign Relations, Russia*.

²*Foreign Relations, Russia, 1918*, I, p. 330f.; II, p. 596f.; the Rt. Hon. Winston S. Churchill, *The World Crisis—1918-1928* (New York, 1929), V, p. 167.

form a bloc with Scandinavia, Finland and perhaps Poland.”³ On January 25, Lord Balfour informed the Estonians that Great Britain would try to prevent the annexation of Estonia by Germany. An English agent was on his way to Tallinn where the Estonians solemnly proclaimed their independence when the German troops suddenly moved into the city.⁴ In a short period of time all the Baltic States were occupied by the Germans who retained them after the Bolsheviks had made the transfer legal in subsequent treaties. While Ludendorff tried to establish a German military colony in the Baltic, some German diplomats tried to create semi-independent states as the Duchy of the Baltic and the Kingdom of Lithuania under German supervision.⁵

When the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was signed and the Germans landed in Finland, the Allies decided to land in Murmansk and Vladivostok to safeguard their military stores.⁶ A precedent was created for an intervention in Russian affairs. On May 3, Lord Balfour, greatly impressed by the anti-Bolshevik and anti-German attitude expressed by the Estonians, granted *de facto* recognition to Estonia. Similar recognition was extended to Latvia on November 11. These declarations contained no promise of eventual independence, nor was the principle of self-determination mentioned. The recognition of the two Baltic governments was to be in force only as long as the countries were occupied by Germans. The British Government wanted to postpone the troublesome question regarding *de jure* recognition of the Baltic republics until the meeting of the Peace Conference of Paris.⁷ The British representatives in the Scandinavian countries, however, were instructed to ask the Scandinavian governments to supply the Baltic nationals with arms and ammunition, and to protect the Baltic states. The Scandinavians, however, were afraid to interfere.⁸

After the sudden collapse of the German Empire the Bolsheviks proclaimed their own Baltic governments and invaded the Baltic area.⁹ The Allies were afraid that the Bolsheviks would eventually conquer much of the war-weary and restless continent of Europe. They decided to include two clauses in the Armistice Convention according to which the German forces

³Foreign Relations, Russia, 1918, II, pp. 815-820, 822f.; cf. Uustalu, p. 162; Alfred Bilmanis, *A History of Latvia* (Princeton, 1951), p. 162; Malbone Watson Graham, *The Diplomatic Recognition of the Border States* (Berkeley, 1939), II, v, later referred to as *Diplomatic Recognition*.

⁴Claus Grimm, *Jahre deutscher Entscheidung im Baltikum 1918/1919* (Essen, 1939), p. 481; cf. Uustalu, p. 162; *Foreign Relations, Russia, 1918*, II, p. 816f.

⁵Baltic States, pp. 17, 22f.; cf. Uustalu, p. 161; cf. Bilmanis, pp. 300-304; Frederick W. Pick, *The Baltic Nations, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania* (London, 1945), p. 66; Constantine R. Jurgela, *History of the Lithuanian Nation* (New York, 1948) p. 511.

⁶George F. Kennan, *Soviet-American Relations, 1917-1920, The Decision to Intervene* (Princeton, 1958), pp. 99f., 250-252.

⁷Estonia, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Pour L'Esthonie indépendante, Recueil des documents diplomatiques publiés par la délégation esthonienne* (Copenhagen, 1918), Doc. IX, p. 32f., cf. Uustalu, p. 163; cf. Pick, p. 66; *Foreign Relations, Russia, 1918*, II, pp. 823-841f.; *Diplomatic Recognition*, II, p. 252f., III, p. 406; cf. Bilmanis, p. 299.

⁸*Foreign Relations, Russia, 1918*, II, pp. 839-841, 849.

⁹August Winnig, *Am Ausgang der deutschen Ost-Politik, Persönliche Erlebnisse und Erinnerungen* (Berlin 1921), IX, p. 50f.; cf. Uustalu, pp. 163-165; Michael Walters, *Leti-*

had to remain in the Baltic area to stem the Bolshevik tide and, when their services were no longer needed, to withdraw from the Baltic without gaining any rewards for their efforts. It was doubtful, however, if the Germans would be willing and able to follow these orders.¹⁰ In his memoirs the British diplomat Herbert A. Grant Watson says that Great Britain was the first of the Western Allies to take a practical interest in the struggle for freedom of the three Baltic peoples and to realise that they had advanced sufficiently to form independent nations, capable of deciding their own political future.¹¹

On November 20, 1918, the Assistant Foreign Secretary, Sir Robert Cecil, announced that the British Government would send ships and arms to Estonia, but refused to send land forces.¹² The VI Light Cruiser Squadron (some twenty warships) under Rear Admiral Edwyn S. Alexander-Sinclair was sent to the Baltic to supervise the carrying out of the armistice terms, to obtain reliable information as to the exact state of affairs in the Baltic, and to support the Baltic nationals in their struggle against the Bolsheviks. The squadron left for the Baltic on November 29.¹³ On that day Lord Balfour declared:

It is for the Russians to choose their own form of government . . . but we [can not] disinterest ourselves wholly from Russian affairs . . . Anti-Bolshevik administrations had grown up under the shelter of Allied forces. We are responsible for their existence and must endeavor to support them . . . [We have] to use such forces as we possess to the best advantage; where we have no troops, to supply arms and money; and in the case of the Baltic provinces, to protect as far as we can the nascent nationalities by the help of our Fleet.¹⁴

Further action would depend on the attitude of Britain's allies, particularly the Americans.

On December 1, the British squadron reached the Latvian port of Liepāja (Libau). After declaring this former German principal naval base in the Baltic to be the main British base, Admiral Alexander-Sinclair continued his voyage and reached Tallinn on December 12, just in time to prevent

land: *Seine Entwicklung zum Staat und die baltischen Fragen* (Riga, 1923), p. 364; cf. Bilmanis, pp. 306, 311f.; *Diplomatic Recognition*, II, p. 256; *Foreign Relations, Russia, 1918*, II, p. 850f.; Arveds Švābe, "Arpolitika," *Latviešu Enciklopedija* (Stockholm, 1950), I, p. 101, hereafter referred to as Švābe.

¹⁰Cf. Uustalu, p. 164f.; *Diplomatic Recognition*, II, p. 256; cf. Bilmanis, p. 306; *Foreign Relations, Russia, 1918*, II, p. 850f.; Švābe, p. 101.

¹¹Herbert A. Grant Watson, *An Account of a Mission to the Baltic States in the Year 1919* (London, 1958), p. 25.

¹²Harold W. V. Temperley (ed.), *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris, 1919* (London, 1924), VI, p. 297f.; Graf Rüdiger von der Goltz, *Als politischer General im Osten, Finnland und Baltikum 1918 und 1919* (Leipzig, 1936), p. 81; General Fürst Pavel M. Awaloff-Bermond, *Im Kampf gegen den Bolschewismus, Erinnerungen* (Glückstadt & Hamburg, 1925), pp. 68, 107; Great Britain, Foreign Office, *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939*, First Series, III, p. 142, Doc. 125, hereafter referred to as *British Documents*.

¹³Paravane, "With the Baltic Squadron, 1918-1920," *The Fortnightly Review*, New Series, VLIH (1921), p. 705f.; *Berliner Tageblatt*, No. 611, November 29, 1918; *Deutsche Tageszeitung*, No. 610, November 30, 1918; *Foreign Relations, Russia, 1918*, II, pp. 854-856.

¹⁴Cf. Churchill, V, p. 166.

the threatening collapse of the Estonian republic. In this operation, called *Red Trek*, the British lost one cruiser and several mine sweepers due to the shallow, icy, mine-infested and stormy waters. The British armed the Estonian troops, provided loans, bottled up the Red Navy and captured two Russian destroyers in a naval engagement on December 26.¹⁵ On December 18, the British warships reached the Latvian capital, Riga, where they helped to suppress mutiny among some Latvian troops and landed several groups of sailors to maintain peace and order in the city.¹⁶

In several meetings with the representatives of the national governments of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, and other interested groups, the British naval and civil authorities explained that they were going to defend the Baltic Border States against the Bolsheviks, at least as far as their guns could reach. The British refused, however, to support German-sponsored Russian nationalists. The German High Commissioner in the Baltic, August Winnig, was told by the British representative Bosanquet, on December 23, to use all available German forces for the protection of the Baltic States.¹⁷ The British Ambassador to Paris, Lord Bertie, explained this policy as follows:

Provided that we can bring about the independence . . . of Finland, Poland, Estonia, Ukraine, etc. . . . I think the remainder [of the Russian Empire] may go hang and stew in their own juice. . . . Bolshevism is a contagious disease. . . . The Entente must establish an old-fashioned quarantine to guard against infection.¹⁸

The Bolshevik system did not collapse, the anti-Bolshevik movement in Russia was too weak, the German armies retreated without fighting, the French intervention in Russia ended in a failure, there were mutinies in the British and French armed forces, the Americans refused to participate in a campaign against Russia, and the new Baltic States could not withstand the Soviet pressure. Lloyd George was not even sure that there was not an internal Bolshevik uprising in these countries instead of an outright Bolshevik invasion. Both he and Woodrow Wilson tried to find some peaceful solution to the Russian problem and initiated a move for a conference of all

¹⁵M. Schwarte (ed.), *Der Grosse Krieg* (Leipzig, 1922), III, p. 193; cf. Grimm, p. 225; *Jaunākās Zinas*, No. 18, December 5, 1918; cf. Uustalu, pp. 166, 168f.; Philip Farr, *Soviet Russia and the Baltic Republics* (London, 1944), p. 14; Vilnis Sīpols, *Arvalstu intervencija Latvijā un tās aizkulises 1918-1920* (Riga, 1957), p. 62; L. Leontin, *Les Armées des Pays Baltes* (Paris, 1934), p. 18; E. E. Iakushkin and S. Polunin, *Angliiskaya interveniya v 1918-1920 g. g.* (Moskva, 1928), p. 66; Louis Tissot, *La Baltique, Situation des Pays riverains de la Baltique, Importance économique et stratégique de la "Méditerranée du Nord"* (Paris, 940), p. 70f; cf. Paravane, p. 707.

¹⁶Cf. Awaloff-Bermond, pp. 111, 116; cf. Sīpols, pp. 63, 68; cf. Winnig, pp. 74f., 77; cf. Grimm, pp. 255, 257.

¹⁷Cf. Awaloff-Bermond, pp. 108-111, 272, 373; cf. Von der Goltz, p. 130f.; Josef Bischoff, *Die letzte Front, Geschichte der Eisernen Division im Baltikum 1919* (Berlin, 1935), p. 51f.; Hugo Lācis, *Toreiz kad Latvijas valsts tapa* (N. pl. 1954) p. 17; *Pagaidu Valdības Vēstnesis*, No. 2, December 23, 1918; *Jaunākās Zinas*, No. 32, Sīpols, p. 67f.; Germany, Forschungsanstalt für Kriegs- und Heeresgeschichte, *Darstellungen aus den Nachkriegskämpfen deutscher Truppen und Freikorps* (Berlin, 1936), I, pp. 149-151; hereafter referred to as *Darstellungen*.

¹⁸Lady Algernon Gordon Lennox, *The Diary of Lord Bertie of Thane 1914-1918* (London, 1924), II, p. 310f.

governments and factions concerned with the Russian Empire. It was crystallized in Wilson's proposal for the Prinkipo Conference, on January 22, 1919.¹⁹

In the session of the Imperial War Cabinet on December 31, 1918, both Field Marshal Wilson and Admiral Freemantle asked for some definite policy in regard to Russia and the Baltic. They were seconded by Winston Churchill, but opposed by Lloyd George who compared the Baltic States and Ukraine to Toulon and La Vendée during the French Revolution. He rejected a plan for an intervention in Russia on a large scale and told the Admiralty to withdraw the Baltic Squadron over the objections of the military, who feared a serious Soviet invasion and possible collapse of the Baltic governments.²⁰ The British squadron left Riga without warning on January 3, 1919, and on January 6, Rear Admiral Alexander-Sinclair was relieved of his command.²¹

The Soviets occupied most of the Baltic area, the Prinkipo policy ended in a dismal failure, but an Imperialist German general, Rüdiger Count von der Goltz, established himself in the western corner of Latvia and Lithuania, planning to turn the Baltic into a German camp from which to conquer Russia, restore a constitutional monarchy, and with its help to overthrow the German republic and restore Imperial Germany. He was supported by the landed gentry of Baltic Germans and to a certain extent by the existing German government in order to avoid Bolshevik invasion of Eastern Prussia and to press the Allied Powers for better peace terms.²²

The new development in the Baltic was contrary to British interests. The I Light Cruiser Squadron was sent to the Baltic under Rear Admiral Sir Walter H. Cowan. His squadron was later considerably enforced and consisted of sixty-five to one hundred modern naval units and a small air force. The object of this force was to prevent further spreading of Bolshevik forces, to watch the Germans and to aid the anti-Bolshevik forces in the Baltic States and Finland. Cowan did not receive any land support and his fleet was relatively isolated in the Baltic.²³

¹⁹David Lloyd George, *Memoirs of the Peace Conference* (New Haven, 1939), p. 117; *Foreign Relations, Russia 1919*, pp. 40-59; *Diplomatic Recognition*, II, p. 257f.

²⁰Cf. Lloyd George, I, p. 213f.; Sir Charles E. Calwell, *Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, His Life and Diaries* (New York, 1927), II, p. 158.

²¹*Foreign Relations, Russia, 1919*, pp. 667-669; Aleksandrs Plensners, "Brīvības cīņas," *Latviešu Enciklopedija* (Stockholm, 1950), I, 315; Kurt von Braatz, *Fürst Anatol Pawlowitch Lieven, Im Kampf gegen den baltischen Separatismus, russischen Bolschewismus, und die Awaloff-Bermondi-Affäre* (Stuttgart, 1926), p. 52; cf. Bilmanis, p. 52; Great Britain, *The London Gazette for the Year 1920*, Fifth Supplement to April 6, 1920, April 9, 1920, p. 4229, hereafter referred to as *London Gazette, 1920*.

²²Sir Stephen Tallents, *Man and Boy* (London, 1943), p. 288; Edward W. P. Newman, *Britain and the Baltic* (London, 1930), p. 83; cf. Von der Goltz, pp. 88, 91, 103, 105; cf. Braatz, p. 37.

²³Great Britain, Parliament, House of Commons, *Parliamentary Debates, Official Report, Fifth Series*, CXVIII, pp. 1331-32, hereafter referred to as *H. C. Deb. 5 s.*; *London Gazette, 1920*, cols. 4229-4230; *Foreign Relations, The Paris Peace Conference XII*, p. 140; IV, pp. 591-593; cf. Tallents, p. 288; cf. Farr, p. 21; cf. Grimm, p. 441; William P. Coates and Zelda Coates, *Russia, Finland and the Baltic* (London, 1940), p. 24; F. D. Volkov, *Krax angliiskoi politiki intervencii i diplomaticheskoi izoljacji Sovetskogo gosudarstva* (Moskva, 1954), p. 92; *Daily Herald*, October 27, 1919.

Both Lloyd George and Woodrow Wilson were against the policy of intervention and *cordon sanitaire* in regards to Bolshevik Russia, but on February 25, while they were absent from the Peace Conference, Marshal Foch and Winston Churchill introduced a plan, according to which the Baltic States would be included in an Allied scheme for an all-out invasion of Russia. Nothing came out of this plan.²⁴ By the end of February Admiral Cowan had reached Leipāja and had decided to defend it against the Bolsheviks.²⁵ A British military mission under Majors Keenan and Ellis established their headquarters at Leipāja. Both of these majors had been flax and timber merchants in the Baltic before the war and now represented British business interests as well. They tried to limit German influence and activities in the remaining Baltic area as yet unoccupied by Bolsheviks. Herbert A. Grant Watson and the former British consul at Riga, Vivian Bosanquet, visited the Prime Minister of Latvia, Kārlis Ulmanis, as unofficial British diplomatic representatives and returned a few weeks later in a more official capacity. Major Keenan and Grant Watson worked together trying to assess the strength of the various movements.²⁶ The British Foreign Office sent to the Baltic a brilliant civil service man, Sir Stephen Tallents, to obtain more information about the situation in the Baltic. He visited the area from March 12 to the end of that month and was convinced that the Baltic States badly needed support, if they were not to fall under either Bolshevik or German rule, and was frightened by the lack of interest regarding these countries among the statesmen in Paris.²⁷

Alarmed by Keenan and Tallents, the Allied Supreme Council started to organize, on April 16, an interallied commission to study the political questions regarding the Baltic problem and on April 19 appointed still another commission to supervise food shipments to the starving Baltic countries.²⁸ About this time the Germans overthrew the Latvian Government, over protests by the British authorities, and reconquered much of Latvia from the Bolsheviks.²⁹

²⁴Cf. Lloyd George, I, p. 242f.; Frank Owen, *Tempestuous Journey*, Lloyd George, *His Life and Times* (New York, 1955), p. 513f.; *Foreign Relations, Paris Peace Conference*, IV, pp. 120-125.

²⁵Cf. Grant Watson, pp. 12, 14, 26, 30.

²⁶*H. C. Deb. 5 s.*, CXVII, cols. 1331-1332; *London Gazette*, 1920, pp. 4229-4230; *Foreign Relations, Paris Peace Conference*, XII, p. 140; IV, pp. 591-593; cf. Sipols, p. 104.

²⁷Cf. Tallents, p. 289f., 293, 306, 311, 350f.; U. S. Congress, 66th Senate, 1st Session, *Senate Documents*, Vol. XV, Doc. No. 105, September 22, 1919, pp. 22, 29f., 37-41; *H. C. Deb. 5 s.*, CXXI p. 347; CXVIII, p. 185; *British Documents*, III, p. 2; *Foreign Relations, Paris Peace Conference*, IV, p. 136f.; cf. Grimm, p. 173; Kurt Gloger, *Baltikum* (Griefswald, 1938), p. 104.

²⁸France, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, *Conférence des Préliminaires de la Paix, Commission des Affaires Baltiques, Procès-verbaux* 1-22 (Paris, 1919), No. 1, p. 1, hereafter referred to as *Commission des Affaires Baltiques*; David Hunter Miller, *My Diary at the Conference of Paris* (New York, 1924), XVI, pp. 96, 175-177, 246-254, *passim*; *Foreign Relations, Paris Peace Conference*, XII, p. 688.

²⁹Cf. Von der Goltz, pp. 112, 114; *Foreign Relations, Paris Peace Conference*, XII, pp. 145, 154-172; cf. Tallents, pp. 308-310; cf. Bilmanis, p. 321; cf. Braatz, pp. 86-88, 93; U. S. Congress, 66th Senate, 1st Session, *Senate Documents*, Vol. XV, Doc. 105, hereafter referred to as *Senate Documents*, XV, No. 105, pp. 18f., 21; cf. Grant Watson, p. 39.

In May Admiral Cowan extended the operations of his fleet to Estonian and Finnish waters. On May 18 and 31, the British had the first indecisive naval engagement with superior Russian naval forces, while the British supported the Estonian army and navy.³⁰ On May 14, the former British V Army Commander, General Sir Hubert Gough, was appointed Chief of the British (later Allied) Military Mission in Finland and the Baltic States. He had to advise the Baltic governments on all military questions and on the best means of defense against the Bolsheviks. Winston Churchill, who was Gough's superior, did not inform him clearly what was the real object of his mission, but expressed his confidence in the final destruction of Bolshevism in Russia. Before Gough sailed to the Baltic, Lord Curzon, who was then Foreign Secretary, saw him in secret and warned the British general that the policy of Great Britain was non-intervention and that Churchill's hostility to the Bolsheviks should not lead Gough into committing Britain to any action which was contrary to the Government's views. Lord Curzon viewed with anxiety any risk of the enmity that might be aroused between a future Russian government and Great Britain and was not sure what the future government of Russia would be. General Gough followed Curzon's advice.³¹ At the end of May Colonel Tallents returned to the Baltic as head of the British Diplomatic and Economic Mission. The French and Americans sent their own missions to the Baltic. For some time there was a close cooperation between the British and the French in the Baltic, but the German-oriented head of the American Mission acted against the best interests of the Allies and was later recalled.³²

On May 22, the Allied Commission on Baltic Affairs in Paris decided to regard the Baltic countries as buffer states between Germany and Russia, but still refused to recognize them officially. The Allied Foreign Ministers agreed to organize the Baltic armed forces, but to retain the German forces as well. As the Russian nationalists started a successful campaign against the Bolsheviks, the Allies, in order to please them, decided, on May 27, to let the Russian probable constituent assembly decide the fate of the Baltic States at some future date. Some British leaders, including Lloyd George and Balfour, did not believe in the self-appointed mission of the Paris Peace Conference to act as the trustees of a non-existent United Russia in order to sacrifice the Baltic States on the altar of a legal fiction. They wanted to see a settlement in accordance with the wishes of the Baltic peoples, but the French still fought for a restored Russia in order to regain their capital invested in Russian enterprises, while the Americans did not want any

³⁰*London Gazette*, 1920, pp. 4220-4231, 4234; cf. Uustalu, p. 174f.; *British Documents*, II, pp. 46, 527; I, pp. 446-448; cf. Awaloff-Bermond, p. 384.

³¹General Sir Hubert Gough, *Soldiering On, Being the Memoirs of General Sir Hubert Gough*, (New York, 1957), p. 190f.; *Senate Documents*, XV, No. 105, pp. 2, 29f., 37-41.

³²Cf. Tallents, p. 289f., 293, 306, 311, 350f.; *Senate Documents*, XV, No. 105, pp. 22, 29f., 37-41; *H. C. Deb.* 5 s., CXXI, p. 347; CXVIII, p. 185; *British Documents*, III, p. 2; *Foreign Relations, Paris Peace Conference*, IV, pp. 136f., 757, 762f.; *Commission des Affaires Baltiques*, No. 4, Cu. p. 12; Richard Walden Hale (ed.), *The Letters of Warwick Greene, 1915-1928* (Boston & New York, 1931), p. 114f., 82; Emanuel du Parquet, *Der Drang nach Osten: L'aventure allemande en Lettonie* (Paris, 1926), p. 39.

changes in the Russian empire as long as the Japanese stayed in Siberia. The Russian White leader, Admiral Kolchak, cynically announced that he was not going to recognize the independence of Finland and the Baltic States, notwithstanding the fact that some of his forces under Yudenich depended on the good-will of the Baltic governments.³³ General Gough maintained that the influence of his mission was exerted to uphold and establish the independence of the Baltic States. He used all the power he had, largely based on bluff, to turn the Germans out of the Baltic countries, to check the Bolshevik advance and to fight the intriguing "White Russians."³⁴

The Germans utilized this period of confusion to their own advantage by attacking the Latvian and Estonian troops, labeling their attacks as the "last battle against England." They were defeated, however, by the Baltic troops, which were well advised by the British Military in that area.³⁵ In the meantime, the British Baltic Squadron had helped the Estonians to capture the Russian fortress of Krasnaya Gorka on June 15, and in the third naval engagement, on June 17, torpedoed the Russian cruiser *Oleg*.³⁶ Colonel Tallents forced the Germans to sign an armistice treaty on July 3 and to retreat from Northern Latvia, assumed the duties of a temporary civil governor of Riga, and appointed his subordinate, Lieutenant-Colonel the Hon. Harold R. L. G. Alexander (later Field Marshal, Governor General of Canada and Minister of Defense of Great Britain), to be commander of the unruly Baltic German *Landeswehr* and sent them as a part of the Latvian army against the Bolsheviks.³⁷

On June 30, the Chief of the American Mission, Colonel Greene, proposed in Paris a plan according to which the United States would assume a mandate over Latvia and Lithuania, while Great Britain would take over Estonia. This plan was rejected by the Allies as displeasing to the Russians.³⁸ Knowing that the Baltic area, especially Latvia, was terribly devastated during the World War, Lord Balfour suggested economic assistance to the Baltic States with all the Allies participating. The Allies felt that Britain, as a more interested power, alone should support these states. The French even rejected the idea that the German reparation payments should

³³Latvia, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Memorandum on Latvia Addressed to the Peace Conference* (Paris, 1919), p. 16f., 28; Estonia, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Bulletin de l'Esthonie* (Paris, 1919), No. 3, p. 57f.; *British Documents*, I, p. 213; II, p. 378f.; III, p. 332; cf. Miller, XVI, pp. 82-87, *passim*, pp. 350-356, *passim*; *Foreign Relations, Russia 1919*, p. 377; *Commission des Affaires Baltiques*, No. 5, pp. 3-13; cf. Uustalu, p. 181f.

³⁴Cf. Gough, pp. 192, 196, 198; cf. Grant Watson, p. 44.

³⁵*Senate Documents*, XV, No. 105, pp. 22, 29; cf. Braatz, p. 103f.; cf. Tallents, pp. 240-242, 311, 313, 329f., 332; cf. Von Der Goltz, pp. 118, 129f.; cf. Bilmanis, p. 323; cf. Pick, p. 71; *Foreign Relations, Paris Peace Conference*, XII, pp. 217, 223-227.

³⁶Cf. Uustalu, p. 175; *London Gazette*, 1920, pp. 4231-4233; *H. C. Deb.* 5 s., CXVIII, cols. 1331-1332; *Foreign Relations, Russia, 1919*, p. 708.

³⁷*British Documents*, III, pp. 1, 19, 32f.; II, p. 6f.; cf. Tallents, pp. 240-242, 319, 329f., 332; cf. Von der Goltz, pp. 118, 126, 129f.; cf. Bilmanis, p. 323; *Foreign Relations, Paris Peace Conference*, XII, pp. 217, 223-227; cf. Pick, p. 71.

be utilized for this purpose. Finally it was decided that the support of these states should be left to private enterprise.³⁹

Churchill still tried to organize his international crusade against the Bolsheviks involving the Baltic States, but his proposals were rejected by the majority of the British Cabinet on July 29. The Cabinet for the first time examined the Russian question as a whole and decided to withdraw all the British forces from Russia.⁴⁰ The British representatives in the Baltic area, Gough, Cowan and Tallents, followed a more realistic policy by strengthening the positions of the Baltic States, trying to get the Germans out of the Baltic area and attacking the Russian positions around Petrograd. The leaders of the "White Russians" became furious, accusing Gough of dismembering "their country." "Yet," says General Gough, "independence for the Baltic States was the only sensible and realistic policy at the time. Moreover, it was in accord with the instructions [he] had received from Lord Curzon." Gough was hated for following this policy and for helping to establish the independence of the Baltic States. He was even accused of being a Bolshevik! His accusers had the ear of Lloyd George and Churchill. As a result of their intrigues, Lloyd George recalled Gough, but his successor, General Heyking, later saw to it that no other policy would work and carried on the policy initiated by his predecessor.⁴¹

The first British air raid on Kronstadt took place on July 30.⁴² When General Gough, no friend of Lloyd George, insisted on *de jure* recognition of the Baltic States, he was fired and replaced by his subordinate, General Marsh, who preferred the strengthening of the Russian White movement to the independence of the Baltic States.⁴³ On August 26, he forced the military commanders of the Baltic States and Poland to form a common anti-Bolshevik front with Yudenich's forces and the so-called "North-Western Russian Army" under an adventurer, Bermond, who made common cause with von der Goltz and took over his forces in the Baltic together with some Russian ex-POW's. Nothing came of the anti-Bolshevik front because von der Goltz and Bermond had decided to destroy the Latvian forces before moving further on.⁴⁴

On August 16, Lord Curzon summarized the situation in the Baltic as follows:

³⁹*British Documents*, I, pp. 213-215; *Foreign Relations, Russia, 1919*, pp. 682, 703; *Paris Peace Conference*, XII, p. 212.

³⁹*British Documents*, I, p. 34; III, pp. 4-6, 24, 166, 368; *Foreign Relations, Russia, 1919*, pp. 667f., 673; *Paris Peace Conference*, VI, p. 673f.; cf. Tallents, p. 291.

⁴⁰*H. C. Deb.* 5 s., CXVIII, pp. 1993-1994.

⁴¹Cf. Gough, p. 201f.; Grant Watson, p. 44f.

⁴²*London Gazette*, 1920, pp. 4231-4233; cf. Paravane, p. 708f.; Baroness Victoria Wester Wemyss, *The Life and Letters of Lord Wester Wemyss, Admiral of the Fleet* (London, 1935), p. 442.

⁴³Cf. Awaloff-Bermond, pp. 143, 153, 156, 384; cf. Braatz, p. 58f., 62, 112f., 116; *British Documents*, III, 18, 20, 26, 41, 46, 527; I, pp. 446-448; *Foreign Relations, Paris Peace Conference*, XII, p. 219; *Russia, 1919*, 857-859; cf. Ustalu, p. 174f.

⁴⁴*British Documents*, III, pp. 53f., 82f., 85-89, 91f., 98-101, 115-117; cf. Awaloff-Bermond, p. 157f., 174f., 188, 192, 248; cf. Von der Goltz, pp. 138-141, 145; cf. Tallents, pp. 361, 363f.

Poland and the Baltic States . . . are continuing military operations against the . . . Soviet Government. So far as the Baltic States are concerned, continuance of their resistance depends largely on the amount of material assistance which the Allied Governments may decide to adopt in regard to their national aspirations. Politically, the present situation is in the highest degree unsatisfactory . . . No communications have been addressed to the representatives of these states in Paris . . . Grave dissatisfaction has consequently resulted in Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia.⁴⁵

On August 15, negotiations started between the representatives of a group of English bankers on the one side and the officials of the Baltic governments on the other. By the end of the year contracts had been drawn up whereby the Baltic governments received financial advances against the yield of flax crops. The Baltic farmers lost considerably on this deal.⁴⁶

On August 18, the British airplanes and coastal motor-boats under Commodore Claude C. Dobson made a combined attack on the Russian naval base of Kronstadt and in one night knocked out the nucleus of the Red Navy—two powerful battleships and several other units. As a result of this surprise operation the Bolshevik naval operations in the Baltic were almost completely discontinued. The satisfaction of the British Admiralty at so gallant an exploit, however, was far from being shared by the Cabinet. Admiral Wemyss, the First Sea Lord, wrote:

As it turned out, while openly disavowing the Bolsheviks, the [British Cabinet] had been secretly negotiating with them, and the sinking of their Fleet was the last thing they desired.⁴⁷

On September 16, Churchill, outlining the distribution of the military forces of the Russian border nations, said that

elements [still] existed which, used in combination, would easily have been successful [against the Bolsheviks]. They have, however, been dissipated by a total lack of combination, and this has been due to a complete absence of any definite or decided policy among the . . . Allies. Some were in favour of peace, and some were in favour of war. In the result they made neither peace or war . . . Every proposal to establish a unified system of command and direction of the resistance to the Bolsheviks had been vetoed.⁴⁸

At that time the Baltic nationals had almost everywhere driven the Bolsheviks out of their countries. When the Baltic governments responded to the Bolshevik peace overtures, Lord Curzon, however, instructed the British Mission at Riga on September 16 as follows:

You should at once make representations to the Latvian Government, and say His Majesty's Government request that they will take no action

⁴⁵Cf. Churchill, V, p. 244f.; cf. Bischoff, pp. 159-161.

⁴⁶*British Documents*, III, pp. 60 n., 65; Walter Duranty, *I Write as I Please* (New York, 1935), p. 37; cf. Grant Watson, pp. 45, 48.

⁴⁷*London Gazette*, 1920, pp. 4231-4233; *H. C. Deb.* 5 s., CXVIII, pp. 1331f.; *Foreign Relations, Russia, 1919*, p. 708; cf. Wemyss, pp. 442-444; cf. Iakushkin, p. 70; William P. Coates & Zelda K. Coates, *Armed Intervention in Russia 1918-1922* (London, 1935), p. 190; cf. Paravane, p. 709f.

⁴⁸Cf. Churchill, V, pp. 267-269.

in the direction of peace. His Majesty's Government would deplore individual action being taken by them, and trust that they will . . . conduct their foreign policy only as part of a concerted plan with the Allied Governments.

This warning did not contain any promises of assistance or recognition of independence of the Baltic States.⁴⁹

On September 20, Churchill wrote to Lloyd George asking him to recognize the independence of the Baltic States at once . . . "for in a little while it would be too late to secure terms for these small, free states which had given aid against Bolshevism." Lloyd George answered with unusual frankness on September 22:

You want us to recognize their independence in return for their attacking the Bolsheviks. They would ask us to (1) guarantee it, (2) supply them with equipment and cash to fight with. And in the end, whoever won in Russia, the Government there would promptly recover the old Russian (sic) Baltic ports. Are you, Mr. Churchill, prepared to go to war with perhaps an anti-Bolshevik Government of Russia to prevent that? If not, it would be a disgraceful piece of deception on our part to give any guarantee to those new Baltic States that you are proposing to use to conquer Russia . . . You won't find another responsible person in the whole land who will take your view, why waste your energy and your usefulness on this vain fretting. . . .⁵⁰

Therefore the British Government informed the Baltic governments on September 25 that it did not feel "entitled to exercise any pressure on the free initiative of the Baltic States" and that "it is for them to determine with unfettered judgment whether they should make any arrangement, and if so of what nature, with the Soviet authorities." By October 12, the last British soldier had left North Russia, but Admiral Cowan's fleet still remained in the Baltic.⁵¹

On October 8, the German-sponsored Bermondts's forces started their treacherous attack on the Latvian troops. They also endangered the safety of a few British and French warships at Riga. On October 10, the Allies declared a blockade of Germany in the Baltic Sea, which was rigorously enforced by Admiral Cowan's ships.⁵² Due to the insistence of the Chief of the British Military Mission in Latvia, General Sir Alfred Burt, and the Chief of the French Mission, Colonel Emanuel du Parquet, Admiral Cowan sent an ultimatum to Bermondts to withdraw his forces from the already taken Latvian fortress of Daugavgrīva (Dünaburg). At the same time, Lord Curzon made an inquiry whether the French would not be able to postpone the ratification of the peace treaty with Germany, but it was already too late.⁵³

⁴⁹*British Documents*, III, pp. 554, 558f.; cf. Sīpols, p. 219; cf. Tallents, p. 389f.; *Bulletin de L'Esthonie*, No. 6, p. 5; *The Esthonian Review*, No. 4, I, 134f.; cf. Uustalu, p. 183f.; *Diplomatic Recognition*, II, p. 28f.; *Foreign Relations, Russia, 1919*, p. 742f.

⁵⁰Cf. Owen, p. 519f.; cf. Churchill, V, pp. 262f., 266.

⁵¹*British Documents*, III, pp. 562-564, 569f.; cf. Churchill, V, p. 251.

⁵²*British Documents*, III, pp. 117, 140f., 154, 166-168; II, p. 170f.; cf. Braatz, p. 153; cf. Von der Goltz, pp. 149-152; cf. Awaloff-Bermondts, p. 202; cf. Walters, p. 392; cf. Pick, p. 71; cf. Tallents, p. 366.

Bermondts disregarded the ultimatum, and Admiral Cowan asked the commander of the French Baltic naval division, Commodore Brisson, to assume command of the combined Anglo-French naval force in the neighborhood of Riga, ten ships with eighty guns, to open fire upon the Russo-German forces at Daugavgrīva. This was done on October 15, but sanction for this spontaneous action was sought from the Supreme War Council only afterwards. While one British naval detachment helped to check the Russians at the Estonian borders and supported Yudenich's forces in their unsuccessful drive to Petrograd, two more detachments helped the Latvians to defeat Bermondts's forces at Riga and Liepāja.⁵⁴

The Allies sent a commission, headed by the French General Henry Niessel, to supervise the evacuation of the defeated Bermondts's forces to Germany and ordered the Latvians and Lithuanians to discontinue their attack on these forces. The British considered an appointment of a French General to head this mission as an insult and Admiral Cowan described Niessel's actions in the Baltic as "madness."⁵⁵ There was already a rivalry between the British and the French in the Baltic. The French still dreamed of the restoration of old Russia and the creation of a Greater Poland under their influence. This Greater Poland should keep much of the Baltic under her influence, directly or indirectly. Lloyd George declared on November 8 that he was against a continued war with Russia. The British favored now an independent solid bloc of the Baltic nations under their influence as a bridge between England and Soviet Russia.⁵⁶

On December 25, Admiral Cowan sent most of his units home, leaving in the Baltic only one cruiser and several destroyers under Commodore Arthur A. M. Duff, who assumed full command of the restored Baltic Squadron on February 9, 1920. Admiral Cowan's forces had disabled two Russian battleships, had destroyed one cruiser, three destroyers, one submarine depot ship, two submarines, four torpedo boats and several smaller units, losing in the action one light cruiser, two destroyers, one submarine, four mine sweepers, nine coastal torpedo boats and some smaller units along with 164 men and seven flyers of the air force.⁵⁷

The British Colonel Tallents and Professor J. Y. Simpson helped the Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians to solve their border problems, but Churchill announced to the Russian White leaders on February 3, 1920,

⁵³*British Documents*, III, p. 154f., 160, 175, 189.

⁵⁴*London Gazette*, 1920, pp. 4230, 4233; cf. Plensners, I, p. 340; cf. Von der Goltz, pp. 155, 164f.; cf. Awaloff-Bermondts, pp. 208, 209 n., 210, 226; cf. Bischoff, p. 228f.; *British Documents*, III, pp. 149-152, 157 n., 162f., 176 n., 193, 197, 208f., 222f., 231f., 249f.; I, p. 958; II, pp. 65-67; *H. C. Deb.* 5 s., CXXII, p. 1100f.; cf. Tallents, pp. 367-369; *Foreign Relations, Russia, 1919*, p. 741; cf. Braatz, p. 154; cf. Duranty, p. 40; cf. Paravane, p. 711f.

⁵⁵*British Documents*, III, pp. 144f., 200f., 223; I, 882, 890-892, II, pp. 85f., 90f. 395-403; Henri Niessel, *L'Evacuation des pays Baltiques par les Allemands* (Paris, 1935), pp. 26-32; *H. C. Deb.* 5 s., CXXI, p. 477.

⁵⁶Cf. Coates, *Allied Intervention*, p. 228; Edward H. Carr, *The Bolshevik Revolution 1917-1923* (New York, 1953), III, p. 150f.; *Daily Herald*, November 19, 1919; cf. Sipols, pp. 236, 241, 303f.

⁵⁷*British Documents*, III, pp. 233, 241 n.; II, p. 37 n. 4; *H. C. Deb.* 5 s., CXXI, p. 637; CXXII, p. 373f.; CXXV, p. 864; CXXXIX, pp. 2594f.; cf. Paravane, p. 715f.; *London Gazette*, 1920, pp. 4229, 4234.

that the British would not support the Whites any more because "the Baltic States are only fighting for their independence, while Denikin is fighting for the control of Russia." As far as the British were concerned they were out of Russia.⁵⁸ Encouraged by the British attitude the Baltic States signed peace treaties with the Soviet Russia and formed the so-called *Cordon Sanitaire* between the Soviet Russia and the rest of Europe. They sought *de jure* recognition and admission to the League of Nations. The discussions in the Assembly of the League revealed, however, an obvious reluctance of the Great Powers to assume any responsibility in case the Baltic States would again be invaded by Germany or Russia. The long pending *de jure* recognition was finally accorded to the Baltic States by the Allied Supreme Council on January 26, 1921, due to the insistence of Count Sforza and Aristide Briand, when Lloyd George overruled a negative decision made by his Foreign Secretary Lord Curzon. (Lithuania was recognized only in December 1922.) The Baltic States were admitted to the League of Nations on September 21, 1921.⁵⁹

During the early postwar years Great Britain virtually ran the Baltic area without having any real aspiration to the control of the Baltic States. She supplied the Baltic States with some arms, ammunition and food-stuffs. The British Baltic Fleet offered both moral and military support to the Baltic countries. From British ships sprang the high prestige which England later enjoyed throughout the Baltic. Colonel Tallents indicated that each British ship was a visible instrument of British power, however diluted in the Baltic, where it had to meet still potent and conflicting German and Russian forces.⁶⁰ It is amazing to consider what function a few scattered Englishmen (Gough, Tallents, Burt, Cowan, Marsh, Alexander, Grant Watson, etc.), who found themselves representing their country in the enemy-infested Baltic during 1919 and 1920, were discharging. Extreme pains and skills were required to lead Britain as well as the Baltic States out of troubles discovered at almost every corner at any time in that part of the world after the First World War. The zigzagging, meandering and wavering of the British policy toward the Baltic States could be partly explained as the result of the considerable disagreement among the Allies in regard to the future of those countries, and partly as a result of the disagreement between the British military men and diplomats and even among the diplomats themselves. Those who fought for the independence of the Baltic States finally won. Grant Watson proudly says in regard to the Baltic States: "We gave . . . active and practical assistance in the moment when

⁵⁸Cf. Tallents, pp. 236, 241, 371-376; cf. Churchill, V, pp. 270f., 275.

⁵⁹Cf. Sipols, p. 231f.; *Foreign Relations, U. S.*, 1920, III, p. 484; cf. Calwell, II, pp. 220, 224; cf. Tallents, p. 365; cf. Coates, *Allied Intervention*, p. 197; cf. Carr, III, p. 156; cf. Churchill, V, p. 288; Count Carlo Sforza, *Diplomatic Europe since the Treaty of Versailles* (New Haven, 1928), p. 74f.; *Diplomatic Recognition*, III, p. 444; Eduards Virza (ed.), *Z. Meierovics: Latvijas pirmā ārlietu ministra darbības atceri veltīts rakstu krājums* (Riga, 1935), pp. 139-142.

⁶⁰Cf. Tallents, pp. 268, 278, 406f.; John Duncan Gregory, *On the Edge of Diplomacy* (*Rambles and Reflections 1902-1928*) (London, 1929), p. 187.

their fate hung in the balance.”⁶¹ The Baltic States needed no more than that.

Within a period of three years (1918 to 1920) Great Britain had managed to replace both Russia and Germany as the dominant power in the Baltic by establishing a bloc of national barrier states between Russia and Germany under her leadership. Great Britain had weakened the positions of her old rival, Russia, and had eliminated the strong German outposts in the north. In the next decade she enjoyed great prestige and economic hegemony in the Baltic States which were grateful to her for their independence. In the next years British policy regarding the Baltic States could be described as benevolent. She supported them morally, but did not commit herself politically or militarily. The British diplomat Gregory said in this connection: “The wisest maxim in diplomacy is—Never make a promise which you will not in all circumstances be able to keep.” The Baltic area was isolated from Great Britain and she did not want to assume any risks. The British Government also did not hesitate to present the Baltic governments with a bill in the amount of £ 3,700,000 for services rendered during the early postwar years. The Baltic peoples, however, greatly prospered under British influence and in the next decades their own culture markedly showed the influence of Anglo-Saxon culture.⁶²

SAN JOSE STATE COLLEGE

⁶¹Cf. Grant Watson, pp. 25, 55.

⁶²Cf. Tallents, pp. 403, 406; cf. Gregory, p. 187f.; Robert Machray, “British Policy in the Baltic,” *Fortnightly*, CXXXIV, New Series (October, 1933), p. 403; cf. Newman, pp. 80, 95, 223, 225; cf. Von der Goltz, p. 131; cf. Gloger, p. 153.

SOVIET STRATEGY IN THE SLOVAK UPRISING OF 1944

by Peter A. Toma

ON APRIL 8, 1944, troops of the First Ukrainian Front reached the boundaries of Czechoslovakia.¹ Three weeks later Marshal Stalin promised that the Red Army would "soon" enter Czechoslovak territory and liberate her peoples from foreign occupation.² Consequently, the Czechoslovak service of Radio Moscow at once urged the people at home to form local national committees both to assist in the struggle against the Nazis and in the government of each area as soon as the country was liberated.³ The "signal" for armed uprising, warned Klement Gottwald,⁴ "was already given by the head of the state and the supreme commander of the Czechoslovak armed forces with the consent and agreement of all groups of the national liberation movement."⁵ Thus encouraged the Slovaks revolted against the puppet government of Tiso at the end of August 1944. Like the Warsaw uprising, the Slovak insurrection required such outside help against the superior Nazi forces. The nearest possible source of some assistance was the Red Army—then only 65 miles distant from the Slovak insurgent territory. But the Red Army did not enter Slovakia until October 29 and the Czech lands until the first part of April 1945. The Nazis, in the meantime, had crushed the revolt by the capture of the administrative center of free Slovakia, Banská Bystrica, on October 27, 1944. During the following five months of bloody reprisals the Gestapo had imprisoned more than 18,000 insurgents, including the bulk of non-Communist leaders, most of whom died in concentration camps.⁶

Ten years later Communist historians both in Czechoslovakia and the U. S. S. R. made Beneš, his officers' clique and the Slovak bourgeoisie solely responsible for the tragic outcome of the Slovak National Uprising. "The penetration of the Soviet troops into Slovak territory did not correspond to

¹See Marshal Stalin's Order of the Day in *The Central European Observer*, XXI, 8 (April 14, 1944), p. 109.

²See Marshal Stalin's Order of the Day, May 1, 1944, in *Československé listy* [Czechoslovak Letters], published in Moscow on May 15, 1944. Cf. also Klement Gottwald, *Za socialistický stát, za socialistické právo* [For a Socialist State, For a Socialist Jurisprudence] (Prague, 1950), p. 22.

³See Klement Gottwald, *Deset let* [Ten Years] (Prague: Svoboda, 1948), p. 244. The national committees [národní výbory] were actually a product of the Moscow negotiations in December 1943 between President Beneš and the Czechoslovak Communists. "He [Gottwald] stressed the necessity of forming national committees which would have to be used not only for the organization of revolutionary cells for the insurrection itself but also as the basis for the whole revolutionary civil administration. I did not oppose this conception." Edward Beneš, *Memoirs* (tr. from the Czech by Godfrey Lias; Boston, 1954), p. 270.

⁴Former Deputy and Chairman of the Communist Party who headed the Czechoslovak Communists in Moscow until his return to Czechoslovakia in April 1945.

⁵Gottwald, *Deset let*, p. 235.

⁶See document no. 31 (Secret Report of the Commandant of the German Security Service of December 9, 1944, on the Reprisals against the Insurgents) in Jozef Lettrich's *History of Modern Slovakia* (New York, 1955), p. 308f.

the plans of the bourgeoisie and measures were adopted to prevent Soviet forces reaching Slovakia (at that time of the uprising—P. Y.).⁷ The plan of the bourgeoisie, according to historian Yanin, "was designed, by utilizing the popular uprising, to effect a *coup d'état* with the help of the Slovak Army and ensure the transfer of power into the hands of the bourgeoisie. This plan was calculated to restore the old capitalist order in Czechoslovakia. The Beneš clique tried to avoid contact with the Soviet Army and any aid on its part."⁸

Is the Soviet contention really true? Were seventy thousand inadequately equipped insurgents in a position to "avoid contact with the Soviet Army and any aid on its part?" Did the Soviet Union ever offer any aid to the Slovak freedom fighters? Just what was the situation in Central Europe during the Slovak uprising in the German rear?

Groundwork for the Uprising

Preparatory measures for the Slovak insurrection were taken both in the military and political fields. The political basis of the uprising was established, after long discussions, at Christmas 1943. Then a secret meeting of the Slovak representatives of all underground groups in Slovakia took place. They all agreed on a political platform, which became the unifying bond of all sections of the liberation movement. A resolution was carried, which called for the liberation and restoration of a pre-Munich Czechoslovak Republic. It was also agreed that this national campaign should be headed by the Slovak National Council,⁹ which would comprise representatives of all political groups participating in the struggle.

The development of the war in relation to Slovakia pointed clearly towards two alternatives: (1) The Red Army in their thrust to the Carpathians might reach the passes leading into Slovakia and the Danubian basin before the Germans would be able to occupy the country; (2) The German Army, not trusting the Slovak forces,¹⁰ might invade Slovakia in order to occupy the vital communications and to fortify and defend the Carpathian passes. After a thorough examination of all possibilities and circumstances the military leaders and members of the National Council decided that whichever of these two eventualities should occur, the army and the

⁷See P. Yanin's "The Truth About the Slovak Uprising," *International Affairs*, no. 8 (1955), p. 138—a review article of J. Doležal's book *Slovenské národné povstání* [The Slovak National Uprising] (Prague: Czechoslovak State Publishing House of Political Literature, 1954).

⁸*Ibid.*, p. 137.

⁹The supreme organ of the liberation movement with legislative and executive powers in the insurgent territory since September 1, 1944. After the war Beneš prudently recognized the legality of the Council and the validity of its decrees. At first the Council had 13 members (7 Democrats, 4 Communists and 2 Social Democrats) but this was later increased to 41 and then to 50 (25 Democrats, 13 Communists, 10 Social Democrats and 2 military commanders with no political affiliations).

¹⁰At the end of August 1944 only two (out of six in 1941) battleworthy Slovak divisions were in the Carpathians with the German Army, which was awaiting the Soviet attack through the Carpathian passes. They were supposed to play a strategic rôle in the uprising. (See footnote no. 12, *infra*.) The remainder of the untrusted Slovak Army stayed in garrisons, inadequately equipped for an armed clash with field forces.

whole people should begin a general armed insurrection with the aim of driving out the German invaders from Czechoslovakia.

The military and political plans of the leaders of the underground (including the Communists) were at once submitted to the Czechoslovak Government in London, with whom the military and political leaders were always in contact, and through the government-in-exile to the Allied Command. In order to establish direct contact with the Soviet High Command, on August 4, 1944, two members of the Slovak National Council with detailed plans for the uprising were flown to the Soviet side of the front.¹¹ In Moscow, instead of receiving assistance and cooperation, the emissaries were first confined in isolation and then, after the uprising had been in full swing, they were sent back home with only vague promises of help.

Meanwhile, in Slovakia preparations were begun with speed and efficiency. Some members of the Slovak insurrection movement held very important posts in the Slovak Ministry of National Defense and were, therefore, able effectively to fulfill orders given by the National Council. Thus, for example, officers known to be collaborating with the Nazis were sent to places where they could do no harm. Orders were given to concentrate all military stocks of aircraft, fuel, military equipment, weapons and ammunition and most of the technical and specialized units in certain garrisons. The command of the military gendarme units was also transferred to where it would be most useful and its detachments were secretly advised that in the case of a foreign invasion they should at once join the guerrillas and the military units in the struggle against the invader.

Other members of the underground, who held important economic posts, under the pretext that stocks of food and other necessities must be safeguarded against the Allied bombings, concentrated most of these stocks where they would be easily accessible to the rising forces. Meanwhile, in the eastern, central and northern parts of the country a great concentration of guerrilla forces under Soviet command took place.¹² As the summer progressed events were quickly coming to a head. On the night of August 28, 1944, the German Army, which had been concentrated on the western borders of the country, began to march into Slovakia. The Slovak National Council immediately issued its order to all garrisons, gendarme posts, local national committees, loyal civil servants, to the whole nation: The day has come! And so the Slovak National Uprising began.

¹¹According to Edward Táborský (Beneš' former Personal Secretary), one of the emissaries—Karol Šmidke—was supposed to be General F. Čatloš' (Minister of National Defense in the Tiso Government) agent carrying a proposal to "solve the internal problems of Slovakia in harmony with Soviet interests." When Beneš protested to Moscow against this type of negotiations "behind his back," V. Z. Lebedyev (Soviet ambassador to the Czechoslovak Government in London) informed him that the negotiations were conducted by the Communist Party and not by the Soviet Government. See Táborský, "Benešove moskovské cesty" [Beneš' Trips to Moscow], *Svědectví* [Evidence], I, 3-4 (1957), p. 203.

¹²In the middle of August, without informing the Slovak National Council, highest organ of the liberation movement, guerrilla units commanded by Soviet officers suddenly started blowing up road and railway bridges, blocking tunnels, raiding military objectives, attacking police organs and threatening adherents of the régime and Ger-

At the time when Slovakia rose in resistance to the German invasion, the nearest Allied front was in the east. The Red Army was still at the foot of the Carpathians and had not entered the passes at a single place. In the west the British had just reached the Somme, the battle near Paris was still going on, and the Allied advance in north-eastern France and towards the Belgian frontier was beginning to develop. In the south the Allies had crossed the river Arno and were approaching the Gothic Line. The Baltic front was on the river Narev approximately 80 miles from the Gulf of Riga. Thus the only logical ally expected to aid the Slovak patriots in their liberation struggle against the Nazis was the Red Army—only 65 miles away.

The Course of the Uprising

The political and military significance of the Slovak insurrection was noted all over the world.¹³ For the Allies it meant new strength in Central Europe. For Nazi Germany, however, it brought a loss of seven divisions, three of them SS armored divisions, "Das Reich," "Deutschland" and "Prinz Eugen." Because of her geographical position and communication lines, the Germans considered Slovakia a significant "defensive wall" against the advancing Red Army.¹⁴ Thus they had decided to take Slovakia at all costs.¹⁵

The main German drive came from both the west and the east. Its aim was to free the double-track strategic line Žilina-Bratislava and the line Žilina-Košice. The struggle for the railway junction of Žilina lasted almost two weeks and for the Žilina-Košice line five weeks of bitter fighting. In order to secure the Žilina-Bratislava railway the Germans began to carry out a pincer movement from the northern valley of the Turec to the south, and from the southern valley of the Nitra to the north, so as to surround the

mans. The Council viewed all this with grave anxiety, because they were threatening the plans for a military and national uprising. Perhaps the gravest consequence of the hasty guerrilla actions was the loss of two battleworthy Slovak divisions seized and disarmed by the Germans before they were given the signal by the National Council to attack German positions in the Carpathians. The same reason for the loss of two Slovak divisions stationed in the Carpathian mountains before the uprising is given by Miroslav Kropilák, member of the Historical Department of the Slovak Academy of Sciences, in his "Vojenské operácie v Slovenskom národnom povstaní. Bojové akcie I. čs. armády" [Military Operations in the Slovak National Uprising. Military Actions of the First Czechoslovak Army], *Historický časopis Slovenskej akadémie vied* [Historical Journal of the Slovak Academy of Sciences], V, 1 (1957), p. 8.

¹³President Franklin D. Roosevelt, for example, had this to say about the Slovak insurgents: "We Americans salute our Czechoslovak comrades-in-arms who are today so bravely contributing to the liberation of their homeland and the rest of Europe." See "Message of the President of the United States Franklin D. Roosevelt to President Edvard Beneš about the Slovak Insurgents," printed in Lettrich, *op. cit.*, p. 307f.

¹⁴"Slovakia has an important task, which it has fulfilled so often in the past. This task is to be a defensive wall of Central Europe. In the past Slovakia was a defensive wall against the Turkish south-east, and at its ramparts the Turkish drive against Europe was halted. Slovakia has a similar task today" stated the Berlin newspaper *Deutsche Allegemeine Zeitung* on October 20, 1944.

¹⁵Inasmuch as our primary interest here is to establish whether or not the Slovak insurgents made any attempt to "avoid contact with the Soviet Army and any aid on its part," we shall be concerned with detailed military operations only where appropriate. For an account of the military operations in Slovakia, see J. B. Muráň, *We Fight On* (London, n. d.).

Czechoslovak units holding out in the mountains along the railway and the highway Žilina-Bratislava. After six weeks of fighting, when the encircling forces had nearly closed the ring, the regular Czechoslovak units were withdrawn to the east to the slopes of the Tatra range, leaving behind only guerrilla units to continue their disruptive activities.

During the month of October, strong German tank and motorized columns, with powerful air support, opened an attack against the south-western fringe of the free territory, only twenty miles from Banská Bystrica and Zvolen. After three weeks of determined struggle the Germans finally broke through the Slovak front. In five days the Germans, with several times the number of their opponents, advanced some 20 to 30 miles into the liberated territory, and on October 27, on the eve of the Czechoslovak Day of Independence, they entered the administrative center of free Slovakia, Banská Bystrica.

At the end of October, when the Germans seized all communication lines between the front and the hinterland, the Red Army had at last crossed the Carpathians, and were only a few miles from the border of Slovakia, having freed the whole of Subcarpathian Russia.

Communist "Fair Play"

From the very first day of the uprising, the Slovak insurgents were desperately in need of air support, heavy and mechanized arms, ammunition and medicaments. Their artillery and heavy arms were seized by the Germans during the first days of the uprising¹⁶ and the U.S.S.R. was still holding the two delegates of the Slovak National Council without informing them of Soviet aid. Thus the Council applied for help to the Czechoslovak Government in London. The government-in-exile immediately undertook diplomatic action with the Allied Governments to obtain military and political support for the insurgents and instructed Zdeněk Fierlinger, Czechoslovak ambassador to Moscow, to do the same in the U.S.S.R. When the Soviet Government failed to answer Fierlinger's request, on September 3, 1944, Klement Gottwald sent a letter to the Soviet Foreign Minister V. M. Molotov restating Fierlinger's request with a detailed analysis of the significance of the Slovak uprising for the Communist interest.¹⁷ It was only then

¹⁶See footnotes nos. 10 and 12, *supra*. Although Academician Miroslav Kropilák admits that the commander-in-chief of the First Czechoslovak Army, Lieutenant-Colonel (later General) Ján Golian, issued orders to the commanders of the two Slovak field divisions in the Carpathians to join the uprising, Anna Hučková, another Communist historian, asserts that "... because the bourgeoisie and the bourgeois-nationalist traitors ... wanted the Soviet Army to avoid contact with the armed [Slovak] nation, the two divisions were not given orders to join the uprising." See Anna Hučková, "K partizánským bojom na východnom Slovensku v rokoch 1943-1945. Partizánska skupina Čapajev" [On Guerrilla Fighting in Eastern Slovakia during the Years 1943-1945. Guerrilla Detachment Chapayev], *Historický časopis Slovenskej akadémie vied*, II, 3 (1954), p. 307; and Miroslav Kropilák, "Vojenské operácie v Slovenskom národnom povstaní. Bojové akcie I. čs. armády," *op. cit.*, p. 17f.

¹⁷See S. Grachev, *Pomosh' SSSR narodam Chekhslovakii v ikh borbye za svobodu i nezavisimost'* [U.S.S.R.'s Help to the Peoples of Czechoslovakia in their Struggle for Freedom and Independence] (Moscow: Góspolitizdat, 1953), p. 163; cf. also Zdeněk Fierlinger, *Ve službách ČSR* [In the Service of the Czechoslovak Republic] (Prague: Dělnické nakladatelství, 1949), II, p. 358.

that "swift" measures were undertaken by the Soviet Government. On September 15, two weeks after the official request from the Czechoslovak Government in London, Soviet planes began to transport the Second Czechoslovak Air-Borne Brigade from the Russian front to Slovakia. It took the Soviet Air Force six weeks to fly in 2800 men. Many times instead of troops, the Soviet aircraft were flying in Soviet guerrilla officers and political commissars, as well as Czech and Slovak Communist agitators and politicians who had been spending the war in exile in Moscow. Among the arrivals from Moscow were the former Communist deputies Rudolph Slánský and Jan Šverma¹⁸ and the new commanding officer of the Czechoslovak Partizán¹⁹ movement Major-General Asmolov. Slánský, who became Asmolov's deputy, "was very successful in establishing contact with the Czech lands where he sent experienced comrades with political instructions and material for Party organizations."²⁰

At the same time a liaison group from Marshal Konev, joined by the American and British Military Missions, came to the Headquarters of the First Czechoslovak Army in Banská Bystrica. The American Mission arrived with three aircraft, which brought much-needed arms, ammunition, drugs and other supplies. On October 6, 1944, six more American planes arrived with arms and medical supplies.²¹ The Anglo-American aid, however, was being given as the result of clandestine improvisation.²²

¹⁸Šverma lost his life during the uprising in 1944. His widow (Marie Švermová) in 1949 was denounced as a spy and arrested. Slánský, who in 1945 became Secretary-General of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, in November 1951 was arrested on a charge of being a spy in the pay of Western imperialists. He was tried in November 1952, and hanged a few days afterwards.

¹⁹The word "partizán" was popularly used among the Slovaks and Russians during World War II meaning "guerrilla" in English. It should be pointed out that the Communists never favored other than guerrilla warfare. According to Šverma, it was the most suitable form of warfare promoting Communist interests. (See Bohuslav Graca's "Slovenské národné povstanie r. 1944" [The Slovak National Uprising of 1944], *Historický časopis Slovenskej akadémie vied*, II, 1 (1954), p. 26.) Karol Šmidke, for example, who in 1944 changed his policy from planning guerrilla warfare to plans for a military uprising, was later accused of deviation and stripped of all Communist ranks. (See *ibid.*, p. 27.)

²⁰B. Pavlík, *Kommunisticheskaya partiya Chekhslovakii v borbye za svobodu* [The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia in the Struggle for Freedom] (tr. from Czech by T. A. Yegerev and N. N. Sokolov; Moscow: Izd-vo inostrannoi literatury, 1951), p. 198.

²¹These planes, according to Yanin, who quotes Doležal for authenticity, were not American but Russian aircraft. "The insurgents received assistance solely from the Soviet Union . . . the scale of this assistance, remarks Doležal, can be gathered from the fact that during the night of October 6 alone several scores of aircraft landed on Three Oak Aerodrome." See Yanin, *op. cit.*, p. 138 and Doležal, *op. cit.*, p. 141. Evidence suggesting that Doležal and Yanin are mistaken is presented by Jozef Lettrich who states that "on October 6, 1944, American planes flew to London a three-man delegation of the Slovak National Council consisting of Ján Ursíny, Ladislav Novomeský and Lt.-Colonel Miroslav Vesel." See his *History of Modern Slovakia*, p. 213 and his *O Slovenskej národnej rade* [About the Slovak National Council] (Bratislava 1945), pp. 5-65.

²²According to Colonel Threlfall, head of the British Military Mission, "who discussed the possibilities of rendering aid to the insurgents with Generals Viest and Golian admitted that the Western Allies were not permitted to make any military

Until October 16, the guerrilla and the armed forces operated under two separate commands.²³ The head of the guerrilla detachments, General Asmolov, received orders from Kiev, while the military units were under the authority of the Slovak National Council and the Czechoslovak Government in London. The result of this separation was reflected in frequent misunderstandings and quarrels between the guerrillas and soldiers and in the weakening of the insurgents' position on the front. The disharmony between the two groups was carefully planned by the Russians. It contributed to the early collapse of the Czechoslovak Army in free Slovakia and thus enabled the Soviets to take over the complete control of the insurgent forces fighting a guerrilla warfare in the mountains. After the fall of Banská Bystrica "the Soviet officers insisted that the First Czechoslovak Army be disbanded and split up into guerrilla units which would be entirely under the control of Soviet commanders or Czechoslovak Communists."²⁴ As it later became clear, the Soviet Government found it undesirable for the Slovak people to free themselves from German domination by their own valiant effort. The Soviets preferred an uprising liquidated by the Nazis to one helped by the West.²⁵ The Soviets wanted to be the ones who would liberate Czechoslovakia, and by such liberation impose a Communist régime and Soviet domination upon the Czechoslovak Republic.²⁶

commitments to the Slovak insurgents, because Slovakia was in the sphere of Soviet military operations and there could be no Western interference in this sphere without Soviet permission." See Lettrich, *op. cit.*, p. 213. It is interesting to note that as early as September 1941, Great Britain gave Russia a half-promise that the Soviets could dominate Eastern Europe after World War II. See U. S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1941* (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1958), I, p. 188. Cf. also Chester Wilmot, *The Struggle for Europe* (New York, 1952), pp. 142 and 711.

²³"The Slovak National Council, working in close collaboration with the Czechoslovak Government in London, swiftly brought the guerrilla forces under effective control when, on October 16th, a general staff of the Slovak guerrillas was created and all the armed forces of the people were united under one command." See Muráň, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

²⁴See Lettrich, *History of Modern Slovakia*, p. 211.

²⁵This thesis is partially supported also by Ivo Ducháček, former Deputy of the Czech Populist Party, in his "Czechoslovakia" published in Stephen Kertész, ed., *The Fate of East Central Europe* (Notre Dame, 1956), p. 200. Ducháček's central thesis seems to be that because of "the presence of the most important Communist leaders at the helm of the uprising, it would seem that the lack of flexibility of the Red Army Command was primarily responsible for the tragic outcome of the Slovak National Uprising." *Ibid.*

²⁶One step in this direction was undertaken on September 17, 1944, when the Slovak Communists supported by left-wing Social Democrats succeeded in dissolving the Slovak Social Democratic Party through the creation of a new Communist Party of Slovakia. The significance of this act was seen only after the war. With the Social Democrats eliminated from the political arena, there were only two political parties functioning in postwar Slovakia: the Communists and the Democrats. Until May 26, 1946 (the first postwar national elections), the "parity" principle gave the Communists 50 per cent representation in all national and local offices in Slovakia. It should be noted, however, that in 1946 twice as many people voted for the Slovak Democratic Party (61.43 per cent of the electorate) as for the Communist Party of Slovakia (30.48 per cent). For the complete election results, cf. R. R. Betts, *Central and South East Europe, 1945-1948* (London, 1950), p. 179.

The Slovak National Uprising was not organized by the Communist Party of Slovakia, as the Communist historians maintain,²⁷ nor was it supported solely by the Soviet Union.²⁸

There is no evidence suggesting that the outlawed Communist Party of Slovakia would have had any members or supporters in the military or administrative organs of the Slovak state. Military leaders of the liberation movement, while holding high-ranking posts in the Slovak Army, were, generally speaking, non-Communists, closely associated with the Czechoslovak Government in London, striving for a free democratic Slovakia within the framework of a Czechoslovak Republic. So were the political organizers of the uprising. With the exception of K. Šmidke, G. Husák and L. Novomeský²⁹ most of the Slovak Communist leaders were either in jail in Hlava or in exile in Moscow or London.

The soul of the uprising was not Communism³⁰ but Thomas Garrigue Masaryk and his concept of democracy.³¹ The insurgents knew very well who in the First Republic fought against mythical and irrational thinking; who gave the nation moral and cultural support; who stood against blind authority of the state, church and party; who introduced ethics into politics; who rejected violence; who taught to judge people by their deeds; who appealed to mankind with the words: Jesus, not Caesar! It was the picture of T. G. Masaryk and not Stalin, the Czechoslovak tricolor and not the hammer and sickle that decorated the streets and buildings in Banská Bystrica, Zvolen, Brezno nad Hronom and other cities and towns in free Slovakia. It was the strong belief in Masarykian democracy that moved the insurgents to rise against totalitarianism with the aim of liquidating fascism in Slovakia. The failure to achieve this aim in 1944 was interpreted by the Slovak patriots as treason against democracy. To ask who committed this treason would be superfluous. Those who participated in the uprising know who prohibited the Western Allies from supplying the insurgents with arms, ammunition and medicaments; who sabotaged the transfer of the Second Czechoslovak Air-Borne Brigade from the Russian front to Slovakia; who caused the disharmony between the army and the

²⁷See Pavlík, *op. cit.*, p. 194; Doležal, *op. cit.*, p. 141; Yanin, *op. cit.*, p. 134; and Miloš Gosiorovsky, *Illegálny boj KSS a Slovenské národné* [The Illegal Struggle of the Communist Party of Slovakia and the Slovak National Uprising] (Bratislava: "Pravda," 1949), p. 45.

²⁸The amount of Soviet aid is very well described by Academician Ondrej Pavlík. The chief Soviet aid to the insurgents, said Pavlík at a conference on the Slovak National Uprising, came through the Dukla Pass. "The struggle of the Soviet peoples in the foothills of the Carpathian mountains was our main support, the support for all of us who were in the insurgent territory. Reports about the Soviet Army coming to our aid [which arrived too late—P.A.T.] gave our people courage and selfconsciousness." See Miroslav Kropilák (ed.) "Vedecká konferencia o Slovenskom národnom povstaní" [Scientific Conference on the Slovak National Uprising], *Historický časopis Slovenskej akadémie vied*, II, 1 (1954), p. 117.

²⁹All of them were tried and sentenced in 1952 (during the Slánský Trial) as bourgeois nationalists and spies in the pay of Western imperialists.

³⁰As claimed by Pavlík, *op. cit.*, p. 195, and Bohuslav Graca, "Slovenké; národné povstanie r. 1944," *op. cit.*, p. 8.

³¹See my article "Odkaz Slovenského národného povstania" [Legacy of the Slovak National Uprising] in *New Yorkský Denník* [The New York Daily], October 29, 1952.

guerrilla units; who contributed to the capture of two Slovak divisions in the Carpathians; who ignored representatives of the Slovak National Council in their mission in Moscow; who aimed to avoid contact with the Soviet Army; and who helped the Nazis to liquidate non-Communist leaders after October 28, 1944. They all know who is responsible for the tragic outcome of the Slovak National Uprising, because they can still recall that in the mountains they were chased by the Communists and in the valleys by the German SS.

UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA

NOTES

A number of conferences concerned with developments in the field of Central and East European studies, held in recent months in the United States, should be noted.

The Far Western Slavic Conference held its annual meeting at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, on April 3-5, 1959, under the general chairmanship of Professor H. H. Fisher. The meeting was divided into four sessions: 1. Nationalism in Russia and Eastern Europe; 2. Nationalism and Communism in Communist state policies; 3. Communism and Eastern European Nationalism; 4. Communism and Asian Nationalism. Four papers were presented at each session, followed by open discussion. The following officers were elected for the year 1959-1960: Charles Jelavich, Chairman; Donald W. Treadgold, Vice Chairman; David T. Cattell, Secretary-Treasurer; additional members of the Executive Board, S. Harrison Thomson and Cyril Bryner.

At the 55th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, meeting in Washington, D. C., on September 1959, there was held a Conference on Soviet and Communist Studies under the chairmanship of Professor Merle Fainsod. The following papers were read and discussed: 1. The Problem of Teaching Soviet Foreign Relations; 2. The Problem of Research in Soviet Foreign Policy; 3. Soviet Politics—Materials and Methods of Research; 4. Problems of Teaching Comparative Communist Politics.

The Slavic Institute of Marquette University at Milwaukee held a special Conference on National Communism on November 2, 1958. The Conference was sponsored by the Social Science Research Council. Four papers were presented: 1. The Origin of National Communism; 2. A Definition of National Communism; 3. Titoism; 4. Gomulka-ism.

* * *

The Baltische Gesellschaft in Deutschland held its fourth annual meeting in Lüneburg (West Germany) from February 13 to 15, 1959 on the general theme of Eastern Europe and the European Idea. Rudolf Neumann (Lüneburg) read a paper on "Osteuropa und der Europäische Gedanke;" Josef Mackiewicz (Munich) on "Die deutsch-polnische Beziehungen im Europäischen Rahmen;" Peter Circis (London) on "Das Nationalitätenexperiment in Bukowina und seine Auswirkungen;" Rudolf Wagner (Munich) and Walter Baraitis (London) on "Die Einstellung der Völker hinter dem Eisernen Vorhang zum europäischen Gedanken."

* * *

The Arbeitsgemeinschaft Ost in Vienna has begun the publication of four series of *Wiener Quellenhefte zur Ostkunde*, under the general editorship of Wilfried Krallert. Reihe Kultur, edd. T. Eckhardt and G. Wyrzens; Reihe Landeskunde, ed. Wilfried Krallert; Reihe Recht, ed. Helmut Slapnicka; Reihe Wirtschaft, ed. Kurt Wessely; Bibliographische Teile aller Reihen, edd. Robert Schwank and Karl Wilke. The inauguration of the series is grounded in an appreciation of the crucial position of Vienna at the crossroads of Slavic and Eastern Europe and of the necessity for the existence of a continued chronicling and interpretation of events and trends in that part of the continent. The first *Quellenheft* bears no date but appears to have been issued late in 1958 or early in 1959. It carries all four Reihen, in

short notes or abstracts, statistics, laws or reports in the several countries behind the Curtain. The bibliographical notes are helpful, though naturally very selective. The seat of the Arbeitsgemeinschaft is Wien I, Josefsplatz, 6.

The Arbeitsgemeinschaft Ost has recently announced the formation of an Ostakademie whose purpose will be to bring to the non-specialist Austrian public the latest reliable information about developments in Eastern Europe. Series of lectures for the leading cities of Austria have already been begun.



The establishment of an Osteuropa Institut at the University of Freiburg has recently been announced. It is to be attached to the Philosophical Faculty (1 A rue de l'Hôpital, Fribourg, Switzerland). The first Director of the Institut is Professor Bochenski. Other members of the staff are Professors Constantin Regamey and Franz Brenn. Z. Jordan and N. Lobkowicz are Assistants. The University Library has been building its holdings in this area for some years, and, in collaboration with the Archiepiscopal Documentation Center for Polish Church Affairs, now has a substantial core of titles for research in this field. A series of publications has been begun and an expanded program of publications of monographs is planned for the near future.



The Polish Academy of Sciences (Warsaw) has begun publication of a new historical journal under the title *Acta Poloniae historica*, edited by an editorial committee of which Marian Małowist is the chairman. The first fascicle (Warsaw 1958) carries four leading articles in Western languages, on subjects of Polish history ranging from medieval agrarian history to a study of deportations by the Germans in the Zamość area in 1942 and 1943. There are furthermore a number of critical reviews and some shorter notices, intended to make available to Western readers the results of recent Polish historical research. All in all it is a meaty and appetizing issue.

BOOK REVIEWS

BUJNOCH, JOSEF, *Zwischen Rom und Byzanz* (Slavische Geschichtsschreiber, herausgegeben von Univ. Prof. Dr. Günther Stökl, Bd. I.) . Graz: Verlag Styria, 1958. Pp. 197. S/55.

This slender volume deserves serious attention both because of its intrinsic value and because it inaugurates a new series which will contribute to a better knowledge of the history and historiography of the Slavs, not only in the German speaking countries but also in many others, including the English speaking, where the German language continues to be much better known than any of the Slavic ones. The Austrian firm Styria, which is publishing, in two separate series, German translations of Byzantine and Ottoman historians (eight volumes have already appeared in the first and three in the second), has started a similar series dedicated to Slavic historiography. Nobody could be better qualified to edit these volumes than the distinguished Austrian historian Professor Günther Stökl, recently called from the University of Vienna to that of Cologne, who shares with his former master, Professor Heinrich Felix Schmid, an unusually objective and sympathetic approach to the Slavic world.

The very name of Professor Stökl—who in this preface to the first volume has well explained the scope and character of the new project, dealing with a great variety of peoples and states—is the best possible guarantee that all the translations will be philosophically accurate and the introductions and notes to each text on a high level of scholarship. This is certainly true of the editorial apparatus supplied in the present case by Josef Bujnoch, though his introductory remarks are rather brief and, especially in the second case, take for granted a fairly good preparation of the reader. They give indeed the most essential bibliographical references, more of which are scattered in the notes at the end of the volume.

Little is more important in any such undertaking than is the selection of the texts which are to be translated. The very title of the first volume, stressing the position of the Slavic nations between Rome and Byzantium, is aptly chosen, as is the first case study, presenting the basic narrative sources for the history of Saints Cyril and Methodius. No introduction to the history of all the Slavs could be more appropriate, and the importance of the problem has been made clear by Bujnoch, who gives separate comments on both the Pannonian legends and on the *vita* of Bishop Klemont, the so-called Bulgarian legend.

Much more questionable is the choice of the second topic included in the present volume. It is obviously true that the Primary Russian Chronicle is one of the most important monuments of Slavic historiography, no less than the biographies of the Apostles of the Slavs. But the full text of that chronicle being already available in the excellent German edition of R. Trautmann, as well as in French and English translations (the latter, by the late S. H. Cross, quite recently re-edited by Professor Sherbowitz-Wetzov), it was scarcely urgent to publish another German translation of the short fragment of the chronicle concerning the baptism of Vladimir of Kiev. Maybe it seemed desirable to place that account, the so-called Korsua Legend, beside the legends which are dispersed in the first part of the volume.

This leads to the question of the material which has been selected for the next volumes of the series. The preface points out in advance that the Russian narrative sources will have to receive special attention, "not so much because the Russians are the most numerous and historically more powerful Slavic people, but rather because the argument of linguistic inaccessibility has more weight with respect to the Greek-Orthodox Slavs." Whatever we might think of that argument, the over-

emphasis on the Russian sector in the field of Slavic studies reappears here once more to the detriment of all other Slavs, though it is promised that the West Slavic and South Slavic historians will receive some attention too and that even chronicles written in Latin will not be excluded. In any case, out of the five volumes which are already announced, three will present Russian sources; but it is very fortunate that in one of them besides the Great Russian *vita* of Alexander Nevsky, the colorful account of the Volkyrian Chronicle about Daniel of Horlich will also be translated, the term "Russland" being obviously used in the general sense of Rus', which in German could be best rendered by the old name "Renssen."

One of the other two volumes will contain the biographies of medieval Serbian writers, and the other one parts of the famous Polish memoirs of Jan Pasek, of the seventeenth century. The prominent Polish historians of earlier times, especially those of the sixteenth century who were no longer writing in Latin but in Polish, also deserve to be translated for the first time.

In view of the high quality of the initial volume, we shall be looking forward to the continuation of this useful series.

Fordham University

OSCAR HALECKI

SCHWARZ, ERNST, *Die Herkunft der Siebenbürger und Zipser Sachsen. Siebenbürger und Zipser Sachsen, Ostmitteldeutsche, Rheinländer im Spiegel der Mundarten. Veröffentlichungen des Süddeutschen Kulturwerks, Reihe B (Wissenschaftliche Arbeiten)*. München: Verlag des Süddeutschen Kulturwerks, 1957. Pp. 229.

Interest in the German dialects spoken in Transylvania known as Transylvanian Saxon (henceforth referred to as TS) may be traced to approximately 1769, when the Jesuit Franz Xaver on his visit to that region discovered similarities between TS and the German spoken in Luxembourg. Of the long list of those who since then have joined in the effort of solving some of the intricate, often perplexing problems connected with TS, the names of F. G. Marienburg, G. Keintzel, G. Kisch, A. Scheiner, H. Klein, F. Holzträger, R. Huss, K. K. Klein, T. Frings, and E. Schwarz, the author of the study reviewed here, are outstanding, and their research is rich and prolific though inconclusive.

The fact that Germans migrated into Transylvania under the reign of King Geisa II is historically established by a document (1224) in which King Andreas II grants privileges to "... *nostri Theutonici Ultrasilvani . . . qui vocati fuerant a piüssimo rege Geysa avo nostro . . .*" But from where did they originally come, and when did they leave their homes? Did they come directly from their original home to the new homeland or was there a transitory home somewhere along the migratory path? If there was a temporary home, where was it located? What is the chronology of migration and settlement in the various sections which make up the TS islands of Altland (with the cities of Hermannstadt, Mediasch, Schässburg, Draas, a.o.), Burzenland (Brenndorf, Tartlan, Kronstadt, a.o.), and Nösnerland (S. Regen, Botsch, Tekendorf, Baierdorf, Bistritz, Jaad, Neudorf, a.o.)? What was the primary purpose in calling these Germans to Transylvania? These are some of the questions which Schwarz in his scholarly and well documented book attempts to answer with the help of linguistic evidence, and by employing methods of dialect geography developed by linguists in the last few decades.

A meticulous comparison of the phonology of the various dialects spoken on the German-language islands of Transylvania and a comparison of these with the phonology of Rhenish German dialects, supported by evidence extracted by complicated methods employed in word geography, collated with historically documented facts yield answers to some of the questions enumerated above and unravel

the story of the migration and settlement of the Transylvanian Germans, which, in the main, agrees with notions expressed by G. Kisch at the end of the nineteenth century. Nonetheless, the author's original contribution is evident from the following features of the book: 1. The extension of the problem area by including the Upper Zips region as an integral part of the linguistic and historical problems of the Transylvanian Germans. 2. The assumption of a transitory home in an area located roughly between Dresden and the Saale river, and the justification for such an assumption. 3. The employment of word geography to support conclusions arrived at by a comparison of the phonology of the dialects under study. 4. His approach based on scientifically established methods of dialect geography, in contradistinction to the intuitive approach of G. Kisch and other predecessors (with the exception of T. Frings). The book attests to the author's wealth of knowledge and to a thoroughness true to the tradition of German *Gründlichkeit* (alas, not always to the glory of German culture). It is not an easy book to read and it is not free of *tours de force*, circular reasoning, and unnecessary repetitions. The study might have gained much by the use of the linguistic atlas for that area which, according to the author's own statement, is in the process of compilation. Understandably, the author may have been anxious to have his book in print lest it meet the same fate as his first *ms.*, lost through the vicissitudes of the war. The inconclusiveness of the results notwithstanding, the book is significant if for no other reason than that it distinctly points up the valuable contribution of modern linguistic methods in the reconstruction of historical facts.

University of Colorado

ISAAC BACON

KOEPPEN, HANS, Ed., *Preussisches Urkundenbuch*. Dritter Band, 2 Lieferung (1342-1345. Herausgegeben im Auftrage der Historischen Kommission für Ost-und Westpreussische Landesforschung.) Marburg, 1958. Pp. iv, 289-650.

Johannes Voigt began in the past century to publish the Prussian documents in a *Codex Diplomaticus Prussicus*. But a modern edition was started in the eighties by Philipp and Woelky, who adopted the plan of edition proposed by Max Perlbach. Thus the *Codex* was to be published in four series: a political one, reaching to 1382; a "*Prussia sacra*" with documents relative to the Prussian bishoprics; a collection of grants of land, divided in respect to the administrative partitions of the Middle Ages; a series containing the documents of the towns. The letters of the fifteenth century were to be published in the *Akten der Ständetage* or in other specialized collections. The plan was only partially realized: the collections of the bishopric's documents were published; but the political series suffered a check after the publication of the first volume. After World War I, Dr. Hein, Director of the Archives of Königsberg, and Professor E. Maschke published Volume II (1310-1335). Then Dr. Hein alone published the first part of Volume III (1335-1341) in 1944. He broadened the base of the edition of Volumes II and III to include all documents issued in or concerning Prussia. Thus the material, greatly expanded, checked once more the progress of the edition. Fourteen years later, Dr. Koeppen published the second part of Volume III (1341-1345), enlarging once more the base and including printed documents. Thus the projected part 3 of Volume III is to be published as a separate Volume IV (1346-1351); and for the years after 1351, the documents will be published in the form of *regesta*.

Dr. Koeppen, as he indicates, deviates in three respects from the method adopted by his predecessors. He broadened the base of the publication; he offered fuller texts, fewer *regesta*; he enlarged the volume of the notes and footnotes and took account of the dorsal notes on the documents. He used mainly the documents

of the former archives of the Teutonic Knights, now at Göttingen. He received without difficulty microfilms and information from the Polish Archives, and obtained material from the archives at London and Gravenhage. But he was not able to work in the Vatican Archives, thus making use only of printed materials in that area. He was unable, as he states, to make use of the Polish historical literature in as exhaustive a manner as he had wished.

The editorial method is excellent and the volume, containing 343 documents, is imposing. Some of the documents printed in old but good editions might have been presented only in the form of *regesta*; but the editor was anxious to give as full a collation as possible to the student. The footnotes afford rich material for the student of onomastics, and are carefully compiled. When reviewing the volume, I found that there are a few minor corrections to be made, e.g., No. 719: the Polish knight "*Comes Johannes heres de Waldowo*" cannot bear the German designation "*Graf*" because the title "*Comes*" was attributed in Poland to officials. Attached to their office, it was not hereditary.

The editor published once more the documents of the peace treaty between King Casimir III of Poland and the Teutonic Order at Kalisz, in 1343. He found that only documents of the Polish side, those of the Order, mentioned in the notarial instrument of their exchange, were lost. Koeppen abstained from trying to resolve the problem, leaving it open to discussion in specialized works—a wise decision. Scholars may be grateful to Dr. Koeppen for having published an impressive work in such a careful manner.

University of Toruń

KAROL GÓRSKI

SOOM, ARNOLD, *Der Herrenhof in Estland im 17. Jahrhundert*. Lund: Skånska Centraltryckeriet, 1954. Pp. 411. 25 Sw. Kr.

This book evolved out of Dr. Soom's earlier researches on the significance of the Baltic on the seventeenth-century international grain market. While investigating the Baltic contribution to the grain trade, Dr. Soom became interested in the manor as the basis of grain production which was the main prop of the Baltic economy. Noticing the large amount of available materials in Swedish archives on manorial operation, Dr. Soom expanded a work which he intended to be primarily economic to one with strong overtones of social history. For this we can be most grateful, for he has written a detailed account of manorial economy in Esthonia, which rivals similar studies dealing with the manors of Western Europe. Because of the broad scope of the undertaking and the great mass of archival materials, Dr. Soom limited himself to Esthonia. With meticulous care, painstaking research, and sound scholarship, he presents a clear picture of all phases of life on Esthonian manors, and in so doing he draws careful distinctions between those manors located more closely to the Baltic and those more eastward and inland. He also describes differences found on those manors under native lordship as compared with those under the control of Swedish nobles.

During the long series of wars lasting between 1558-1625, the manor as an economic unit declined, but during the second half of the seventeenth century seigneurial economy expanded. This expansion was in turn accompanied by far-reaching social and economic consequences, which were more noticeable on those estates owned by Swedes. On the whole Swedish controlled manors showed greater adaptability than did Esthonian ones and they achieved more economic and social progress both productively and in the treatment of the peasantry. Swedish overlords, moreover, were not so dependent upon grain production, but supplemented basic agriculture with commercial and industrial activity.

The peasant's lot, as might be expected, was one of constant oppression and exploitation. The status of the free peasant declined in Esthonia during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as compared with gradual emancipation in Western Europe, although the Esthonian manor as a public institution had roots in the Middle Ages. The Lord of the manor not only had judicial power over the serfs, but also the authority to administer "House Discipline" in the form of corporal punishment. On Swedish estates such "House Discipline" was regulated by law, but it was not until 1689 that legal restrictions were extended to all private manors. Economic changes and oppression led many serfs to desert the manor, while those remaining provided cheap but highly inefficient labor. Maltreatment also led to peasant revolts and riots. By the middle of the century the Swedish Government with some success attempted a rational approach to the problems of Esthonian laborers.

Dr. Soom sheds much information on many facets of manorial economy in addition to the production and exchange of grains. He lucidly treats the manufacture of hemp and flax, the important timber trade from Russia and Lithuania and the export trade to the West, the cattle business which later became important in Esthonian economy but which in the seventeenth century was just beginning to stir with the importation of Dutch cattle, and the nascent industrial life that began to emerge on some Swedish manors. Of special interest is the chapter dealing with guest house and tavern concessions plus distilling rights, which were cherished privileges. Taxes, types of service, agricultural methods, crop yields, etc., are all expertly treated in Dr. Soom's study of Esthonia's manorial economy. Charts, a full bibliography, a study of place names, and an adequate index contribute to make this work highly significant for those interested in Esthonian economic and social history.

Coe College

JOHN J. MURRAY

WINTER, EDUARD, Ed., *Die Deutsch-Russische Begegnung und Leonard Euler; Beiträge zu den Beziehungen zwischen der deutschen und der russischen Wissenschaft und Kultur im 18. Jahrhundert. Quellen und Studien zur Geschichte Osteuropas*, Vol. I. Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1958. Pp. 196.

This volume is the first in a projected series of publications of studies and sources in East European history. Since a second announced work will consider one aspect of Polish-German intellectual ties in the first half of the eighteenth century, it appears that the latter period has attracted the initial attention of German scholars who are reaching back into the history of German-Slavic "reciprocity" in science, technology, and culture throughout the ages. The presence in the work under review of several essays by Russian scholars attests to a contemporary reciprocity of interest.

The study of the past in this case has a bearing on the politics of today. The Society for German-Soviet Friendship acts as a patron (*Hausvater*) in supporting and encouraging such research and publication. In the editor's introduction as well as elsewhere, the importance of Soviet-German friendship is underwritten, as a pledge for peace in Europe and the world. The myth of a perpetual German-Slav conflict is due for modification in detail.

The present volume centers about Leonard Euler, noted eighteenth-century German (Swiss by birth) mathematician, who is described as embodying the "... good tradition of a real, upright friendship and communion which was discarded later in the age of bourgeois nationalism." Euler first went to Russia in the time of Peter the Great, when St. Petersburg was described as "the scholar's paradise" by the German philosopher, Christian Wolff. After fourteen years with the Academy

of Science in the new Russian capital, Euler responded to the call of Frederick the Great to join the revived Berlin Academy of Science. He justified the move by stating that thereby he would be in an even better position to foster enlightenment in the eastern empire. Even the Seven Years War failed to sever his ties with Russian scholars. In Berlin, where he was officially rated as "useful but not illustrious," he failed to get the presidency of the Academy. Accordingly, he returned to St. Petersburg in 1766, where he resided until his death in 1783. Members of the Euler family acted as permanent secretaries of the Russian Academy for nearly a hundred years.

On the 250th anniversary of the birth of Euler both the Berlin Academy and the Soviet Academy of Science held testimonial sessions in Euler's honor. Their papers read on the occasion provide the materials for most of the chapters in this work, which has all the weaknesses of similar publications—a series of fragments with no attempt to draft a comprehensive picture. It is too early to attempt the latter.

Various fragments of scholarly research, other than those on Euler, help to round out or demonstrate the need of further study of this eighteenth-century meeting (*Begegnung*) of Russian and German minds. A count is made of Russian students attending German universities, with due recognition of the fact that most of them were from the Baltic areas. Some information is provided on the presence of numerous Germans in Moscow and St. Petersburg, where they might have served as avenues through which German culture was siphoned into Russia's chief cities. The library of Prokopovič, an advisor of Peter the Great, is described in some detail. Of 741 volumes, 420 come from the hands of German authors.

With all its limitations, this work gives interesting data on the international ties of scholarship in the eighteenth century. No formal bibliography is included, though many good sources are mentioned in the footnotes. Political considerations to the contrary, there seems to be no attempt to wring too much out of the evidence. After making a bow to the reigning deity, the contributors stuck to the task of being scholars.

Montana State University

OSCAR J. HAMMEN

MOSSE, WERNER EUGEN, *The European Powers and the German Question 1848-71*, Cambridge [Eng.]: University Press, 1958. Pp. ix, 410. \$9.50.

This is the first major book of the author who has earned his spurs by several contributions to the diplomatic history of the 1850s and 1860s, such as "Britain, Russia, and the questions of Serpents Islands and Bolgrad" (*Slavonic Rev.*, v.29, 1950-51), "The Russians at Villafranca" (*ibid.*, v.30, 1951-52), "How Russia made peace, September 1855 to April 1856" (*The Cambridge Hist. Jour.*, v.11, 1955) and "England and the Polish Insurrection of 1863" (*Engl. Hist. Rev.*, v.71, 1956). The main topic of the book is to show how British and Russian attitudes and interests were affected by the German Question and that the "German" policies of both Powers must be examined and understood in the first place from the point of view of *Realpolitik* and of their own *Staatsraison*, and not be viewed principally as mere reactions to the intentions and actions of the prime-mover on the diplomatic chess-board, Bismarck. In reexamining the reaction of the Powers to the German national movement and in analyzing the considerations which determined their policy, the author was guided by the conviction that the prevailing narrow "Germano-centric" (or rather: Bismarcko-centric) approach in dealing with German History in the formative years of the German Empire should be superseded. The author's fundamental premises that "Russia, ideally, required a Germany that was dualist

and conservative, England one that was unitary and liberal," can hardly be challenged.

Excellent use has been made of numerous British public and private archives and of the Vienna archives thus making available considerable new information. The Stuttgart archives providentially provided a substantial amount of correspondence between the Russian Foreign Minister Gorchakov and Olga Nikolaevna, Crown-Princess of Württemberg; thus they became to a certain extent a substitute for the Moscow archives.

In his first chapter Mosse convincingly points out that Russian intervention in Hungary in 1849 was caused principally by concern for the security of Poland and was not directly connected with Germany, but that "paradoxically, the subjection of Hungary in its consequences formed perhaps the most far-reaching intervention in German affairs." Chapter II, focused on the Crimean War, deals with developments between 1853 and 1859 which decisively influenced the evolution of German affairs; the conditions, on which the restoration settlement of 1815 rested, were basically changed by the outcome of the Crimean War and the Franco-Austrian War of 1859. Chapter IV, dealing with the Polish insurrection of 1863, and chapters VI and VII (on Schleswig-Holstein) take a fresh look at endlessly debated issues. The author takes a depreciatory view of the Alvensleben Convention as part of the "Bismarckian legend" (p. 110). With regard to the Question of Schleswig-Holstein he emphasizes that the policies of the Powers were determined by their mutual relations and by extra-German considerations (p. 210) and that hitherto the influence of the Schleswig-Holstein dispute on the evolution of the German Question has been overrated. The latest monograph on the Schleswig-Holstein Question: L. Roots. *Schleswig-Gol'shtinskii vopros i politika evropeiskikh derzhav v 1863-1864 godakh* (The Schleswig-Holstein Question and the Politics of the European Powers), Tallinn, 1957, was not accessible to the author.

The Austro-Prussian War sealed the destruction of the political order established by the Congress of Vienna. The "revolution" in the Power relations by a "new order" based on the principle of nationality, was completed between 1867 and 1871. Showing "diplomatic skill of the very highest order" (p. 290 n. 1), Bismarck by a secret Russo-Prussian understanding (1868) "achieved the seemingly impossible in partly dissociating the eastern and western questions" (*ibid.*). British and Austrian policies in July-August 1870, and the genesis of the Russian abrogation of the Black Sea clauses are reexamined with great care in the light of new Austrian and British sources.

Three appendices discuss (A) "German historiography and the German Question" (not clearly discriminating between scholars and popularizers and alluding to Erich Marcks' opinion in undeserved mockery as the "Marcksist" standpoint), (B) "British diplomacy and the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War," and (C) "The Russian national press and the 'German peril': 1870-71." Dealing with Mikhail Katkov only on the basis of Austrian diplomatic reports, App. C proves how carefully the Russian press was scrutinized at the Austrian Embassy in St. Petersburg; in this connection Irene Greuning's original research on Katkov (*Die russische öffentliche Meinung und ihre Stellung zu den Grossmächten 1878-1894*) published in 1929, deserved to be mentioned.

German special literature has been used to a large, but not to the fullest extent. It should be noted that Bismarck's *Gedanken und Erinnerungen* are used in a popular edition of 1913 and not in the critical edition (*Erinnerung und Gedanke*), the v.15, 1932, of the *Gesammelte Werke*. In the course of his research the author was struck several times by certain "curious" facts, "resemblance," "coincidence"

or "parallelism" (p. 50, 76, 84, 85, 91, 95 and 215) which he thinks were perhaps not entirely accidental; he did not, however, pursue any further this subject, which borders on the realm of philosophy of history. One would have wished that a way had been found to abbreviate monsters of abbreviation such as HHSAPARRR and HHSAPSDiRMPM for two collections of the Vienna Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv.

As a piece of solid and diligent research the book must be added to the few modern outstanding works in English on the crucial period of Bismarck's unification policy such as Lawrence D. Steefel, *The Schleswig-Holstein Question* (1932) and Chester V. Clark, *Franz Joseph and Bismarck* (1934). It is gratifying to have Mosse's up-to-date account at a moment when Alexander Scharff's publication of Otto Becker's posthumous monumental work *Bismarcks Ringen um Deutschlands Gestaltung* (Heidelberg, Quelle & Meyer, 1958. 963 pp.) reopens the discussion in Germany.

The Library of Congress

Fritz T. Epstein

JELAVICH, CHARLES, *Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, Russian Influence in the Internal Affairs of Bulgaria and Serbia, 1879-1886*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1958. Pp. 304. \$4.50.

It is the sub-title of this interesting monograph that tells us what it is really about: we are dealing *not* with a general synthetic treatment of the big subject adumbrated by the main title but with a careful and detailed study of seven critically important years of Tsarist foreign policy and its interaction with native Bulgarian and Serbian opinion. A reader who comes to Professor Jelavich's book fresh from W. L. Langer's *European Alliances and Alignments*, B. H. Sumner's *Russia and the Balkans, 1870-1880*, and C. E. Black's *The Establishment of Constitutional Government in Bulgaria* will be carrying the absolute minimum of bibliographical baggage; he will find himself still happier if he has already familiarized himself with the appropriate works of Corti, Skazkin, and Radev. In addition to the printed materials available to these and other scholars, Professor Jelavich has been able to draw upon unpublished English and Austrian diplomatic correspondence, in London and Vienna, and upon those portions of the correspondence of the Russian Foreign Minister, N. K. Giers, now in the possession of Giers' grandson. Jelavich does not tell us, however, where the Giers papers now are, nor does he supply us with any description of their score as a collection, though casual examination of the footnote references to them suggests that they consist largely of materials sent to Giers rather than emanating from him. Ought not the author to have indulged his reader by locating and giving a full account of this major unpublished collection of source materials which he here skillfully exploits for the first time?

After a general introductory chapter on *Russia's Near Eastern Policy* covering the years between the Congress of Berlin and 1881, Jelavich, in five chapters, chronicles the story of Russian policy toward Bulgaria down to the eve of union with Eastern Rumelia in September 1885. This touched off the crisis leading to the Serbian-Bulgarian War; so the author at this point turns, for two retrospective chapters, to Serbia, in this period a client-state of Austria with the full consent of official Russia though not of the Serbian people. Jelavich then returns, in the two final chapters, to Bulgaria for the crowded events of 1885-1886, reaching their climax in the kidnapping, return, and second departure of Prince Alexander of Battenberg, and in the complete bankruptcy of Russian policy. The main focus, then, is where it belongs, from the point of view of Russian policy: on Bulgaria. Nowhere else, so far as I know, can the student find so thorough an analysis of the

developing and shifting Russian attitudes toward the new state, toward its liberal constitution, its putative future railroad lines, its army, the personnel of its government, its politicians, and above all its prince. By sheer staggering ineptitude the Russians managed to throw away all their advantages in Bulgaria, strangling themselves, so to speak, with their own free hand, until they found themselves passionately opposing Bulgarian acquisition of territory that they themselves had assigned the new state only a few years before.

As one reflects on the instructive story, one is astonished all over again at the inability of the Tsarist autocracy to co-ordinate the activity of its own servants. Each of the Russian representatives in Bulgaria, military and political—Parensov, Kumani, Davydov, Ernrot, Khitrovo, Remlingen, Sobolev, Kaulbars, Ionin, Koriander—interpreted Russian national interests according to his own whim, his actions often conflicting with those of his colleagues on the spot or in St. Petersburg. As for Alexander of Battenberg, though his difficulties command sympathy and his intermittent courage (as in the decision to accept the union with Eastern Rumelia) admiration, he emerges as incompetent and unintelligent. On Jelavich's own showing, one may question the opinion (p. 62) that Alexander had "gained immeasurably in experience and wisdom" during 1879-1880: experience he got in abundance, but one looks in vain for any trace of wisdom, right down to the last melodramatic telegram in 1886 by which he himself handed over to Tsar Alexander III the means of ousting him permanently from Bulgaria. Stambolov's judgment (quoted by Jelavich on pp. 259-260): "This is the man for whom we have roused the whole of Bulgaria, have put our necks in the noose . . . he throws his crown at the feet of a foreign ruler and keeps us in the dark about it" seems more to the point. Giers remains colorless, though the discomforts of his position and his pacific tendencies entitle him to respect. In the end it is Alexander III, narrow, brutal, coarse, under traumatic shock since his father's murder, who is more responsible than anybody else for the fatuity of Russian policy and for its ultimate failure. And this failure, in the Balkans, forms an important chapter in the events leading to the First World War. The reader reminds himself again that none of the factors at play: Russian pursuit of several policies at once, Russian overbearing behavior, ultimate reliance on force, lack of vicariousness in understanding even closely related peoples,—made its first appearance or its last during these seven years, but he is grateful for the detailed case-history of their operation.

A reviewer finds the usual host of small questions rising to plague him. Dubious translations leap to the eye (p. 14, and p. 40, note 19). Sprightly and instructive quotations are buried in footnotes, sometimes untranslated (p. 17, note 19; p. 49, note 41). New persons are suddenly introduced without identification (Welsenheimb, p. 140; Morier, p. 235). Why not include Aleko Pasha's last name (Vogorides) and give some brief account of his gaudy earlier career? The author's style falters because so many of his chief personages are named Alexander; a few more active verbs and a rigorous onslaught on the various forms of the verb *to be* would have made reading easier. The map at the beginning of the book confuses even an experienced eye: it misspells "Vardar" and omits Dedeagach. Why use the form "Salonika" instead of "Saloniki" or "Thessalonica"? Why risk giving Croatian readers apoplexy by referring to Bosnia and Hercegovina as "Serbian national territories" (p. 168) without qualification? This could go on a good deal longer, but perhaps will prove sufficient to protect the reviewer's franchise.

Harvard University

ROBERT LEE WOLFF

BORN, KARL ERICH, *Staat und Sozialpolitik seit Bismarcks Sturz. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der innenpolitischen Entwicklung des deutschen Reiches 1890-1914*. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1957. Pp. 256.

The *Historische Kommission* of the Mainz *Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur* is to be congratulated on this first volume of its *Historische Forschungen*. This is an excellent study, packed with interesting information, sound and vigorous in interpretation, a real contribution to the study of Germany after Bismarck.

The social policy of imperial Germany has followed a different pattern from that of the Western European countries. The difference was not a matter of degree, of a backward policy as opposed to a forward one. It reflected the difference between two societies. The Germany of Bismarck and the Kaiser was essentially an autocracy, in which the welfare state was created by concessions on the part of the monarchy. Meanwhile England, France and Belgium had constitutional governments and their social policies started with a recognition of the working man's basic political and social freedoms.

The difference between Germany and the Western countries has been variously evaluated by German historians. There have been those—Hans Rothfels and Adalbert Wahl among them—who have appraised the German achievement positively by pointing out that the German workers enjoyed more material benefits than those in other countries. On the other hand the critics of the German achievement have pointed toward the limitations of merely administrative reforms; Hans Herzfeld summarizes his criticism by stating that the political modernization of Germany did not keep pace with the economic and social one. Karl Erich Born on the whole accepts this position: he finds the monarchy's material achievement less important than the workers' need for political equality. He therefore concludes that the German state was unable to solve its social problems since it did not deal with their political implications and since it failed to win over the workers.

Born's book is a study of the *Neuer Kurs* after Bismarck rather than of the Kaiser's *Persönliches Regiment*. The latter was welcomed at the outset by public opinion. The dropping of the Anti-Socialist law and the so-called February decrees of 1890 concerning the labor question seemed to promise a new era of social reform. However, Born minimizes the rôle of the Kaiser as a social reformer. Wilhelm II was limited even more than Bismarck by his conservative concept of the state. In the Golden Book of the city of Munich he noted: "voluntas regis suprema lex!" and in 1905, in face of the war danger over Morocco, he wrote to Bülow: "First shoot down, decapitate, disarm the Socialists—if necessary by blood bath . . ." Was this the "*roi des gueux*" as the Kaiser had described himself to Bismarck? Even the February decrees were mainly a means to outmaneuver the old Chancellor and to gain popularity. Accordingly, Born dismisses the view generally held by historians that the Kaiser became disillusioned with social reform in 1893/94 since his initial social decrees had not brought any immediate improvement of the social climate. The *Persönliches Regiment*, Born claims, was, to start with, devoid of any real social significance.

As for the *Neuer Kurs* and its distinct social reforming tendency, it was not of the Kaiser's making. "The policy of imperial Germany," says Born, "was a civil servants' policy, which in the time of Wilhelm II was repeatedly hampered by the Kaiser's attempts at a personal regiment." (p. 113) The social policy of the *Neuer Kurs* was essentially the work of the two men, the Prussian Minister of Commerce von Berlepsch and the State Secretary of the Interior Count Posadowsky-Wehner. They followed a tortuous but on the whole resolute course between the pressures

from the Crown, the Conservatives and the employers in favor of outright repressive legislation and those from the Left in favor of legal recognition of the labor movements, (since the late Nineties, the Progressives—*Freisinnige*—and the Social Democrats acted increasingly in unison in matters of social policy).

An excellent chapter (III) analyzes the positions taken by various political and social groups (such as the Socialists of the Chair, the churches, political parties, employers' associations) on questions of social policy. Born concedes that the policy of Berlepsch, Posadowsky, and Bethmann-Hollweg did have a consistency of its own. These statesmen had overcome all tendencies toward repression; indeed they were aiming eventually at giving equal rights to the workers and thus reconciling them to the state. However, this final step was to be achieved only after the workers had seen the light, abjured Marxism and left the Social Democratic movement. Clearly this policy was not realistic. Nobody could have expected the very party which in the 1912 election sent the largest single representation to the Reichstag to go into eclipse. The conservative side could, however, have profited from the process of embourgeoisement, deradicalization of the Socialist movement which indeed led it later in 1914 to vote for the war credits; there might have been some basis for a reconciliation between the state and the workers. However, even such a policy was not possible within the constitutional structure of imperial Germany, which so much depended upon the power of conservative Prussia and which no one in a position of responsibility, including the reforming ministers, was willing to change.

The tragedy of the whole period 1890-1914, as has been recently pointed out for the Caprivi area by J. Alden Nichols (*Germany after Bismarck*, Cambridge, Mass., 1958), stemmed from the limitations imposed upon it by the Bismarckian constitution. The *Neuer Kurs* followed a course of good will; but good will is not enough in politics, particularly in a country where the shadow of Bismarck was still so much in evidence.

This fine study would have benefited greatly from an index.

Smith College

KLEMENS VON KLEMPERER

KORASZEWSKI, JACEK and MIECZYSLAW SUCHOCKI, *Rola Twórczości Adama Mickiewicza w Rozbudzeniu i Utrzymaniu Polskości na Śląsku* (The Role of the Works of Adam Mickiewicz in the Awakening and Maintenance of Polish National Consciousness in Silesia). Poznań: Instytut Zachodni, 1957. Pp. 301 35 zł.

In the history of postwar Poland the year 1955 may have little significance for the layman. The student of Polish affairs, however, will remember it as "Mickiewicz Year," proclaimed as such by the Government of Poland. Both at home and abroad Poles arranged and participated in numerous special events designed to commemorate the centenary of the death of Adam Mickiewicz, the national poet of Poland.

The publication of books devoted to Mickiewicz was one of the ways by which the centenary was observed. New editions of his complete works as well as a new biography (by Jastrun) appeared in Poland. At least two new biographies (by Gorski and Sovetov) appeared in the Soviet Union. UNESCO published a volume by contributors from several countries. Some thirty foreign and American writers contributed to the much more imposing volume edited by Waław Lednicki and entitled *Mickiewicz in World Literature*. The book under review is another example of scholarly productivity stimulated by the anniversary of Mickiewicz's death.

The objective of the authors is clearly set forth in the title of their work: it

was to determine the rôle that the writings of Mickiewicz played in the awakening and maintenance of Polish nationalism in Silesia. This they have accomplished by giving a detailed picture of the popularity of Mickiewicz and his works among the Poles in Silesia (both Prussian and Austrian) in the period between the November Uprising and the Upper Silesian plebiscite (1830-1922). The high school and university students (University of Wrocław) were especially enthusiastic about Mickiewicz. The enthusiasm was shared by the Polish masses, who were exposed to Mickiewicz through the very active Polish press in Silesia.

One of the authors of the book was uniquely qualified to deal with the press, being the son of the founder and editor of the *Gazeta Opolska*. For thirty-two years (1890-1922) Bronisław Koraszewski edited this Polish newspaper in Opole. Because his Polish nationalism was displeasing to the German authorities who had inaugurated a "system of national extermination," Koraszewski suffered nine months of imprisonment. It might be pointed out that the policy of Germanization, as much as the writings of Mickiewicz, served to awaken Polish national consciousness in this area.

There is little in this book that reveals a communist bias apart from the peculiar chapter divisions and the terminology of the chapter titles. Each chapter deals with the problem under consideration during a different stage in the development of capitalism. The death of Mickiewicz (1855) and the transfer of his remains from France to the Wawel Castle in Cracow (1890) or the unveiling of a monument to his memory in Warsaw (1898) would have been much more appropriate chapter divisions, for these events represented high points in the expression of Polish nationalism.

Finally, although the book was no doubt inspired by the Mickiewicz centennial, it is also a product of the Western Institute at Poznań. Studies published by the Institute, including the book by Koraszewski and Suchocki, have attempted to prove the Polish character of the "recovered territories." It would seem to me that the future status of these lands will be determined not so much by the prolific research and publication of the Western Institute as by the *Realpolitik* of the Soviet Union.

The Ohio State University

CHARLES MORLEY

WEBER, MAX, *Gesammelte Politische Schriften*, second and enlarged edition, Johannes Winckelmann, Ed. Preface by Theodor Heuss. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1958. Pp. 593. DM 45.

Max Weber has been considered as the most prominent German political thinker and sociologist in the years preceding World War I and during the war itself. He died in 1920, at the age of fifty-six. One year after his death his *Collected Political Writings* were published. Now, thirty-seven years later, they are being re-edited. Several articles, absent from the first edition, were added. The most important among them are the two brilliant reports which Max Weber published on Russia in the revolutionary situation of 1905-1906. They clearly show the power of penetrating analysis which made Weber's sociological studies famous. They can be read even today with great profit.

Weber's political writings preserve their importance for an understanding of the attitude of leading German intellectuals in the Wilhelmian Reich. They combine political acumen—and thereby a recognition of the shortcomings of the Kaiser's personality and policy—with a corrosive extreme German nationalism which established a close link between Weber, the Kaiser, and the pan-Germans. Weber was originally a member of the pan-German league. When he parted company with it, it was not for reasons of liberalism or of moderation but because the pan-German

league did not pay enough attention to the danger of losing German lands in the eastern part of Prussia to Polish settlers.

National power fascinated Weber. German national power remained a supreme value to him. He spent his last years in a struggle against Versailles and against a policy of fulfillment of the peace treaty. In an article in the *Frankfurter Zeitung* on January 17, 1919 he wrote, "Im Fall einer uns vergewaltigenden Polen- und Tschechenpolitik der Entente oder von Fronknechtschaft wird daher die öffentliche Meinung Deutschlands ihre Orientierung wohl im weiteren Osten suchen, wo im Laufe einiger Jahrzehnte mit dem Wiedererstehen Russlands die Lage die alte sein wird."

In another respect Weber's influence on the nascent Weimar Republic was equally disastrous. He was mainly responsible for the fact that the Weimar constitution decreed the election of the President of the Republic, who carried the strange but characteristic title of *Reichspräsident*, by popular elections and bestowed upon his office a plenitude of power which ultimately undermined the weak German democracy. If the President of the Republic had been elected by the parliament, Hindenburg would have had no chance in 1925 nor Hitler any in 1932 to put up their candidacies.

In a long address about war aims which Weber delivered in October 1916, he maintained that the Germans desired power because they carried the responsibility before history of preventing the Western world from being divided among the Anglo-Saxons and the Russians. "Between such world-conquering powers we had the duty of becoming a power state. . . . The honor of our folkdom demanded it. This German war was fought for the sake of honor, not for changes of the map or economic profit." According to Weber, German military strength made it possible for small nations—the Low Countries and Switzerland, Scandinavia and others—to live in the shadow of German power. The small nations thought otherwise.

City College of New York

HANS KOHN

HANSEN, HANS PETER. *Diary of a Dying Empire*. Translated by Oscar Osborn Winther. Ralph H. Lutz, Mary Schofield, and C. O. Winther, Eds. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1955. Pp. 409. \$6.75.

As a member of the Reichstag, with entrée to many circles normally closed to a private observer, H. P. Hansen could observe the wartime German scene from a very favorable vantage point. He was on cordial terms with a variety of groups and individuals—Poles, Alsations, Guelphs, Progressives, Centrists, and Social Democrats. Apparently he was welcome at the favorite café tables of each for he recorded with candor and intimacy not a little of their crackling, uninhibited repartee. He belonged to a leading committee, the heavy Finance Committee, in whose forum the Kaiser's highest officials and the Reichstag's ablest members matched words and wits on basic issues of wartime policy. On its deliberations, which were not reported in full, Hansen took copious notes, and in his journal he tried to render verbatim many passages of important speeches. On the level of everyday life he saw how the Germans reacted to the stress of wartime shortages and how their moods of optimism and hope over the course of the war alternated with pessimism and despair. In the flow of wartime gossip and rumor Hansen naturally participated, though usually with some detachment and on occasion he was able to convey to his Reichstag colleagues reliable information from abroad, through his access to newspapers from Scandinavia.

Hansen was cognizant of the opportunity given to him and how best to use it. He often commented very briefly or not at all on matters of first rate importance,

knowing they would appear in the press or in official proceedings. The dangers of search and confiscation restrained him in other matters. "I did not dare to entrust to paper many things of interest," he wrote. "I often jotted down notes in great haste; frequently they were written in the late hours of the night, but always close to the events." He meant them to be accurate. He possessed long editorial experience, on the academic and the newspaper level. He was a citizen of the Reich—and must share in its fortunes—but he was also the heir of, and remained loyal to, Danish culture and traditions. He was dedicated to the cause of the North Slesvigers, whom he represented, and therefore critical of much in German policy, but not blindly partisan. Some emotional involvement in the stirring events around him was inevitable, but this was moderated by his disciplined mind and by his normally dispassionate temperament. The credibility of the record he left is high.

Often Hanssen captured the spirit and atmosphere of a setting in revealing phrases. Thus, Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg (March 31, 1916) appeared "tense, tired and nervous. He smoked one cigarette after another to quiet his nerves. To judge from the tempo at which he smoked during the committee proceedings, he must consume five or six dozen daily. His hair has become white, his face is lined with deep furrows. He seems the personification of despair. . . ." Philip Scheide-mann (March 30, 1917) narrated privately that "at nine-thirty last evening he had gone out with a knapsack on his back to get some potatoes, since his family had no food in the house. He had gone from place to place and had not reached home with his fifteen pounds of potatoes until two in the morning." Gustav Stresemann (Sept. 25, 1918) "who has always been a good speaker, was today—physically and emotionally—remarkably small and down in the dumps. Instead of a puffed-up turkey gobbler, he was a respectable little bantam. He could not command attention."

In the present volume the editors include well over half of the material in the original two volumes, issued by Hanssen in 1924 as *Fra Krigstiden*. Omissions are heaviest for the years 1915 and 1918 and they relate mainly, though not always, to entries which do not help interpret events in wartime Germany. The student interested in the Slesvig question, for example, in which Hanssen was so deeply involved, must still rely on the Danish original. Very useful is the list (pp. 371-97) of biographical notations, drawn from Hanssen's longer list, and edited to serve the English reader. Professor Winther's translation, sometimes quite free, is uniformly conscientious. In his introductory essay on Hanssen, Professor Lutz, who has long been associated with the assemblage and utilization of World War I materials in the Hoover Library at Stanford, gives ample space to the Danish side of Hanssen's career.

Lutz summarizes Hanssen's wartime experience as that of "a scholarly professional witnessing the first great cataclysm of the twentieth century." To which may be added that fate not only assigned him a lodge seat for the performance but equipped him to make many perspicacious and revealing notes on the program of the tragedy. No student of wartime Germany can afford to overlook Hanssen's diary.

New York University

OSCAR J. FALNES

SMITH, C. JAY, JR., *Finland and the Russian Revolution 1917-1922*. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1958, Pp. 251. \$4.50.

Franz Borkenau once observed that, since mastery of the Finnish language was a prerequisite for understanding the Finnish Civil War of 1918, this aspect of of Russo-Finnish relations remained unclear to him. The present study dem-

onstrates the wisdom of Borkenau's caution; it fails adequately to come to grips with some of the basic causes of the Finnish Civil War, primarily because of the factual unreliability of those sources given greatest emphasis. Finnish sources remain untouched. The rôle of social forces in these causes receives a remarkable downgrading; reference is made (p. 14) to "all the trivia of social revolt." Lolo Krusius Ahrenberg, on the other hand, feels that ideological and social differences within Finland "brought about the Finnish Civil War." The presence of Russian troops in Finland before and after January 1918, is viewed (p. 211) as the *sine qua non* of the Civil War. This is, of course, quite possibly true, since this presence was viewed by the Finnish bourgeoisie as incompatible with Finnish independence, and by the Red Guards as indicating that a ready source of arms would be available if war did break out. In fact, however, the Finnish Government did not officially request immediate removal of all Russian troops at the time of Russian recognition of Finnish independence, and the Russian Government had, by the outbreak of the war in Finland, removed most of its troops. The war itself actually saw an acceleration of the rate of removal of the remaining troops. Furthermore, contrary to the assumption (pp. 22, 33f.) that Russian soldiers in Finland supplied Red Guards with arms and ammunition, such transfers were in fact resisted by the Russian soldiers both before and after the outbreak of war.

It is certainly true that the memoirs of Svechnikov (a Russian colonel who joined the Finnish revolutionary cause) emphasize the rôle of Russian soldiers in the Finnish Civil War, but whether these memoirs are "decisive" and "candid" (p. 211) is highly doubtful. Published in 1923, they represent the attempt of a former Imperial Army officer to demonstrate that he was a genuine revolutionary rather than an opportunist who had boarded the Bolshevik bandwagon in 1917. Under such circumstances, it is difficult to place full trust in these memoirs. It is interesting to note that the memoirs of a genuine revolutionary, M. G. Roshal (a member of the Bolshevik "Helsinki Committee" in 1917), show a fundamental dichotomy between Finnish Social Democrats and Bolshevik agents prior to the dissolution, in July 1917, of the (Social Democratic) Finnish Parliament by the Provisional Government. Finns of all political beliefs agree that this dissolution decree (which was probably unconstitutional in terms of the legal relationship between Russia and Finland) was of major significance in leading Social Democrats into armed revolt. Whether, in light of this fact, the Finnish policy of the Provisional Government was "most enlightened" (p. 18) is questionable. At the time of Bolshevik recognition of Finnish independence, at the turn of 1917-1918, even Finnish nationalists felt that Lenin's Finnish policy was preferable to that of Kerensky. In view of the rather strong anti-Bolshevik views of the present study, it is surprising to find important and otherwise unsubstantiated statements (pp. 10, 96, 191, 198f.) supported only by references to Soviet writers. It is perhaps less surprising to find other statements supported only by references to works of members of the Finnish extreme right wing who attempt to create an image of the events of 1918 as a war of independence in which Finnish armed might defeated Bolshevik Russia.

A result of lack of familiarity with Finnish politics is that unique characterizations are given of important Finnish leaders. Wilhelm Thesleff is considered (p. 74) to have been a "good" liaison officer between Mannerheim and the Germans during the Civil War, in spite of the fact that Thesleff's pro-German orientation led Mannerheim to bar him from important meetings. Edvard Gylling, whose personal honor was conceded even by political opponents, and who two decades later sacrificed his life during the great purges for the cause of a "Finnish" Soviet Karelia,

is identified (p. 56) as "an ex-burglar." It is quite permissible to view (pp. 127, 155, 210, 213) Gustaf Mannerheim as a Finnish version of George Washington, as a great general and statesman. It would, however, hardly be expected to find him rechristened "von Mannerheim" in a monograph in which his is the central name.

Brown University

MARVIN RINTALA

KENNAN, GEORGE F., *The Decision to Intervene*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958. Pp. 513. \$7.50.

The incredible confusion of purpose which marked the initial months of American policy toward Soviet Russia, described in Mr. Kennan's first volume, showed no abatement in succeeding months. Indeed, the question of intervention introduced new complications, which are delineated in the second volume of the series with the same thorough accounting and reasoned analysis. Fortunately, unlike many historians of detail, the author never loses the sense of drama or the feeling for style that makes for vivid writing and exciting reading.

Through the spring and early summer of 1918 France, Great Britain and Japan became increasingly convinced of the desirability of armed intervention in Russia. The objectives which they argued as the year advanced, i.e. the restoration of the eastern front, the protection of allied supplies, presumably threatened with German confiscation, and the rescue of the Czech Legion, have all seemed remarkably unrealistic to later students of this period. But the German offensive in the spring of 1918, the unfounded rumors of German penetration into northern Russia, the conviction that the Bolsheviks were on the verge of collapse and the conflicting reports and advice received from their observers in Russia contributed to a badly warped picture by the British and French. The Japanese, while not uninfluenced by these factors, had, in addition, territorial and economic ambitions in eastern Siberia.

The stumbling block to action was American reluctance to accept the Allied assumptions and recommendation. Without American support, preferably evidenced by at least token participation, intervention was not feasible. Accordingly great pressure was put upon Wilson to give his consent. Wilson, in the pattern of so much of his decision-making after American entry into the war, was torn between his desire for Allied unity and his dedication to certain moral principles. As a recent and junior partner of nations which had expended vast resources of men and treasure in the common cause for the past three years, it was difficult for the United States to deny their request. Yet Wilson could see no benefit in the course urged, and he recognized the dangers in its implementation. Despite the assurance of Foch that intervention was "a very important factor for victory," Wilson could not convince himself that the mounting of an eastern front was practicable nor banish his belief that such action, by "using Russia rather than serving her," would rally support to the Bolsheviks.

After much tortured consideration and the rejection of other arguments, he found, with the advent of the Czech uprising and the apparent need to facilitate their passage to Vladivostock, a cause which permitted him to sanction participation and not violate his conscience. The advantages of this formula to Wilson proved in the final analysis to be more than offset by the misconceptions it fostered, the facts it ignored and the resulting confusions regarding American policy and actions after the expeditionary forces entered Siberia.

Much of what Mr. Kennan has to say about this rather dismal chapter in American diplomacy has been said before, but never with such a balanced blend of breadth, complexity and interpretation. He has also added new information and

many revealing insights which give fresh perspective. Certainly among the latter must be placed Kennan's keen exploration of the peculiarly personal approach of Wilson to the Russian problem, which brings a new dimension to the deliberations and decisions of those days.

University of Colorado

ROBERT PAUL BROWDER

ZIMMERMANN, LUDWIG. *Deutsche Aussenpolitik in der Aera der Weimarer Republik*. Göttingen: Musterschmidt-Verlag, 1958. Pp. 486. DM 34.

As a member of the "Zentralstelle für Nachkriegsforschung" in 1935, Professor Zimmermann was given access to the documents of the Auswärtiges Amt and the Reichskanzlei. His work in these materials forms the basis for the first part of the present book. From the evidence cited, however, it seems doubtful that the author was able to see more than a fraction of the documents on the Weimar period that have in recent years become available to scholars through the Inter-Allied microfilming project of the German Foreign Ministry Archives. The only source from this vast collection which Professor Zimmermann was able to use was the Stresemann "Nachlass." This forms the basis for the major portion of the book. The author has also consulted the published documents of the other great powers and a large number of published memoirs. The secondary works on the subject have not been fully exploited. There is, unfortunately, no comprehensive bibliography, and the footnote references to unpublished documents are too brief to be of much use.

The result of Professor Zimmermann's extended research is a massive volume surveying German foreign policy from the Paris Peace Conference to the advent of Hitler. How definitive it will be in the light of the more specialized studies now under way on various phases of German foreign policy during the 1920s remains to be seen. Already since publication, the books by Vietsch on Rechberg, by Epstein on Erzberger, and by Helbig on Rapallo, have corrected and supplemented Zimmermann in several respects. As a general introduction to the period, however, his volume will remain of great value. As the author rightly says: "Whoever wants to select the essential, needs to have surveyed the whole."

The tone of the book, on the whole, is dispassionate, and its method of "letting events speak for themselves" seems objective. This, however, is somewhat deceptive. Touchy issues, such as Germany's evasions of the Versailles disarmament provisions, are played down. Few German statesmen are seriously criticized and several, among them Papen, are treated with undue kindness. Allied leaders, on the other hand, are judged severely, and in the cases of Lloyd George and Poincaré are condemned in rather harsh terms. The author's treatment of Stresemann, who occupies the central position in the book, does not ever come to grips with the widespread criticism that has been directed at the underlying motives of his foreign policy. Zimmermann's interpretation of Stresemann's famous letter to the German crown prince is certainly one of the least plausible attempts that have been made to explain away this embarrassing document.

One of the welcome tendencies among German historians since 1945 has been their readiness to take a broader and more objective view of their country's past. While criticizing the Versailles settlement, for instance, they have reminded their countrymen of the harsh terms which Germany intended for her enemies in case she won the war. There is little of this kind of objectivity in Professor Zimmermann's book. Great emphasis is placed, for instance, on Germany's understandable desire to revise the more onerous terms of Versailles. Yet no corresponding attempt is ever made to explain the reasons for France's opposition to such revision and to

appreciate her well-founded desire for security. This is not to say that Zimmermann is rabidly nationalistic, far from it. He merely fails to present both sides of most issues.

Considering the size and scope of the book, finally, one might have wished for a more detailed and thoughtful conclusion. Professor Zimmermann merely makes a few observations on the present state of the world and then gives this brief summary of his findings: "The timely revision of the peace treaties would probably have saved the Weimar Republic and peace." With this view one cannot take issue. Still, it seems an oversimplified explanation of the disasters that befell Europe after 1933, and a meagre lesson to have learned from studying for so long such an eventful period as that of the Weimar Republic.

The Johns Hopkins University

HANS W. GATZKE

GESSLER, OTTO, *Reichswehrpolitik in der Weimarer Zeit*. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1958. Pp. 582. DM 28.50.

Dr. Gessler was one of the most prominent, vigorous and able of the mayors (*Oberbürgermeister*) of the old, professional school—a school for statesmanship from which have emerged such figures as Karl Goerdeler, the civilian leader of the most significant circle of resistance to Hitler, and Konrad Adenauer, who has dominated West Germany since 1948. His autobiography is an important primary source for the study of the Weimar Republic in general and for the examination of its security problems, both internal and external, in particular.

The manuscript was originally much longer and apparently covered Dr. Gessler's entire life. In accordance with his wishes, however, the present version was reduced to readily publishable size by the exclusion of the material leading up to 1914, the deletion of most of the material dealing with World War I and of that covering his career after his resignation from the Cabinet in 1928. This limitation of the presentation to the period when Dr. Gessler occupied a Cabinet post would be unfortunate were it not for a short but excellent biography of Gessler provided by the editor as a prelude to the memoir which is supplemented by the inclusion of a number of interesting documents or memoir extracts as appendices.

The memoir itself is a clearly written, persuasive and courageous presentation of the events of the Cabinet years coupled with an explanation of the Minister's motivations and attitudes. It presents the reader with new facts, with incisive, compelling portraits of key personalities and, perhaps equally important, with new insights and the viewpoint of a man who is not in the least apologetic about his course of action nor at all reticent about his likes and dislikes.

The reader may agree or disagree with Dr. Gessler; he may see him as a machiavellian figure or as an honest man carrying out a common-sense policy in a time of trouble. He cannot, however, fail to sense the strength of the man or his determination to follow the course he believed to be best for himself and for Germany.

The book is important for its picture of a man in high places. It is perhaps equally important as a presentation of the attitudes and position of a democratic monarchist operating in a democratic republic, a position more common among the prominent men of Weimar than is generally realized, but one which has rarely been presented as a counterweight to the memoirs from the socialist side, from the conservative side and even from the Nazi corner. Here a fluent representative of the Democratic Party, which deserved, in this reviewer's opinion, a better fate than to be ground to pieces between the extremists of left and right as a consequence of the radicalization of the electorate attendant upon economic crisis and international

ostracism, presents the Weimar Republic seen through the eyes of a member of the right wing of that moderate party.

Because of the nature of the Treaty of Versailles and of the controls and limitations which it imposed upon Germany's armed forces, Dr. Gessler's account also provides a most interesting picture of Germany's foreign policy and international position, particularly where the former Allied powers were concerned. The hostility of the Allies towards the vestigial armed forces of the Reich meant that the Reichswehr Minister was, aside from the Foreign Minister and the Chancellor, the best informed man in Germany regarding dealings with other powers. The availability of the diplomatic archives of the German Foreign Office obviously greatly reduces the dependence of the historian upon memoirs of participants, but it does not make them superfluous nor reduce their interest for those who may wish to get behind the documents or even to judge the character and accuracy of the memoirist.

Equally important, perhaps, Dr. Gessler's autobiography is an authoritative account of the rôle of the Reichswehr in the Weimar Republic. Much has been written concerning the Reichswehr since the end of World War II by those who were ill informed as well as by those who were very well informed. Few persons, however, were so close to the Reichswehr without being of it as was Dr. Gessler, who provides new materials on many aspects of the military policies and problems of Germany between the wars, as well as a picture of General von Seeckt which is a valuable corrective for the somewhat distorted image which emerges from General von Rabenau's voluminous biography of that general. Beyond such services to the historian, Dr. Gessler also performs an essential service for himself. His book should do much to banish the myth perpetrated by his foes which asserted that he was a mere pawn in the hands of the generals. Just as the reader of Noske's *Von Kiel bis Kapp* cannot easily accept the portrayal of the author as a pitiful weakling, so the reader of *Reichswehrpolitik* must struggle manfully to see Dr. Gessler as an object of pity and scorn.

Naturally, this work has the weaknesses as well as the strengths of the best autobiographies in that it is an expression of the personality of a strong man. Gessler is occasionally incorrect in statements of fact regarding events in which he was not directly involved. He does not always clearly indicate the sources of the interesting and provocative quotations with which his manuscript is studded. At times he portrays persons and events more in relation to himself than in the round. He is an avowed partisan in the military-political as in the diplomatic struggles which he recounts. Such flaws, if flaws they are in a work of this nature, do nothing to reduce the importance of this book, which should be read by anyone interested in the history of Germany after 1918 and which is indispensable for the student of the Weimar Republic.

University of Pittsburgh

HAROLD J. GORDON, JR.

CRAIG, GORDON, *From Bismarck to Adenauer: Aspects of German Statecraft*. The Albert Shaw Lectures on Diplomatic History, 1958. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1958. Pp. 156. \$4.50.

This is the thirty-third volume in the Albert Shaw Lectures, which began in 1899, and the first to deal exclusively with German diplomacy (E. H. Carr in 1951 explored *German-Soviet relations between the two wars 1919-1939*), a theme on which Professor Craig, of Princeton, has made himself a distinguished authority. In this study he examines the diplomatic technique of Bismarck and a succession of German statesmen down to the present federal chancellor, being concerned not so much with the substance of their policies as with the methods used in carrying

them out. Or, in other words, why did German diplomacy, after Bismarck's fall, fail to maintain the standard set by the Iron Chancellor? In such a study of personalities, the memoirs of individuals are a more rewarding source of information than the *Grosse Politik* and other similar compilations.

As an index of what is needed to make a good diplomatist, Mr. Craig adopts the "three preeminent qualities" laid down by Max Weber: "passion, a feeling of responsibility, and a sense of proportion" (p. 15), by passion meaning "the quality of wholehearted devotion and total commitment to something." Judged by this formula, Bismarck proved himself the most successful diplomatist of his time, for he knew what he wanted (passion), estimated correctly how far he could go to achieve it (proportion), and never overlooked what he liked to call the *imponderabilia* (responsibility). In short, he was never guilty of *Hubris* (p. 26).

All this, of course, is well known. But his successors, the "*epigoni*," did not measure up. Although they were all pupils of Bismarck, "Holstein lacked a sense of proportion; Bülow lacked a sense of responsibility; and if Kinderlen was a passionate man, his passion was not of the kind that animates and inspires statecraft." (p. 32) It is significant that all three played with the idea of war or threats of war, and while they were not in power in 1914, they bear much of the responsibility for the bankrupt policy which led to war in that year.

Of the three republican statesmen considered, Rathenau had the sense to realize that Germany was helpless before the Allies and must at least try to carry out the treaty of Versailles, but his acceptance of the treaty of Rapallo was "an act of weakness and a denial of everything he had accomplished so far." (p. 69) Brüning was "a headstrong and willful statesman . . . whose tactics in foreign affairs did not bring advantage to his country" (p. 84)—a refreshing judgment. Stresemann, on the other hand, was successful because of "three great gifts":

These were his ability to sense danger and to avoid it by seizing and retaining the initiative; his ability to maintain his perspective and his sense of values in the midst of a changing diplomatic situation; and finally his ability to be more stubborn than his partners in negotiation and to refuse to allow their importunities to force him to accept second-best solutions [p. 74].

An interesting chapter is devoted to "The ambassador from Bismarck to Hitler." The "great prophets" of Bismarck's time—Reuss, Schweinitz, Radowitz, Hatzfeldt, Münster—were never matched in the Wilhelmine era, and after the collapse of 1918, only Brockdorff-Rantzau really mattered, although Shtamer in London, Hoesch in Paris, and Solf in Tokyo get honorable mention. Under Hitler ambassadors were of no consequence, for he distrusted them and seldom read their reports.

In the final chapter, Mr. Craig expresses his high admiration for Chancellor Adenauer. The author is to be congratulated on having written a stimulating book.

University of Chicago

BERNADOTTE E. SCHMITT

KALVODA, JOSEF, *Titoism and Masters of Imposture*. New York: Vantage Press, Inc., 1958. Pp. 327. \$5.00.

Mr. Kalvoda advances a new thesis in the series of books on Titoism, this most exciting political phenomenon of our time. It is his contention that Stalin, without planning it originally, subsequently used Tito as a Trojan horse to dupe the West and that Tito accepted this rôle willingly to serve the cause of world Communism. The West has fallen entirely into the trap; it even commits the tragic mistake of feeding the Trojan horse; it hopes for the spread of Titoism; it bends its ear to what he calls Western Titoists, all sorts of political émigrés—the Masters of Im-

posture—whose political life is tinged by past cooperation with Communists and who supposedly continue to serve the Communist goals. Some of them are outright spies, others simply imbeciles. Titoism is a myth, maintains Mr. Kalvoda. Tito himself denied its existence, but it is the United States which has tried to create it and her assistance to Yugoslavia has been used, in fact, to advance Communism. The Voice of America, and particularly Radio Free Europe, have been under the influence of this faulty policy, and the latter has become a weapon of "international conspiracy" in the hands of "former Communists and their collaborators" (pp. 149, 159).

These and many others are strong words, and Mr. Kalvoda uses them with passionate convictions. However, the author presents haphazard evidence to prove his thesis and fails to grasp both the complexity of the postwar past and the intricate avenues of the present policies of the United States toward Yugoslavia. It is a dubious method for a scholar to tear sentences out of context; it is an impermissible hindsight to condemn individuals for their past mistakes without analyzing them against the background of the political situation prevalent during and after the war. Greater men succumbed to the fallacy of good will in co-operating with Communists.

Mr. Kalvoda rejects emphatically any compromise with Communism; coexistence leads the free world only into an abyss. He is a crusader and pleads for a policy of liberation by encouraging revolts behind the Iron Curtain and by giving the revolutionaries help. Such recommendations, desirable as they may be, reveal, however, lack of understanding for the hard realities, depressing as these are. The West can hardly hold its own. Even less capable is it of engaging in a crusade which might open the gate to the cataclysm of nuclear war. In such a situation the policy of supporting Tito, distasteful as it is to a moralist, brings some dividends. It helps to keep the wound on the Communist body wide open. The present campaign of Moscow against the Yugoslav "revisionism" indicates how painful the wound is.

University of Denver

JOSEPH KORBEL

RAPOŠ, PAVOL, *Priemysel Slovenska za Kapitalizmu*. Bratislava: Slovenske vydavateľstvo politickej literatury, 1957. Pp. 116. Kčs 6.80.

This little monograph is an enlarged version of the article which originally appeared in 1953 in the Economic Journal of the Slovak Academy of Science. The topic actually was conceived as a prologue to a more comprehensive study of Slovakian industrialization under Socialism. The publication of the entire study had to be temporarily postponed, because—as Rapoš admits in the introduction—in the wake of the 20th Congress of the Russian Communist Party, the momentous occasion on which Khrushchev denounced Stalin, "there were opened even for economic science broader possibilities of scientific research work, and access was provided to more comprehensive factual material, its study and analysis."

The review of Slovakia's pre-Communist industrialization is divided into three distinct time periods: pre-1918, 1918-1938 and 1939-1945. It is one of the rare occasions where major political events coincide almost perfectly with structural changes in economic phenomena.

Prior to World War I Slovakia was merely a province of Hungary, which in turn was the junior partner of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. In the 1850s Hungary proper, as well as Slovakia, were predominantly agrarian economies. Yet Slovakia was better endowed with certain strategic raw materials needed for industrialization. There was coal, iron ore, forests. Slovakia therefore became a

logical location for Hungary's steel, woodworking, pulp and paper industries. Rapoš reviews this period as a case study in subsidization of infant industries.

After 1918 Slovakia became the junior partner of the new State of Czechoslovakia. The "historical lands" in the West (Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia) had already well established industries geared to serving the 51 million people market of the dual monarchy (29 million in the Austrian part, 22 million in Hungary). This large market was suddenly made inaccessible by tariffs and import quotas. The highly developed industries in the western part of Czechoslovakia thus came to compete for export markets with the infant industries of Slovakia. It was a ruthless struggle in which the Slovaks often lost out. This was not necessarily because the bankers and cartels were inherently unfriendly inclined towards the Slovaks, but mostly because things could be fabricated more efficiently in the historic lands. And vice versa, of course. If Slovakia's raw materials—and particularly her cheap labor—offered advantages, new industries were created there. Sometimes apparent confusion resulted from the erratic workings of the "invisible hand" of capitalism, but there was seldom a vicious intent. Mr. Rapoš will no doubt find that structural adjustments made under the different five year plans of the socialist economy are no less painful and frequently more confusing.

During World War II Slovakia became an "independent" state under Hitler's protection. The Czech civil servants and technicians, who used to guide Slovakia's economy during the inter-war period, had to leave the country. Suddenly Slovaks took over. Although the economy was geared to the German war effort—a wrong emphasis from the viewpoint of long-range economic development—many Slovaks learned how to be industrial executives. Thus, when the war ceased in 1945, Slovakia was better prepared for further industrialization than ever before.

How Slovakia's newly acquired skills were put to use under the Communist régime will be told by Mr. Rapoš as soon as he figures out the meaning of "the possibilities for broader scientific research" opened up as a result of the 20th Congress of the Russian Communist Party. This might take him years.

Be that as it may, Rapoš' study, which reads like an American Ph.D. thesis, is a very competent piece of work. He presents interesting data, much of which is for the first time made accessible to foreign readers. His adaptation of the evidence to fit the Marx-Lenin straight-jacket is skillfully done, and most irritating to the "capitalist" scholar. All in all here is a little volume that well warrants perusal by economic historians, as well as by students interested in case studies of the economics, sociology and politics of industrialization, or "economic development," as some people would prefer to call it.

Stanford Research Institute
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FRANK MEISSNER

SAREL, BENNO, *La classe ouvrière d'Allemagne Orientale*. Paris: Editions ouvrières, 1958. Pp. 268. 915 frs.

To approach "industrial relations" in the Soviet orbit from an essentially Marxist viewpoint will necessarily result in a controversial book. Sarel's basic proposition may—without injustice—be reduced to the formula that in both East and West there is occurring, by nature of the productive process of modern society, a new development of "working-class consciousness." In the Soviet orbit this development has become accentuated with the planification of both society and enterprise precisely because the theory of the "worker's society" is constantly violated in practice.

Sarel has set himself the task of tracing the "evolution of action and consciousness" of the working-class in the Soviet Zone of Germany and the "coopera-

tion which, by reason of production itself, is established between members of the same enterprise." (p. 18) From this follows the author's major concern with the relationships between the workers in the plant and the new *dirigeants* as well as with the "new" and "old" intelligentsia, the rôle of the Trade Unions, the Works' Councils and the Party.

The study suffers, however, from a series of methodological and empirical weaknesses. It is not the author's fault if under present conditions any meaningful sociological group analysis in Eastern Europe has become almost impossible. The régimes have, for obvious ideological reasons, erected terminological and statistical barriers. The uncritical use of official publications can introduce distorting factors. But Sarel is especially guilty of utilizing isolated quotations concerning specific events to illustrate a presumed general trend, or of taking frequently repeated general exhortations as entirely novel instances portending a new trend (cf. esp. p. 229). As a result the author's descriptions of so-called workers', unionist, directoral or Party predominance in the plants during given periods is substantiated by sporadic evidence. Moreover, the instances are often contradictory.

We are told that the original "alliance" between workers and the "old" intelligentsia had, by 1951, turned into a new "alliance" of régime and intelligentsia against the workers because of the corrupting effect of disproportionate material benefits bestowed upon the intelligentsia. By 1953 another "alliance" between workers and the intelligentsia arises—apparently because of common opposition to the new methods of increasing labor productivity—whereas by 1956 the workers have found new champions among the members of the "new" intelligentsia and the students who arose from their midst.

Unfortunately for Sarel's thesis, however, the new opposition operates outside the plant. It is no longer carried on by the technical intelligentsia (engineers, technicians etc.) but by circles of academic intellectuals; and many of the major spokesmen cited (Harich, Bloch) do not even derive from the working-class. In 1956, in fact, the plant intelligentsia remained neutral if not loyal to the régime. Recent refugee statistics show no increase in their number, while the number of academic and professional refugees has more than doubled. (This incidentally is also a reminder that such a study would have benefited greatly from the questioning of refugees which, in the case of eastern Germany, can be carried out to a certain extent.)

The book also contains many dubious and erroneous assertions. That there were Party "action committees" in the plants during the spring of 1948 (p. 46); that the *Activist* movement had its source in the original enthusiasm of 1945 (rather than Soviet example) (p. 69); that the introduction of "personal balance sheets" of workers was a success (p. 86f); that the workers accepted the "authority" represented by the norm calculators (p. 109) and that the reorganization of industry since 1956 was done "at the expense of the Central Planning Commission (the very opposite is true) (p. 243).

From all this arises a rather unreal picture of the situation in East Germany, and the concluding statement: "... only an organization comprising workers and intellectuals would permit the struggle of the workers to be enriched by theory which would give expression to the movement; and in this way the workers' struggle would easily project itself into all levels of official society," is more of a desideratum than a hypothesis. It expresses a socialist world view in which antagonisms between managers and workers disappear in a future society without capitalist or étatist expropriation. The evidence of social processes in East Germany does not reveal such a trend.

Here is a book, then, which offers challenging reading. But in all fairness it should be pointed out that some sections—the early development in the plants, the *stachanovite* movement, the pre-history of the 1953 revolt—are excellently treated.

HORST DUHNKE

RICHERT, ERNST, *Macht ohne Mandat—Der Staatsapparat in der sowjetischen Besatzungszone Deutschlands*. Schriften des Instituts für Politische Wissenschaft, Berlin; Vol. 11. Cologne: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1958. Pp. 181. DM 20.

In Bolshevik theory and practice the state apparatus plays an important rôle as the most powerful instrument of the ruling party, both as a repressive weapon in the continuing "class struggle" and as an organ for the "economic-organizational" and "cultural-educational" (Stalin) guidance of society in the transitional period from capitalism to socialism and communism. While the Party initiates the basic principles of public policy, every Party directive has to pass at some point through the machinery of the state. This is that place where, according to Richert, "the particular will of the Party becomes socially binding" and the "medium where leadership and masses confront each other."

The author of the present volume sponsored by the Berlin Institute of Political Science investigates the practice of the interaction between the Party and the governing organs in the remolding of society in the East German satellite in greater detail and depth than, to this reviewer's knowledge, has so far been attempted in any study of the Soviet system. Richert emphasizes how practical objections by Governmental experts, whose advice the Party always seeks and often heeds, act as a deterrent to Party decisions based on ideological considerations alone, so that "every draft legislation must have as its basis the connection between the precisely analysed given situation and the next optimal stage to the achievement of which the laws and decrees are to contribute." The end result is a system of compromises, however temporary they may be.

The Party, according to Richert, acts primarily as a *prima causa* which operates through a Party-created state and social mechanism "whose individual activities no longer need the permanent presence and shaping influence of the initiator." (p. 10) There exists therefore no real duality of Party and state functions, despite an existing organizational parallelism. At first sight this seems a questionable assertion, but it becomes clear in the context of the book that this is a description of an ideal-typical situation. To the extent that East-German society is not fully totalitarian, the Party is in fact compelled to intervene in purely state functions at every level. This is officially deplored but it is usually sanctioned. In practice it is impossible to draw a meaningful line between the *Anleitung* (roughly: guidance) which the Party is to exercise through its members in all governmental institutions, and the theoretical principle of non-interference in the functions of the state.

Richert's findings that the more recent measures to insure wider public participation at the base of social and economic activity have brought about "the rudiments of genuine republicanism" may come as a bit of a surprise to many readers, though it is undoubtedly supported by the polling of refugees. This apparent "democratization" has, however, had no modifying influence on the will and power emanating from the Party. If anything, it has served to strengthen it. The social fabric in East Germany has become more cohesive as the individual escapes from "politics" into what appears to him as an a-political economic sphere of action with its satisfactions of achievement. Perhaps unwilling to accept the aims of the Party, he succumbs to the "authority" of the state behind which the Party masks itself.

This process must be seen against the theoretical implications of totalitarianism which are made more explicit in the extensive introduction to this volume, by Martin Drath. It should be read by everyone who has followed the discussions by Hannah Arendt, Carl J. Friedrich and others. Drath seeks to penetrate beyond the mere phenomenological characteristics of totalitarian societies to their central "principle," which he sees in the intention of bringing about that internalized "compulsion to compel" oneself to the acceptance of an entirely new system of values. The similarity with Hannah Arendt's phrase of the "compulsion with which we can compel ourselves" comes readily to mind. But, unlike Arendt, Drath omits any consideration of the rôle of terror, while Richert specifically objects to its overemphasis, correctly pointing out that it has become more of an *ultima ratio* than an actually applied tool.

Lack of space here prohibits any discussion of these points. But it should be pointed out that this book is not only the best on the Soviet Zone of Germany which has yet appeared, but also a contribution to our understanding of the problems of totalitarian government.

University of California at Berkeley

HORST DUHNKE

VON FARKAS, JULIUS, Ed., *Ungarns Geschichte und Kultur in Dokumenten*. Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1955. Pp. 234. DM 15.

This well organized book deals with Hungary's history and culture. It is based on the central attitude of Hungarian historians, scholars, statesmen, writers and poets regarding the destiny of their nation and people. Seneca speaks of "that most knowing person—a gossip." Unfortunately gossip, which in its ruthlessness becomes slander, is concerned not only with individuals, but with nations too. Insufficient evidence produces erroneous generalizations. It is such imprecision which leads to the sometimes questionable views foreigners hold about Hungary. Obviously there are dark periods in Hungarian history—periods for which leaders of the nation could be blamed; but after all, the history of no nation is spotless and every history shows desirable principles destroyed by incompetence or falsehood.

The volume, edited by Julius von Farkas and clarified as to intent by a preface and brief introductions to the works of the authors quoted, in manner of writing combines weighty and sparkling prose and gems from lyric and epic poetry. Of course, it inevitably represents but a fraction of the most significant writings of Hungarian scholars and men of letters. Despite the difficulties of singling out the most relevant pieces, Professor Farkas succeeded in solving his task with an admirable sense of proportion. This reviewer would have included some additional names and omitted others, which would merely indicate that his opinions are determined by a different social-political sphere than that of Professor Farkas.

The book is divided into seven parts. On the second page there is a reference to Arabian and Byzantine historians, contemporaries of Prince Arpad, stressing the organizing ability, military strategy and love of pomp of the Magyars. These traits have characterized them throughout the centuries; but there is also a sense of isolation, national anxiety, a protective spirit in defense of Christendom and patriotic ardor. Too often the odds were against them; at times they took flight from reality; at times they were unwilling to heed the advice of the wise. It must be borne in mind that the geographical position of Hungary invited crucial epochs. Nevertheless, from this work one reaches the conclusion that the representatives of the Hungarian ethos rendered substantial service to the nation as well as to humanity in general.

First is a chronicle from the *Gesta Hungarorum*, whose author is unknown; then selections from legends and letters of the early Christian period of Hungarian history; documents from the Renaissance, the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation era, offering evidence of the strategic uneasiness of the nation; then illustrations of the power with which the nation was able to regain its faith in the decades of the Enlightenment, Romanticism and Realism; quotations of documentary writings from the period of Liberalism and the nation's collapse after World War I and from the works of the statesmen and writers between the two world wars. We receive a picture of Hungarian history and culture which offers exciting reading and revealing information. The bibliography and index show Professor Farkas' access to excellent source material.

Western Reserve University

†JOSEPH REMENYI

KONITZA, FAIK, (edited by G. M. Panarity), *Albania: The Rock Garden of South-eastern Europe and Other Essays*. Boston: Vatra, 1957. Pp. xlv, 175.

The author of this book was a well known figure in the diplomatic circles of Washington, D. C., where he served as Albania's envoy in the interwar period. He was better known, however, in his own country, although he spent but a little time there, for he had begun his patriotic and enlightening activity as far back as the end of the last century with the publication, first in Brussels and then in London, of the review *Albania* (1897-1909), and continued it until his death in 1942. *Albania* contributed greatly not only to the Albanian language and the development of Albanian consciousness, at a time when the writing of Albanian was forbidden within the Turkish empire, but also to the propagation of the knowledge of Albania abroad, as part of the review was written in French. Konitza was also very well known among the Albanians of the United States, where he had been one of the principal founders of the Pan-American Federation of America, *Vatra*, and had served for several years as editor of its organ, *Dielli* (The Sun).

The book, which is Konitza's posthumous publication, comprises ten essays. It has been edited by G. M. Panarity, formerly editor of *Dielli*, who found the manuscript, part of a projected history of Albania to have been published by Robert M. McBride & Company of New York, in the files of the deceased. Panarity, who has also written a chapter on "Faik Konitza: One Man Crusader," has taken the liberty of amplifying some parts of the essays by using mainly material contained in the files of the author. Bishop Fan S. Noli, one of Konitza's Albanian friends and collaborators, has written the Introduction, in which he reminisces about his contacts, fills up certain gaps of the book, and attempts to determine the author's place in the history of modern Albania.

Although intended to be historical, Konitza's essays are mainly a survey of Albania and her people. The first one, "That Strange Land—Albania," is a sort of introduction. It is followed by a chapter on the physical aspects of the country and the description of the chief towns. The next essay, on the Illyrian descent of the Albanians and their life and character, is closely related to the other two which deal with the fighting qualities of the Albanians and their beys and bayraktars. "The Picturesque Fustanella" constitutes a short chapter; in it the writer maintains that the Greek kilt is an imitation of the Albanian one and dates from the end of the eighteenth or the beginning of the nineteenth century. Two sketchy essays on "Language and Literature" and "Religion" follow. The last two chapters are nearer to our times: one is a "Farewell to Zog's Albania," for whose ruler Konitza had no respect although he represented him, and the other is a historical outline of

the northern part of Greece (province of Janina) to serve as a background for the Italo-Greek conflict of 1940-1941.

According to a letter addressed to McBride & Company, the author was firmly against amateurishness—"an air of amateurishness from which I decidedly shrink" (p. vii)—but he could not escape from it. His essays are rather unprofessional and not scholarly. Konitza did not seem capable of continued and painstaking research, and Bishop Noli once told this reviewer that he was not capable of a work *de longue haleine*. One has also the impression that he could not think in isolation, as a scholar, but that he needed an audience to perform and display his brilliance.

A passage in the book, however, appears deserving of some comment, both in order to point out the incorrectness of views held by scholars, against which Konitza rebelled, and his tendency to exaggerate in order to prove his point. The excerpt is as follows: "Although the written use of Albanian vernacular, contrary to the opinion of some sleepy professors, who fondly imagine it to have started in the seventeenth century, was already well established and deep-rooted in the thirteenth and probably goes back to the eleventh century when Robert Guiscard's Normans landed on the coast of Albania . . ." (p. 2). By "sleepy professors" Konitza seems to allude in particular to Antoine Meillet, the famous French philologist, who wrote the widely read book *Introduction à l'étude comparative des langues indo-européennes*. In the 1922 edition of this work, Meillet states: "Albanian is known to date from the seventeenth century and in extremely altered forms." (pp. 51-52) Apparently influenced by Meillet, the American philologist Leonard Bloomfield wrote in his widely diffused work, *Language* (edition 1934, p. 62): "Albanese known from records since the seventeenth century . . ." Although in the 1934 edition Meillet modified his text to read: "Albanian is only known from the sixteenth century and in forms which have reached an advanced state of evolution" (p. 76), and in that of 1937 even reduced the sixteenth to the fifteenth century (p. 76), the posterior editions (1950, 1951) of Bloomfield's *Language* have preserved the original statement. It is one of those mistakes which a scholar makes and another repeats without being aware that the former has revised it. Konitza, on the other hand, reaches the conclusion that written Albanian existed in the thirteenth and even the eleventh century by a process of retrospective speculations which remain undocumented (cf. pp. 122-124). The fact at present is that the first records in Albanian date from the fifteenth century, and they are a baptismal formula in the Catholic rite (MS in Biblioteca Laurenziana, Florence) and a fragment of the New Testament in the Byzantine rite (MS in Biblioteca Ambrosiana, Milan).

The essays by Konitza are written in an informal and fluent style. They abound in quotations from various writers old and new, who have written about Albania and the Albanians, for Konitza was erudite. The French poet Guillaume Apollinaire, who was his friend, called him a "walking encyclopedia." Although sketchy, the essays are charming, sprinkled with wit and humor, often containing pointed remarks.

There is no doubt that, for the Albanian people, Konitza will always occupy a high place as a patriot and a consummate writer, whose language and style were held up as a model in prewar Albania. However, this reviewer is far from agreeing with Bishop Fan S. Noli, when he likens Konitza's incomplete book to Schubert's *Unfinished Symphony* and Michelangelo's unfinished group of statues.

Columbia University

STAVRO SKENDI

SHORTER NOTICES

HAHLWEG, WERNER, *Carl von Clausewitz, Soldat-Politiker-Denker*. Göttingen: Musterschmidt-Verlag, 1957. Pp. 111.

Hahlweg's concise biography of von Clausewitz is one of the best in the series entitled *Persönlichkeit und Geschichte*. It consists of two parts, one dealing with his works and the varying interpretations of his writings. Within the limitations set by the size of the book, the author does justice to both the man and his work. He brings out clearly what impact the catastrophic events of his time had upon the intellectual growth and the career of von Clausewitz. He shows how the tragic blows dealt to his country by Napoleon induced von Clausewitz to intensify his study of history and politics, and thus add to his profound knowledge of military science. This strong desire to acquire universal knowledge, as well as an understanding of the problems of his time and his country was shared by the generation of reformers in Prussia. The best of them—Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Hardenberg, Stein—recognized von Clausewitz as outstanding in character and intellect.

The author points out that von Clausewitz could never fully utilize his knowledge and training, being forced to go into exile in Russia, thus being not only in an ambiguous position, but held back in advancement in the Prussian army after the defeat of Napoleon. His appraisal of von Clausewitz as a man of courage and character is quite different from the usual image conjured up by the name von Clausewitz.

The second part of the book is a critical evaluation of von Clausewitz' writing in general and of his *Vom Kriege* in particular. The most interesting section is that dealing with changing interpretations of the meaning of his book published for the first time after his death as Parts 1-3 of *Die Hinterlassenen Werke über Krieg und Kriegführung*. In his interpretation the author relies upon Hans Rothfels, whose opinions he quotes. The author's main thesis is that the full text of *Vom Kriege* has to be read, and the purpose for which it was written understood, in order to get at the real meaning of the book and the theories evolved there. In the author's opinion, a false picture has been created by quoting passages out of context, as has been done frequently by authors who have not read the original at all. He reiterates that von Clausewitz was not an apostle of militarism as has often been claimed. On the contrary his books were neither read nor considered acceptable by the Prussian army throughout most of the nineteenth century. He strongly advocates reading *Vom Kriege* with the critical eyes of a scholar, and seeing the man in his proper historical perspective.

Vassar College

ALMA LUCKAU MOLIN

ZMARZLIK, HANS-GÜNTHER, *Bethmann Hollweg als Reichskanzler, 1909-1914: Studien zu Möglichkeiten und Grenzen seiner innerpolitischen Machtstellung*. Düsseldorf: Droste-Verlag, 1957. Pp. 160. DM 18.

This valuable study does both more and less than its title suggests. It discusses only a few (not all) of Bethmann Hollweg's major policies (mainly his tax reforms and his efforts to improve the status of Alsace-Lorraine). But in doing so, it provides also an excellent analysis of the complex structure of the Prusso-German Empire and of the many centrifugal forces in the Empire with which the Chancellor had to deal on both the Prussian and the Reich level.

Much of this has of course long been known, but Zmarzlik, who had access to the official documents of the Imperial and Prussian Governments, adds a considerable amount of new factual material to our knowledge. We are given here a much more thoroughly documented picture of Bethmann's problems than we have so far had.

In addition to the known sources of the Chancellor's difficulties—the Emperor, the Prussian Conservatives, the Reichstag, and the military—Zmarzlik calls attention to two less familiar obstacles—the ministerial colleagues with whom Bethmann was involved in many a bitter struggle, and the Federal Council in which at times the

smaller states presented a solid phalanx of opposition. Given these difficulties, many of Bethmann's policies could be no more than halfway measures, but it is a tribute to his skill that he was able at least to carry out these.

The book also throws some new light on the attitudes of William II. While admittedly the monarch showed greater restraint in his public utterances after the disaster of the *Daily Telegraph* interview, this study makes it clear that he remained as erratic and impetuous as ever in his behind-the-scenes dealings with his Government. True, in the end he always gave in to Bethmann, but not without having caused much ill-will and confusion. Recent attempts of some German historians to rehabilitate the Kaiser on the grounds that his was not a "*persönliches Regiment*" will have to be revised in the light of this book.

However, the real villain of the piece would seem to have been the German people (although Zmarzlik refrains from saying so). The nation's complacency and lack of unity helped to maintain a form of government of whose inadequacy most Germans were quite aware.

Ohio State University

ANDREAS DORPALEN

STEMMANN, INGEBORG, *Russiske Bønder fortæller*. . . . Copenhagen: Martins Forlag (Nyt Socialt Bibliotek), 1932. Pp. 126.

Before the close of the First World War a number of Russian prisoners held by the Germans in Mecklenburg and near the Danish-German border managed to escape into Denmark, where they remained until the close of the war and the end of the Tsarist régime in Russia. They were most appreciative of the hospitality extended them by the Danes. Miss Ingeborg Stemmann, a well known Danish linguistic scholar, had begun her study of Slavonic languages before their arrival, and she decided to solicit the help of some of them in extending her knowledge of spoken Russian and in learning at first hand something of their native background. In this way she also contributed to the Danish effort to help the refugees to get adjusted to their new environment and to keep them in good spirits. As one of them put it in a letter to her, "Now I am enjoying a real vacation for the first time in my life." Farm or village jobs in Denmark were indeed "vacations" to soldiers with farm labor backgrounds in prewar Russia.

At first Miss Stemmann had asked the soldiers to record what they remembered of the outbreak of the war, but when some of them prolonged their stay in Denmark considerably, she asked them to write up their whole life stories from childhood on. Most of them could read and write, and several of them tackled this job with alacrity. Those brought up on farms, as most of them were, recalled vividly what they saw when they invaded East Prussia early in the war—the well built cement-floored stables, farm machinery, and flourishing root crops and clover fields. Their stay in Denmark showed them how a small state with poor soil could supply foreign markets with high class agricultural and dairy products.

The bulk of the letters were written in Denmark by seventeen Russian refugees, mainly from the lower peasant ranks. Some of them had got their early schooling only through putting pressure on their parents, and a few managed to get through a *gymnasium* before they were called into the service. The letters give emphasis to the Tsarist régime's lack of interest in encouraging mentally capable young peasants to get the schooling needed to make them useful and influential subjects. They give interesting glimpses of family life, of the treatment of humble peasants by farm owners of high and low social standing, some of the owners cruel and others kind. A proletarian, Aleksei, relates his life story in rhyme and tells how he "sought the truth and found only lies." The book closes with a few pages from letters received by Miss Stemmann after they had left for their homeland. These cover the years 1915-1931 and give some valid hints of postwar Russia's desperate economic plight, and just a faint suggestion of hope for the future.

This little collection of letters provides a variety of revealing individual examples of what Russian proletarians of the Tsarist period were thinking about on

the eve of the transition from Tsar Nicholas II to Lenin. They are entertaining as well as informing, and in this reviewer's opinion they deserve translation into English.

*University of California
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WALDEMAR WESTERGAARD

BRANDT, WILLY, and RICHARD LOWENTHAL, *Ernst Reuter, ein Leben für die Freiheit*. Munich: Kindler Verlag, 1957. Pp. 759. DM 12.80.

Ernst Reuter—born into a sternly Lutheran middle class family; breaking with his fraternity and his milieu as a student of philology; agitating for the pre-World War I German Social-Democracy; as a prisoner of war in Russia, being chosen by Lenin to become "commissar" for the Volga-Republic after the Bolshevik revolution; for a short time after the 1918 revolution being Secretary General of the German Communist Party; shaking off all ties with the Communists and, within months, changing from a tempestuous revolutionary to the municipal expert of the Social-Democrats; organizing energetically the traffic system of the German capital; having been mayor of Madgeburg, twice inmate of a Nazi concentration camp, émigré and advisor to the Turkish government, Lord-Mayor "over the rubble" of Berlin after his return to Germany in 1946, symbol of resistance to Communism during the air-lift; ceaselessly working and fighting on many fronts at once—these were facets of the man who died from exhaustion little more than six years after the downfall of the Nazi tyranny.

As socialists of a younger generation the two authors had been friends of Reuter. One of them has now become Reuter's successor at the helm of a still divided Berlin; the other, diplomatic correspondent of the *London Observer*, is one of the most astute students of European Communism. Under their pen the apparent contradictions of Reuter's fascinating career dissolve; the remarkable personality of a man emerges who, till his end, and amidst the love of millions of Berliners remained a lonely figure because he never quite belonged to a party or to a milieu. (Lenin at the time of their collaboration had spoken of him as "a bit too independent.") The political significance of this biography consists of its lucid narrative of that fateful half-century of German history during which Reuter sought, through trials and errors, the best ways to eradicate from his country's soil militarism and doctrinary radicalism and to establish the foundations for a democratic society.

Wherever possible the book lets Reuter speak himself: excerpts from his speeches during the last years of his life contain profound reflections on the physiology of Russian Communism, on the cold war, and on the prospects of a "negotiated peace." But the existence of their hero left little time for the establishment of personal archives. Hence the authors had to seek out, painstakingly through hundreds of interviews, the many strands that formed Reuter's life.

But neither did they hesitate to watch Reuter, as it were, from a distance and take a critical view of his opinions and deeds. Their interpretations of the problems of the Bonn Republic are particularly interesting and often convincing. The portrait of Adenauer, incomplete as it must be in the biography of one of his strongest antagonists, is historically valuable since it is painted neither by systematic detractors nor by the official panegyrists.

It would be highly welcome if at least a shortened version of this remarkable book could be made available in an English translation.

University of Colorado

HENRY W. EHRLMANN

Hamburger Mittel-und Ostdeutsche Forschungen. Hamburg: L. Appel (Ostdeutscher Kulturtrat in Hamburg), 1957. Pp. 250. DM 7.80.

This is a unique little book containing nine articles written by scholars who have fled to Hamburg from eastern sectors of Germany since 1945. The reviewer is tempted to comment at length on each article but will be content to cite their titles and general characteristics. Article one, *Hamburg und der Osten* is a brief,

concise history of the city of Hamburg from earliest times to the present. This is followed by, *Die Kulturleistung des deutschen Ostens*. The remaining articles are: (3) *Die Gründung des Dorfes Coccenjendorf* (a study in colonization in the reign of Frederick the Great); (4) *Max Marie von Webers kulturgeschichtliche Bedeutung für Gesamtdeutschland*; (5) *Das heutige mitteldeutsche Hochschulwesen*; (6) *Karl Lamprechts wissenschaftlicher Anruf an Rheinland und Sachsen und an die gesamte Deutsche Nation*; (7) *Res Severa Verum Gaudium—Das Leipziger Gewandhaus Zum 1765 jährigen Bestehen*; (8) *Zwei entscheidende Jahrzehnte sächsischer Wirtschaftsgeschichte (1850-1870)*; and (9) *Der Interzonenhandel, eine wirtschaftliche Verbindung mit Mitteldeutschland*. All of these articles are, for the most part, well written and contain adequate footnote references. In the opinion of this reviewer articles 5, 8, and 9 are probably the best written and most valuable of the group. But more important than the content of any of these articles is the general theme of the total project as expressed in the book's Foreword, the first two articles, and implied in the others; namely, that the attention of eastern scholars is called to the long and brilliant history of scholarship in central and eastern Germany over the centuries and in nearly all fields of human intellectual expression, that the scholars emanating from these eastern districts of Germany identified themselves with the West and that the latter can justly claim them and their work as a part of Western culture, and, in a more immediate sense, Hamburg has been since 1945 *a*, if not *the*, cultural and intellectual center of those contemporary scholars who have fled from Communist East Germany. While all this may be debated, the book concludes with a valuable and extensive bibliography (pp. 226-245) of publications by former East German scholars on a wide variety of subjects which have appeared over a ten-year period from 1947 to 1956. Perhaps this is the most valuable part of the entire book. This bibliography also includes a list of newspapers and periodicals published in East Germany but which are concerned in some measure with East Germany. There is a brief but adequate index for the articles. The print and format are commendable.

Purdue University

M. L. FLANINGAM

SCHROEDER, ERNST, *Krupp, Geschichte einer Unternehmerfamilie*. Göttingen: Musterschmidt-Verlag, 1957. Pp. 82.

The author, historian and director of the Krupp archives at Essen, has produced a masterful sketch of the early history of the Krupp family and of the beginnings of the industrial empire built by later generations.

After a brief introduction dealing with the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century forbears of the Krupp family who were merchants, city councilors and mayors in Essen, the story deals in some detail with the close connection between the Krupp family and the growth of the iron industry of the Ruhr.

As archivist the author has had access to all available material, and as historian he has rendered a concise and critical account. Surprising is the frankness with which he discusses the somewhat precarious financing of early experiments in the manufacture of steel. At a time when the production of steel sounded more like an alchemy than a science, every member of the Krupp clan was called upon to invest in the enterprise. In spite of crises in production, financing and marketing, the Krupp family held on to mines and blast furnaces. True to the tradition of patrician families in Germany, even the dowry of a bride, or the widow's portion was used to bail out the entrepreneur members of the clan. The author does not gloss over the financial difficulties of Friedrich Krupp in the 1920s and the difficult position in which he left his family and factory. The major part of the book is devoted to his son Alfred, who salvaged what was left and built it into the world-renowned *Krupp Werke* by putting production on a scientific basis, by looking for suitable markets, and by a much more systematic administration of the various enterprises which supplemented each other. Although he looked like a grand seigneur, and used credit extensively, his financing was conservative. He

stopped the practice of draining the family resources, persuaded able engineers and administrators to work for him, introduced new production and marketing methods, and thus built a small family enterprise into a world-renowned firm. What the author shows clearly is the dependence of even men like Alfred Krupp on capable engineers and loyal workers, and how he tried to repay his loyalty by instituting a patriarchal system of social welfare for his employees which antedates the social insurance laws of Bismarck. The story ends with the death of Alfred Krupp.

Vassar College

ALMA LUCKAU MOLIN

JACKSON, W. G. F., *Seven Roads to Moscow*. London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1957. Pp. 334. Sh. 30/-.

It is not clear to whom Colonel Jackson's book addresses itself. Certainly, the scholar will be baffled by the meager bibliography with its spelling mistakes (Ver-nadsky, Hoffmann, Goerlitz, Wartenburg). Shoddy editorial work is further evidenced by the same and other kinds of mistakes in the text, on the maps, and on the dust cover (Hindenburg), by the often inept style, by constant repetitions, and by ridiculous errors such as describing the same man (Schiedemann) as a German general in the index and a Russian general in the text.

The book is divided into two parts. The first embraces, in twenty pages, a thousand years of Russian history and not less than three "roads" (i.e. invasions) "to Moscow," one of which deals with a period before there was a Moscow. Charity forbids reviewing these pages.

Charity also forbids discussing the general historical surveys in the second part; this review will therefore be confined to the author's description of battles, which forms about one half—and the essence—of the book. Three further "roads" are described: the Swedish (Charles XII's invasion), the French (Napoleon's invasion), and the German (First and Second World Wars). In vain did the reviewer search for the seventh road.

The section dealing with Charles XII's campaigns is brief. The battle of Narva is rather neglected, but the campaigns of 1708 and 1709 are usefully described. The section on Napoleon is extensive. A clear exposition of strategy and tactics and simple sketches of important battles give the militarily uninformed reader a satisfactory survey. The intrusion of unexpected elements and the gamble which military planning always involves, are minimized. One may wonder if another description was necessary, but the campaign of 1812 is such a vivid, stirring drama that it will never lose its appeal.

The German "road" consists of two phases: 1914-17 and 1941-42. The first, comprehensive and concise, gives a good picture of the major engagements. The second, based—for lack of Russian sources—on German material, describes soberly and interestingly Nazi plans, campaigns, and individual battles, but breaks off with Stalingrad. Comparisons are made with Napoleon and Charles XII. Disagreements between Hitler and his generals are mentioned. Some surprising conclusions are reached, such as: "Hitler, by his determination to allow no retreat [in the winter of 1941], probably saved his army" (p. 289).

As a whole, the book contains some useful reference material about great battles fought on one and a half out of the "seven roads to Moscow."

University of Delaware

WALTHER KIRCHNER

VON HARPE, WERNER, *Die Sowjet Union, Finnland und Skandinavien 1945-1955*. Tübingen: Böhlau-Verlag, 1956. Pp. 67.

The decade 1945-1955 seems certain, because of the pervasive cold war which marked it, to become one of the historian's established units of periodization. That it can serve well even a limited sector of inquiry is evident from Dr. Harpe's survey of the pressures exerted, during the decade, by the Soviets on the states of Northern Europe. His account is related mainly to the overreaching struggle between East and West; and the attention given to local and regional objectives as such, is

modest. The stresses of domestic politics in each country, even those having a bearing on foreign policy, are scantily treated, though in this respect the treatment of Finland is more full than that given any of the other states. Insular areas bulk relatively large, for not a little of the decade's diplomacy involved sparring for bases—hence the generous attention given to issues concerning the Aaland Islands, Bear Island, Svalbard (Spitzbergen), Iceland, and Greenland.

The treatise is composed of two essays; one tracing Soviet relations with Finland, the other those with Scandinavia. They are based on printed sources from the several countries. Footnotes are uniformly eschewed (a notable exception is the rendering *in extenso* of the Molotow-Kuusinen agreement of December 2, 1939), but at the close there is provided a list of more than a score of titles, chiefly of collections of documents, of treaties, and of parliamentary debates. The Russian items are most numerous and include leading organs of the Soviet press.

The narrative concerns itself mainly with agreements and treaties which the Soviets have concluded with the individual states. A chronological list of relevant notes and treaties (*ca.* seventy-five in number) by Dr. Dietrich Geyer adds materially to the usefulness of the monograph. The tone of the narrative is uniformly objective and dispassionate. However, it seems clear that the writer's sympathies are with the West and not the Soviets; and in the introductory paragraphs (pp. 9-16) some developments of the 1939-1945 period are, understandably, clearly viewed through German eyes.

In sum, the specialist on Northern Europe can add this booklet to the row of general surveys on his shelf. It will retain some usefulness for him, even after unpublished sources for the decade can be tapped in volume, and the story broadened. The treatise appears in the series of studies on postwar international relations, sponsored by the Research Group at Tübingen which is working on Eastern Europe.

New York University

OSCAR J. FALNES

URBAN, RUDOLF, *Die Organisation der Wissenschaft in der Tschechoslowakei*. 2. Auflage, Marburg / Lahn, 1958, Johann Gottfried Herder-Institut. ix & 308 S.

The author warns the reader that his study is not and under given conditions cannot be complete, as certain sources are not available, but although there are some gaps, his book gives more than its title promises. The main purpose of the book is to describe the organization and activity (up to 1957) of the three academies, i.e. the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, the Slovak Academy of Sciences, and the Czechoslovak Agricultural Academy, and then the development (since 1945) and organization of Czechoslovak universities, i.e. four classical and four technical universities, and a number of schools for post-graduate studies, and special schools (e.g. of economics, mining, art, theology). The author shows how the organization of the universities, their teaching, examinations and grades, appointment of professors and administrators, is an imitation of the Soviet system of higher education. Foreign readers become acquainted with the spiritual atmosphere of the Czechoslovak schools by extensive and pithy quotations of addresses, given on various occasions by Czechoslovak ministers of education and of propaganda, of presidents of those three academies and a few professors. Some of their utterances (against "objectivism," "cosmopolitanism") show a profound ignorance of what science is, other ones seem to be hypocritical "sacrifices of the intellect" to the violent and revengeful regime. The author describes very well the attitude of the students toward the system of teaching and learning, and registers their revolt in May 1956, when a "thaw" began to be felt in the Soviets and in the captive nations. This book is an important contribution to the knowledge of the communist system of higher education.

University of Pittsburgh

JOSEF MACEK

BOUVIER, CHARLES, *La Collectivisation de l'Agriculture*. Librairie Armand Colin, Paris: 1958. Pp. 246. 975 fr.

Preparation of Bouvier's study was sponsored by the East European section of the French National Political Science Foundation. The essay covers Soviet Russia, East European Satellites and Communist China.

Bouvier presents a broad philosophical, political and socio-economic background of farm collectivization, its practices and impact. He starts with the spark of the idea in Marx's mind and carries it through the metamorphosis of Lenin, Stalin, Mao-Tse-Tung, Tito. Here is a fascinating chronology of ideological zig-zagging about the means by which the Communists try to achieve the end—industrialization. In spite of incredible cruelty and apparent economic waste, there is nevertheless frightful efficiency in the process.

The analysis of collectivization's rôle in the planned socialization of economies contains some interesting attitude studies on the psychology of peasantism, and how to deal with it. I am not aware of anything similar in English. Otherwise the Anglo-Saxon scholar will find little new in the book.

The lay reader might find here a quick broad overall review of a tremendously important part of the current world political scene. The workmanship is competent; the text is somewhat wordy, but it reads well; there are few cumbersome footnotes, and hardly any statistical tables. All these qualities might warrant translation of his essay and American publication as paper back.

Crown Zellerbach Corporation
Golden Gate College, San Francisco

FRANK MEISSNER

SCHIEDER, THEODORE, *Staat und Gesellschaft im Wandel unserer Zeit*. München: R. Oldenburg Verlag, 1958. Pp. 207.

This volume of essays, most of which have been previously published in journals, offers evidence of the lines along which German historical thinking has been moving since the war. The author, who is professor at the University of Cologne and editor of the *Historische Zeitschrift*, concentrates upon issues of the relation between state and society in the 19th and 20th centuries. Much of his discussion, that about conceptions of revolution in the 19th century, about liberalism, about German party history, has actual significance in the search of the German people at the present date for a stable relationship between government and society. The discussion will not be enlightening to us in the same degree, for we have struggled with these issues for at least a century, during which the Germans were living first with more or less contentment under constitutional monarchism and later in the turmoil of war, revolution, and dictatorship. We had succeeded in overcoming the gap between state and society; the Germans had not done so, and these essays offer a late attempt to illuminate aspects of the problem.

The effects upon historical scholarship of the lag in German development may be seen in the fact that the author goes back to Ostrogorski and Max Weber for his concepts of historical work on political parties, and that in all these essays he uses Max Weber as the main source of social scientific inspiration. His last two essays, "Types of Historical Knowledge," and "Renewal of Historical Perception" (*Bewusstsein*) owe much to Weber and share the qualities of clarity and courage of thought of Weber's creative mind. Although like most continentals Professor Schieder has not found how to acquaint himself with non-German writings on his subjects (neither have we with respect to non-English publications), he shows repeatedly in all his essays but especially in the last two that thinking about the use of history and about the topics most in need of treatment and about points of view to be taken with respect to them is developing along similar lines in all free countries of the West. Like Ludwig Dehio's essays these formulate objectives of research that can only be reached by the work and meditation of all of us, irrespective of country. They open the prospect at some time in the future of comparative studies of social and institutional history.

University of California, Los Angeles

EUGENE N. ANDERSON

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INDUSTRIALIZATION IN BOHEMIA AND MORAVIA IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY¹

by *Herman Freudenberger*

THE administrative and military reforms of Maria Theresa's reign are well known. They have been studied and analyzed in detail. Less attention has been paid the economic activities of the same period, without which the reforms in the government and in the military establishment would have had little chance of lasting success.

Since the publication of the studies of Karl Přibram,² Arthur Salz,³ and Johann Slokar⁴ in the first two decades of this century, little interest has been shown in the industrial history of Bohemia and Moravia, the old monarchy's most important industrial area. Only within the last decade have Czechoslovak historians shown some activity in this field.⁵ The economic and social historians of the days of the Republic concentrated on the country's agricultural history. Much monographic work has yet to be done before a complete picture of the industrial history of the Czech lands can emerge.

We shall trace here the outlines of the industrial picture of the eighteenth century, the era that was as fundamental for the monarchy's economic institutions as it was for its political institutions. During this century, and especially in its second half, the economic changes were many and had a profound, long-range effect. Factories were founded, capital was accumulated, labor and management gained valuable experience, and new markets were opened. Here was a country well aware and conscious of its underdeveloped economy and ready and willing to use every means to cata-

¹This paper was read at the annual meeting of the American Historical Association, December 29, 1958, in Washington, D. C.

²Karl Přibram, *Geschichte der österreichischen Gewerbepolitik von 1740 bis 1860* (Leipzig, 1907).

³Arthur Salz, *Geschichte der böhmischen Industrie in der Neuzeit* (Munich and Leipzig, 1913).

⁴Johann Slokar, *Geschichte der österreichischen Industrie und ihrer Förderung unter Kaiser Franz I* (Vienna, 1914).

⁵Arnošt Klíma, *Manufakturní Období v Čechách* (Prague, 1955).

pult itself into the strong economic position that it believed its physical potential allowed and its political pretensions required. The welfare of the population was incidental.

The catalyst for all this activity was the weak military position of the monarchy in the middle of the eighteenth century. Maria Theresa and her advisers determined that only by keeping up a standing army of 100,000 men, costing 14 million fl. a year,⁶ could the monarchy be secured against future aggression and spoliation such as it had experienced only recently in the Silesian Wars at the hands of Frederick of Prussia.

Unfortunately, the Habsburg government had for decades been notorious for the slimmness of its financial resources. Prince Eugene once remarked that if the fate of the monarchy depended on the immediate raising of 50,000 fl., it would without question be impossible to save it from destruction.⁷

In part, the poverty of the royal treasury could be traced to an antiquated system of tax collection and of administration in general. But to a large extent the cause was the poverty of the people: poor people—poor monarch. One attack on this joint problem was the series of administrative reforms of Count Haugwitz in 1749. The second attack involved planning for long-range economic growth, with the determined goal to make the Habsburg taxpayer better able to meet the obligations placed upon him.⁸

The task was difficult to begin with, but it was immensely complicated by the loss of Silesia to Prussia. Silesia, a territory of one million industrious inhabitants,⁹ had been paying annually a sum equivalent to twenty-five per cent of the total direct-tax revenues collected from the Bohemian and Austrian lands combined.¹⁰ Yet, in the 1750s and the 1760s, the Habsburg government faced the problem of raising more money than when Silesia still belonged to the monarchy.

Silesia had not only been a major tax contributor; it had also been the economic leader of the monarchy. Together with Bohemia and Moravia, it had long made up the most powerful economic complex in the monarchy. In Silesia were the entrepreneurs who had been buying Bohemia's and Moravia's surplus of raw materials, such as grains, and of semi-finished goods, such as yarn and unbleached linen. With Prussia now in control of this territory, however, an economic reorientation became necessary in the remainder of the Habsburg monarchy. From 1750 to 1790, the Habsburg monarchy, under the reigns of Maria Theresa and her son, Joseph II, was engaged in the effort to replace Silesia's economic contribution to the mon-

⁶Josef Kallbrunner, *Kaiserin Maria Theresias Politisches Testament* (Vienna, 1952), pp. 53, 90.

⁷Alfred Ritter von Arneth, *Prinz Eugen*, I (Vienna, 1864), 212.

⁸Karl Pfilbram, *Gewerbepolitik*, pp. 132, 134.

⁹Hermann Fechner, *Wirtschaftsgeschichte der preussischen Provinz Schlesien in der Zeit ihrer provinziellen Selbständigkeit 1741-1806* (Breslau, 1906), p. 1.

¹⁰Friedrich Walter, *Die österreichische Zentralverwaltung* (Vienna, 1938), p. 255. In 1739 the Bohemian and Austrian lands appropriated about 8 million fl. for military purposes. Hungary and Transylvania probably added another 1.5 million fl. Cf. Franz Freiherr von Mensi, *Die Finanzen Österreichs von 1701 bis 1740* (Vienna, 1890), pp. 124, 705.

archy. It endeavored to do this by promoting the growth of industry in general, and particularly in Bohemia and Moravia.

Through industrial growth, the monarchy also hoped to be in a more favorable position *vis à vis* its West European rivals, from whom it still imported large quantities of goods. Almost all the better-quality merchandise consumed in the Habsburg dominions was imported. Thus, the crisis of the 1750s presented the Habsburg policy makers with a unique opportunity: they could put their cameralistic theories into practice and try to make the country economically self-sufficient. For years the cameralistic writings, above all the patriotic and emotional tract *Österreich über alles, wann es nur will* (Austria above everything, if she only wishes it) had been avidly read. In this tract the "veritable self-contained little world" that the Habsburg monarchy supposedly represented was highly extolled.¹¹ But beyond paying lip service to the idea, the ponderous, custom-encrusted mechanism of Habsburg society and its government would not go. Hoernigk had suggested that the Turkish danger in the 1680s was the perfect time to cut through the dead weight of vested interests because people were ready to make sacrifices so that they could survive. Leopold I was not capable of taking advantage of the situation; his granddaughter Maria Theresa was cut of different cloth.

The major goals of the government's economic policy beginning with the 1750s was independence of foreign suppliers and the creation of a more prosperous population—one that would be able to pay the increased taxes required of it by the government. What were the methods used? How successful were they?

Chronologically, we must divide the period under examination into two sections: one, from 1750 to 1770 when a relatively dogmatic mercantilism was adhered to and, two, the period from 1770 to 1790 when a more eclectic mercantilism was heavily modified by liberal economic views. In the first period, the government played a dominant rôle, hoping that by adhering to strict cameralistic theory it could induce industrial growth. Since this method did not produce the expected results and, furthermore, was under heavy criticism from exalted quarters, a less rigid period followed during which the government relaxed but did not relinquish its rôle as the watchful protector and stimulator of industry.

The effects of this attempt to induce economic development may best be observed in the Bohemian lands, the area that was then and continued to be until the end of the Habsburg monarchy in 1918 the most industrialized part of the monarchy.

Here, in an area of over 28,000 square miles, an area the size of the state of South Carolina, lived in the middle of the eighteenth century some 3,500,000 people,¹² or about half the population of the Great Britain of that day. The vast majority were serfs who were tightly under the control of their

¹¹Philipp von Hoernigk, *Österreich über alles, wann es nur will* (Leipzig, 1707), p. 6.

¹²Alfred Gürtler, *Die Volkszählungen Maria Theresias und Joseph II 1753-1790* (Innsbruck, 1909), Table I.

noble lords, but whose position was still better than that of the Russian and Polish peasant. Bohemia and Moravia thus represented a transition area between Western and Eastern Europe.

This might also be said of industry. Better developed than in other parts of the monarchy such as Hungary and the Austrian provinces, and also better developed than in Poland and Russia, Bohemian and Moravian industry was nevertheless far behind the industry of Western Europe.

As in other parts of contemporary Europe, the manufacture of textiles was the most important industry in the Bohemian lands, providing a livelihood or important side-earnings for a large portion of the population. Ninety-five per cent of the Bohemian, and, most likely, of Moravian industrial workers were in the textile trade. Over 400,000 persons, or about ten per cent of the total population, were employed in industrial endeavors. But nearly three-fourths, or approximately 280,000, were spinners, possibly half of whom worked only part-time.¹³ In short, the proportion of the population in the Czech areas in 1775 employed in all of industry was about the same as the proportion of the English population in 1741 in woolen manufacturing alone.¹⁴

The great bulk of workers in Bohemia and Moravia was in the linen industry, with the woolen industry making up a poor second. In value, however, the woolen industry accounted for a production nearly half as large as the output in the linen industry. Cottons had a very late start in the Bohemian lands; in this respect they were far behind the province of Lower Austria, which harbored a number of large establishments.¹⁵

Besides the textile industry, which will be our prime consideration, two other industries may be noted. One of these was the manufacture of glass, which had a world-wide reputation for excellence and which was second only to the linen industry in value of exports from the Habsburg monarchy. The glass manufacturers not only had their own system of marketing, but in every other way had been independent of Silesian intermediaries. Thus, the disruption of the traditional economic connection between Silesia and the rest of the Bohemian lands caused no particular social or economic crisis

¹³Klíma, *Období*, p. 436, quotes the estimate of a Bohemian official that there were 200,000 spinners in Bohemia in 1774. The official census of the following year (Hofkammerarchiv, Böhm. Commerz, Fasz. 53. Red. No. 795) gives a figure of 130,000 spinners. This would mean that for every one of the 22,000 looms there were about six spinners, a somewhat low but nevertheless reasonable figure. Bohemia exported, moreover, about 600,000 fl. worth of linen yarns per year and it may well be that the census figures did not fully account for this production. Moravia's census of 1775 (Hofkammerarchiv, Böhm. Commerz, Fasz. 54, Red No. 796) gives a figure of 80,000 spinners for about 12,000 looms, a ratio of about 7 spinners per loom. Moravia exported little, if any, yarn and presumably all spun yarn went to weavers. In the light of the Moravian figures, therefore, the higher estimate seems to be valid for Bohemia. It must finally be observed that none of the statistical data is very reliable.

¹⁴Phyllis Deane, "The Output of the British Woolen Industry in the Eighteenth Century," *Journal of Economic History*, XVII (1957), 271.

¹⁵For details, see Viktor Hofmann, "Beiträge zur neueren österreichischen Wirtschaftsgeschichte. Zweiter Teil. Die Anfänge der österr. Baumwollwarenindustrie in den österreichischen Alpenländern im 18. Jahrhundert," *Archiv für österreichische Geschichte*, CX (1926), 415-742.

among the glass manufacturers. Government interference was therefore unnecessary.

Lastly, there was the mining and metals industry, which the government neither totally ignored nor especially promoted. Silver mining had been important at the time of the discovery of America but by the eighteenth century it was only of minor importance. On the other hand, the coal and iron industry was in its very infancy in the eighteenth century and did not reach its full development until well into the nineteenth century.

In contrast to the glass industry, government interference became necessary in the Bohemian and Moravian textile industry. Silesia's departure from the monarchy had seriously disrupted not only the economic but also the social system. The state could not stand idly by and watch the thousands of Bohemian spinners and weavers who had formerly sold their wares to Silesian merchants starve to death for lack of a market. On the other hand, to allow the Silesians to carry on their business activities in Bohemia as if nothing had happened was equally impossible. It would have meant that some of the most important Habsburg lands would be economically dependent on the whims of Prussia, a not too sympathetic foreign power. Curiously, the peace treaty of 1742 actually did provide for the maintenance of the old economic relations between Silesia and Bohemia.¹⁶ But in the 1750s, Maria Theresa made the inevitable decision that her dominions must be economically independent of Prussian Silesia and for that matter of all other foreign countries.

The implementation of this decision she left to the Court Commercial Council, whose members were for the most part followers of cameralistic theories. As expressed by J. H. G. von Justi, whose writings probably reflected the sentiments of Maria Theresa's administration fairly accurately,¹⁷ cameralism did not mean constant government interference in the economy.

Quite the contrary, indirect measures were much preferred. Nature, with a minimum of help from government, policy makers and advisers of the empress were convinced, would induce industrial growth. Growth was being impeded, they felt, by such man-made obstacles as inequitable tariffs, tolls, and guild rules. They were especially vehement on guilds, which they considered hotbeds of blind reaction. In 1751, the government even gave serious consideration to a move to abolish the guilds entirely,¹⁸ but shrank from this radical step for the obvious reason that it would basically dislocate the economy. Nevertheless, it began to reduce the restrictive powers of the guilds. This was not very effective, however, in expanding the production of the artisan masters. Whether or not guild regulations controlled their lives, the artisans of the Habsburg monarchy were tightly bound by tradition and fearful of change.

¹⁶Hermann Fechner, *Die handelspolitischen Beziehungen Preussens zu Österreich* (Berlin, 1886), p. 10ff.

¹⁷Henryk Grossmann, "Die Anfänge und geschichtliche Entwicklung der amtlichen Statistik in Österreich," *Statistische Monatschrift*, N.F. XXI (1916), 348.

¹⁸W. Gustáv Kopetz, *Allgemeine österreichische Gewerbs-Gesetzkunde*, I (Vienna, 1829), 98.

Maria Theresa's government did not rely solely on purely negative measures. It also attempted through more positive methods to prod industry into increased production, especially of goods normally imported from abroad. One such article was so-called "fine cloth." The government promised any cloth maker immediate purchase (by the army) of all the fine cloth he produced. But no master took up the offer; no guild master produced fine cloth. Similarly, a prize competition for the production of the best pieces of the same type of cloth in the various lands found only one taker, a non-guild master who had been brought to the monarchy several years before at government expense and who was ostracized by his fellow masters. This man and others like him had been recruited by the government in Verviers so that they could teach their more advanced methods to Habsburg cloth makers. The efforts of the Belgians, like those of the many other foreign specialists brought in by the government, were spurned by the native artisans.

If the government authorities were frustrated in their efforts to modernize the techniques and the way of doing things of anachronistic artisans, they found their task with the merchants no easier. They tried to get Habsburg businessmen to purchase their goods at home rather than to import them from abroad and for that purpose began an advertising campaign to inform the merchants of one part of the monarchy concerning the industrial products manufactured in other parts. Neither this information nor appeals to patriotism could, however, induce the merchants to support native industry. Foreign goods, the merchants insisted quite rightly, were cheaper and better than corresponding domestic articles.¹⁹ Moreover, the foreign suppliers allowed long credits, which the domestic manufacturers were unable to grant.

Not only did the merchants shy away from purchasing domestic goods, they were even less inclined to invest money in domestic industry. The mercantilistic planners had hoped that some merchants would act as putters out on a large scale and thereby organize particular trades.²⁰ In this way, the existing industrial system could be utilized and made more efficient. Generally speaking, Austrian mercantilists in and out of government merely wanted the artisans to become more disciplined and more open to technological innovations. They did not favor a radical change within the industrial system and would accept machines and other labor-saving devices only if the number of workers to be employed would not be reduced thereby.²¹ Even when the planners considered the formation of consolidated workshops or factories, cottage industry was still uppermost in their minds. They saw in these workshops simply more forceful methods of training workers. Typical of this attitude was the manner in which Count Joseph Kinsky, President of the Bohemian Commercial College, operated. He

¹⁹Karl Přibram, *Gewerbepolitik*, pp. 186-187; 196-197.

²⁰*Ibid.*, p. 190.

²¹Joseph von Sonnenfels, *Grundsätze der Polizey, Handlung, und Finanzwissenschaft*, 3rd ed., II (Vienna, 1770-72), 210.

brought foreign masters to his estates to train his serfs in new methods of manufacturing. Upon completion of a training course, the worker many times received the equipment as a gift from Count Kinsky and worked in his own home.²² Quite often, however, the consolidated workshop retained its form and eventually became the modern factory. But the immediate goal of founding a widespread cottage industry serviced by a network of putters-out was not achieved.

Neither artisans nor merchants were willing to cooperate with the government. This spirit of antagonism was not aided by the various sorts of coercion that the government applied during this period. Some merchants, for example, were forced to buy the shoddy merchandise of a cloth manufacturer heavily supported by the government.²³ Another group of merchants, who were caught smuggling goods valued at many thousands of gulden, were forced to take over a woolen-fabrics factory in distress. Otherwise, the government would have confiscated the smuggled goods. Confiscation might have hurt the merchants less, as it turned out, for their losses as a result of this venture were very heavy.²⁴ This particular factory finally was turned over to the Linz woolen-fabrics factory, a government-owned establishment, for operation. In short, these and other similar attempts to get merchants to aid in the stimulation of industry failed. Even an attempt to force the Habsburg merchant community to buy domestic merchandise by an absolute prohibition of the importation of certain articles failed. This attempt, made in the 1760s, did not have a chance of success since the Habsburg industry was simply not in possession of the productive capacity to meet domestic demand. The mercantilistic officials had reasoned, however, that the demand would induce the supply, a dogmatic position that was totally in conflict with the realities of the situation.

The appeal of the government planners for aid in stimulating industrial growth fell on deaf ears when addressed to the middle classes; the nobility, however, was more responsive. Between 1750 and 1790 numerous industrial enterprises were begun on the manors of the Bohemian and Moravian nobility. However, despite the heavy subsidies and various privileges granted to many of them, these manorial industrial units were generally unsuccessful. The nobles often turned over the management to supposed specialists, many of whom were outright frauds, while they themselves played the rôle of the valiant patriot responding to an urgent appeal from his liege lord, the empress. They, of course, hoped that factories on their estates would be profitable. Among other things, such enterprises would help them to dispose of their agricultural surpluses. Finally, with

²²A. Pandler, *Graf Josef Kinsky* (Leipa, 1885), p. 20ff.

²³Hofkammerarchiv, Böhm. Commerz, Fasz. 101/2, Red No. 893, Folio 1-238. For details on the operation of this enterprise, see Herman Freudenberger, *A Case Study of the Government's Role in Economic Development in the Eighteenth Century: The Bruno Fine-Cloth Factory* (Columbia University, unpublished doctoral dissertation, 1957).

²⁴Viktor Hofmann, "Beiträge zur neueren österreichischen Wirtschaftsgeschichte. Erster Teil. Die Wollenzeugfabrik zu Linz an der Donau," *Archiv für österreichische Geschichte*, CVII (1920), 712ff.

more money in his pocket, the serf would be in a better position to pay dues and fees to his manorial lord, an important consideration where the serf was so often in arrears on all types of payments.

Lastly, the state not only supported enterprises by means of privileges and monetary assistance; in a few cases it created them outright. More often the enterprises that might be said to be owned by the state came into its possession because of financial difficulties.²⁵ Certainly in the second half of the eighteenth century, the state was a very reluctant owner of industrial facilities. As Count Chotek, President of the Court Commercial Council, said in 1761, the state owned an enterprise only when private initiative was completely lacking.²⁶

Judged by immediate results, the government activities, conducted under the direction of mercantilistic officials, were unsuccessful. Count Kaunitz, Joseph II, and various members of the Council of State were almost unanimous in their denunciations of these policies—policies that were indeed wasteful, fumbling, and grossly inefficient. From 1750 to 1770, a period during which mercantilistic ideas were given full play, there was little apparent industrial growth. It is during the subsequent years that increases in industry can be clearly perceived. As mentioned before, starting with the 1770s and ending about 1790, at the time of Emperor Joseph's death, a period of mercantilism strongly modified by more liberal ideas held sway. The government did not eschew positive interference in the economy completely during this time, but it interfered with increasing reluctance and with greater selectivity. Emperor Joseph believed that the government should remain disinterested and allow private capital to seek on its own the most advantageous objects for investment. The state might aid private industry only in unusual cases, such as when a new product hitherto imported was to be manufactured within the monarchy.

Whether or not this policy of relative *laissez-faire* was the cause, employment and output in industry rose noticeably during this period. In the linen industry of Bohemia and Moravia, the number of workers employed in weaving nearly doubled between 1775 and 1788, from 39,000 to 66,000.²⁷ There is also considerable evidence that the scale of enterprise increased during this twenty-year period. We do know, for example, that several so called factories, that is, large-scale merchant-manufactories, were in operation and had grown considerably in size.

In the woolen-goods industry of these two lands a similar trend was in evidence. There, too, the number of persons employed in weaving and in knitting (of stockings) nearly doubled, from 17,000 in 1775 to 32,000 in

²⁵The state was usually not the outright owner. The greatest of these "state-owned" enterprises, the Linz Woolen Fabrics Factory, for example, was nominally owned by the Municipal Bank of Vienna, an institution tightly under the control of the central government. This factory, as well as several other industrial units, came to the Bank in 1754 as a result of the bankruptcy of the Oriental Company, in which the government had been financially, as well as otherwise, heavily involved.

²⁶Hofkammerarchiv, Böhm. Commerz, Fasz. 101/1, Red. No. 891, 14.IV.1761.

²⁷Hofkammerarchiv, Böhm. Commerz, Fasz. 53 and 54, Red Nos. 795 and 796, respectively.

788-89.²⁸ Moreover, a number of factories, in this case workshops, owned and operated by an entrepreneur who employed sizable numbers of workers under one roof, were in existence. The average scale of enterprise in the woolen-goods industry was undoubtedly larger than in linen manufacturing. The progress made by the woolen-goods industry during this period is indicated by another interesting fact: by 1790, very little woolen cloth had to be imported whereas in the 1760s over one million guildens' worth was annually procured abroad.²⁹ What is more, by the 1790s, Bohemia and Moravia were able to export large quantities of woolen cloth.

Both the linen and the woolen industries had received considerable attention from the state. This was not, however, true of cotton manufacturing. Mercantilists disliked this branch of industry because all of its raw material had to be imported, thus allowing bullion to escape the monarchy. Nevertheless, this condition was still preferable to importing the entire finished product.

Bohemia, more than Moravia, saw a decided growth of the cotton industry, though in this respect Lower Austria in 1790 still dominated the monarchy. Growth in Bohemia's cotton industry must be judged against the background of the 1760s, when this industry was just beginning. From about the 1830s on, it began to occupy a more prominent place in Bohemia than the linen industry.

By the 1790s, it can safely be asserted, Silesia's former contribution towards the industry of its neighboring lands and to the monarchy as a whole had been adequately but not yet completely replaced. Bohemian and Moravian industry had grown considerably. No one knows, of course, how much better the industry might have fared had Silesia remained a part of the Habsburg monarchy.

The growth registered in Bohemia and Moravia had been strongly aided by the state, though the greatest efflorescence of Bohemian and Moravian industry in the eighteenth century came during a period when this aid was at a minimum. Inefficient and wasteful though the mercantilistic era from 1750 to 1770 had been, it nevertheless had the effect of shaking the economy out of its torpor. Similarly, though the manorial enterprises that were founded during this period proved for the most part to be costly failures, they encouraged the establishment of other more permanent and better-managed businesses. There was no significant interval between the end of the mercantilistic period and the beginning of the period in the Habsburg monarchy of more liberal economic views. On the contrary, the two periods ran into each other.

It was the industrial growth during the eighteenth century that enabled Bohemia and Moravia to make their great strides during the nineteenth century. Nevertheless, the industry of the Bohemian lands, like that of the entire monarchy, was still considerably backward in comparison with that of Western Europe and of Germany. It is open to conjecture whether the

²⁸*Ibid.*

²⁹Hofkammerarchiv, Böhm. Commerz, Fasz. 101/2, Red No. 893, Folio 845ff.

Austrian monarchy would have assimilated the industrial revolution as well as it did without the preparatory build-up during the time of Maria Theresa and Joseph II. For that matter, I would suggest that the momentum generated by the accomplishments of the reigns of these monarchs carried Austrian industry into the twentieth century. Thus, the period 1740 to 1790 provided a base for industry in the Habsburg monarchy similar to that which Joseph Redlich claims it provided for the country's political institutions.³⁰

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³⁰Josef Redlich, *Das österreichische Staats-und Reichsproblem*, I (Leipzig, 1920), 26.

GENERAL WEYGAND AND THE BATTLE OF WARSAW OF 1920

by Piotr S. Wandycz

AMONG many legends in recent European history few have proved more impervious to facts than the story which makes General Maxime Weygand the savior of Poland in 1920. Numerous textbooks maintain that the Russian offensive was repelled "only because the French chief of staff, General Weygand, assisted the Poles,"¹ or that the victory was due to a "counter-attack planned by French General Weygand."² Similar statements appear in monographs written by distinguished historians or by people who knew a great deal about the actual events. Harold Nicolson, for instance, has related that Weygand "after much obstruction on the part of Marshal Piłsudski, had . . . persuaded the Poles to counter-attack."³ Professor Goriely, in a recent study of Polish-Soviet relations, states that the Red armies "stopped at the gates of Warsaw thanks to General Weygand."⁴ One finds similar opinions in a book written by a well-informed German diplomat,⁵ in a study by a French officer,⁶ and even in editorial notes to Lord D'Abernon's diary,⁷ which is especially surprising given what D'Abernon himself wrote on the subject.⁸ Small wonder that the story is widely accepted and books which show it to be legend are often overlooked.

Information now available from a collection of Polish documents containing the original notes written by Weygand and other French generals during the battle of Warsaw,⁹ and the recently published volume of Weygand's memoirs dealing with this period, may well be used here to recall once again the facts and invoke the testimony of the principal actor of the events. What are the facts?

A Franco-British Mission led by two ambassadors, Lord D'Abernon and Jules Jusserand, and comprising a British general and General Weygand, left for Poland on July 22, 1920. The situation in Poland was at that moment critical: the Red armies had broken through the Polish front and were rolling victoriously westward. The Bolshevik Government had rejected Western proposals for a Russian-Polish armistice and stated that it could only consider proposals emanating directly from Warsaw. The chief

¹Crane Brinton, John B. Christopher, Robert L. Wolff, *A History of Civilization*, II (New York 1955), 482.

²Richard M. Brace, *The Making of the Modern World* (New York, 1955), p. 728.

³Harold Nicolson, *Curzon: The Last Phase 1919-1925* (London, 1934), p. 206.

⁴B. Goriely "L'Union soviétique et la Pologne" in J. B. Duroselle, Ed., *Les frontières européennes de l'URSS 1917-1941* (Paris, 1957), p. 225.

⁵Wipert von Blücher, *Deutschlands Weg nach Rapallo* (Wiesbaden, 1951), p. 101.

⁶Commandant d'Etchegoyen, *Pologne! Pologne!* (Paris, 1925), p. 208.

⁷Lord D'Abernon, *The Diary of an Ambassador*, I, (1929), 75.

⁸Lord D'Abernon, *The Eighteenth Decisive Battle of the World* (London, 1931), 115-116.

⁹*Akta Generala Rozwadowskiego* (General Rozwadowski Papers), Józef Piłsudski Institute of America, New York. Hereafter cited as *AR*. The first file contains: Correspondence [of Rozwadowski] with Generals Henrys and Weygand, and the French Mission during the battle of Warsaw; Orders and Instructions, summer 1920.

tasks of the Mission were to ascertain the exact nature of the situation in Poland and to help the Poles in their armistice negotiations with the Russians.

The British Government gave rather brief and laconic instructions to D'Abernon¹⁰ but the French Government instructed its envoys much more fully. The French instruction, recalling the events preceding the decision to send a mission to Poland, stated that "the first task [of the mission] will be to make certain of the disposition of this Government [of Poland] with regard to the armistice proposal which it is to address directly to the Soviets." If the Allies are to help Poland effectively, the instructions said, it is necessary for the Polish Government "to conform strictly to the indications of the Allies." If Poland conforms and the Soviet Government rejects an armistice, or tries to impose Communism on Poland, or invades "Polish territory," the Allies "will concert with the Government of Poland."¹¹

To this extent the French instruction dealt mainly with the question of an armistice, but in the second half of it there is a passage which reflected clearly the intentions of the French Government:

The immediate task of the Mission will be to obtain a clear picture of the situation, military as well as political, of the [extent of] authority of the present Polish Government . . . of the resistance potential . . . and [to suggest] means of remedy . . . If Poland does not yield, the support of the Allies, moral and material, will help her to concentrate her forces on the front and inside [the country] and to achieve the constitution of the Republic within boundaries comprising indisputably Polish territories.

Thus the Mission was not sent primarily to bring immediate and tangible assistance to Poland or act as an advance guard of Allied forces, but primarily to advise, to suggest, to watch over the armistice negotiations, and as far as the French were concerned, to promise more help in event of a breakdown of armistice negotiations. In the existing critical military situation, the mission, to use the words of the Italian Minister in Warsaw, was little more than "a palliative to disguise the real impotence of the Allies."¹² During his first interview with Weygand, Józef Piłsudski, the head of the Polish state and the Commander-in-Chief, asked the French general bluntly how many divisions the Allies were prepared to send. Learning that they were not prepared to send any, the Polish marshal expressed great skepticism at the value of the mission.¹³ As for materiel which France was sending, there were difficulties and delays and the bulk of French munitions arrived in Poland after the battle of Warsaw.¹⁴

¹⁰Text in General Maxime Weygand, *Mémoires: II, Mirages et Réalité* (Paris, 1957), 97.

¹¹*Ibid.*

¹²*Ibid.*

¹³Francesco Tommasini, *La Risurrezione della Polonia* (Milan, 1925). I used here the Polish translation: *Odrodzenie Polski* (Warszawa, 1928), p. 125.

¹⁴Weygand, *op. cit.*, p. 105.

¹⁵General Hubert Camon, *La manœuvre libératrice du maréchal Pilsudski contre les Bolchéviks* (Paris, 1929), p. 15.

The purposes of the Franco-British Mission were thus much different from those later ascribed to it. The French, however, unlike the English, did not seriously believe that there was a chance of an armistice between Poland and Russia, and Weygand on his way to Poland outlined possible measures to be taken in the military sphere. He felt that Piłsudski should not unite the functions of chief of state and supreme commander, and he speculated on a possible Commander-in-Chief "free from political servitude."¹⁶ Rejecting the idea of replacing Piłsudski by an Allied officer, he thought that an Allied officer might be appointed chief of staff to a titular Polish commander. This as well as passages quoted above in the French instruction suggest that the Mission was to take an active part in Polish internal problems, and possibly try to establish a kind of tutelage over the Polish Government. But for this purpose there was little if any sympathy from Piłsudski, a forceful personality, who resented the fact that Poland had to be in the French sphere of influence. Consequently he took an attitude of reserve toward the Allied Mission, especially since he knew that his rightist opponents in Poland would attempt to use the Mission against him, and that intrigues would flourish.

On its arrival, the Mission quickly ran into difficulty. It discovered soon enough that the question of a genuine armistice was a rather academic one, and concentrated on appeals to London and Paris for effective help. At the same time it put pressure on the Poles to utilize the services of Weygand whose prestige as Foch's wartime chief of staff was great indeed. But not only Piłsudski and the Polish staff were opposed to letting Weygand take charge of military matters; there were additional complications connected with the presence in Warsaw of General Paul Henrys who headed the several-hundred-strong French military mission and was senior to Weygand in rank. General Henrys had cooperated closely and loyally with Piłsudski for some time, and Weygand was to discover his disinclination to criticize the Polish marshal or suggest sweeping changes.¹⁷ Henrys was suspected by the British of being a "devotee" of Piłsudski, and the situation was highly embarrassing. To replace Henrys by Weygand would have been awkward for France because it would have implied that the French general and his mission had done a poor job and were responsible for giving erroneous advice to the Poles.¹⁸

Under these circumstances a momentary solution was reached on July 27, 1920, which consisted in appointing Weygand to the somewhat ill-defined position of counselor to the Polish chief of staff, General Tadeusz Rozwadowski. Relations between these two high-ranking officers did not work out very well. The two generals communicated at times only by means of written notes sent from one room to another,¹⁹ and while this need not

¹⁶Weygand, *op. cit.*, p. 98ff.

¹⁷*Ibid.*, p. 102ff.

¹⁸*Ibid.*, p. 119.

¹⁹Józef Piłsudski, *Pisma Zbiorowe* (10 vols., Warszawa, 1937-38), VIII, 110; W. Półbog-Malinowski, *Najnowsza Historia Polityczna Polski 1864-1945*, II (London, Paris, 1953-56), 339.

be taken as proof of a complete breach between them²⁰—the French officers generally insisted on putting everything on paper—it accentuated existing differences of opinion. Rozwadowski scribbled on one note sent to him by General Henrys: "Two Allied divisions on the spot would do far more good than these superfluous papers,"²¹ and he showed his impatience occasionally in other comments. All these difficulties of Weygand in Warsaw soon caused alarm in Paris, and the Polish liaison officer on the staff of Marshal Foch reported it to Rozwadowski.²² Further, Lord D'Abernon quickly realized that Weygand's title was no insignificant matter devised solely to manage Polish susceptibilities.²³ His diary indicates, in entries dated July 30, August 2, August 3, that Weygand not only was not in control of the general staff but was not even receiving a proper hearing from the Polish generals. Thus the British Ambassador was quick to express his indignation when, on August 4, General Rozwadowski affirmed that although Weygand's advice had been taken, it was up to the Polish staff to make final decisions.²⁴ Weygand clearly was being ignored and the situation was compounded by the fact that his relations with Piłsudski were practically nonexistent.

A Polish report of August 4 contains a detailed description of the situation. The Polish liaison officer with the French military mission reported that D'Abernon and Jusserand were "publicly expressing their astonishment" that the Poles had not appreciated "the significance of Marshal Foch's act in sending General Weygand to cooperate with the Polish high command." They felt that "the opinions of General Weygand were being ignored and at that at a highly critical juncture." Regarding the position of Piłsudski himself, the report stated that Weygand felt "that the two functions of chief of state and commander-in-chief should not be united in single hands." The liaison officer also forwarded the information that General Henrys, whom the French command considered too soft and "incurably" influenced by Piłsudski, was to be sent back to Paris, but that Jusserand retained him temporarily "on the assumption that General Weygand considering his own stay [in Poland] useless, would depart for France"²⁵ which would leave no French high ranking general on the scene.

This tense situation reached a dramatic *dénouement* on August 9, when Piłsudski suggested that Weygand become the effective chief of staff and share the command of the army. Piłsudski's decision resulted largely from the political campaign organized by opposition parties,²⁶ and possibly also

²⁰There is no evidence of such a breach in the Rozwadowski Papers.

²¹Henrys to Rozwadowski, Aug. 3, 1920, *AR*, I/15.

²²Captain W. Morstin to Rozwadowski, July 29, 1920, *AR*, I/56.

²³D'Abernon, *The Eighteenth . . . Battle*, p. 42.

²⁴*Ibid.*, p. 44ff.

²⁵Lt. M. Arciszewski's report of August 4, 1920. *AR*, I/20.

²⁶See for instance *Kurjer Poznański*, July 27, *Gazeta Warszawska*, July 28, and especially *Kurjer Warszawski* of August 7 which attacked the "ambitious dilettantism" of the Polish high command.

²⁷Piłsudski, *op. cit.*, VII, 153.

²⁸Weygand, *op. cit.*, p. 142. D'Abernon speaks also of an offer by Piłsudski: *The Eighteenth . . . Battle*, p. 67ff.

from the pressure exerted by the Allied Mission. Piłsudski himself explained his decision in the following terms:

Exhausted by the absence of moral strength among us . . . I wanted to be partly relieved of the responsibility and I offered General Weygand a share in command, but he refused. He maintained very reasonably that to command armies so hastily organized as ours, unknown to him from the point of view of their value and methods of command . . . would be too difficult and [in fact] impossible for him.²⁷

Weygand wrote in his recently published memoirs that this proposal did not come directly from Piłsudski but from the Foreign Minister, Prince Eustachy Sapieha,²⁸ yet even so the initiative was undoubtedly Piłsudski's. Weygand added that he refused after consulting Paris. While the actual method used by Piłsudski in offering Weygand a share in command might still be clarified, and the motivation of the French refusal remains somewhat obscure, one thing is clear, namely that Weygand's rôle did not change after August 9. General Rozwadowski confirmed this by stating that "General Weygand himself made it clear, despite a different point of view of the British representative, that he was purely a counselor."²⁹

This rôle admittedly was of some importance and Piłsudski was unjust when he wrote that in the battle of Warsaw Weygand "contented himself with expressing theoretical judgment."³⁰ He did a good deal more than that—working with the staff and with the French military mission. According to the testimony of Rozwadowski, Weygand constantly discussed important matters both with him and with the Minister of National Defense, General Kazimierz Sosnowski, and "Although there were often important differences of opinion . . . once decisions were taken General Weygand helped loyally in their execution."³¹

What was Weygand's share in the adoption of the final *ordre de bataille* which decided the outcome of the battle of Warsaw and indeed of the whole campaign? D'Abernon wrote that "statements made both by Weygand and Piłsudski point to the conclusion that the boldest measures included in the scheme were due to the personal initiative of Piłsudski."³² Weygand himself writes that one must distinguish between the general idea of a manoeuvre and the tactical execution of the plan. As for the former, he states that the idea of stopping the Soviet offensive and counter-attacking in the general northern direction from the right wing suggested itself to him, to Piłsudski, and to Rozwadowski alike. As for the operation itself differences existed, and when Piłsudski sent Weygand the order of operations of August 6, the French general recognized that this scheme "was superior to the one I had envisaged because it corresponded more closely to the possibilities of the Polish troops."³³

²⁷Protocol of the eighteenth session of the Council of National Defense (Rada Obrony Państwa), Aug. 16, 1920, *AR* I/50.

²⁸Piłsudski, *op. cit.*, VII, 153.

²⁹*AR*, I/50.

³⁰D'Abernon, *The Eighteenth . . . Battle*, p. 81.

³¹Weygand, *op. cit.*, p. 131 and p. 165f.

Judging by the large military literature on the battle of Warsaw, it appears that Weygand blurs the differences which existed between the various approaches and plans. Without going into a detailed analysis of all the highly complex strategic ideas that can be found in a number of books,³⁴ one can say that three main conceptions existed at the time. Weygand's was highly colored by his experiences on the Western front where conditions of trench warfare differed greatly from the 1920 war of movement over large spaces. Weygand, with the example of the battle of the Marne ever present in his mind, favored the creation of a fixed line of defense, based on the Vistula and San rivers, before launching a counter-attack. General Rozwadowski, while opposing Weygand's plan of retreat to the San—for political rather than military reasons, thought largely of an attack from both wings on the classical model of the battle of Cannae. Piłsudski's plan adopted for the actual operation was clearly inspired by Napoleonic strategy,³⁵ and consisted in catching the enemy off balance during his advance by a surprise attack from the south.³⁶

The plan of the battle of Warsaw was, according to all testimonies (Weygand, Sikorski, D'Abernon among others), definitely attributable to Piłsudski, and one must agree with the statement by the French military expert who wrote that "Marshal Piłsudski is indubitably the author of the manoeuvre which saved Poland."³⁷ Piłsudski assumed personal command of the group of armies which carried out the manoeuvre, and Weygand loyally admitted that the Marshal electrified his soldiers, and that under no other leader would the Polish troops have been capable of a similar effort.³⁸ Thus it appears evident that despite his contribution to the Polish victory, General Weygand cannot be considered to have played a decisive rôle in the campaign. The kind of relationship which existed between him, Piłsudski and Rozwadowski made it difficult for Weygand to press his points. Piłsudski stated emphatically that Weygand "refrained in my own case at least from exercising any kind of pressure with regard to decisions and orders."³⁹ General Henrys complained that the Polish high command issued man-

³⁴French: Weygand, *op. cit.*; Camon, *op. cit.*; Gen. Henri Mordacq, *Les légendes de la grande guerre* (Paris, 1935); Gen. Louis Faure, "La bataille de Varsovie," *Revue Militaire Française*, III (1928). Polish: Piłsudski, *op. cit.*; Gen. W. Sikorski, *La campagne polono-russe de 1920*, Preface by Marshal Foch (Paris, 1928); Gen. M. Kukiel, *The Polish Soviet Campaign of 1920* (Edinburgh, n.d.); Gen. M. Kukiel, "Dramat Generała Weyganda," *Bellona* (Apr.-June, 1949); Col. H. Piątkowski, "Krytyczny rozbiór bitwy warszawskiej," *Bellona* (Jan.-March, 1957). English: J. F. C. Fuller, *The Decisive Battles of the World*, III (London, 1957), 339-363.

³⁵General Camon describes the battle of Warsaw using the term "manoeuvre napoléonienne." *Op. cit.*, p. vi.

³⁶Many of these differences emerge in the Rozwadowski Papers. Thus the chief of staff wrote on the margin of Weygand's note of July 30: "Purely defensive, is it not?", *AR* 1/10. His comment on Henrys' advocacy of an attack in the region of Białystok (note of July 23) was: "What? Just the opposite." *AR*, 1/3. Rozwadowski's plan of a double attack against Budienny in the south and in the Siedlce region in the north emerged clearly from Henrys' critical comments of August 3. *AR*, 1/19.

³⁷Camon, *op. cit.*, p. 1.

³⁸Weygand, *op. cit.*, p. 145.

³⁹Piłsudski, *op. cit.*, VII, 153.

orders "without having previously consulted the French military mission,"⁴⁰ and so showed the disappointment of the French at their limited possibilities of controlling military operations.

One wonders, of course, how the factual situation at Warsaw in 1920 was forgotten so soon afterward. Analyzing the situation, it is evident that there were two main sources of what one might describe as the "Weygand legend." One source was Polish, and the other French.

Looking at the Polish political scene in the late summer of 1920 it is difficult to overemphasize the intensity of anti-Piłsudski feeling which existed among the Polish opposition of the Right, especially among the National Democrats. The parties of the Right had capitalized on Polish defeats before the battle of Warsaw to blame Piłsudski, and after the victory they were determined to deny Piłsudski any credit for the campaign. Shortly after the battle the National Democrats launched the slogan of "Weygand the savior." Stanisław Stroński, a leading National Democrat and a prominent francophil, wrote passionate articles to this effect in *Rzeczpospolita*, and referred to Weygand as the "Conqueror of Warsaw."⁴¹ Manifestations in honor of Weygand reached extreme proportions, and many Poles honestly believed that the victory was due entirely to him. Women kissed his hands, children were brought to gaze upon him, triumphant processions filled the streets of Warsaw and other Polish cities.⁴² Stroński was credited with the invention of the term "the Miracle of the Vistula," as a parallel to "the Miracle of the Marne." The story of how General Józef Haller, a prominent anti-Piłsudskite, influenced the outcome of the battle by his prayers found wide circulation. Thus everything was done to exalt Weygand and also a number of Polish generals known for their rightist sympathies.

Weygand, touched by the enthusiasm of the crowds—which was sincere—was at the same time embarrassed by the political aspect of the whole show. In his last letter from Warsaw, written to Foch, he said that "there were so many intrigues around my activities, which the opposition parties wanted to exploit against the head of the state and the Polish command, that I was obliged, in order to put things in their proper place and clear up the atmosphere, to give an interview, my first one, in which I declared that the victory was Polish, the plan was Polish, and the army was Polish."⁴³ The interview accorded to Paul Genty, a correspondent of *L'Information*, on August 21, contained the following remarks of Weygand in answer to the question on his rôle in Warsaw:

... I beg you to fix French opinion on that important point. This is a purely Polish victory. The preliminary operations were carried out in accordance with Polish plans by Polish generals.⁴⁴

⁴⁰Henrys to Rozwadowski, July 28 (?) 1920, *AR*, I/8.

⁴¹*Rzeczpospolita*, Aug. 25, 1920.

⁴²Pobóg-Malinowski, *op. cit.*, II, 335-337.

⁴³Weygand, *op. cit.*, p. 166.

⁴⁴Quoted in Mordacq, *op. cit.*, p. 242; Pobóg-Malinowski, *op. cit.*, II, 336; W. Baranowski, *Rozmowy z Piłsudskim* (Warszawa, 1938), p. 135.

Thus Weygand spoke out immediately to testify to the truth. He made the same statement several times later—in his introduction to a book by General Sikorski, in his talk with the Polish diplomat Tytus Komarnicki,⁴⁵ and in an interview accorded to the Polish quarterly *Kultura* in 1953.⁴⁶ He has repeated his previous statements in the second volume of his memoirs. His views have been borne out by the opinion of several French officers, cited here, as well as by General Marie-Eugène Debeney of the French general staff.⁴⁷

Such candid statements were disregarded by Polish political circles inimical to Piłsudski, just as they were dismissed by Frenchmen who for political reasons wanted to make the battle of Warsaw appear as a French victory. It was relatively easy to ascribe Weygand's protests to soldierly modesty and refuse to treat them seriously.

In France in 1920 the victory at Warsaw came as a godsend to the political Right, then in the midst of a presidential campaign for the candidacy of Alexandre Millerand. As the Paris correspondent of the *London Times* shrewdly pointed out, the victory crowning Millerand's pro-Polish policy was "a tremendous political asset for M. Millerand," and "General Weygand has probably been the best possible, if unconscious, presidential election agent to an unconscious candidate, M. Millerand."⁴⁸ Given Weygand's prestige as Foch's chief of staff it was easy to assume that he was the principal author of the victory. Charles Maurras entitled an article in September 1920 in *L'Action Française* simply "The victory of Weygand."⁴⁹ Other newspapers followed suit. In a book written shortly afterward, Jacques Bardoux propagandized Millerand as the man who "by saving Warsaw . . . saved peace and exalted France."⁵⁰ The French used the victory of Warsaw for political ends even at the Washington Conference of 1921-22, when Aristide Briand declared that "France had been the soldier of order on behalf of the entire world."⁵¹ Under these conditions it was necessary to maintain the story of Weygand's achievement, and many Frenchmen believed it without hesitation.

It seems that the Polish legation in Paris headed by Count Maurycy Zamoyski, a prominent National Democrat, did little if anything to dispell the story. Thus the Polish liaison officer in Paris reported to Rozwadowski: "Two names are being repeated here; that is, yours, General, and that of Weygand, and people say that these two men have saved Europe."⁵² There is no mention of Piłsudski's name in the entire report, which is surprising to say the least.

The "Weygand legend," whose proponents were the Polish National

⁴⁵T. Komarnicki, *The Rebirth of the Polish Republic* (London, 1957) deals with the whole question extensively on p. 698ff.

⁴⁶K. A. Jeleński "Wywiad z gen. Weygand," *Kultura* (June 1953).

⁴⁷L. Noël, *L'agression allemande contre la Pologne* (Paris, 1947), p. 17.

⁴⁸The *London Times*, Aug. 29, 1920.

⁴⁹Charles Maurras, *Le Mauvais traité: de la victoire à Locarno*, I (Paris, 1928), 170.

⁵⁰Jacques Bardoux, *De Paris à Spa* (Paris, 1921) p. 365f.

⁵¹Georges Suarez, *Briand*, V (6 vols., Paris, 1938-52), 275.

⁵²Morstin to Rozwadowski, Aug. 19, 1920. *AR*, I/56.

Democrats and the French supporters of Millerand (though Millerand himself was no party to it⁵³), placed Weygand in a highly uncomfortable and unpleasant position. Two days after the battle Piłsudski discussed orders for the progressing campaign with the general staff, in Polish, in front of Weygand, paying no attention to the latter.⁵⁴ The Polish marshal had so far supported the presence of the French general in Warsaw as a necessary evil. Now he openly showed his displeasure. Weygand was offended and he complained to Paris. The Polish liaison officer there reported the French reaction to Rozwadowski, but, without mentioning Piłsudski, added that Weygand's complaint was not directed against the Polish chief of staff (Rozwadowski).⁵⁵ The breach between the Polish marshal and the French general was now complete. Weygand withdrew from all further participation in Polish military affairs and he left Poland a week later, on August 25, amidst demonstrations of Polish sympathy. Piłsudski was away from Warsaw and did not come to bid him farewell. He instructed Rozwadowski by telegram to see Weygand off and present him with the highest Polish military decoration, the *Virtuti Militari*, which Weygand duly received at the railroad station. The Weygand episode in Poland was over. But there remained the bitter aftertaste, and the legends which began to grow.

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⁵³Millerand, "Au secours de la Pologne," *Revue de France*, (Aug. 15, 1932).

⁵⁴Weygand, *op. cit.*, p. 151; D'Abernon, *op. cit.*, p. 96f.

⁵⁵Morstin to Rozwadowski, Aug. 19, 1920, *AR*, I/56.

SECRET HITLER-BENEŠ NEGOTIATIONS IN 1936-37

by Gerhard L. Weinberg

THE entrance by German troops into the demilitarized zone in the Rhineland on March 6, 1936, and the failure of France and Great Britain to take action against this violation of the Versailles and Locarno treaties radically altered the balance of power in Central Europe.¹ The progressive strengthening of Germany's armed might and the incipient establishment of fortifications along Germany's western frontier would make the prospect of war with that power an increasingly unpleasant one for France. At the same time, the closing of the gaping hole in Germany's western defenses tended to remove the major factor restraining her from adventures in other directions.

In Germany, the star of Joachim von Ribbentrop was rising, partly because Hitler believed he was more dependable than the regular foreign service, partly because of his success with the Anglo-German Naval Agreement in the preceding year.² In the international uproar occasioned by the German move into the Rhineland, Ribbentrop was sent to London to speak for Germany before the Council of the League of Nations on March 19.³ In his activities, Ribbentrop was aided by a kind of private foreign ministry, the *Dienststelle Ribbentrop*. One of the men associated with this office, Albrecht Haushofer, son of the famous geopolitician, advised him on the steps Germany might take under the new circumstances.⁴ In a memorandum of April 1936 which he personally discussed with Ribbentrop, Albrecht Haushofer took up the "Political Possibilities in the Southeast."⁵ In it he suggested how Germany might take advantage of her new position.

He began by listing some basic premises: the impeding of French pressure in Central Europe through a strong defense system in the Rhineland and a defensive policy in the West; an effort to restrain British policy by restricting any new automatic guarantees to the West; replacement of the treaty system of the former Allies in Central Europe by a "real peace" between the peoples; and the strengthening of the German position in South and Southeast Europe by expanded trade. If England objected, Germany

¹The most recent study is Max Braubach, *Der Einmarsch deutscher Truppen in die entmilitarisierte Zone am Rhein im März 1936* (Cologne: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1956).

²See D. C. Watt, "The Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935: An Interim Judgment," *Journal of Modern History*, XXVIII (1956), pp. 155-76.

³The text of Ribbentrop's statements is in Fritz Berber, Ed., *Locarno, Eine Dokumentensammlung* (Berlin: Junker und Dünhaupt, 1936), pp. 318-28, 332. Ribbentrop wrote the foreword to this collection. Berber, now Professor at the University of Munich, was Ribbentrop's main publicist.

⁴Albrecht Haushofer was associated with the Hochschule für Politik. Like his father, he was a friend of Rudolf Hess. In 1945 he was killed for his involvement in the plot against Hitler. The papers cited here are in the Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress under Accession Number 11,249. On Albrecht Haushofer, in addition to his own works, see also the book by Hildebrandt cited in n. 25 below.

⁵Albrecht Haushofer "Politische Möglichkeiten im Südosten" (Denkschrift April 1936, Ribbentrop pers. übergeben u. ausführlich besprochen).

could apply pressure by supporting Italy—this at the time of sanctions—in return for concessions on the Austrian question, and by playing the Japanese card through an anti-Comintern pact.⁶

In analyzing the situation of Czechoslovakia and Austria, Haushofer pointed out that "both states are sensitive to the growing military pressure of Germany. The political leadership in both countries recognizes the inadequacy of their defenses once the potentially immediate intervention of France along the Rhine has been removed. The possibility of Russian aid, which was sometimes pushed very much to the fore in Czechoslovakia, is currently evaluated more sceptically." On the other hand, Haushofer noted certain differences between the two countries. Czechoslovakia was not weak, and its government was sufficiently strong to cope with any internal danger. "The German people as a whole is considered the main enemy [by the Czechs]. But it is precisely because the small Czech territorial nucleus of Czechoslovakia] is increasingly jeopardized in case of war, that the question whether a permanent understanding with Germany could be found is becoming constantly more urgent. The uncertainty in Prague is great. One cannot consider the attempt to split open the encirclement of Germany from Prague impossible." Haushofer recommended the following goals to Ribbentrop: (1) A ten-year non-aggression pact which would in practice be a confirmation and broadening of the existing arbitration agreement of 1925;⁷ (2) "A German-Czech Compromise (Ausgleich)" according to which "Germany would agree not to raise the boundary question for an appropriate period of time in return for complete cultural autonomy and economic equality for the Sudeten Germans;" (3) Economic negotiations to increase German-Czech trade; (4) Preparations for a "newspaper peace"; (5) An attempt to create a common front on the Habsburg question. Haushofer proposed that a reduction of French and Russian influence in Prague be considered the ultimate aim of such negotiations and pointed out that the conversations would have some effect in this direction even if they did not lead to a comprehensive agreement, presumably because they would compromise Prague in French and Soviet eyes.⁸

In the summer of 1936 a German-Austrian agreement brought those countries closer while the international negotiations concerning a possible replacement for the Locarno Treaty proved abortive. In the fall, Haushofer was apparently authorized to sound out the Czechoslovak minister to Berlin, Karel Janoušek, along the lines he had suggested. The evidence of later developments shows that certainly Ribbentrop and probably Hitler pro-

⁶Albrecht Haushofer, like his father, was interested and had friends in Japan. It should be noted that the Antikomintern Pact was negotiated in 1936 by Ribbentrop behind the back of the Foreign Ministry; the final papers went through the *Dienststelle Ribbentrop* (Wilhelmstrasse 64) although Ribbentrop was already ambassador to England and thus in the sphere of the Foreign Ministry (Wilhelmstrasse 74). Gerhard L. Weinberg, "Die geheimen Abkommen zum Antikominternpakt," *Vierteljahrshäfte für Geschichte*, II (1954), 201.

⁷Text in League of Nations Treaty Series 1926, No. 1296, p. 341ff.

⁸The balance of the memorandum and its annexes pertain to Austria, the Abyssinian conflict, the Habsburg question, and the activities of the Italian press attaché in Vienna.

vided the impetus for this step.⁹ Haushofer's report on his conversation with Mastný on October 18, 1936, delineates the nature of the German approach.¹⁰ Mastný pointed out that Haushofer knew him to be a personal friend of Beneš while Mastný knew that Haushofer could report to the top men in Germany. The Czechoslovak minister stressed his own interest in friendly Czech-German relations and the need for a quick settlement. He recognized "that the 7th of March had changed all the bases of Czech policy," and that while one could not denounce existing treaty commitments (meaning those to France and the Soviet Union), these should not be taken too precisely. Mastný perhaps thought of an analogy to Belgium's reorientation toward "neutrality" then in progress.¹¹ He thought that the barriers against an understanding—aside from the psychological ones exemplified by the press conflict—were the German concern about Czech ties with the Soviet Union and the Sudeten German question. Mastný tried to reassure Haushofer about the harmlessness of Czech-Soviet relations. As for the question of the Sudeten Germans, this was a difficult topic, but it could be discussed; it was clear to the Czech Government that an understanding between Prague and Berlin would be possible only if there were an accommodation between Czechs and Germans within Czechoslovakia. He accepted Haushofer's formulation that the border of the Czech state was secure against Germany only if the Czechs gave practical recognition to the German nationality border inside Czechoslovakia. He admitted Czech errors in this regard, and, while rejecting territorial autonomy, assured Haushofer that economic and cultural equality could certainly be considered. Mastný recommended an increase in trade and a press agreement. Both then spoke approvingly of Konrad Henlein, the leader of the Sudeten German Party. Finally, Mastný told Haushofer that he "would spend a week in Prague and speak only with Beneš about our conversation. He again asked for the strictest secrecy here [by the Germans] and asked me [Haushofer] to consider whether after his return I might be prepared to make a trip to Prague for an informal and private conversation with Beneš."

While Mastný took up the problem with Beneš Haushofer, with Ribbentrop's authorization, kept Himmler—but not the German Foreign Ministry—informed through Karl Wolff of Himmler's personal staff.¹² Haushofer stressed that although it was doubtful that a loosening of Czech ties with Moscow and Paris could be attained by direct negotiations, even a slight possibility had to be utilized, and that Ribbentrop had accordingly authorized him to accept the invitation to Prague if Mastný repeated it. Haushofer met Mastný a second time, probably at the beginning of

⁹On these negotiations, see also the excellent account of pre-Munich diplomacy by Boris Čelovsky, *Das Münchener Abkommen 1938* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt 1958), esp. p. 88f., 97.

¹⁰Albrecht Haushofer, "Aussprache mit dem tschechischen Gesandten Mastný am 18.X.1936." There is a manuscript draft and a carbon copy of the typed report; the quotations are translated from the latter.

¹¹See Jane K. Miller, *Belgian Foreign Policy Between Two Wars, 1919-1940* (New York, 1951), chap. 9.

November.¹³ The general tenor of the first conversation was confirmed. Mastný, furthermore, indicated that a suppression of the political activity of the émigrés from Germany in Czechoslovakia, including their press, could be a product of a comprehensive understanding.¹⁴ In answer to Prague's express wish, Haushofer agreed to make the trip to see Beneš; he left Berlin on November 13. Graf zu Trauttmannsdorff, a personal assistant of the Minister of Labor, cooperated with him.¹⁵

On the 13th and 14th of November, 1936, Haushofer met with Beneš, the President, and Foreign Minister Krofta (but apparently not with Prime Minister Hodža).¹⁶ In the conversation, the Czechoslovak President stressed his past friendship for Germany and listed a long series of events since the Peace Conference in which his policy had been essentially favorable to Germany. The present régime in Germany had not altered this; he had made it clear to France that Czechoslovakia would not join in any preventive war against Germany. He was ready "to negotiate today about a non-aggression treaty with Germany." Beneš had thought of fitting such a treaty into a new Locarno system; but when Haushofer pointed out that the negotiations for a Locarno replacement might drag on for a long time, Beneš took the position that he would open negotiations and sign a comprehensive treaty with Germany even without a West-Locarno. He also expressed the opinion that Rumania and Yugoslavia would join with pleasure because the Little Entente operated independently of France and even more of Russia. This brought the conversation to the subject of Czech-Soviet relations. Beneš was almost violent in his assertions of independence of Moscow and in the repudiation of all insinuations that the Soviet Union could influence Czech policy against a rapprochement with Germany. Similarly he insisted that there would be no internal opposition to him—he could sign with Germany at any time. As for the Czech alliances, they bound Czechoslovakia to intervene as much as the old Locarno Treaty bound England¹⁷—this after the British Government had made it clear to France that they would not honor their obligations under the reference to the demilitarized zone in Article I of the Locarno Treaty. He reiterated his well-known opposition to a Habsburg restoration in Austria and added that he had no objection to German-Austrian cooperation. He spoke enthusiastically about doubling German-Czech trade. Turning to the topic of the Sudeten Germans, Beneš indicated his willingness to discuss this difficult

¹²Copy of a letter, Haushofer to Brigadeführer Wolff, Reichsführung SS, Oct. 25, 1936.

¹³Allbrecht Haushofer to Karl Wolff, "persönlich und vertraulich," November 12, 1936.

¹⁴This question was of constant interest to the Germans. For later details, see *Akten zur deutsche auswärtigen Politik*, Series D, Vol. II, Nos. 12, 15-18, 29.

¹⁵Celovsky, pp. 88, 97. Trauttmannsdorff stayed in Czechoslovakia for some time late in 1936 in connection with these negotiations. See his letter to Haushofer of 11 January 1937 and his report of 9 January 1937.

¹⁶Allbrecht Haushofer, "Bericht über Unterredungen in Prag am 13. und 14.11.36 mit Präsident Benesch und Aussenminister Krofta." There is a manuscript draft on stationery of the Esplanade Hotel in Prague and a carbon copy of a typescript; the quotations are translated from the latter.

¹⁷"Ich betrachte mich aus meinen Verträgen nur in dem Mass zu einem Eingreifen verpflichtet wie England sich aus dem alten Locarno-Vertrag verpflichtet fühlt." *Ibid.*, p. 4.

subject. Although no admirer of Henlein, Beneš expressed the wish that the Germans in Czechoslovakia be satisfied. Once good state to state relations had been established, all subjects could be discussed. After four hours of conversation, Beneš asked Haushofer to speak to Krofta and indicated that he himself would take up the Sudeten German question with Haushofer at his next visit.¹⁸

Haushofer spoke about the issue of the Sudeten Germans with Krofta. The latter opposed regional autonomy but favored some cultural autonomy for them. He held out an end to any discrimination and denationalization measures and expressed the hope that confidence between Czechoslovakia and Germany would make such adjustments easier. Beyond desiring a press agreement, he promised that if a general understanding were reached the Czech Government would tolerate no activities directed against the German state by the émigrés, meaning primarily the German Social Democratic Party whose headquarters were still in Prague at this time.

On his return to Germany, Haushofer dutifully informed Himmler through Wolff.¹⁹ He then prepared notes for his report to Hitler.²⁰ In the manuscript draft of these notes the date "Berlin 6.12.36" is crossed out and replaced by "25.11.36"; because the latter date is on the typed copy of the notes which was annotated by Hitler, it would appear that a conference was scheduled for December 6 and then moved up to November 25.²¹ Haushofer listed the possibilities in two columns: the attainable and the unattainable. The first attainable item was a bilateral non-aggression pact, independent of any West-Locarno and with a Czech reservation concerning the League of Nations Covenant (presumably meaning Article 16); omission of the reservation was considered unattainable. The purpose of such a pact would be the second attainable objective: the neutralization of Czechoslovakia and the Little Entente in case of a Soviet attack—presumably against Germany—and a German-Soviet war concerning the then current struggle in Spain.²² Haushofer considered the neutralization of Czechoslovakia in case of a German attack on the Soviet Union unattainable; in the draft of his notes he had included an attack on France in this category. A third attainable goal was a tacit agreement on common policy on the Habsburg question, while a fourth was the restriction of the political activities of the émigrés in Czechoslovakia together with a press agreement. Fifth would be an eco-

¹⁸Beneš could not refrain from needling the German by asking why Germany did not take up the question of the German minorities in Poland and Hungary, both then on close terms with the Reich.

¹⁹Haushofer to Wolff, November 19, 1936.

²⁰Albrecht Haushofer, "Berlin-Prag nach dem Stand von Mitte November 36." There is a manuscript draft and a typed copy. On the typed copy are various marks in red and a note by Haushofer: "Rot: F. [führer] eigenhändig!" showing that Hitler went over it carefully. He underlined the notation "very secret" at the top of the first page. See also n. 25 below.

²¹This was the date of the signing of the Anticomintern Pact. Ribbentrop, by this time ambassador to England, returned to Germany for the occasion, leaving for England again at the beginning of December. The change of date may be connected with this.

²²"Neutralisierung der Tsch. (u. Kl. Ent.) bei russischem Angriff oder bei Konflikt mit Russland über Spanien."

omic agreement aiming at a doubling of the volume of trade with efforts to give preferential treatment to Sudeten German areas especially hard hit by the depression. Finally, while regional autonomy for the Sudeten Germans was listed as unattainable, it would be possible to secure for Germany influence regarding an improvement in the status of the Sudeten Germans including economic equality, cultural autonomy, and legality of cultural and political relations between them and the Reich.²³

In weighing the alternatives of acceptance or rejection of an agreement along the foregoing lines, Haushofer argued that the conclusion of such a treaty would strengthen German and weaken French influence in the Danubian area; reduce the possibility of a Soviet attack and make a positive impression in England. It would be possible to extend the system to include Yugoslavia and Rumania. Hungary would be offended (*gekränkt*), and Italy would be made unhappy because it did not want German influence in the lower Danube area increased. On the other hand, failure to conclude an agreement without further negotiations would convince the Prague government of Germany's evil intentions and would, therefore, produce a strengthening of Czech-Soviet and Czech-French relations. If for any reasons Germany were to prefer not to make an agreement, it would be best to continue the talks in a dilatory fashion, perhaps causing them to fail by sharply raising the Sudeten German demands.²⁴

Hitler's reaction can be determined at least partly from the annotations he made on Haushofer's report.²⁵ The first suggestion, the one for a non-aggression pact, did not interest the Führer—he crossed it out. The fifth point, that of a trade agreement, appealed to him—he marked it with a "1." The fourth point, the restrictions on émigré activities, carries Hitler's notation that it was to be point "3"; one may therefore assume that Haushofer's second objective, the neutralization of Czechoslovakia in case of a Soviet attack appealed to Hitler as a second point in his schedule. As for the Fabsburg issue, it evoked only a question mark. The sixth objective, Germany's securing some influence in improving the lot of the Sudeten Germans, did not interest Hitler sufficiently to provoke any comment at all. Perhaps he feared that success along those lines would deprive him of an argument he might need in later attacks on Czechoslovakia. In short, Hitler was interested primarily in settling the side issues in German-Czech relations; he would have liked to neutralize Czechoslovakia, but not at the

²³This refers to disputes in the preceding years of legal proceedings in Czechoslovakia against Sudeten Germans who belonged to various German political and cultural organizations.

²⁴"... gegebenenfalls durch ein schärferes Anziehen der Schraube sudetendeutscher Forderungen ergebnislos zu machen." This was precisely the way Hitler instructed Henlein in March 1938. See *Akten zur deutschen auswärtigen Politik*, Series D, Vol. II., Nos. 7, 109.

²⁵The report with Hitler's annotations was shown by Haushofer to Rainer Hildebrandt about 1940. See the latter's description in his *Wir sind die Letzten; aus dem Leben des Widerstandskämpfers Albrecht Haushofer und seiner Freunde* (Neuwied/Berlin: Michael-Verlag, 1949), p. 22f., and also p. 51f. Although the description refers to the document cited here, after about ten years Hildebrandt naturally makes some slips.

price of signing a non-aggression pact.²⁶ Nevertheless, he authorized Haushofer to make another trip to Prague.

Haushofer and Trauttmannsdorff were again received by Beneš on December 18.²⁷ No report on this conversation is included among the Haushofer papers quoted here, but there is an undated handwritten note by him entitled "Outcome of Prague" (*Ergebnis von Prag*) which appears to be a summary of Haushofer's impression of this visit. Haushofer and Trauttmannsdorff discussed the Sudeten German question with Beneš: Beneš had promised Haushofer in their first talk. Haushofer wrote: "What one can notice at most a certain anxiety but no serious desire for an understanding among the Czechs, the decisive individual—a personality of stature (*eine Persönl. von Format!*)—looks further and makes efforts to secure better relations. Naturally as cheaply as possible. It is clear to him that without better treatment of the Sudeten Germans, an improvement in the relations between Berlin and Prague cannot be attained. It will be easy to secure assurances in principle, [but] actual measures and guarantees, to say nothing of their realization, will be very difficult to secure." Summarizing the bases for an understanding, Haushofer assumed that Beneš wanted a guarantee of the existence of his state; a German promise of non-aggression which might be unimportant for him now would be essential for Czechoslovakia in five or ten years. In return for such a guarantee, Beneš offered to refrain from adopting a pro-Russian foreign policy and from interfering with German relations with Rumania and Yugoslavia. There would be economic cooperation; the political activities of the émigrés in Czechoslovakia would be stopped, and a still to be negotiated number of concessions would be made to the Sudeten Germans. Reviewing the attainable and unattainable objectives a second time, Haushofer concluded that Germany could secure Czech opposition to Soviet influence in the Danubian area—though not in case of a direct German attack on Czechoslovakia. Cultural autonomy (with minor exceptions) and economic preferences for the Sudeten Germans were attainable; regional autonomy was not. Haushofer and Trauttmannsdorff returned to Berlin, but Trauttmannsdorff made another trip to Prague on January 3-4, 1937.²⁸ On this visit, Trauttmannsdorff apparently made further investigations into the Sudeten German problem, concluding with a list of minimum demands for them that should be raised and, in his opinion, could be accepted by the Czech Government. On his return he sent Haushofer a report and the draft text of a proposed German-Czech treaty on January 11, 1937.²⁹

Haushofer took the draft treaty to Hitler and presented it to him later.

²⁶This appears to contradict other evidence that Hitler wanted a non-aggression pact with Czechoslovakia; perhaps he liked the idea only in the abstract.

²⁷Čelovsky, pp. 88, 97.

²⁸Graf Trauttmannsdorff, "Bericht über die Verhältnisse in der Tschechoslowakei" (January 9, 1937).

²⁹Trauttmannsdorff to Haushofer, January 11, 1937. According to this letter, his stay in Czechoslovakia was paid for through Haushofer, i.e. the *Dienststelle Ribbentrop*, not the Ministry of Labor where Trauttmannsdorff was officially employed.

a January.³⁰ Haushofer told Hitler that now Beneš also did not want a non-aggression pact but rather a confirmation of the 1925 arbitration treaty.³¹ The draft treaty accordingly provided for the "extension and strengthening" (*Erweiterung und Vertiefung*) of the arbitration treaty with relevant details to be worked out in friendly conversations. Each power was to respect the internal régime of the other. Trade negotiations were to be initiated. A protocol was to confirm the understanding between the two countries by providing for an end to press attacks (with some criticism to be allowed); the two powers would cooperate in combatting the Comintern; they would cooperate in police, border, and customs affairs; and the Czech Government would suppress political activities of émigrés directed against the German Government, which promised to reciprocate. According to Haushofer, a cultural agreement was also planned. Although the details of Hitler's reaction are unknown, the general tenor is clear: Haushofer was instructed to drag out the negotiations, which meant that they were to be dropped.³²

The Czech Government apparently expected a quick outcome from the negotiations.³³ Trauttmannsdorff wrote Haushofer on February 20, 1937, that Mastný wanted to see him again, and he was in a quandary.³⁴ Discussing the cooperative attitude of the Czechs in recent trade negotiations, Trauttmannsdorff recalled a conversation with Mastný which must have taken place at the end of January or early in February. Mastný had indicated that the Czech Government was making concessions in anticipation of an understanding on the basic issues. If such understanding did not take place, Beneš would have to change his policy entirely. Trauttmannsdorff thought that Germany had to declare herself; and, since he wanted a positive outcome, he asked Haushofer to have the question settled definitively by Hitler (*an höchster Stelle*). Furthermore, the German Foreign Ministry was becoming suspicious of Trauttmannsdorff's frequent trips to Czechoslovakia; the Foreign Minister had recently asked his own minister (Seldte) about them. This fact, too, made speed necessary. It is doubtful that Haushofer went back to Hitler about this—no trace of such a meeting has been found—but if he did, the answer cannot have been much different from the negative one of the January meeting.

In 1937 Hitler was already thinking along lines different from those of an earlier period—Germany's growing strength made it less and less necessary to conceal his aims. In August 1936 he had made it clear that he

³⁰"Vertragsentwurf," marked "Führer vorgetragen Jan. 37." The draft is typed with corrections in Trauttmannsdorff's handwriting.

³¹Haushofer's pencilled notes clipped to the "Vertragsentwurf."

³²Haushofer noted, "Befehl erhalten hinauszuzögern" (*ibid.*). There is no indication that he ever returned to the subject.

³³On the Czech side, Beneš worked out a draft closely parallel to that of Trauttmannsdorff. In a covering memorandum and a draft communiqué he discussed the treaty, referring to preliminary conversations on 21 November and 18 December 1936 and 12 January 1937. The discrepancy in the dates cannot yet be clarified unless other conversations by Trauttmannsdorff with Czech officials are referred to. National Archives, Record Group 242, Container 1040, Serial 1809, frames 412843-47. See also Čelovsky, p. 89f.

³⁴Trauttmannsdorff to Haushofer, February 20, 1937.

wanted Germany ready for war by 1940.³⁵ At the now famous conference of November 5, 1937, Hitler informed his leading advisors that he intended to take all of Czechoslovakia.³⁶ The German-Czech arbitration treaty—and certainly any amplification of it—would hinder, not help his plans. This was clearly grasped by Foreign Minister Neurath, one of those present at the conference, when he wrote to the German minister in Prague that “the fact must not be lost sight of that, if complications should arise between Germany and Czechoslovakia, the arbitration treaty may prove an inconvenient restriction on our freedom of action.”³⁷ In the light of the evidence, there is now no reason for believing that in January 1937 Hitler thought very differently on this subject.

In spite of the fact that the negotiations proved abortive, they do illuminate both the methods and aims of German foreign policy in the National Socialist period. In regard to the procedure used, these feelers provide a good example of the way Hitler sometimes handled negotiations behind the back of the Foreign Ministry. The incident, therefore, also points up the difficulties facing the historian of those years: much depends on stray documents outside the traditional diplomatic archives. For an understanding of Hitler's policy, it is worthy of note that this incident confirms the impression that he was never seriously interested in an agreement with the Czech Government. By an irony of fate, the papers of Albrecht Haushofer, who was shot by the SS a few days before Hitler's suicide, show how totally uninterested Hitler was in the fate of the Sudeten Germans. For a time economic advantages for Germany might be of some use; later the Czech state would disappear. As for the Sudeten Germans, the man to whom most of them looked for help was interested only in the help they might give him.

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³⁵Wilhelm Treue, “Hitlers Denkschrift zum Vierjahresplan,” *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, II (1955), 184-210.

³⁶*Akten zur deutschen auswärtigen Politik, 1918-1945*, Series D, Vol. I, No. 19.

³⁷Neurath to Eisenlohr, February 5, 1938, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. *Documents and Materials Relating to the Eve of the Second World War*, Vol. I, No. 2. This letter must have been one of Neurath's last acts as Foreign Minister because it went out the day after his replacement by Ribbentrop. For further consideration of this issue see *Akten zur deutschen auswärtigen Politik*, Series D, Vol. II, No. 269.

COMMUNISM IN FINLAND

by F. Ray Marshall

FINNISH Communists, operating through an organization called the Finnish People's Democratic League, SKDL, have demonstrated considerable political strength since they were legalized by the terms of the Finnish-Soviet Armistice of 1944. The SKDL has been able to win between a fifth and a fourth of the Finnish electorate; this is considerably more support than Communists have been able to muster in any of the neighboring Scandinavian countries. In fact, outside of the Soviet bloc, only the French and Italian Communists, operating under much different circumstances, have been able to win larger percentages of their electorates.

The purpose of this paper is to discuss the main political, economic and social forces responsible for the strength of Communism in Finland. We shall first attempt to uncover the main factors which caused early radical agitation to meet with such sympathetic response in Finland. This will be followed by a reconstruction of the events leading to the Finnish Red Revolution of 1918, which, together with its aftermath, is still an important source of strength for Communism. Radical activities will then be traced to the present, with emphasis on the post-1944 period. We shall conclude with a summary of the main current sources of strength and weakness for Communism in Finland.

Radicalism often finds fertile soil in the problems involved in the adjustment of an agricultural population to the rapid growth of industry. Finland was no exception, though her economic change was perhaps less rapid than in some other countries. Industrialization started gaining momentum around the middle of the nineteenth century and increased steadily thereafter. Agricultural employment, which accounted for about three-fourths of the labor force in 1880, had declined to less than two-thirds by 1910.¹

The following important impediments kept Finnish industrialization from being more rapid: the lack of political independence; a shortage of capital; the absence of such important raw materials as coal, petroleum and iron ore; the necessity of transporting electricity some 200-300 miles from northern generating sources to industrial sites in the south; and the gentle declivity of Finnish river beds, which make the harnessing of electricity relatively more expensive than in, for example, Norway.²

For these reasons, the rate of economic change was probably a less important cause of Finnish radicalism than some other factors, especially the lag of Finnish industrialization behind that of neighboring countries, its concentration in lumber industries, and poor agricultural conditions.

¹Geographical Society of Finland, *Suomi* (Helsinki, 1952), p. 320.

²For a discussion of the effects of rapid industrialization on the Norwegian labor movement, see Walter Galenson, *Labor in Norway* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1949), chap. 3.

Lumber camps attracted carefree bachelor wanderers who were particularly susceptible to the radical ideologies produced in neighboring countries especially Sweden and Germany. The dependence upon the export of wood products in order to pay for the imports of necessary foodstuffs produced economic instability which augmented and gave birth to discontent. In Finland, as elsewhere, there is a close relationship between economic instability and the development of radical ideology.

Socialist doctrines, which accompanied industrialization in other countries, spread to Finland in the last half of the nineteenth century and were propagated by several skillful agitators. Socialist movements were formed in Germany in 1863, Denmark, 1871 and Sweden, 1889. In fact, of the 30 European Socialist parties associated with the Labor and Socialist International in 1931, 31 were organized between 1873 and 1892.³ Several Finns including N. R. af Ursin, Eetu Salin and K. H. Wiik, were thoroughly familiar with the Socialist movements, especially the German.⁴

Finnish Socialist agitators obtained organized assistance for their propaganda activities from several quarters. Unwitting aid was rendered by the moderate middle-class-led labor societies formed in the 1880s to forestall the development of radicalism; these societies trained future labor leaders in forensic, organizational and propaganda matters. Organizations under more radical leadership split from this moderate movement and, in 1899, formed the Workers' Party of Finland, WPF. The WPF changed its name to the Social Democratic Party of Finland in 1903 and adopted the Erfurt Program of the German Social Democrats. By this time, there were already labor parties in the larger cities. The Tampere Labor Party, in one of Finland's main industrial towns, had its own paper by 1899 as well as its own building and a workers' institute; it later organized a workers' theater. The first national labor paper, *Työmies*, (Workingman) was started in 1905. In 1909, Karl Marx's *Kapital* was translated into Finnish and, by that time, there were 17 Social Democratic newspapers throughout Finland. In 1908 a workers' calendar was printed and widely circulated. By then workers' literary societies had been formed in the larger cities; these organizations translated and discussed Socialist literature.

This propaganda activity was supplemented by numerous fleeing Russian revolutionaries, especially after 1905. For example, Stalin and Lenin met for the first time in December 1905 in the Tampere Workers' House, and Stalin returned to Finland after the Bolshevik Revolution to urge the Finns to emulate their Russian comrades. Finnish workers also came in contact with the many revolutionary Russian soldiers and fortifications workers who were in Finland during World War I.

³Adolph Sturmthal, *Unity and Diversity in European Labor* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1953), p. 33.

⁴See N. R. af Ursin and Karl H. Wiik, "Die Arbeiterbewegung in Finnland," *Archiv für die Geschichte des Sozialismus*, v. XII.

⁵Lenin, *Selected Works*, I (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1946), 32.

⁶For a contrary view, see Kenneth Boulding, *The Organizational Revolution* (New York, 1953), p. 17.

Thus, Finnish workers had adequate exposure to radical propaganda; it is also important to explain why they were susceptible to it. The history of Socialism proves that radical ideas must have more than skilled agitators and propaganda techniques in order to be accepted as ideology by any significant number of people: organizational techniques and skills, while important, are probably less vital in the beginning of a mass movement than fertile political, economic and social conditions.⁶

The conditions of agricultural workers have furnished some of the most fertile soil for the growth of radical ideologies, and Finland is no exception to this.⁷ One cause of agrarian discontent was the fact that many large landowners were Swedish-speaking Finns, and most tenants had Finnish as a mother tongue.⁸ Swedish soldier-nobles were given grants of land in Finland and, by the middle of the seventeenth century, they owned much of the land in the country.⁹ A second, and perhaps more important, agricultural problem was the large number of landless families and tenants whose ranks were swelled by rapid population growth after 1860. Most of the tenants paid their rent by day labor, causing much social grievance and insecurity of occupancy. Only 45 per cent of Finnish farmer families owned their farms in 1901; 33 per cent were farm workers and 22 per cent were tenants.¹⁰

Rural discontent grew towards the end of the century as farmers became more dependent upon uncertain market conditions. A general shortage of capital in Finland during these years caused farmers to become dependent on town merchants who often charged very high interest rates. Farmers also were tied to uncertain international markets because forestry furnished them an important source of supplementary income; there was a great slump in exports and imports in 1886, for example.¹¹ Farmers turned to the cooperative movement, which grew rapidly after its founding in 1889, to overcome some of their problems; other difficulties, such as the duty-free importation of Russian grains and the tenancy problem, would have to be settled by different means.

The extent of agrarian unrest is indicated by the fact that the Finnish labor movement had about as many agricultural as industrial workers' societies affiliated with it in the beginning; but in 1904, there were 41 rural and 58 city societies.¹² In preparation for the first democratic elections to parliament in 1907, the Social Democratic platform included a demand that the tenancy problem be solved. After this platform was adopted, the

⁷See David Mitrany, *Marx Against the Peasants* (Chapel Hill, 1951).

⁸The language conflict became very acute during the 1860s and 1870s and Finns succeeded in getting Finnish established on an equal basis with Swedish as an official language in 1863.

⁹J. Hampden Jackson, *Finland* (New York, 1940), p. 39.

¹⁰Nils Westernmarch, *Finnish Agriculture* (Helsinki: Pellervo Society, 1954), p. 25. See also W. R. Mead, *Farming in Finland* (University of London: Athlone Press, 1953), 178.

¹¹Martti Kovero, "Commerce," *Suomi* (Finnish Geographic Society, Helsinki, 1952), 568.

¹²Ursin and Wiik, *op. cit.*

Socialists called a meeting of 400 delegates representing some 50,000 tenants to explain that part of their program of particular interest to agricultural workers.

The Social Democrats consistently won many more parliamentary seats than any other party between 1907 and the 1918 uprising, but their attempts to secure needed reforms were just as consistently thwarted by Finland's lack of complete political independence from Russia. For example, an agrarian reform bill was passed by Parliament and the Senate, the administrative branch of government, but the Czar accepted it merely as a favor to the Finns and not as a constitutional right. The Finns refused to accept the bill on this basis.

Toward the First World War, inflation was added to the other problems plaguing Finland. Inflation accompanied the war in Europe, and was aggravated by food shortages, speculation, and a drain on supplies caused by the presence of unusually large numbers of Russian soldiers and fortifications workers. Inflation was particularly dangerous for farmers, because the prices of supplies rose rapidly and there was a considerable lag between expenditure and income because of the time required to plant and harvest.

Turbulent times upset all sections of the Finnish population, however, and there were many protest strikes as conditions worsened; there were 482 strikes during 1917, for example, while the 1909-14 average had been only 54 per year. Inflation as well as such depressions as occurred after 1907 added to the dissatisfaction with the status quo.

Another factor which made workers susceptible to radical ideology was the class structure and the lack of political democracy. The Diet, which exercised some autonomy in the last half of the nineteenth century, excluded most workers; and, while Finland did not experience feudalism, many of the class attitudes and customs were imported from other countries, especially Germany and Russia. The fact that a large proportion of Swedish-speaking Finns were among the upper classes, and the growing language conflict, contributed to class consciousness.

When Russia was defeated by Japan in 1905, there was widespread reaction and a general strike in the Grand Duchy of Finland. The general strike was a partial and temporary success. On the sixth day after it started, the Czar's ministers announced that they would withdraw some of the obnoxious regulations and replace the undemocratic Diet by a unicameral Parliament elected on the basis of universal suffrage.

After the strike, several developments strengthened the position of those within the Finnish labor movement who favored revolution. Even though the Social Democratic Party won an absolute majority of the Parliament in 1916, it was unable to secure reforms because Parliament did not have final authority. The Russians began to tighten their grip again after they regained control at home; bills could be vetoed by the Senate, which was appointed by the Governor-General, and even if they were passed by the Senate, they had to be accepted by the Czar in order to become law. Other factors turning the tide away from those who favored peaceful solu-

tions to problems were: the apparent success of force in the 1905 general strike; the presence of armed forces on class lines; the apparent success of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia; the fact that the new workers who flooded the cities for war work were more favorably disposed toward the Red Guard, the armed wing of the labor movement, than the old Socialist leaders; and the 200,000 Russian troops in Finland who were expected to help the Reds if fighting started.

Events rapidly came to a head after the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia. Two days later, the Social Democratic Party, trade unions and the Helsinki Workers' Organization established a Revolutionary Central Council of Workmen, RCC, which established organizations throughout the country connected by an intelligence system. The RCC sent delegates to Lenin, who sent an advisor to help the Finns. On November 13, the RCC declared a general strike, which many expected to signal the beginning of a revolution.

A decisive event for the revolution occurred when a new government was formed made up entirely of right-wing members after the Social Democratic Party lost its majority in Parliament in the October 1917 elections. Revolutionaries argued, at the two-day Social Democratic meeting called to discuss strategy, that middle-class forces were armed and determined to crush the labor movement. The Bolsheviks had sent Stalin to this meeting; he told the Finns: "We have heard that in Finland you have experienced a similar government crisis as we did in Russia on the eve of the October Revolution, and that you, too, have been threatened with starvation, sabotage and other things; but let me tell you, on the basis of my experience in the Russian Revolution, that such dangers are not insurmountable, if you act in a determined and unhesitating manner. . . . If you need our help, we will give it to you and will offer you the hand of brotherhood. Of that you may be sure."¹³

In December, the Finnish Parliament passed a bill to establish a strong armed force. According to an anti-Social Democratic observer: "The Government was now entirely free to declare the Civic [White] Guards to be the official protectors of order in the country. The Socialists, however, described the decision as a 'public declaration of war on the laboring population of Finland,' from which 'great suffering and struggle would soon grow.'"¹⁴ The Finnish Socialists Ursin and Wiik contend that after the election of the bourgeois government, the moderate Social Democrats gradually lost control of the labor movement to radical extremists who were working with the Bolsheviks.¹⁵

Shortly after the Act authorizing the establishment of an armed force,

¹³E. Räikkönen, *Svinhufvud: Builder of Finland* (London, 1938), p. 21.

¹⁴Henning Söderhjelm, *The Red Insurrection in Finland in 1918, a Study Based on Documentary Evidence* (London, 1919), p. 75.

¹⁵"Die Arbeiterklasse die sich von legalem Einfluss auf die Dinge abgeschnitten empfand, wurde immer mehr auf revolutionäre Wege getrieben. Die sozialdemokratische Parteileitung war immer weniger imstande, die wirkliche Führung zu behalten und diese Gericht in die Hände extremer, welche hinter dem Rücken der Leitung direkt mit den Bolsheviken zusammenarbeiten." *Op cit.*, p. 94.

General Mannerheim, a Swedish-speaking Finn who had served some 30 years in the Russian Army, was made Commander-in-Chief and went to the north to train White forces. Mannerheim received considerable assistance from a force of young Finns who had been secretly training in Germany since 1915. The Whites' main support came from middle-class townspeople and northern farmers.

On January 28, 1918, the Reds seized control of government offices in Helsinki. Mannerheim gathered his White troops in the north, and the Red seized control of the southern part of the country. The Russians gave some military leadership and supplies to the Reds and the Germans landed troops to help the White forces in the south. The Whites also received support from Swedish arms and volunteers.

The war ended on May 26, 1918, with a White victory. Many Reds fled to Russia where they formed the Finnish Communist Party in August, 1918; but tens of thousands of workers and tenants were put in concentration camps where thousands of them died from starvation. Most of the prisoners who survived the concentration camps were tried and received prison sentences; 125 were condemned to death. Reaction to this "White Terror" has probably been the single most important source of strength for Communism in the post-civil war period. The Civil War and the "White Terror" had an ambivalent influence on Finnish radicalism: it embittered many, causing them and their descendants to give blind allegiance to the Communists, while it had a sobering influence on others who had seen the inefficacy of revolution under Finnish conditions.

Communism in the Post-Civil War Period

Communists were represented by about a third of the delegates at the Social Democratic Party Congress which convened in December 1918, to prepare for the 1919 parliamentary elections. They argued that the psychological atmosphere of the "White Terror" and the Civil War, plus the imminent world-wide Communist Revolution, made revolution the only logical course for the Finnish labor movement to follow. The Communists also contended that the Civil War was lost mainly because of the indecisiveness of the moderate Social Democrats.¹⁶

As a result of the moderate majority in the Social Democratic Party, the extreme left wing formed the new and more radical Socialist Labor Party in 1920; the term "Communist" was illegal. The SLP maintained underground contacts with the so-called "Emigrant Communists" who had fled to Russia after the Civil War to avoid prosecution. In 1920, the Communists obtained control of the Finnish trade union federation which they wanted in order to gain mass support. They also began to train revolutionary cadres, and to seek political office on a radical platform. The SLP won 27 seats in the 1922 parliamentary elections; the Social Democratic Party lost exactly that number.¹⁷

¹⁶Juhani Paasivirta, *Suomen Poliittisen Työväenliikkeen Kehitys*, (Helsinki and Porvoo: Söderström, 1949).

¹⁷See Table I.

Table I
Party Representation in the Finnish Parliament, 1919-1954

Year	Soc. Dem.	Communist ¹	Agrarian	Conservative	Liberal ²	Swedish People	Other
1919	80	...	42	28	26	22	2
1922	53	27	45	35	15	25	
1924	60	18	44	38	17	23	
1929	59	23	60	28	7	23	
1930	66	...	59	42	11	20	1
1933	78	...	53	18	11	21	19
1936	83	...	53	20	7	21	16
1939	85	...	56	25	6	18	10
1945	50	49	49	28	9	14	
1948	54	38	56	33	5	14	
1951	53	43	51	28	10	15	
1954	54	43	53	24	13	13	
1958 ³	38	50	47	29	8	14	14 ⁴

SOURCE: *Statistical Yearbook of Finland*, Central Statistical Office, Helsinki, 1955.

¹Communists used various names after the Civil War, and after 1945 they used the name Democratic League of the People of Finland, SKDL. The SKDL contained a few extreme left-wing non-Communists, but its policies and membership were completely dominated by the Finnish Communist Party.

²After 1951, the Liberal or "Progressive" Party became the Finnish People's Party.

³*Facts about Finland* (Helsinki: Pohjoismaiden Yhdyspankki, 1959), p. 1.

⁴Thirteen of the fourteen 1958 seats went to the Independent Social Democrats who split from the Social Democratic Party of Finland.

Communist political activities were dealt a temporary setback in 1923 when Prime Minister Kallio, Agrarian Party, dissolved the SLP, arrested its leaders, including the 27 members of Parliament, and closed its headquarters and newspaper offices. Kallio took these measures after he discovered the close underground connections between Moscow and the SLP. Communist political activity did not cease, however; a new front organization, the Workers' and Small Farmers' Party, obtained 18 parliamentary seats in the 1924 elections.

Another blow to Communist strength came with the successes of the more moderate Social Democratic Party, which, as can be seen from Table I, has consistently been the strongest party in Parliament. Socialist strength has fluctuated inversely with that of the Communists, indicating that Communist followers often switch to the Social Democrats when the FCP loses the ability to operate, as, for example, when Communist political activities were outlawed during 1930-1944.

The Social Democrats surprised right-wing parties by winning 80 seats in the first post-Civil War Parliament, though many Socialists were still in prison; the very effective Socialist slogan in the 1919 elections was "Awake from suppression." Social Democratic policies gradually became more moderate as the radicals lost influence and the Civil War receded into history. Socialists were able to achieve important reforms in the 1920s by working with liberals in other parties.

By 1926, it became possible for the Social Democrats to form coalition cabinets with other parties—a policy which left radicals had previously prevented by imposing stiff restrictions on the Social Democratic Parliamentary Group. Social Democratic prestige was enhanced considerably by

the skill of the 1926 cabinet which Socialists formed under the leadership of the able moderate Socialist Väinö Tanner. The Tanner cabinet was a minority government, but its actions did much to overcome right-wing opposition to the Socialists and thereby paved the way for future cooperation. These developments added credence to the arguments of those leaders who wanted the SDP to reject the revolutionary line.

The Finnish Communists were further weakened by the obvious failure of the World Revolution and internal disagreement over the desirability of rigid control from Moscow. A decisive event occurred when the Emigrant Communists tried to use the unions in Finland in an unsuccessful general strike to secure the release of Communists awaiting trial for treasonable activities. The more conservative union leaders broke away from the Communist-controlled National Trade Union Organization and, in 1930, formed the Finnish Trade Union Confederation, SAK. A group of dissidents also started publishing their own paper, the *Finnish Worker*, in opposition to the Emigrant Communists.

Agrarian unrest, which figured largely in the 1918 Revolution, was considerably alleviated by land reforms after the Civil War. State loans were made available to farmers who wanted to buy their own land and, by 1934, some 65,000 people had acquired land, including 53,000 home plots and 31,000 farms on new plots. In 1910, only about 56 per cent of Finland's farms were cultivated by owners; by 1941, this proportion had increased to over 95.¹⁸ Politically, these reforms probably strengthened the Agrarian Party at the expense of the Communists.

The final blow to the overt activities of the Finnish Communists was the development in the 1930s of the radical right-wing Lapua Movement. This movement drew considerable support from conservative farmers, who were incensed at the continued illegal activities of the Communists; it also obtained support and leadership from Lutheran ministers determined to stop Communist atheism. The Lapuans were particularly enraged at the intimidation of ex-farm workers, who had fought on the White side, when they moved to the cities to find industrial employment. Things were made worse by the depression which brought falling timber prices, lower agricultural income and intensified Communist activity.

Lapuans resorted to such measures as smashing Communist presses, kidnappings and beatings; they finally forced the President to arrest the Communist members of Parliament and caused the adoption of a law to bar Communists from government. Despite these concessions, the Lapuans continued their activities and actually attempted an unsuccessful coup d'état in 1932, which was put down by government troops without a shot being fired on either side.

The main conclusion to be drawn from the Finnish experience between the Civil War and Winter War in 1939 is that the attainment of political democracy, and consequent democratic, political, economic and social reforms considerably reduced Communist influence; just as the absence of

¹⁸See Mead, *op. cit.*

These conditions combined with the forces tipping the scales toward radicalism before the Civil War.

Communism in Finland after 1944

There was considerable uncertainty in the immediate postwar years as to the relative power of the various organizations and political parties in Finland. Power relationships had been unbalanced by war and its aftermath; the armistice with the Soviet Union required the dissolution of several right-wing organizations, and the legalization of the Communist Party, outlawed since 1930. Communist power became a large unknown quantity; with apparent Soviet support, it was believed that the Communists would wield great pressure in their efforts to achieve their objectives, but no one could foretell how successful they would be, nor how much help they would get from the USSR. Communists throughout Northern Europe were strengthened by Soviet military strength and Communist prestige derived from underground opposition to Fascism in the countries occupied by Germany. The Finnish Communists were also in excellent geographic position to receive financial, technical, and leadership assistance from Russia. It was fairly common knowledge, also, that the Finns had close personal relations with leaders in high places in the Soviet Union; the leader of the Finnish Communist Parliamentary Delegation, for example, is Hertta Kuusinen, daughter of Otto Kuusinen, Finnish Emigrant Communist, and a member of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

The strategy of the Communists in Finland, as in other places, seems to have been to seize control of the cooperatives, trade unions and other mass movements; and to attempt to gain control of the Government by capturing strategic cabinet posts, especially the Ministry of the Interior, which controlled the State Police.

Elections to the central administrative offices of the Socialist cooperative movement, KK, were on a majority basis before 1946; for this reason, the Communists, who controlled about a third of the movement's membership, were never very influential in its top management. Proportional representation was adopted between 1946 and 1952, and in 1946 the Social Democrats won 15 members on the Board of Administration to seven for the SKDL; in 1948 the SKDL increased its representation to eight members, but since then has stabilized to about one-third of the Board.¹⁹

This pattern is followed fairly closely in the local societies, except that in some of them the Communists have absolute majorities. The largest KK society is Elonto, in the Helsinki area; of the 60 members on its Board of Representatives in 1955, 24 were Social Democrats, 23 SKDL and 13 were right-wingers. Elonto is managed by a twelve member Board of Administration composed, in 1955, of five Social Democrats, four SKDL members and three right-wingers. Communists control several local KK societies which

¹⁹Esko Aaltonen, *Consumer Cooperation in Finland*, Abbreviated Edition (Helsinki: Kulutusosuuskuntien Keskusliitto, 1954), p. 131.

had a combined membership of 62,216 at the end of 1954. (KK's total membership in 1954 was 527,041.)

SKDL's activities presented a more serious challenge to unions and the Government. The Social Democrats had one more seat than the Communists in the 1945 Parliament, but by 1948 two of their members had defected to the SKDL. Communists also became active in the Finnish Trade Union Confederation, SAK, after 1945, and sought to gain control of that organization; SAK assumed added power and significance after the War because the Finnish Employers Confederation, STK, had agreed to bargain collectively in 1940 and had actually signed a general agreement in 1944. At the 1947 SAK convention, the SKDL was able to elect six members to the Executive Committee, as compared with eight for the Social Democrats.

Mauno Pekkala, SKDL, formed a cabinet in March, 1946, and SKDL Minister of the Interior Leino systematically filled police positions with his followers and all SKDL cabinet members sought to draw Finland closer to the Soviet Union. An investigating committee revealed in August 1948 that Leino's police had placed two cabinet officers and several members of Parliament under surveillance and had committed other offenses, including arresting Finnish citizens and sending them to the Soviet Union for trial. Eighty-five per cent of this police force was found to be unqualified and incompetent; many of its members had criminal records for offenses ranging from theft to treason.

In May 1948, Parliament censured Leino by a vote of 81 to 61 for his illegal activities; he refused to resign, forcing the President to dismiss him. Communists retaliated against this move with a dockworkers' strike and a threatened general strike unless SKDL members were appointed to the posts of Minister of the Interior and Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs; President Paasikivi pacified the Communists by appointing Hertta Kuusinen Minister without Portfolio and another SKDL member Minister of the Interior.

These developments caused the Communists to lose heavily in the July, 1948 elections; they retained only 38 of the 51 seats which they controlled earlier. The Social Democrats increased their strength to 54 seats and Agrarians emerged with 56, making it the largest party in Parliament for the first time. The SKDL was excluded from subsequent cabinets, and has never since been included in a government.

The SKDL decided to try to recover from the disastrous psychological shock of the 1948 parliamentary elections by a concerted attempt to gain control of the trade unions. Scattered strikes were called throughout 1948 in opposition to the Social Democratic leaders of the SAK, who opposed the sweeping demands being made by the Communists. SKDL leaders decided to launch a campaign in 1949 with a series of strikes to be staggered in Communist-controlled unions.

The Government, led by Prime Minister Fagerholm, Social Democrat, declared these strikes illegal, appealed to the workers to return to work,

and alerted the armed forces for emergencies. The Socialist leaders of the SAK also ordered the strikers to return to work and declared the strikes illegal since they had not been sanctioned by SAK's Executive Committee.

The Finnish Communists received help during this strike from the Communist-dominated World Federation of Trade Unions. The International Seafarers and Harbor Workers Union told leaders of the Finnish Transport Workers Union that it would boycott all Finnish ships loaded by volunteers trying to break the strike. WFTU, which SAK had joined in 1945, sent Secretary General R. Arrachard of the French Building Workers Union, a WFTU official, to investigate the Finnish strike. SAK stopped paying dues to the WFTU because of Arrachard's attitude and activities; they particularly objected to his pro-Communism, his interference with what SAK considered to be a purely internal affair, and his siding with the striking unions and rejecting SAK's position that the strikes were illegal.²⁰

By agreement between SAK and the employers' confederation, STK, the latter refuses to bargain collectively with unions that are not members of the trade union confederation. This gives the SAK leadership considerable power over the Communists, since expulsion from the confederation carries with it the loss of collective bargaining ability. During the 1949 strikes, the SAK expelled seven unions, five of which were taken back later; the Transport and Forest and Floating Workers Unions were expelled for repeated offenses against SAK's rules and the decisions of its Executive Committee. In about two years after their expulsion, these unions had ceased to be of much practical importance. The Communist-led Finnish Textile Workers Union was expelled in 1952 and replaced immediately by the non-Communist Textile and Hosiery Workers, which a majority of the members of the Communist-led organization joined. The Communists had, in 1956, majorities in seven of the 39 SAK unions, the only very important one of which was the Finnish Building Workers Union with about 45,000 members.

In April 1951, member unions elected delegates to SAK's quadrennial congress. The Social Democrats elected 152 delegates to the Communists' 55 and the non-political seamen's five. Thus, between 1947 and 1951, the Social Democrats increased their strength from 57 to 68.5 per cent and the Communists declined from 43 to 29 per cent.

Conclusions

By the spring of 1951, Finnish Socialists had effectively checked the imminent Communist threat to their hegemony in the labor movement. This success was due largely to the energetic leadership which the Socialists exerted at the time. Because they represent the workers and are a part of the labor movement, Social Democrats can win workers away from the Communists much better than can non-working class groups. Other non-Communists gave the Socialists valuable assistance at times, however—an

²⁰In June 1951, the SAK voted 143 to 63 to withdraw from the WFTU, despite Communist efforts to cement relations between the organizations.

example being the willingness of the employers' confederation to deal solely with the SAK.

Despite these checks on its power, the SKDL remains relatively strong in Finland. This hard core of Communist strength may be explained mainly by the following factors: (1) The Civil War continues to cause lingering class antipathy. (2) Radicalism still finds fertile soil in such low income, unstable industries as lumber and harbor work, especially in the north. The future of Communist strength in Finland depends in some measure upon the solution of pressing economic problems. A crucial problem is the uneconomically small size of Finnish farms, the median being about 18 acres and 72 per cent having less than 25 acres of cultivated land in 1950. (Denmark, usually considered to be the typical country of small farmers, has a median size farm of about 29 acres.) Another very important problem is the threat of inflation in the face of power struggles between highly organized politico-economic groups. (3) Communists have intensified their efforts in certain areas, especially where there is little industrialization and where Social Democratic strength is weak.²¹ (4) Though they traditionally appeal to lower-income groups, the Finnish Communists receive considerable support from some of the most highly paid workers in Finland, as for example building workers. This is probably due to tradition and the instability of the industry. (5) Communist strength everywhere fluctuates with the prestige of the USSR, and inversely with the prestige of the West, especially the United States. (6) Finland's location next to the Soviet Union and her partial economic dependence on that country give the Communists some support. Geographic location also makes it possible for Communists to maintain covert relations with the USSR.

The main factors of weakness for the Finnish Communists are: (1) The democratic character of the Finnish people and their strong desire for independence. (2) The strength of the Socialists and their determination to maintain control of the labor movement; Socialist strength will probably grow with the stabilization and diversification of Finnish economic life. (3) The inability of the Communists to attain positions of power in the Government, unions, cooperatives and other mass organizations will probably cause the SKDL to encounter increasing problems in recruiting able young leaders. Barring some sudden change, it is unlikely that the democratic elements in Finland will allow the Communists to share positions of power. (4) Communists were weakened by the world reaction to the seizure of Czechoslovakia, the Korean War and the Hungarian atrocities. Any attempt by the USSR, through the SKDL, to take over Finland through undemocratic means would probably force Sweden into NATO. (5) It may

²¹The Socialists have in the past been too preoccupied elsewhere to give full attention to these places, especially in the north, but Social Democrats have recently sought to counteract Communist strength in the north by building a school, sponsored jointly by unions and cooperatives, at Oulu. The SAK school near Helsinki has proved its worth as a training ground for anti-Communist activity.

so not be a coincidence that, within Finland, Communist strength seems to grow with the distance from the main Civil War battle lines.

The strength of the forces affecting Communism in Finland was dramatically revealed in the 1958 parliamentary elections and subsequent events. The Communists emerged from these elections the strongest party in Finland; they won 50 of the 200 seats, and the Social Democrats retained only 38 seats after losing 13 to the Independent Social Democrats, a splinter group. The Communists seem to have gained largely at the expense of the Agrarians, however, because the latter retained only 47 seats, a decline of 13 since the 1954 elections. (See Table I)

There are undoubtedly many complicated factors accounting for these Communist gains, but the following are probably the main ones: the split in the Social Democratic Party, which seems to be partly ideological and partly personality conflict, caused some voters who might have voted for the Social Democrats to switch to the Communists; Finland had experienced continuing unemployment and inflation since the 1956 general strike and the Social Democratic-Agrarian coalition seemed unable to cope with these economic problems, causing some voters either to stay home or switch their support; the Communists concentrated their activities in areas where the Agrarians and Social Democrats were weakest and where economic conditions were poor (they gained five of the nine parliamentary representatives from Lapland, for example, and nine of the thirty-five seats in the Town Council of Rovaniemi, capital of Lapland); the Communists also probably gained from the general increase in Russian prestige following the launching of the earth satellite and other dramatic scientific accomplishments.

The coalition cabinet formed by Prime Minister Fagerholm following the 1958 elections enjoyed the support of 137 of the 200 members of Parliament, but was immediately threatened by external pressure from the Soviet Union. The Russians were suspicious of Fagerholm's motives not only because his cabinet excluded Communists, as had all Finnish governments since 1948, but also because Finland was experiencing a growing surplus of exports over imports in trade with the Soviet Union; the Russians were afraid that this would cause growing purchases from the West and diminish Finland's ties with the East. The Russian and Chinese Communist ambassadors to Finland suddenly returned home without explanation and the trade talks between Finland and the Soviet Union were broken off. Fagerholm's cabinet was unable to withstand these pressures because Finland depends heavily on trade with the Soviet Union; a dependence which was strengthened after the 1944 armistice by the Russians' insistence that Finland pay war reparations in goods which the Finns did not previously produce and which would require the building of uneconomic industrial capacity whose output could be exported only to the Soviet Union. The cabinet fell on December 4, 1958, when the Agrarians withdrew their support, but continued to operate on a caretaker basis for 90 days until a new one could be formed.

These Russian pressures were unsuccessful if we assume that they were

motivated by a desire to get the Finnish Communists included in a cabinet. The new government formed by Professor V. J. Sukselainen was made up of Agrarians except for one member of the Swedish People's Party. The Russians seem to have been angered mainly by the Social Democrats, however, because, after the Sukselainen government was formed, Soviet Premier Khrushchev and Finnish President Kekkonen met in Leningrad for discussions which resulted in a resumption of the trade talks and a return of the Soviet and Chinese ambassadors.

LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY

THE PERSONNEL SCREENING COMMITTEE AND PARLIAMENTARY CONTROL OF THE WEST GERMAN ARMED FORCES

by John L. Sutton

SINCE the understanding in principle between the NATO nations in 1950 on the rearmament of West Germany, there has been considerable speculation over the place the new German armed forces would occupy in the German governmental and social structure. A number of serious works have already been published contending that the position of the German army in the German state was, at least in part, responsible for the aggressive policy of German governments in the past and the outbreak of two major wars in this century. The planning and building of the new German military force has thus been carefully watched by observers outside Germany. Probably less apparent to non-Germans is the deep concern which the Germans themselves have shown for the beginnings of their new military system.

The total defeat of the German forces in 1945 and the complete disarmament which followed permitted no recrudescence of the theme which was developed in ever louder tones during the Weimar and Nazi periods—that the German Army in World War I had been betrayed from within and had never been defeated at the front. Since 1945 not only has the German scholar sought to analyze the history of his nation for an understanding of the proper relationship of military and political power, but the common citizen and his parliamentary representatives in the Federal Republic recently have faced the problem of seeking practical solutions in legislation and administrative control.

Today an effort is being made by the German Government and German Parliament to establish a military force with more conscientious attention to democratic principles and greater responsiveness to civilian control. In some ways the period resembles that in which Scharnhorst rebuilt the Prussian army after the catastrophic defeat by Napoleon of the army which Prussia inherited from Frederick the Great. The reforms which were instituted then were, for those days, and for Prussia, sweeping concessions to liberalism. It was not without some justification that the first Federal Minister of Defense, Theodor Blank, when he inducted the first men into the new German armed forces in November 1955, recalled the name of Scharnhorst.

The principle—if not the degree—of civilian control of the armed forces was not seriously contested. However, as the time came to devise concrete legislative measures to assure this, the question of civilian control rapidly advanced to a second stage where serious conflict emerged. In simple terms the Adenauer Government interpreted civilian control to mean control by the executive arm of the Government while the Parliament, in which a large segment was opposed to rearmament as a policy, was equally sure that

civilian control meant parliamentary control. From this basic disagreement developed a battle which is still being fought. However, it is definitely not a clear cut struggle between the Government and opposition parties in the Parliament, but one which cuts across party loyalties.

A full discussion of this conflict would represent a major work, and there is little doubt that it will form the basis for exhaustive research in the future. The acceptance of the Defense Committee of the Bundestag as a standing committee with investigatory rights, the creation of a Parliamentary Defense Commissioner, and the parliamentary accountability of the Minister of Defense—all these are evidence of the strength Parliament has exerted. However, there has been one facet of the struggle which has been in some ways more dramatic and revealing. This is the controversy over the actions of the Personnel Screening Committee (*Personalgutachterausschuss*) which was empowered by Parliament to screen the records of officers being reactivated in the new German armed forces in the rank of colonel and above. In great measure, it precipitated the conflict, forced a resolution unexpectedly and quickly, and has very probably set the Parliament-Government environment within which the German armed forces will develop. This particular dispute has been a dramatic one. It has involved the Chancellor, his Minister of Defense, the Parliament, spokesmen of the major political parties, and key figures in the military planning, and has stirred the reaction of journalists throughout Germany.

The Government Attempts its Initial Military Legislation

In order to clarify the nature of this key conflict, it is necessary to review briefly the actions of the Adenauer Government and Parliament when the first two pieces of military legislation were passed in 1955. The Volunteer Law (*Freiwilligengesetz*) was one of these; the other was the Personnel Screening Committee Law.

The "vehemence of the opposition" to rearmament itself was noted by Hanson Baldwin at the beginning of 1955 when he mentioned the difficulties which the Government could expect in passing the legislation necessary to initiate the German rearmament program.¹ After the passage through the Bundestag in February 1955 of the Paris agreements, with a resultant weakening of the Chancellor's influence on that body, it became apparent that concessions to Parliament were needed to pass the military legislation.

In a news conference on 10 May, 1955 Adenauer announced that he would soon abandon the post of Foreign Minister in order to devote himself to internal social problems and rearmament. The *New York Times* in a phrase which would have appeared ironic a few months later, headed this story with the line: "Adenauer Plans to Control Army."²

During the next few weeks it became apparent that, despite the Chancellor's frequently asserted determination to build a military service responsive to civilian control, the Parliament was not reassured. Possibly the att-

¹*New York Times*, 2 January, 1955.

²*New York Times*, 11 May, 1955.

side of the Parliament was affected by such statements as that which Adenauer made on his trip to the United States in June: "The danger of German militarism has disappeared. It is not there any more."³ In any case, by the time the Chancellor returned to Germany he apparently was aware that the draft of the first piece of military legislation, the Volunteer Bill, was facing growing hostility in Parliament as too vague and inadequate.

During this period the ideas of the Defense Ministry on the formation of a new military arm were drawn up and published under the title, *On the Future German Soldier*. The Chancellor added his agreement in a short statement in the front of the book under the date of June 1955. The book developed the "citizen-in-arms" concept and pointed out the basic reforms needed to create a German army in a democratic republic.⁴ These same ideas were brought out by the Government when the debate on the Volunteer Bill began in the Bundestag on 27 June.

Parliament Acts on the Military Legislation

Defense Minister Blank stated the case for the Government before the Bundestag on 27 June in a long justification (*Regierungserklärung*). He echoed the oft-heard phrase, "The army must not become a state within the state," and detailed the Government's views on the Volunteer Bill and military affairs in general. He emphasized the importance of the choice of key military personnel and stated that the Government would, by virtue of its own organizational authority, form a personnel committee of disinterested and qualified citizens to review the records of officers proposed for the rank of colonel and above. The Government would not interfere in the work of this committee, promised Blank, and would not induct any officer against the veto of the committee. He added that the Government therefore did not believe the creation of such a committee need be a matter for legislation.⁵

The Bundestag appears neither to have been impressed by Blank's statement that, "Parliamentary control must be made stronger than was formerly the case in Germany," nor by the provisions of the Volunteer Bill, nor by the method intended by the Government for the creation of a screening committee. After a stormy debate, the Volunteer Bill was referred to committees of the Bundestag, and it was made clear that drastic revisions would be made.⁶ The deputies reportedly felt that the bill did not provide guarantees which would implement the elaborate dissertation on civilian control given by Minister Blank.⁷

³*New York Times*, 15 June, 1955.

⁴*Vom künftigen deutschen Soldaten, Gedanken und Planungen der Dienststelle Blank*. Verlag Westunion. The writer was reported unofficially to be a former Captain first in the Defense Ministry.

⁵*Verhandlungen des deutschen Bundestages, 2 Wahlperiode, Stenographische Berichte, and 26, 92 Sitzung*. Also quoted in Elmar Brandstetter, *Freiwilligengesetz mit Nebengesetzen*. Carl Heymanns Verlag, (Köln, 1955), pp. 23-41.

⁶*Ibid.*, 93 Sitzung 28 June, 1957.

⁷*New York Times*, 28 June, 1955.

By 11 July the Volunteer Bill was reported to have been completely redrafted by the Security Committee of the Bundestag. The Government had been stopped in its alleged attempt to acquire "unlimited powers" and the "blank check" effect of the three-paragraph Volunteer Bill had been replaced by specific restrictions dealing with the Government's use of the new volunteers and the structure of the high command. At the same time the Security Committee reported it had completed its work on the draft of a bill for a personnel screening committee.⁸ The proposed bill specified that the members would be nominated by the Government and approved by the Bundestag, with final power of appointment resting with the Federal President rather than the Chancellor.⁹

On 13 July the Personnel Screening Committee Bill passed its first reading by the Bundestag, and it and the new Volunteer Bill were passed on 15 July. Adenauer sat quietly in the Bundestag as the bills went through their final reading. According to the *New York Times*, "The two bills represented the greatest victory of Parliament over the Chancellor since he took office." The *Times* noted of the PSC Bill that, "The bill will give Parliament absolute control over the officer personnel."¹⁰

Thus in the space of a few days the revisions made by the Bundestag on the first piece of military legislation and its creation of a second law had effectively reversed the legislative program of the Government. The "blank check" Volunteer Law requested by the Chancellor had been rejected and, as will be seen by an examination of the PSC Law, a blank check had been written by the Bundestag for its use in controlling the appointment of officer personnel.

The Personnel Screening Committee Law

The PSC Law was characterized by the same qualities which the parliamentary deputies had objected to in the Volunteer Bill—brevity and vagueness. The text is brief enough to reproduce in full:

Law Concerning the Personnel Screening Committee for the Armed Forces¹¹

Part I

- (1) The Personnel Screening Committee has the task of
 1. Examining the personal suitability (*persönliche Eignung*) of soldiers who are to be commissioned (*eingestellt*) in the rank of colonel and above
 2. Proposing principles by which the personal suitability of other soldiers may be determined.
- (2) If the Personnel Screening Committee has not affirmed the personal suitability of a candidate according to Par. 1, No. 1, that candidate may not be commissioned.

⁸*Kölnische Rundschau*, 13 July, 1955.

⁹*New York Times*, 11 July, 1955.

¹⁰*Ibid.*, 16 July, 1955.

¹¹*Verhandlungen des deutschen Bundestages*, 2 Wahlperiode, Anlagen Band 36. Drucksache 1595. 11 July, 1955. See also Brandstetter, *op. cit.* pp. 42-47.

Part II

The PSC consists of 30 to 40 members. They will be appointed by the Federal President upon the proposal of the Federal Government. The proposal of the Federal Government requires the confirmation of the German Bundestag; no debate will take place.

Part III

(1) The PSC and its members are bound by no directives.

(2) The PSC will devise its own working rules.

(3) All the personnel files of those referred to in Part I, Par. 1, No. 1, are to be made available to the PSC. The PSC has the right to inform itself directly. All offices are obliged to render the PSC official assistance without charge and to provide information and files upon demand in so far as these are necessary for the carrying out of the task of the PSC.

(4) The members of the PSC are bound to secrecy regarding the matters made known to them in their activity.

The Selection of Personnel Screening Committee Members

According to a published report of the Bundestag Security Committee, issued in connection with the passage of the PSC Law, the Security Committee had considered the problem of screening military personnel as early as the first Bundestag period (prior to the 1953 elections). It believed that something had to be done to keep out certain officers who might give a dangerous direction to the military mentality of the new armed forces. It was the steadfast intention of the committee, the report went on, as well as that of the Government, to bring in a group of persons of incontestable integrity and high capacity for judgment to examine the personal suitability of senior officers.¹²

It can be seen that the essence of the law was that it gave the PSC the right to decide upon the "personal suitability" of officers of Colonel's rank and above whose names were submitted to it. The report of the Security Committee mentioned above emphasized that the term "personal suitability" excluded the professional competence as well as the intended employment of the candidate. These considerations were to remain within the competence of the Defense Ministry. The law gave no guidance as to what constituted "personal suitability." Neither did it suggest any working rules for the PSC.¹³

It should also be noted that there was no provision for the termination of the work of the PSC. It was generally understood that the task was to screen the initial selections of the Defense Ministry, and it was not assumed that the PSC would continue its work indefinitely. It was not until later that it was discovered that the PSC could quite easily interpret its task

¹²*Verhandlungen, Anlagen Band 36, Drucksache 1620, 14 July, 1955. Also Brandtetter, op. cit., p. 42.*

¹³Despite this written understanding that the Bundestag did not intend the authority of the PSC to extend to a limitation of the assignments to be given a particular officer, it has been widely reported without refutation that Lt. Gen. Heusinger, the senior officer of the armed forces, was approved with the stipulation that he would not be given command functions.

as an indefinite one and perpetuate itself as long as Parliament failed to rescind the law.

The selection of members was intended to represent persons dedicated to democratic government and to represent fairly the important geographical areas, political parties, professions, and age and religious groups of the Federal Republic. There were thirty-eight members chosen and it was generally conceded that the selection approached the ideal of representation as well as could be expected. It could not be maintained that the group was made up of persons having no knowledge of or sympathy with military organization, since seven were former general officers and several others had served in the armed forces, including several former general staff officers. About half a dozen could be considered as coming from the field of education. Others represented private industry, the legal profession, and government service. Two of the members were women. Persons who had actively opposed the Nazi régime were represented by people like Fabian von Schlabrendorff, who planted a bomb in Hitler's aircraft, and Annedore Leber, widow of Julius Leber, one of the leaders in the July 20, 1944, plot against Hitler. The man selected by the members as their chairman was a former mayor of Aachen removed by the Nazis in 1933. If any general criticism of the group could be made it might be that the average age was rather high; twenty-seven were born before 1900. In all, it appeared to be a sound group. It was later maintained—and probably correctly—that the determination of the Bundestag to include only the highest types of individuals led it to permit the committee to devise its own working rules.¹⁴

The Committee Exercises its Functions

The PSC Law came into effect on 26 July, 1955. The PSC was formed shortly thereafter and was operating during the autumn months. It did not begin immediately with the screening of the higher officers, which was assumed to be its principal function, but started with the task of devising a set of rules or principles for the selection of officers of the rank of lieutenant colonel and below, and non-commissioned officers, as provided by the law. These were general rules describing criteria to be used by the Defense Ministry in its appointments. Upon their completion the Defense Ministry obviously regarded them as advisory rather than directive in nature.¹⁵ An editorial in the *Westdeutsche Allgemeine*, on 15 October, criticized the Minister's attitude, which "apparently does not consider the screening committee recommendations binding," and suggested that this

¹⁴This is further borne out by the fact that the names proposed by the Government appear to have been submitted to the Bundestag before the passage of the law. The thirty-eight names appear in the German parliamentary minutes as Document 1619, dated 13 July, 1955. The law was passed on 15 July. The Bundestag was thus assured of the identity of the men composing the committee before it actually passed the law.

¹⁵The report of the Security Committee of the Bundestag on the PSC Law (*Verhandlungen, Drucksache 1620*) stated that the Defense Minister had already indicated his willingness to incorporate these principles into directives. The Defense Minister was thus expected to accept directives not yet written by a group of persons not yet (at least formally) selected.

should be remedied by incorporating the committee's principles in a new law. By 20 December this matter had still not been settled, and the Munich daily, the *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, noted that the screening committee was not yet aware of what instructions had been given the induction boards to assure implementation of their rules. The rules were never incorporated directly into law. However, most were sufficiently general in character to arouse no opposition in the Ministry, and it is possible to say that, effectively, they were already in use as a basis for selection of personnel. The more concrete proposal of attaching two civilian members to induction boards was not adopted.

However, the PSC had, in the meantime, called attention to its activities on a far more vital and sensitive issue. After the completion of the selection rules mentioned above, it had proceeded with the examination of the individual personnel files of officers proposed by the Defense Ministry for the rank of colonel and above. Since there were no field units, the staff in the Ministry of Defense constituted the first group to be activated under the Volunteer Law, and the committee turned to the examination of their records. Apart from the approval of Lieutenant Generals Heusinger and Speidel (in time for Minister Blank to hold his modest reactivation ceremony on 12 November), nothing definite was known of the attitude of the PSC toward the other applicants until December.

On 8 and 9 December both the German and foreign press announced that the PSC had rejected four officers in the Defense Ministry. Two of them occupied key positions and had participated for several years in the armed forces planning. These were former Colonel Fett, whose position at the Ministry at the time was that of chief of staff of the three armed services, and former Colonel Bergengruen, then head of the army division of the Ministry. Both were to have been recommissioned as brigadier generals.

The shock effect of this was extreme. It was apparent that Blank had counted on the acceptance of his closest subordinates without question. Although press reports stated that the names of the rejected men were given out in a press conference on 7 December by the chairman of PSC, it was noted in one account that the news had originally been leaked to the press by Blank in order to rouse public sentiment.¹⁶ Heavy German press coverage followed for several days, and editorialists tended to take sides for or against the committee's decision. Against the action of the PSC was the accusation that it was becoming a kind of de-nazification board (a term calculated to evoke suspicion and resentment in the minds of a great part of the German public), and that it violated constitutional principles. Standing behind the PSC were not only those opposed to rearmament itself, and those who feared the recurrence of a German military system which evaded civilian control, but political enemies of the Chancellor both inside and outside his own party.

A rejection of two of Blank's closest associates appeared to be a virtual vote of no-confidence in Blank himself, and it was expected that the full

¹⁶*New York Times*, 28 December, 1955.

force of the Government would be brought upon the PSC to make some concessions. However, the PSC held fast. Although beset by charges that its act constituted a secret trial and condemnation violating constitutional guarantees, the PSC on 16 December held a plenary session in which it decided to maintain its rules of procedure and its secrecy.¹⁷ A resolution passed by the PSC maintained that its secrecy did not violate constitutional principles; that discrimination in favor of candidates from the Defense Ministry was inadmissible under the law; that the PSC might review a case if new evidence were produced; and that so far neither the Federal President nor the Chancellor had requested the PSC to reveal its reasons for rejecting several candidates.¹⁸ Victor Renner, one of the strongest personalities on the PSC, and doubtless speaking for it, was quoted as saying that he would not yield to any pressure.¹⁹ On this same day, the influential daily *Die Welt* stated that the principal parties of the coalition and the opposition (the CDU/CSU, the FDP, and the SPD) had agreed to respect the PSC decision to abide by its present rules.

The dispute thereafter receded somewhat in the press. However, the Government was not willing to drop the matter, and on 23 December it was announced that Adenauer would receive PSC executive board members some time between Christmas and New Year's to discuss the committee's 16 December decision not to change its rules of procedure. *Die Welt* predicted that the meeting would not produce sensational results, because the PSC members were "very sensitive" to outside influence.²⁰

The Committee Extends and Consolidates its Activities

Having weathered the shock of the Government's reaction to the rejection of Fett and Bergengruen, the PSC now seemed to feel itself more secure and moved into a new area of conflict even before the first had been conclusively settled. The PSC had declared its competence to screen the officers of colonel and above in the Border Police force (*Bundesgrenzschutzpolizei*) when this organization would be incorporated into the new armed forces. The Border Police, an organization which had been built up quietly during the preceding years to patrol the Zonal Border, was a heavily armed police force operating under the Interior Ministry. It was generally accepted that the use of its trained personnel would accelerate the building up of the new armed forces, and it was believed that the greater part of the Border Police, who were in many cases former army personnel, would be eager to transfer to the new army. Press discussion was noted on the future of the Border Police during October,²¹ and by late December a bill for the inclusion of the Border Police in the armed forces was approved by the Bundesrat. The Under Secretary of the Interior Ministry was quoted as stating that the bill provided for the screening of officers of Colonel's rank

¹⁷*Hamburger Abendblatt*, 17 December, 1955.

¹⁸*Der Mittag*, 19 December, 1955.

¹⁹*Ibid.*

²⁰*Die Welt*, 23 December, 1955.

²¹*Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 24 October; *Hamburger Anzeiger*, 25 October.

and above by the PSC.²² In answer to objections voiced by a spokesman of the Border Police, who stated that perhaps the officers subject to screening by the PSC might reconsider their readiness to join the armed forces if they must be so screened, the chairman of the PSC, Rombach, stated that those who were rejected by the PSC might retain their status in the Border Police, which would continue as an organization.²³ When the bill enabling the transfer of the Border Police members to the armed forces was passed in May and came into force on 1 June, it contained the provision desired by the PSC.

In the meantime the Government had not yet given up its case for the rejected former officers and was, at the very least, seeking to restrain the PSC from taking such a strong hand in the future. The *Frankfurter Rundschau*, on 10 January, stated that Adenauer and PSC members probably would discuss differences during the week. So far as is known, the meeting between Adenauer and the PSC members which was to have occurred before New Year's was never held. According to the *Frankfurter Rundschau* the PSC and the Defense Ministry had received new material on four of the rejected officers, and, the report added, it was possible that the PSC would propose on its own initiative to re-screen them. This meeting, too, apparently was postponed, but Adenauer met with some members of the PSC, presumably on 19 January.²⁴ The PSC apparently held to its stand and made no concessions regarding the changing of its rules. The conclusion must be that the Chancellor was unable, or at least chose not to try, to throw the force of his office and personal influence into the struggle with the PSC and take the matter before the public. Although there were several rumors in the press that the PSC would again take up the cases of the four officers, no revision of the cases was undertaken which altered the original decision.

Two interesting consequences now occurred. On the one hand, the PSC and the Government undertook to devise a system for smoother operation which would prevent another embarrassing clash; and on the other hand, the PSC determined to clinch its rejection of the four officers by forcing the Government to discontinue their employment even as civilians in the Defense Ministry. Already in January the question had arisen of what the Ministry intended to do with the men who had been rejected. On 23 February it was reported that the PSC was opposed to their continued employment in the Defense Ministry. These four men, said the chairman of the PSC, were exercising functions which should be entrusted exclusively to soldiers, and he intended to urge Blank officially to discharge them. Since they had been rejected by the PSC, their continued employment would constitute an evasion of the existing law, he added.²⁵ By 19 April, Rombach, in an interview with the press, was able to announce that

²²*Stuttgarter Nachrichten*, 22 December, 1955. With regard to the accuracy of coverage of PSC matters in this newspaper it should be noted that its editor and co-publisher, Henry Bernhard, was a member of the PSC.

²³*Die Freiheit*, 27 Dec., 1955.

²⁴*Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 19 January, 21 January, 1956.

the four men would leave the Ministry within a short time.²⁶ As a further reminder of its now consolidated power the PSC rejected another long-time planner in the Ministry, a former Colonel Kaulbach, who was in charge of intelligence and attaché matters, and was to have been commissioned a brigadier general. Since Kaulbach had been in contact with the diplomatic colony in Bonn in his official functions, his rejection could not fail to attract notice. The press announced in April that Kaulbach had been rejected.²⁷

Thus the PSC had met the Government head-on in a clash involving the retention by the Minister of Defense of several members of his own staff, two of whom were in very high positions and had represented the Defense Minister and the Federal Republic in dealings with NATO nations for many months. Despite the initial impression that the Government would be able to bring pressure for some concessions, the PSC made virtually no concessions whatsoever. It not only maintained the rejection of the applicants as future officers, but followed up with the demand that they be discharged from the Ministry. Supported by the Bundestag, the PSC was able to defy the Government, even the persuasion of the Chancellor himself, and extend the limits of its functions.

Principles of the Committee's Operations

During the period when the activities of the PSC were a matter of lively discussion—following the rejection of the four former colonels in the Ministry—little was known of its inner workings or the procedures which it had adopted. Since its members were pledged to secrecy by the law itself, only information in the form of speculation by “informed sources” was available. The most interesting questions which could not be definitely answered were the bases used by the PSC to determine whether an applicant was “suitable” or not, and specifically what information had been brought out against the rejected individuals. Gradually, the principles and methods of operation of the PSC were made known through the statements of members of the committee and informally from descriptions of hearings held by the committee reported by applicants who had been called before it.

One fairly clear outline of the PSC's operations was given in an interview by member Walther Hensel.²⁸ According to Hensel, the PSC was not qualified to pass on the functional suitability of candidates, but only on three aspects of their personal suitability: (a) a candidate's attitude toward the state; (b) his character; (c) his relations with others. Candidates who had been persecuted or discriminated against by the Nazis were given preference. Hensel also mentioned another pertinent criterion developed by the PSC. It took into account the rehabilitation achieved by the candidate since 1945. Since a great many of these men were professional sol-

²⁶*Stuttgarter Nachrichten*, 23 February, 1956.

²⁷*Die Zeit*, 19 April, 1956.

²⁸*Westdeutsche Allgemeine*, 12 April, 1956.

²⁹*Neue Rhein-Zeitung*, 29 March 1956. The PSC later published these criteria.

iers, the end of the war and the collapse of Germany represented a hopeless collapse of the only profession they had ever known or cared to know. In addition, there was a general feeling against professional military people among the German public. The PSC felt that any officer who had re-established himself successfully during the ten-year period since the war had demonstrated desirable qualities superior to those of a man who had spent his period more or less inactive or who had little constructive work to show for the postwar period. Another significant point mentioned by Hensel was that the men who had been rejected were, with few exceptions, rejected by the unanimous vote of the committee. Other details of the PSC's operation were revealed in an interview by the chairman, Rombach.²⁹ The PSC collected information on an applicant by contacting his co-workers, former POWs, administrative agencies, and so on. At least two committee members met the applicant in person. If their impression was negative, the applicant was invited to appear before a nine-person subcommittee. Finally, the full committee made its decision. Afterwards, the PSC had all applicants' personnel files destroyed, whether the individual was approved or rejected.³⁰

The Government, after finding it could make no impression upon the termination of the PSC to maintain its rules and abide by its decisions, undertook measures to preclude further embarrassment. By March it was reported in the press that the Ministry had devised a system of contacting the PSC to find out in advance whether individual applications submitted by the Ministry would stand a chance of success.³¹ This was confirmed in the interview by Walther Hensel mentioned above. Hensel stated that after the rejection of several of its candidates the Ministry withdrew all applications, cancelled several, resubmitted the rest, and completely changed its own personnel staff. Chairman Rombach later confirmed this operation in the interview mentioned above. Rombach also indicated the number of applicants involved, stating that 191 applications had been submitted and 14 had been rejected. By September the press reported that 397 applications had been made of which 322 had been decided upon, including 30 rejections.³²

While the PSC was winning its battle with the Government, there were some attempts to question its authority within Parliament, whose will presumably the PSC was carrying out. The right-wing *Deutsche Partei* in the Bundestag submitted a bill calling for the replacement of the PSC by a "honor council," which would screen officers of colonel's rank and above. The council would consist of 27 former officers, and the Bundestag Defense Committee could protest its decisions within 14 days. The bill also provided for the members to be appointed by the Federal President upon nomination by the Defense Ministry acting in agreement with the Federal Cabinet.³³

²⁹*Die Zeit*, 19 April, 1956.

³⁰This presumably did not include all the files submitted by the Ministry.

³¹*Stuttgarter Nachrichten*, 17 March, 1956.

³²*Stuttgarter Nachrichten*, 14 September, 1956.

³³*Frankfurter Neue Presse*, 13 February, 1956.

However, on 12 April the Bundestag rejected the *Deutsche Partei* motion to revoke the PSC Law.³⁴

The victory of the PSC was now secure, its authority unquestioned. Its problem now was one which had not been settled by the law and could have been difficult to resolve—that of the duration of the committee. Although it was obviously the intention of the Bundestag to assure an adequate screening of only the initial applicants for the armed services, there was, besides a natural tendency for an organization to perpetuate itself, a certain support in Parliament for the indefinite retention of the PSC. Again referring to the report of the Bundestag Security Committee, it was stated that since no officers of the rank colonel and above would be directly commissioned after the initial period, it was unnecessary to limit the duration of the law.³⁵ At length the Committee announced that it would complete its work by August 1957, and did so. In a final reckoning of its activities it listed 600 cases examined; 100 applicants rejected or withdrawn from consideration; and 486 found acceptable and 14 conditionally acceptable.³⁶

Conclusions

It should be emphasized that the sequence of events described above was only one aspect of the complex interplay of forces in West Germany set off by the decision of the Federal Government to rearm, and, indeed, only one aspect of the effort of Parliament to control the tempo and character of the program. During this same period the Bundestag had already begun debate on several other items of military legislation, including the conscription law, the law determining the rights of soldiers, and the law determining the high command relationship.

On the favorable side, the actions of Parliament have indicated that neither the Ministry of Defense nor the Government will be able to develop military policy in a vacuum independent of Parliament. The intimate relation between Parliament and the choice of new leaders in the armed forces may also act as a reassuring factor with the German public and foreign countries. It has become fashionable to castigate the German general staff and its officers as traditional agents of aggressive militarism. Blank, in organizing his planning staff, drew heavily from the ranks of the former general staff corps officers. (Generals Heusinger and Speidel are both examples.) Although it is difficult to imagine what other source of personnel Blank could have resorted to to accomplish the staff work for the new armed forces, he was nonetheless placed in a defensive position by this fact. However, if there was a danger that the Government, through laxness in controlling the staff of the Defense Ministry, would permit the introduction of key personnel whose background or ideas were seriously at odds with those of the Parliament, that danger appears to have been averted.

For good or ill, the victory of the Parliament's creature, the Personnel

³⁴*Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 13 April, *Neue Rhein-Zeitung*, 13 April, 1956.

³⁵*Verhandlungen, Drucksache* 1620. Also Brandstetter, *op. cit.*, p. 49.

³⁶*Bulletin des Presses u. Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung*, 6 February, 1958.

Screening Committee, has for an indefinite period probably determined the Parliament-Government relationship on military questions in general. Whether the control of Parliament has gone too far is another question. Criticisms were heard that a "parliamentary army" was in the making and, indeed, there are valid grounds for misgivings if the details of military organization should be removed from the policy-making arm of the Government and undertaken by an organization in which a sizable minority is opposed to rearmament as such, and in which, consequently, the votes to support an individual measure might be obtainable only by a complicated bargaining process reflecting the immediate political party relationships rather than the needs of intelligent or cohesive policy. On the other hand, in contrast to his predecessor, the present Defense Minister, Franz Josef Strauss, probably because of his personal strength in the Bundestag, has shown himself unusually able to withstand parliamentary pressures which might have limited his legitimate authority of decision.

In any event, the spectre of the new German armed forces as a "Staat im Staate," and its symbol, the monocled visage of Reichswehr General von Seeckt, have receded farther into the background.

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE ACADEMY

NATIONALISM VERSUS PROLETARIAN INTERNATIONALISM IN THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA

by *Edward Táborský*

OF all the "remnants of bourgeois ideology" that have been plaguing the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (KSČ) in recent years none has been more persistent than nationalism. Ever since the establishment of "the dictatorship of the proletariat" in 1948 the Communist rulers of Czechoslovakia have been engaged in a determined struggle against various "harmful bourgeois-nationalistic manifestations" within the Party's own ranks. Yet, in no field have they been less successful. After more than ten years of continuous battling against this arch-enemy of "proletarian internationalism," accompanied by repeated purges and colossal indoctrination campaigns, the Party's body politic shows no signs of recovery from its affliction by the nationalistic "virus," called alternately "Titoism," "national communism" and "bourgeois nationalism."¹

"Titoism"

None of the spectres haunting the orthodox Leninist-Stalinists in the last years of the Stalin era was exorcized more ferociously and fought more vigorously than "Titoism." To be labeled a "Titoist" meant not only political disgrace but often also criminal prosecution that could, and sometimes did, involve capital punishment. Untold thousands of Communists have been demoted, purged and liquidated throughout the satellite world for having been stricken by that black plague.

The Czechoslovak Communist leaders yielded ground to no one in the anti-Titoist crusade. After Tito had been denounced by the Cominform in 1948 they staged a nation-wide witchhunt for "Titoists." Except possibly for Hungary, this persecution had been more wide-spread and more virulent in Czechoslovakia than in any other country within the Soviet orbit. Perhaps more than anywhere else "Titoism" was used as a convenient tool in settling personal rivalries in the uppermost crust of the Party leadership, such as Gottwald versus Slánský and Široký versus Clementis. Rudolf Slánský, the KSČ's Secretary General and the Number Two Czechoslovak Communist, was the highest-ranking satellite Communist executed as a "Titoist traitor." In addition to their desire to please Moscow, the KSČ leaders were incited in their anti-Titoist drive by their dislike for Tito himself, who had been derisively critical of them for their "temporizing with bourgeois elements" prior to 1948.

¹The term "revisionism," which has again become fashionable since 1956, is also sometimes used in reference to deviations based on nationalistic sentiments in the current Communist jargon. But it is a loose catch-all concept designed to cover all cases of "right-wing" opposition to whatever may be the current official version of Marxism-Leninism, except "dogmatism." Cf. the Moscow "Socialist Commonwealth" Manifesto of November 1957.

Therefore, it is hardly surprising that the abrupt Soviet reversal, dramatized by Khrushchëv's unprecedented pilgrimage to Belgrade and his apology to "Judas" Tito in the spring of 1955, shook the Czechoslovak rulers and caused them to drag their feet for many months before they fell grudgingly into the new Soviet line. As late as July 1955 Tito could rightly complain, in his speech in Karlovac, that the Czechoslovak Communists "find it difficult to admit their mistakes before their own people, as the dead cannot be resuscitated." Indeed, of all the satellite rulers the Prague régime was the last one to adopt Khrushchëv's new line on Tito and to apologize obliquely for past mistakes. It was only on the eve of 1956 that the Communist President of Czechoslovakia, Antonín Zápotocký, cautiously touched upon the hot topic in his New Year message, blaming it all on the "misleading information and the diversionary activities of the enemy." He asked that the past in Yugoslav-Czechoslovak relations be "blotted out" and sourly admitted that the "propaganda campaign which developed after the breach (in 1948) went at times too far."² While the so-called Titoists were being publicly rehabilitated to the South and to the North, all that the Prague régime did was to release from jail, in an almost clandestine fashion and without a word of apology, those members of the "Slánský-Clementis gang" who had been lucky enough to get away with prison sentences, and to concede that those accusations against Slánský and his accomplices that had been based on "Titoism" were false.³ One of the leading Czech Communists, Rudolf Barák, went so far as to claim that it was Slánský who was responsible for having fraudulently allowed Tito's name to be linked with his. According to Barák, Slánský had actually "welcomed the atmosphere created by the wrong accusations against the leading Yugoslav comrades"⁴!

How bitter was the pill which the Czechoslovak rulers felt obligated to swallow to please Khrushchëv is clearly apparent from their subsequent behavior. While the relations between Yugoslavia and the USSR were improving the Czechoslovak Communists came out with a few general gestures of friendship, exchanged some delegations, and even admitted past errors regarding Tito. This was especially so after the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party which, with its doctrine of "different roads toward socialism" and the explosion of the Stalin myth, seemed to vindicate Tito's stand.⁵ On the other hand, when Soviet-Yugoslav relations took a turn for the worse, following the revolts in Poland and Hungary, the Czechoslovak Communists began to snipe at Tito again. Typical of their attitude toward things Yugoslav was a recent publication of a map of Yugoslavia by the Czechoslovak Central Administration for Land Survey and Cartography. The descriptive text on the map spoke of "a revolution which has only

²*Rudé Právo*, Jan. 2, 1956.

³*News From Behind The Iron Curtain* (further cited as *News*), Vol. V, No. 5 (May 1956), p. 57.

⁴*Ibid.*, No. 8 (Aug. 1956), p. 21.

⁵*Cf.* speeches by Zápotocký, Novotný and Barák at the Communist Party Conference in June 1956. *Rudé Právo*, June 12, 1956 and *News*, Vol. V, No. 8 (Aug. 1956), p. 15ff.

partially succeeded;" of "so-called workers' councils;" of the "stagnating Yugoslav economy developing in a "haphazard manner" and of "certain bourgeois elements . . . which aim at the restoration of the bourgeois system."⁶ However, uncertain as they were about the way matters would eventually turn out, the Prague régime preferred to paraphrase whatever was the current Moscow line at the time rather than develop too much initiative of their own.⁷ Thus they followed the Moscow example in not sending a delegation to attend the Congress of the Yugoslav Communist Party in April 1958; and the Czechoslovak Ambassador to Yugoslavia promptly abandoned his seat as observer when the signal was given by the Soviet Ambassador to leave the hall in protest against Rankovic's criticism of the stiffening Soviet attitude toward the Yugoslav Party.

This deliberate Soviet insult to the Yugoslav Communists, the Chinese Communists' wanton anti-Tito tirades, and especially the elaborate condemnation of the Yugoslav position published in Moscow's *Kommunist* convinced the Czechoslovak leaders that the official Marxist-Leninist line on "Titoism" had at last crystallized into a definitive shape. Rejoiced at this vindication of their initial reluctance to fraternize with Tito when it was fashionable again in 1955-1956, they wasted no time in jumping on the anti-Titoist band-wagon. On May 8, 1958, the editorial of *Rudé Právo* spelled out the Prague régime's official stand, which adhered much more to the firm but relatively dispassionate Soviet attitude than to the vitriolic denunciation by the Chinese Communists.⁹ The same resolute rejection of "Titoism" characterized the proceedings of the Slovak and Czechoslovak Party Congresses meeting in May and June 1958, respectively. Delivering the main report to the KSČ's Congress, the Party's First Secretary, Antonín Novotný, upheld the Cominform's anti-Yugoslav resolution of June 1948 (expelling the Yugoslav Party from the Cominform) as "correct in principle," while admitting mistakes in "the methods of its execution" and labeling as incorrect the Cominform's second anti-Yugoslav resolution of November 1949 (calling for an open revolt against Tito). But he rebuked in sharp terms "the un-Marxian attitude of the Yugoslav leaders" whom he accused of "distorting and falsifying" the Marxist-Leninist teaching "from opportunistic, nationalistic and subjectivist positions."¹⁰ The greetings delivered at the Congress by delegates of "fraternal" Communist parties bristled with scathing attacks on the Yugoslav Party that made Novotný's

⁶*Kommunist* (Belgrade), Jan. 10, 1958. *East Europe*, Vol. VII, No. 3 (March 1958) p. 31.

⁷For instance, *Rudé Právo*, Nov. 19, 1956, repeating *Tass's* criticism of Tito's attitude on Hungary; Novotný's criticism of Tito at the session of the Party's Central Committee in December 1956, *Rudé Právo*, March 8, 1957, reprinting a sharp rebuke of Popović's speech taken from Moscow's *Pravda* of March 6, 1957.

⁸P. Fedoseyev and others, *O projekte programmy Soyuza kommunistov Yugoslavii* *Kommunist*, No. 6, 1958.

⁹*Jen Min Jih Pao*, Peking, May 5, 1958. Cf. Russian translation in *Pravda*, Moscow May 6, 1958, under the title: *Sovremennyy revizionizm dolzhen byt osuzhden*.

¹⁰*Rudé Právo*, June 19, 1958. For accusations leveled at Yugoslavia at the Slovak Party Congress of May 1958, cf. *Československý Přehled*, Vol. V, No. 5 (May 1958), p. 26ff.

language sound fairly moderate by comparison.¹¹ The "un-Marxist revisionist attitude proclaimed by the Yugoslav Communist League" was scored also in the resolution which was passed with habitual unanimity by the Congress before it adjourned.¹²

"National Communism"

If "Titoism" were only what the narrow literal construction of the word conveys, namely siding with Tito in his feud with Stalin, the Soviet Dictator's death and the ensuing reconciliation between Belgrade and Moscow, as long as it lasted, should have shelved the issue. However, it is common knowledge that "Titoism" was a misnomer that served as a convenient cover for what is generally known as "national" Communism. Hence, far from healing that insidious sickness within Marxist-Leninism, Stalin's death and recanonization plus Khrushchëv's emphatic enunciation of the "different roads toward socialism" and his 1955-1956 bows to Tito have only aggravated it. All over the Soviet-controlled world "national communism" began to raise its head and press with increasing vigor against the shattered walls of Stalinist monolithism.

As could have been expected, the Czechoslovak Party was caught in the middle of this weird battle of attrition between the opposing forces of Sovietism and "national communism." If "national communism" means an adherence to the basic Communist tenets, such as the wholesale socialization and the dominance of the Party, coupled with a desire not to be subjected to interference and orders from the Kremlin, then both Gottwald and Zápotocký, the two leaders who stood successively at the helm of Czechoslovak Communism for twelve out of fourteen postwar years, qualified as potential "national" Communists.¹³ To a lesser extent this is probably true of some of the present leading Czechoslovak Communists as well. Consequently, such men should have been pleased by the victories that the cause of "national communism" achieved with Yugoslavia's rehabilitation in 1955 and especially with Poland's "October Revolution" of 1956. Having, however, surrendered to the Kremlin, they had come to the conclusion that they had already forfeited all their chances of retaining power should "national communism" prevail in Czechoslovakia. The close brush with death which Communism experienced in Hungary strengthened them even

¹¹*Rudé Právo*, June 20, 21 and 22, 1958.

¹²*Rudé Právo*, June 23, 1958.

¹³Such is, at least, the belief of most of those (including the present writer) who knew the two men and studied their mentality and behavior. Cf., for instance, Pavel Korbel, "I worked for Gottwald and Zápotocký," *New Leader*, Apr. 27, 1953, p. 9ff.; Paul Barton, *Prague à l'heure de Moscou*, Paris, 1954, pp. 110, 189 and *passim*. There is also some evidence of Gottwald's and Zápotocký's attempts to retain at least some modicum of independence from the Kremlin. Cf., for instance, Gottwald's acceptance of the invitation to Marshall Plan consultations in Paris, revoked later on Stalin's orders; Lubert Ripka, *Le Coup de Prague*, Paris, 1949, p. 43ff.; Zápotocký's public opposition to the belief of Party cadres commissions that it was a good policy to entrust important positions solely to Party members; Antonín Zápotocký, *Revoluční hnutí odborové po roce 1948*, Praha, 1952, p. 326ff.; the opposition to the law on forced-labor camps, (Korbel, *op. cit.*).

more in their belief that their personal salvation lay only in their power of intimidation, which in turn depended primarily on the availability of Soviet military assistance in case of necessity.

Realizing that, in so far as their personal fate is concerned, "national communism" presents almost as deadly a danger for them as anti-Communism, the KSČ leaders have singled it out as their number one domestic enemy and concentrated on it their heaviest barrage. Addressing the meeting of the Party's Central Committee in December 1956, Novotný denounced "national communism" as an ally of the imperialists, who saw it as "some kind of first phase for the return to the old capitalist system." He rejected both the "incorrect views and moods" in Poland and Tito's distinction between Stalinist and non-Stalinists, and stated in no uncertain terms: "The Leninist example remains for us the only binding example which is being applied creatively in different historic and socio-economic conditions."¹⁴ A few days later "national communism" was scored once again and an unwavering friendship with the USSR as a pre-requisite for the victory of socialism was stressed in a joint resolution prepared by a conference of delegates from the Central Committees of the Communist parties of Czechoslovakia and East Germany meeting in Prague for the obvious purpose of bolstering publicly the unity of the Communist camp. Similar dire warning, coupled with an ardent advocacy of closer ties with the Soviet Union, dominated the proceedings of the Twelfth Congress of the Communist Party of Slovakia held in Bratislava in April 1957,¹⁵ as well as the meeting of the Czechoslovak Party's Central Committee in June 1957.

"Bourgeois Nationalism"

While "national communism" is a new term that has come into usage only since the Stalin-Tito feud, "bourgeois nationalism" is a veteran pre-war label. Of all the pernicious "isms" that worry the Communist leaders none has been exorcized over a longer span of time. However, though frequently used, the term "bourgeois nationalism" has never been adequately defined and its practical application has been very loose and broad. Judging by the Soviet usage, its main ingredients seem to be an excessive consciousness of belonging to a given ethnic group and an undue insistence on local self-government. In the Soviet Union the label has mostly been attached to members of non-Russian nationalities and much less to Russians found guilty of "Russian chauvinism." In so far as the sin is committed by a Party member, the conception of "bourgeois nationalism" strongly resembles that of "national communism." Although placed in circulation by opposite camps—"bourgeois nationalism" by the *bolsheviks* and "national communism" by the West—the two terms differ from one another little more than Tweedledee from Tweedledum. In fact, reluctant to use the

¹⁴*East Europe*, Vol. VI, No. 2 (Feb. 1957), p. 46.

¹⁵*Rudé Právo*, Dec. 21, 1956.

¹⁶Especially speeches by Novotný and Bačilek, *Pravda* (Bratislava), Apr. 27 and 28, 1957.

¹⁷*Rudé Právo*, June 19, 1957.

"State-Department coined" term of "national communism," the Communist rulers definitely prefer the label of "bourgeois nationalism," which has been broadened so as to include even instances of deviationism that have sometimes little in common with nationalistic feelings. Since the introduction of the old-new formula of revisionism as a more general catch-all for various Communist heresies, the tendency has recently developed to construct "bourgeois nationalism" somewhat more restrictively.

This is clearly demonstrated by the Czechoslovak practice. While the designation of "bourgeois nationalism" is still used rather loosely and casuistically, it is now generally reserved for those whose real or alleged misbehavior stems primarily from their ethnic affiliation or sentiments of local patriotism. On the other hand, those who object to Soviet predominance, principally on the ground that it is contrary to genuine "proletarian internationalism," are now mostly included among the revisionists, even though an accusation of "bourgeois nationalism" or some other bad "ism" may be thrown in for good measure.

Though the Czech Party members are by no means immune to the "bourgeois nationalistic" heresy, its most fertile ground is among the Slovaks. "One of the weakest sectors of our ideological struggle is the struggle against bourgeois nationalism," bewailed the Slovak *Pravda* on December 14, 1956. The growing concern of the Party leadership about the spread of the heresy among the Slovak Party members is documented by the increasing criticism to which the Slovak branch has been subjected in the past years on that count. No occasion has been missed to remind the Party membership of the dangers and the wickedness of "bourgeois nationalism" and of the urgent need to wage a merciless battle on this arch-enemy of "proletarian internationalism." "Bourgeois nationalism is a poison," said the Party's First Secretary, Karol Bacilek, delivering the opening speech at the Twelfth Congress of the Slovak Party in April 1957.¹⁸

Why the Slovak branch of the KSČ is especially vulnerable in this respect is easy to understand. Traditional Slovak nationalism is too deeply rooted in the heart of many a devout Slovak Communist to be discarded merely upon higher orders. Even such high-ranking Party men as Clementis, Husák and Novomeský (all of them subsequently purged for "bourgeois nationalism" and "Titoism"), devoted as they were to the Communist cause, firmly believed that there was no contradiction between their loyalty to Communism and to Slovak patriotism. I have never encountered a more forceful, more fiery and more enthusiastic advocate of the Slovak national cause than Laco Novomeský, the prominent Slovak Communist whom the Party had sent to London in 1944 for the specific purpose of persuading Beneš to yield to Slovak nationalistic demands. Directed always against those who wielded authority in Czechoslovakia's capital, the historic Slovak aversion to, and suspicion of, Prague centralism necessarily turned against the KSČ leadership and was thus bound to enhance nationalistic and autonomistic leanings among the Slovak Party members. Last but not

¹⁸*Ibid.*, Jan. 14, 1958.

least, the KSČ's abrupt abandonment of its earlier vigorous support of Slovak nationalistic postulates when tactical needs no longer demanded it after the February coup of 1948, deeply and permanently undermined the loyalty of the many Slovak Communists who had taken the KSČ's original stand in earnest. That is why little credence can be given Bacilek's assertions, made at the session of the Slovak Party's Central Committee in January 1958, that a good deal of "bourgeois nationalism" within the Party was to be blamed on the officials of the "former Republic and of the Slovak Fascist state" who, "posing as workers," had joined the Party.¹⁹

Finally, it is significant, although not at all surprising, that "bourgeois nationalism" has found fertile ground among Party members of Hungarian descent. Addressing the Slovak Party's Eleventh Congress in April 1955, Bacilek complained that "some of our citizens of Hungarian nationality, and they comprise also some members and functionaries of our Party, forget that the Czechoslovak Republic is their fatherland and that the Central Committee of the KSČ determines policy for the Hungarian comrades as well. . . ."²⁰

* * * *

The very fact that, more than ten years after Gottwald's triumphant victory, the Communist rulers of Czechoslovakia find it necessary to pursue as fiercely as ever their struggle against the "bourgeois-nationalistic" ideology "sullyng the purity" of the Marxist-Leninist teaching indicates that their crusade has thus far met with little success. That is also borne out by information gathered from recent escapees from Czechoslovakia and other non-Communist sources. The consensus of their opinion is that nationalism has been strengthened rather than weakened in recent years, both among the population as a whole and among ordinary Party members. Why is it that the persistent Communist efforts to extirpate nationalism from the hearts and minds of the Party's own rank and file have had such meager results?

The basic cause of the Communist failure lies undoubtedly in the Czechoslovak national temperament itself. Like other nations of Central-Eastern Europe, the Czechs and the Slovaks are imbued with very strong nationalistic feelings. That is truer of the present generation than of its fathers. The agonizing experience of the Munich *Diktat*, the nightmare of the Nazi occupation and the bitter disillusionment of 1945-1948 (when the hoped-for liberator turned out to be the worst enemy) could not but whip up Czech and Slovak nationalism to an all-time high. The bad behavior of the Red Army and the NKVD in 1945 and Stalin's callous disregard for Czechoslovak national pride killed the "Big Brother" complex which had characterized the Czechoslovak attitude toward Russia in the past and wiped out the difference that had previously existed in that respect between the Poles and the Czechs. A betrayed lover makes the most ferocious hater.

Nor could the cause of "proletarian internationalism" be served by the

¹⁹*East Europe*, Vol. VII, No. 3 (March 1958), p. 43.

²⁰*Pravda*, Apr. 24, 1955.

Kremlin's bullying tactics toward the Czechoslovak "fraternal" Party that have characterized the Stalinist era. Forced to prostrate themselves before the Kremlin and to do things that they would not have done on their own, the Czechoslovak Communists could not help becoming more and more resentful of this domination, which was bound to make them more and more unpopular in the eyes of the masses at home and thus add to their domestic difficulties. Their lack of genuine support by their own people and even by the bulk of the Party membership, composed predominantly of opportunists rather than devout disciples of Communism, made the Party leaders utterly dependent on the Kremlin and effectively prevented them from yielding to any temptation to emulate Tito's example. But the bitterness and hurt national pride conditioned the disillusioned rank and file of the Party for "national communism" and "bourgeois nationalism," although they had to hide it under a deceptive veneer of sycophancy and hypocritical praise of "proletarian internationalism."

The clumsy methods used to persuade the Party followers of the necessity and the excellence of Soviet leadership have also helped to buttress sentiments of that same "bourgeois nationalism" that the Kremlin has been trying so hard to smash. The incessant campaigns to get people to register for Russian courses, subscribe to Soviet periodicals, enroll in the Society for Soviet-Czechoslovak Friendship, and attend Party classes in Marxism-Leninism could hardly generate enthusiasm among the unwilling "volunteers." The over-abundance of pompous statues and portraits of Stalin, the playing of the Soviet national anthem on each and every occasion, and the excessive praise of everything Soviet has served only to stir up more hatred for the Soviet leaders and their native lieutenants. The persistent efforts to blacken Czechoslovakia's "bourgeois" past, typified by vicious abuse of its two democratic Presidents, T. G. Masaryk and Eduard Beneš,²¹ have thus far been mostly self-defeating as too many people are still alive who remember the better past and can compare it with the bleak present. "There are many illusions about the bourgeois democracy," lamented *Rudé Právo* as late as April 25, 1958, stressing the regrettable fact that prewar Czechoslovakia "was a relatively highly developed form of bourgeois democracy" and that "the creation of the bourgeois-capitalist state was coupled with national liberation."

Last, but not least, it should not be forgotten that the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia entered the postwar era and made its bid for power as a vociferous advocate and standard-bearer of radical nationalism. It hitched its wagon to the cause of Slovak nationalism in 1945 and supported stock-and-barrel the extremist demands of the Slovak nationalists. It rode the high crest of rampant Czech anti-Germanism, actively supported the most extreme solution of the Sudeten German problem and was more

²¹Cf., for instance, Václav Král, *O Masarykově a Benešově Kontrarevoluční protisociální politice*, Praha, 1953; *Dokumenty o protilidové a protinárodní politice T. G. Masaryka*, Praha, 1953; Richard Hunt, "The Denigration of Masaryk," *Yale Review*, Vol. XLIII, No. 3, March 1954, p. 419.

nationalistic in that respect than any other Czech party. Similarly, its Slovak branch took the lead in anti-Magyar reprisals in Slovakia. While all this was done strictly for reasons of revolutionary strategy, this short but very intensive courtship of nationalism left an indelible mark on the Party's membership. After all, almost ninety-nine per cent of the present members joined the Party after the war, mostly during its nationalistic stage in 1945-1948.²² Apart from reasons of personal opportunism, more of them were attracted by the Party's patriotic slogans of those early postwar years than by "proletarian internationalism" and other ideological tenets of Marxism-Leninism.

Taken together, these factors and influences have left most of the Party's rank and file with a hard core of nationalism and with a built-in protective shield against the appeals of "proletarian internationalism" which the Soviet rulers and their native lieutenants find extremely difficult to pierce.

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²²According to figures revealed by Bruno Kohler of the Party's Secretariat in September 1953, only 1.5 per cent of Party members were Communists from prewar days while 91 per cent joined the Party after 1945 and 7.5 per cent became KSČ members after the fusion of the Social Democratic Party with the KSČ in 1948. *Zpráva o Československu*, Vol. IV, No. 9 (Sept. 1953), p. 3f.

DOCUMENTS

THE SERBIAN-MONTENEGRIN ALLIANCE OF SEPTEMBER 23/OCTOBER 6, 1912

by E. C. Helmreich

THE treaties and conventions negotiated before the First Balkan War that were the basis for the Balkan League have never been grouped and published as a collected whole.¹ They consisted of a Serbian-Bulgarian Alliance,² a Bulgarian-Greek Alliance,³ a Bulgarian-Montenegrin oral understanding based on drafts of a military convention,⁴ and a Serbian-Montenegrin Alliance. Negotiations between Serbia and Greece and also between Montenegro and Greece were carried on, but apparently no agreements were signed.

The only one of these agreements, the text of which, to the best of my knowledge, has never been published—although we have long known of its existence—is that arrived at between Serbia and Montenegro.⁵ In May 1930

¹For the negotiation of these agreements and bibliography see E. C. Helmreich, *The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars 1912-13* (Cambridge, 1938), pp. 36-89.

²The Serbian-Bulgarian treaty of alliance, annex, military convention and agreements (with exceptions noted below) are to be found in I. E. Gueshoff, *The Balkan League*, trans. by Constantin C. Mincoff (London, 1915; French ed. Paris, 1915), pp. 112-127; Balkanicus (Stojan Protić), *The Aspirations of Bulgaria* (London, 1915; French ed. Paris, 1915), pp. 96-109 (military convention misdated here); Diplomatist, *Nationalism and War in the Near East* (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Oxford, 1915), pp. 387-396; *British Documents on the Origin of the War 1898-1914*, ed. by G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley (11 vols., London, 1927-38), vol. IX, part I, 781-2; part II, 1006-1113; *Doklad na parlamentarnata izpitatelna komisiya* [Report of the parliamentary commission of inquiry] (4 vols. and 3 supplements; Sofia, 1918-19, hereafter cited as *Doklad*), vol. I, pp. 159-173; B. D. Kesyakov, *Prinos kŭm diplomaticheskata istoriya na Bŭlgariya* [Contribution to the diplomatic history of Bulgaria] (4 vols.; Sofia, 1925-35), I, 36-48. The agreement between the two Chiefs of Staff of June 18/July 1 in regard to possible war with Austria is to be found only in *Doklad*, I, 163-5 and Kesyakov, *op. cit.*, I, 423; see also E. C. Helmreich, "Ein Nachtrag zu dem serbisch-bulgarischen Abkommen von 1912," *Berliner Monatshefte*, XIII (1935), 1073-6. The agreement of June 18/July 1 covering the allocation of troops in case of war with Rumania is to be found only in Kesyakov, *op. cit.*, I, 43-5.

³The text of the Bulgarian-Greek alliance treaty of May 16/29, 1912 and of the later military convention of September 18/October 5, 1912 can be found in Gueshoff, *op. cit.*, pp. 127-33; Balkanicus, *op. cit.*, pp. 110-15; Diplomatist, *op. cit.*, pp. 396-400; *British Documents*, vol. IX, part II, pp. 1015-18.

⁴See Helmreich, *Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars*, pp. 86-88; Edward C. Thaden, "Montenegro, Russia's Troublesome Ally, 1910-1912," *Journal of Central European Affairs*, XVIII (1958), 127.

⁵In a "Lettre de M. Pierre Plamenatz ancien Ministre des Affaires Étrangères du Monténégro à M. M. . . , Londres" of May 23, 1917 printed in M. Boghitschewitsch: *Die Auswärtige Politik Serbiens 1903-1914* (3 vols., Berlin, 1929), vol. II, pp. 563-68, Article II of the treaty is summarized and Article I of the military convention is quoted textually. These are in accord with the texts of the treaties as given below. This can also be said in regard to the references to the treaties in the Russian documents *Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia z epokhu imperializma, 1878-1917*, edited by A. P., Bolshemennikov, A. A. Ierusalimskii, A. A. Mogilevich, and F. A. Rotshtein (Moscow, 1930ff), 2nd Series, 1900-1913, vol. XX, part 2, 1/14 August-4/17 October, 1912, nos. 669, 802; see also p. 364, note , as cited in Thaden, "Russia's Troublesome Ally, 1910-1912," *Journal of Central*

when I made an inquiry at the Serbian Foreign Office, the archivist showed me the registry of treaties, assuring me that the agreements existed and promising that they would be published in the forthcoming collection of Serbian Documents. These have not appeared. When I was in Belgrade in the summer of 1957 I again made an effort to obtain the text of the treaty. I met Dr. Vojislav J. Vucković, diplomatist and historian, who gave me the texts of the treaty with this note: "A typewritten copy of these texts was given by General Petar Pešić to Professor Grgur Jaksić around the year 1926, and I received it from the latter for the purpose of making a copy thereof on 12 January 1955." It is with the consent and encouragement of Dr. Vucković that the agreements are being made available to scholars through publication in the *Journal of Central European Affairs*. I am indebted to Professor I. J. Lederer of Yale and Professor C. E. Black of Princeton for the translation of the document.

POLITICAL CONVENTION

The King of Serbia and the King of Montenegro, deeply convinced that the interests and the destiny of their respective states and of the Serbian people are identical, and determined to defend these interests most decisively with their united forces, have agreed to the following:

Article I

The Kingdom of Serbia and the Kingdom of Montenegro bind themselves without any reservation to aid each other with their entire strength, should either of them be attacked by one or more states.

Article II

The Kingdom of Serbia and the Kingdom of Montenegro pledge to aid each other with their entire strength should Austria-Hungary attempt to annex, occupy or even temporarily hold with its army a part of European Turkey, and should one of the contracting parties regard this as contrary to its vital interests.

Article III

Should one of the contracting parties regard the situation in Turkey and general conditions in Europe as favorable, to initiate action for the liberation of Serbs under the Turkish yoke, and should it turn to the other party with a proposal in this regard, the other party must immediately enter into negotiations thereon.

European Affairs, XVIII (1958), 127. The agreements were apparently concluded on September 19/October 2, 1912, at Lucerne (*Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniia*, 2nd series, vol. XX, part 2, p. 297, footnote 3), but as stated in Article X of the Military Convention became effective with the signatures of the governments on September 23/October 6, 1912. (Boghitschewitsch, *Die Auswärtige Politik Serbiens 1903-1914*, vol. II, p. 563). As to signatories of the agreements Petar Pešić was Serbian military attaché in Athens in 1914, later became Serbian Minister of War and of the Navy and held diplomatic posts at Brussels and Prague. Jovan Plamenac was Montenegrin Minister of Interior and Education 1912-1913, and is to be distinguished from Petar Plamenac, who was chargé d'affaires in Constantinople 1912 and Montenegrin Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1913-1915. Jovo Bećir was Commander of the City of Cetinje in 1914 and Assistant to the War Minister. Biographical notes taken from the *Register*, vol. IX, of *Österreich Ungarns Aussenpolitik von der Bosnischen Krise 1908 bis zum Kriegsausbruch 1914* (Vienna, 1930). There are short sketches of Pešić and Petar Plamenac in *Dictionnaire Diplomatique*, published under the direction of M. A.-F. Frangulis, vol. V (Paris, 1954).

Article IV

Inasmuch as the governments of the Kingdom of Serbia and the Kingdom of Montenegro regard the present situation in Turkey and general conditions in Europe as very favorable for action aimed at the liberation of Serbs under the Turkish yoke, they have agreed that war should be declared upon Turkey at the latest by October 1 of the current year. If, however, for special reasons, one party were to find this impossible within the stated time limit, it is bound to give ample notice to the other party as to the date to which it proposes to defer action. There can be only one postponement.

Article V

The Allies must not negotiate with the enemy for any special advantage, nor conclude an armistice or peace without mutual agreement.

Article VI

The boundaries between the allied Serbian Kingdoms must be regulated by a joint commission.

If the commission cannot reach agreement, it will be left to the King of Bulgaria and the King of Greece to resolve the issue of our common frontiers.

Luzern, September 1912.

For Serbia
General Staff Infantry Colonel:
Petar Pešić

For Montenegro
Minister, Jovan Plamenac
Brigadier, Jovo Bećir

MILITARY CONVENTION

Article I

In case of war with Austria-Hungary the manner of warfare on the part of Montenegro and Serbia will be that of strategic defensive, not excluding tactical offensive in certain directions and at appropriate moments.

Article II

In a war with Turkey the character of warfare pursued by the armies of both Kingdoms will be that of strategic offensive.

Article III

In this latter case the Montenegrin army will operate with its main force in the operational direction of Skadar, Northern Albania, Debar, Kičevo, Bitolj. Secondary Montenegrin forces will operate in the Sanjak of Novipazar.

Article IV

In this event the Serbian army will move with its main force in the operational direction of the Vardar Valley, with Skoplje and the Veles-Štip line as its principal and primary objective. The next operational objective will be determined by the situation on the battle-field. Secondary Serbian forces will operate in the operational zone Sanjak of Novipazar-Poreč-Vardar.

Article V

In its main movements the Montenegrin army will seek to outmaneuver the Turkish army through action in its rear in order to cut its communications with Salonika and the sea, and so that the Montenegrin army will constitute the right wing of the Serbian army.

Article VI

At the beginning of operations, the supreme commands of both armies will be independent in their performance. Following the first successful operations and the attainment of joint objectives, both supreme commands must come to agreement on the subsequent course of operations, in the interests of unity of action and solidarity of operations.

Article VII

Both armies must undertake all necessary measures in peace to insure the most effective organization of military forces, and must facilitate, as speedily as possible, mobilization and concentration.

Article VIII

The operational forces of both Kingdoms must be fully prepared to operate abroad, and not only in defense of the state.

Article IX

The relationship of the main army force to secondary forces will be determined by the war plan of the respective armies, but no less than three-fourths of all the operational forces must be directed into the main battle-zone.

Article X

This Convention becomes effective on the day when it is signed by the Royal governments, will last three years and can be extended by agreement. It can be denounced half a year in advance.

Article XI

This agreement is to remain secret in its particulars, and can be communicated only to allies.

Luzern, September 1912.

For Serbia

General Staff Infantry Colonel:
Petar Pešić

For Montenegro

Minister, Jovan Plamenac
Brigadier, Jovo Bećir

BOWDOIN COLLEGE

GERMAN REVISIONIST PROPAGANDA IN 1925-1929: A DOCUMENT

by Zygmunt Gasiorowski

THERE is to be found in the files of the German Ministry for Foreign Affairs an interesting memorandum of January 4, 1929, entitled "Zur Frage polnischer Propaganda."¹

Having at the outset pointed to the intensification of Polish propaganda in the Corridor question, as manifested in the books by Slawski and

¹Microfilm of the documents from the German *Auswärtiges Amt* (the file of the Reichsminister), National Archives, Washington, D. C., container 1428, serial 2945H, frames 573799-803.

Srokowski and articles in *The Polish Economist*, the author of the memorandum, Roth, writes:

Trotzdem ist zur Wahrung des deutschen Standpunktes und zur Widerlegung der polnischen Darstellungen in der Frage der Propaganda viel geschehen. Allein an Buchpublikationen sind in den letzten 4 Jahren auf Veranlassung des Auswärtigen Amts oder in Verbindung mit dem Auswärtigen Amt (teil Referat Polen, teils Pressabteilung) u. a. folgende Bücher erschienen:

- (1) Etchegoyen, *Pologne, Pologne*. . . .
[also a German and an English edition entitled: *The Comedy of Poland*.]
- (2) Roth, *Die Entstehung des polnischen Staates*.
- (3) Kaufmann, *Das deutsche Westpreussen*.
- (4) Fürst, *Der Widersinn des Korridors*. Engl. *The Nonsense of the Corridor*.
- (5) Lorenz, *Geschichte der Kaschuben*.
- (6) Tourly, *Le conflit de demain: Berlin-Varsovie-Dantzig*.
- (7) Hansen, *Polens Drang nach Westen*; Engl. *Poland's Westward Trend*.
- (8) Street, *Upper Silesia, an Economic Tragedy*.
- (9) Worgitzky, *Ostpreussen*.
- (10) Recke, *Die Wiederaufrichtung Polens in Versailles* (Aus dem Buch Reckes, *Die polnische Frage*).
- (11) Szczeponik-Franz, *Die Gewissensnot der deutschen Katholiken in Polen*.
- (12) Polonicus, *Die Deutschen unter der polnischen Herrschaft*.
- (13) Martel, *La Pologne et nous*.
- (14) Korostowetz, *Die Auferstehung Polens* (Englische Ausgabe: *The Resurrection of Poland*).

Im Druck befindet sich ferner ein Buch des Engländers Sir Robert Donald. Von den aufgezählten Werken sind manche feuilletonistischen Charakters, wie Nr. 1 und 6, manche stark polemisch, wie Nr. 9 und 14, andere wieder streng wissenschaftlich, wie Nr. 2, 3, 5. Auch die schwerere Literatur hat für die politische Propaganda Bedeutung. Beispielsweise ist das Buch von Roth über die Entstehung des polnischen Staates den Mitgliedern des Haager Gerichts bei dem Prozess um Chorzow den Richtern überreicht worden und hat einen für Deutschland günstigen Niederschlag im Urteil gefunden.²

In conclusion Roth recommends publishing small booklets and brochures. The memorandum was submitted to ministerial directors Schneider, Trautmann and Noebel.

RUSSIAN RESEARCH CENTER
HARVARD UNIVERSITY

²*Ibid.*, 573799-801.

NOTES

The Institute of International Education (1 East 67th St., New York 21) announces the receipt of a grant from the Ford Foundation in the amount of \$325,000 to finance a full-scale exchange program with Eastern Europe. The program is an enlargement of the Ford Polish Program, in effect since 1956. Since the inception of this latter program, 75 Polish professors and specialists have been brought to the United States and 15 American professors have gone to Poland as lecturers or on special research projects. The Polish visitors have visited more than 30 American universities and over 20 American business or industrial concerns. The present grant is the fourth received by the Institute from the Ford Foundation in this Polish and East European Program.

* * * *

The Forschungsinstitut für den Donaauraum of Vienna (Schottengasse 10, Wien I) held its annual session over a period of four days, October 10-13, 1959. The session was focussed around the general theme: "Forty years after St. Germain und Trianon." The Chairman of the Institute, former minister Theodor Hornbostel, opened the session, and Professor Oswald Gschliesser spoke on "The Catastrophe of St. Germain." C. A. Macartney of All Souls College, Oxford, spoke on "The Treaty of Trianon: its nature and consequences." Professor Hugo Hantsch of Vienna spoke on "The Paris Treaties of 1919-20 and Europe." On the second day of the meeting, Sunday, October 11, Professor K. C. Thalheim (Free University of Berlin) discussed "Changes in the social structure of the Danube basin since the First World War." On the third day, Monday, October 12, Dr. Kurt Wessely (Vienna) discussed "The economy of the Danube Basin 1914 and 1959." At the last session, Tuesday, October 13, Professor Rudolf Wierer (Munich) spoke on "Bases of nationality law in the Danube Basin before and after the two world wars." At the same meeting Professor Peter Berger (Vienna), Secretary of the Institute, spoke on "Austria's Independence after the State Treaties of 1919 and 1955." All sessions were marked by open and lively participation from the floor.

* * * *

The newly founded Society for Italian Historical Studies is anxious to learn of any research being done in the field of Italian history. Dr. K. R. Greenfield, Apt. 1012, The Ambassador, Baltimore 18, Maryland, is acting as liaison for the purposes of collecting this information. Any scholar interested in Italian historical studies or knowing of any that are under way is urged to get in touch with Dr. Greenfield.

* * * *

In connection with the 100th anniversary of the unification of Italy in 1859, Columbia University Libraries and the Society for Italian Historical Studies jointly prepared an Exhibit of 150 documents related to this event, which opened on November 5th in Harkness Academic Theatre, 535 West 114th St., New York 27 with a formal ceremony and an address by H. E. Manlio Brosio, Italian Ambassador to the United States. The actual exhibit remained on display in the Butler Library of the University until early in December.

The Polish Institute of Arts and Sciences in America held an Academic Conference to commemorate the approaching "Millennium of the Christianization of Poland" in the Bishop's lounge at Fordham University on Saturday, November 14, 1959. At the morning session, presided over by the Very Rev. L. J. McGinley, President of Fordham University, Professor Gerhart B. Ladner (Fordham University) spoke on "The Holy Roman Empire of the Tenth Century and East Central Europe;" Professor Oscar Halecki (Fordham and Columbia University) spoke on "The Significance of the Christianization of Poland in European History." At the afternoon session Professor Francis Dvornik (Dumbarton Oaks) discussed "The Role of Bohemia and St. Adalbert in the Spread of Christianity in Poland," Professor Astrik Gabriel (Notre Dame University) spoke on "The Christianization of Hungary" and Professor Ihor Sevcenko (Columbia University) spoke on "The Christianization of Kievan Rus'."

* * * *

The Permanent Chair of Polish Culture, Canisius College, Buffalo, N. Y. held its First National Symposium on the theme "Poland as a Nation in History" on November 28, 1959. At the morning session Dr. Bohdan Pawlowicz (Canisius) spoke on "Poland—Its Birth and Development as a Nation," and Professor Oscar Halecki (Fordham and Columbia) on "Poland and World War I." At the afternoon session Dr. Roman Debicki (Georgetown) spoke on "Poland Today." A later session was an open forum and panel discussion on the subject "The Future of Poland—A Forecast."

* * * *

The publishing house of G. K. Hall & Co., 97 Oliver St., Boston, Mass., announce the publication in book form of the card catalogue of the Slavonic Collection of the New York Public Library. About 130,000 volumes are listed, and there are 540,500 entries for works in Latvian, Lithuanian, and the Slavonic languages, including translation, both into and out of these languages. There will be, in all, 26 volumes of about 1,000 pages each. The set will list at \$910. Further inquiries may be addressed to the publisher.

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CORRESPONDENCE

November 5, 1959

Editor
Journal of Central European Affairs
 Dear Sir:

I should be grateful for space in which to comment on Professor Nicholas V. Riasanovsky's review of my book, *The Great Siberian Migration*, in your January 1959 issue.

I have no quarrel with Professor Riasanovsky's estimate of the book—indeed it is a flattering one generally—nor do I find the review characterized by anything else than the fairness, judiciousness, and clarity common to the other distinguished reviews for which Professor Riasanovsky has become widely known.

However, on one point, to which the reviewer devotes about half his space, his own estimate of one important figure whom I discuss in the book has led to a distortion of my own position. Professor Riasanovsky feels he "should emphasize" that I "support completely Stolypin's policies," and speaks of Stolypin as my "designated would-be savior of Russia." He erroneously declares that Stolypin reported, I "apparently"

accepting this, that only 3.8% of Siberian migrants returned home, and that this contradicts other material I present. Actually Stolypin's returner figure, given on the very page he cites, as 10%—3.8% represents, as is clearly stated, Stolypin's calculation of how many people returned without actually setting up households, rather than the gross traffic. The figure of 10% is not in contradiction with my table on pp. 34-35, although indeed the returner figures given there, some of them including scouts and some not (I have indicated which was which), may be confusing. (In general the statistical side of Russian migration, as I have tried to show throughout, is regrettably a mare's nest.)

Professor Riasanovsky accuses me of relying too heavily on Stolypin's report of his Siberian journey, ignoring the fact that it "represented the minister's defense of his own policies to the monarch." In fact Stolypin had initiated no important migration policies at that time, and the report is filled with criticisms of existing policy and practice in Siberia and in relation to that region; thus the reason for questioning credibility which the reviewer gives seems ill-formulated. He chides me for calling Minister of Agriculture Ermolov's "bumbling," charges that I criticize him simply because he disagreed with Stolypin, and points to Ermolov's high competence in his subject. His competence is known, as is his inactivity as minister despite that competence, and what this has to do with Stolypin is not clear.

Since the issue of my general evaluation of Stolypin has been raised, let me quote with the same approval I showed when citing it in an article of mine in 1955, C. A. Maklakov's remark: "Stolypin, desiring through the reform of peasant life to erect a support for *personal rights*, contradicted himself when he was indifferent to whether *this principle* of personal rights was trampled on by the government itself." Stolypin endeavored to put the peasant majority on the same legal footing as the small ruling minority, as a prerequisite to creating a solid social basis for constitutional monarchy. Unfortunately the habits of the autocracy were still strong and the machinery of autocracy was still in existence, and Stolypin came to debate legality in his battle with his foes, manhandling both the courts and the infant parliament in the process. In the book under consideration, however, I was concerned less with Stolypin as a man and statesman than as the author of an agrarian reform which was providing important economic and legal results, which indeed might have had, if continued, just the effect for which Stolypin hoped from the first.

Stolypin as a man and as a minister must be judged in the context of issues broader than those examined in my book, and that holds true for his motives in promulgating his agrarian reform. However, the principles of the reform itself ought not to be evaluated in terms of like or dislike for the man, but in terms of the agrarian problem which it sought to mitigate. My view is that the reform, by its attack on communal tenure, was removing the chief obstacle to a real solution to the problem. The reviewer argues the preferability of the expropriation of gentry land as a solution, and refers to "migration to Siberia" as my own "favorite" measure. On the contrary, I held (p. 236) that the "real solution could . . . be reached only by using the land more efficiently," and that the migrants' contribution toward this solution was much less by the act of migration than by "showing how that could be successfully done" in Siberian frontier conditions where more efficient methods could be easily utilized from the start. The Stolypin reform, by freeing the peasants in European Russia from the commune, was enabling them to adopt improved agricultural methods as well. I hold that the growth of independent peasant tenure and the spread of improved methods at the expense of the old communal tenure and the practice of extensive cultivation, both of which were gathering momentum long before the Stolypin reform, constituted the best emerging practical remedies as well as the preferable theoretical correctives to Russia's agrarian problems. Professor Riasanovsky may not agree. However, he ought to have made clear that from the first to the last chapter *this*, and not the portrayal of Stolypin as Russia's "savior," was the central thesis of my book.

Sincerely yours,
Donald W. Treadgold
University of Washington

BOOK REVIEWS

ITTERS, GERHARD, *Stein. Eine Politische Biographie*. Neugestaltete Auflage. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1958. Pp. 656. DM 36.

In this new single-volume edition Professor Gerhard Ritter presents a "line or line revision" of his well-known biography of Freiherr vom Stein, originally published in two volumes in 1931. There is a new introduction, the text has been rendered more compact, the new monographic literature has been exploited, and the critical apparatus of more than a hundred pages has been revised and extended. The revision of this massive study merits serious attention.

The historian who writes a political biography of Freiherr vom Stein is confronted with a number of uniquely difficult problems. If he adheres too rigidly to the restraints which a biography imposes on the author he will risk being vague and unintelligible on complicated problems and inadequately exploiting excellent monographs such as those of Ernst von Meier, Georg Winter, Hans Hausherr and Knapp; or he may be tempted to go to the opposite extreme and embark on a general history in the manner of Alfred Stern, Franz Schnabel or Cavaignac. By expanding his account to include essential and relevant materials wherever it is necessary to make his study readily comprehensible Ritter has resolved most of the difficulties with remarkable, yes brilliant, success. The account is clear and precise, and even his analysis of involved problems, such as the one on agrarian reform, invariably yields to close reading. And yet, one difficulty remains, especially for the foreign reader. If Georg Winter's document publication on the reorganization of Prussia in 1807 proves anything, it demonstrates that this reorganization was based on a broad and comprehensive program, to which Stein, it is true, contributed, or which he later modified in his own characteristic manner, but which in its conception and scope was overwhelmingly the work of Hardenberg. Against Hardenberg, however, Ritter displays an unmistakable and unaccountable hostility. Had Ritter extended his account to include a discussion of the entire complex of reformist tendencies and ideas at work in Prussia in 1807, he might, indeed, have broken out of the constricted limits of a biography, but by doing so he could have placed both these reformist tendencies and Stein himself into sharper perspective. No one, hereafter, will challenge Ritter's contention that Stein remained unmoved by the ideas of 1789, but it is also true that many high Prussian officials of this reform era were deeply imbued with these same ideas. Some of these officials subsequently pressed him further, as Ritter readily admits, in the liberal direction, for example in the matter of monopolies and guilds, than Stein had originally intended to go. Thus, the whole question of the influence of the French Revolution on the Prussian reform era is more complicated than Ritter, justifiably concerned above all with Stein himself, makes it appear. Ritter remedies this lacuna only indirectly when he later points out how, through Schön and Altenstein, much of Hardenberg's original program found its way back into the reform legislation of the Stein ministry.

This Stein reform era has not enjoyed a very favorable press in the United States in recent years. Guy Stanton Ford's measured account was succeeded by the most astringent studies of W. M. Simon and Hans Rosenberg, both of whom described the Stein reforms as a lamentable failure, though not as a complete failure. The attentive reader of Ritter's study, still the most searching by any historian of the present generation, will be quick to perceive that Stein's hefty personality, reminiscent of the gnarled and angular portraits of Albrecht Dürer, and

his program were not unconnected with this failure. In the perspective of our own day this program appears as sadly confused; what it lacked was the legal clarity of the Fathers of the American Revolution and, above all, a profound concern for civil liberty. Stein, as Ritter emphasizes, was of course as much opposed to Prussian royal autocracy with its peculiar "cabinet government" as he was to bureaucratic absolutism, which finally resulted from all his efforts during the Restoration. Ritter also reminds us that he was no less opposed to the democratic government of the French Revolution than to Bonapartist Caesarism. His political ideal, we are told, was "Germanic," that is to say a curious amalgam of the aristocratic model of England with its liberties, franchises and inheritable privileges and the archaic German *Ständestaat* which he hoped to revitalize into something like constitutional and representative government. This program required a drastic reform of the authoritarian Prussian state, but reform within the framework of "historic" continuity that salvaged as much as was practicable from the old régime.

The position which Ritter takes on many crucial issues is more readily understood if we regard his book as a conscious reaction against Max Lehmann's exaggerated idealization of Stein as the ideal representative of German liberalism and the trail-blazer of modern democracy. If Lehmann's three-volume work was a passionate defense of a Carlylean hero Ritter marks a return to the calm, passionless, and critical historiography of Ranke. By his vigorous insistence that Stein can be understood only within the historical context of his own age, Ritter's study has had a clarifying effect. That in the process Lehmann's hero should lose something of his originality and stature was almost inevitable. It is mistaken, contends Ritter, to identify Stein with the National Liberal party as Lehmann did, or with the democratic left as Hugo Preuss did, or with National Socialism as Erich Botzenhart did. Stein occupies a straddling position between the Enlightenment and Romanticism, between the archaic hierarchy of the estates and modern liberal constitutionalism. If Ritter identifies Stein with any movement at all, it is with what he calls that "special form of German liberalism" of Kant and Humboldt which perished under the oppression of the Restoration period. This, however, is being so vague that this reviewer prefers the more categorical statement of Wilhelm Mommsen that Stein was not a liberal.

While Ritter's portrait of Stein is not wanting in personal warmth the prevailing temper of this volume is critical. Ritter's Stein is bereft of political sense and tact and has no grasp at all of international affairs, which he persists in seeing in moralistic terms. He owed the great impact on his age less to his political thought, about which there was little that was truly original, than to his massive strength of character, to his Puritanical moralism, to his courage in facing the King and his critics, and to his personal power to sweep others along with him. Being an independent *Reichsritter* he was not, like Hardenberg, a careerist and he felt no need to sacrifice his principles to a desire to continue in public office. Nor was he, like Hardenberg, an autocrat, for he allowed his subordinates, Schön, Altenstein, and Frey to play an important, sometimes decisive rôle.

Those early chapters in which Ritter describes how Stein, an official in the Mining Department, matured into a statesman make fascinating reading and have much to offer that is new. Naturally enough, the chapters devoted to the reform legislation of the Stein ministry in 1807 and 1808 constitute the core of the volume. Here the detail is greatest and, since the author is treading on controversial ground, his solicitude to be as precise as his documents will permit sometimes makes reading difficult. Yet, the outlines of the general picture that emerges are sharp enough. No historian has been at greater pains to point out the limitations of Stein's

achievement. Again and again Ritter emphasizes the fragmentary, imperfect and incomplete nature of Stein's reform legislation. Practically none of it remained unaltered in the Restoration period that followed. Thus, in the reorganization of the Prussian governmental institutions, in large measure the work of Altenstein, it was ultimately Hardenberg's ideas that triumphed. Ritter's critique of Lehmann is the most successful of Stein's agrarian reform measures. The pattern that was followed in the famous October Edict of 1807 and the ordinance of February 14, 1808, both the work of Schön, was the British example and the Physiocratic ideal of *grande culture*, i.e., the smaller peasant holdings were sacrificed to the larger ones. It is apparent that Stein did nothing to save the smaller peasants. No less original and precise is Ritter's discussion of municipal reform, the most successful of all of Stein's measures. Yet, as the law emerged from his hands it literally teemed with imperfections and inadequacies. The right of the state to confirm municipal elections and the lack of precision in defining the line that separated the state's police power from municipal self-government later gave Prussian bureaucrats a handle to narrow down the scope of municipal autonomy. What is surprising is that Ritter denies any influence whatever of the French Revolution upon this law, whereas it appeared to the old Hintze that it was precisely in the structure of the municipal assembly that the French Revolution developed a modern type of representative body on which this law is patterned.

The student of the Napoleonic period will be especially attracted by the more dramatic chapters that deal with the French occupation, the negotiations over Russia's financial payments to France, and foreign policy. In so far as Stein played a leading rôle in these affairs, Ritter's judgment of his conduct is sharply critical; indeed, he condemns this entire policy as that of a bungling dilettante. Stein cherished the illusion that by making his financial payments promptly he could move Napoleon to relent in his harsh treatment of Prussia. It was characteristic of Stein's moralistic dialectic that when he found that this policy produced no results, he immediately began to agitate for war and that on his own initiative, hoping to confront the King with a *fait accompli*. Actually, it was this adventurist policy, which made any viable relationship with Napoleon utterly impossible, that induced Hardenberg, Altenstein, and Nagler to demand Stein's immediate dismissal. It should be said that Ritter here provides the first satisfactory analysis of all the circumstances that led to Stein's second dismissal.

Ritter's final chapters, which are devoted to Stein's activities after 1812 as adviser to Tsar Alexander I on German affairs, may contain less that is positively new but they are still not lacking in interest. To this reviewer Stein's nationalism and his impassioned agitation for German unification have always appeared to be a direct result of his opposition to Napoleon. Ritter himself keeps emphasizing the importance of Stein's origin as a *Reichsritter* which, emancipating him from any notional attachment to a particular state, compelled him to concentrate on Germany as a nation. This has recently earned him some criticism at the hands of Wilhelm Mommsen. The sensible view, it would seem, is that both positions contain an element of truth. Ritter, too, it seems to this reviewer, has the better of the argument in his debate with F. Meinecke, who insisted that there was a "cosmopolitan" element in Stein's nationalism. In any case, Ritter subjects all the numerous plans for a German constitution drafted between 1813 and 1815 to a careful and thorough analysis. It cannot be surprising that these final chapters also are charged with acid criticisms. Stein's political imagination was too deeply rooted in medieval corporative ideologies and his judgment was too thoroughly vitiated by his moralistic approach to politics to enable him to draft a realistic plan for German

unification. Even had he not been shunted to the sidelines Stein was not the political equal of Metternich, and Humboldt surpassed him in depth and maturity of judgment. And yet, Humboldt could scarcely have achieved what he did achieve in the German Confederation of 1815 without the moral authority and the incessant agitation of Stein.

When all is said, this is not only Ritter's most scholarly book, it is the most scholarly study that we have on Stein.

Columbia University

WALTER L. DORTCH

WENTZKE, PAUL, and WOLFGANG KLÖZER, ed., *Deutscher Liberalismus im Vormärz. Heinrich von Gagern Briefe und Reden 1815-1848*. Göttingen, Berlin & Frankfurt: Musterschmidt Verlag, 1959. Pp. 496. DM 46.

This volume, the first of three, is presented as a contribution to the study of German liberalism in the Pre-March period. Since there exists no other adequate biographical study or publication of the papers of Heinrich von Gagern, President of the Frankfurt Parliament of 1848, it also helps to fill a conspicuous gap.

After a brief biographic introduction, selected letters of Heinrich von Gagern to his immediate family and liberal friends have a priority on space. Second in importance are excerpts of speeches and proposals in the Hesse-Darmstadt parliament. The manuscripts here printed are deposited widely in various German archives, private collections, and libraries.

The choice of materials published, as well as the deletions in specific letters, was determined by the limitations of a one-volume work and the aim of illustrating the political views of von Gagern. Thereby the political man emerges rather fully, though much about his personal life and affairs is sacrificed in the process. The scholar is disappointed in seeing so many deletions of parts dealing with foreign affairs. The thinking of many Germans was colored greatly by the fact that Germany lay in the center of Europe surrounded by neighbors and competitors. Fortunately, the editors include a brief description of the nature of omitted materials.

Aside from certain individual variations, von Gagern has the typical views of the German constitutional liberals of the age. He was forthright in a sustained opposition to the perpetuation of small German states, which, in his view, commanded no respect among European powers and in which no real freedom could prevail. The lack of any professions of a Hesse-Darmstadt patriotism may be ascribed partly to the fact that he and his family had no ancestral roots there. His attitude, he admits, was more intolerable in the precincts of the petty German courts than the worst demagoguery (*ärgste Demagogie*).

In the Darmstadt parliament, von Gagern defended the *Burschenschaft*, admitting his own former membership when such a statement without a penitential bow, was synonymous with a confession of subversive activity. The populace of the right bank of the Rhine saw in him a champion of their French judicial and legal systems. He repeatedly made a public defense of individual liberties and parliamentary power as being in accord with German needs and the trends of the age. His moderation in viewpoint and expression won the respect of liberals who hoped to gain their ends in an evolutionary manner, at worst nursed along by a limited revolution. Von Gagern's prominence in 1848 was not an accident.

Von Gagern early looked to Prussian leadership in Germany. Austria had abandoned a German mission in favor of a destiny which pointed down the Danube and into the Balkans. He shared with most Germans (until 1848) a hope for

oland's revival. Isolated flashes occur as a portent of the liberal position in the 1860s. In 1832 he wrote, "I could desire nothing more strongly than to be subject to a despotic German king, firmly convinced that freedom would break open a way for itself once unity were achieved." (p. 100). Again, in contrast to most liberals, he believed that the War of Liberation in 1813 needed no incentives in the way of promise of a constitution (the Bismarck thesis).

The editors of this volume have prepared for the scholar all possible aids facilitating research: various indices, bibliographies, and biographic outlines of the correspondents and members of the von Gagern family. May the ensuing volume (1848-50) appear soon.

Montana State University

OSCAR J. HAMMEN

ENGEL-JANOSI, FRIEDRICH, *Österreich und der Vatikan, 1846-1918*. Vol. 1, 1846-1903. Graz: Verlag Styria, 1958. Pp. xxiv, 323.

This is not only a work of love but of considerable scholarship. Anyone who has ever met Professor Engel-Janosi will realize that not only does he bring to his tasks deep knowledge and penetrating insight, but he sometimes evokes a faint nostalgia for the symbol of the two-headed eagle and the age of the waltzing archdukes.

Engel-Janosi is intending a two-volume study of Austria and the Vatican. The volume under review carries the story through the two pontificates of Pius IX and Leo XIII. It is papal history seen from the Austrian connection, an Austrian connection based on the utility of Church to State. The survival of an Austrian dynastic state in a century of nationalism required every effort of the Habsburgs to replace structural weaknesses and peeling political plaster in the ramshackle empire. This meant using the convenient fact that an overwhelming majority of the Austrian people were Catholic, along with the conveniences of army, bureaucracy, and dynastic loyalty, to prop up the monarchy. Out of self-interest, Austria, remaining the last great Catholic power after 1870, sought to bolster the prestige of the Papacy without serving as a cat's paw to draw papal political chestnuts out of the Italian nationalist stewpot.

The story properly begins with the conclave of 1846. Gregory XVI had died suddenly of what Romans called St. Anthony's fire. The cardinals assembled to choose a successor. Austria was opposed to a liberal such as Gizzi or Mastai-Ferretti. Cardinal Gaysruck of Milan hastened to Rome to proffer the veto of such. The Sacred College selected Pio Nono with unseemly haste before Gaysruck's carriage reached the Vatican.

The author carefully examines the *rapports* of Metternich with Pius IX during the pontiff's liberal years. Then he treats the affair of the Second Roman Republic and Gaeta. Austria, recovering from the *moti* of 1848, made a new concordat with the Holy See. Next came the meddling of Napoleon III in Italy, the setbacks of 1859, the Vatican oecumenical council, and finally September 20, 1870. The old papacy survived until Pius IX's death in 1878 and Leo XIII's inauguration of a new age.

Austria, with renewed efforts as the sole remaining Catholic and Apostolic monarchy, stepped up her diplomacy at Rome. Leo XIII was gracious, courteous, and always mindful of the past. When his transition régime ended, Pius X was at the point of election, prepared to discard forever the old Habsburg right of a papal veto.

Thus the tale of Austro-Papal relations from 1846-1903 is neatly told. Pro-

fessor Engel-Janosi is no tyro at his subject. He has already published ten previous studies in this area and has clearly shown his mastery of his topic. His technique is to follow closely the reports of ambassadors and the instructions of the Austrian Government. While Vatican documents for the period are not available, he has used papers from the Haus-, Hof-, and Staatsarchiv and the French foreign ministry. He has also consulted private papers such as the correspondence and memoirs of Count Friedrich Karl Revertera-Salandra, who was Austrian ambassador to the Vatican from 1888 to 1901.

There are few errors and none of any consequence. If Professor Engel-Janosi maintains the same high level of sustained narrative in his second volume, promised for 1959, he will, as one reviewer has stated, "move to the forefront of the leading historians of our time."

It is anticipated that an index will be included in volume II that will cover the period from 1846-1918.

University of Miami

DUANE KOENIG

GAGEL, WALTER, *Die Wahlrechtsfrage in der Geschichte der deutschen liberalen Parteien 1848-1918*. Düsseldorf: Drost-Verlag, 1958, Pp. 200.

The present volume is number twelve in the series published by the *Bonner Kommission für Geschichte des Parlamentarismus und der Politischen Parteien*. Its schema is "the relationship of liberal political theory" on the suffrage question, "to political and social reality" (p. 6). Liberals in the Frankfurt Parliament favored property qualifications for voting in order to assure direction of a parliamentary state by those representatives of the middle classes whose interests were identified with the common good. Yet they rejected the idea of particular social groups employing the suffrage for specific political ends. The state, and along with it the suffrage, was viewed as an end in itself, not as a means to an end. This interpretation complemented the economic theories of free-trading liberals, and justified support of the Prussian three-class system of voting which conveniently favored the middle classes. The harmony was broken as the liberals experienced two catastrophes: the constitutional conflict with Bismarck, and the growth of Social Democracy. The one denied them access to political power from above; the other threatened to submerge them in the rising mass of socialist-led workers from below. The harmony of theory and practice had become a dilemma. To achieve the liberal ideal of parliamentary government the liberals were now required to join forces with the Social Democrats, and hence to accept the universal suffrage which Bismarck had imposed upon the Reich. This was the course championed by Friedrich Naumann, but accepted only by a small group of left-liberals, for universal suffrage weakened the representation of liberal groups in the party struggle and cooperation with the socialist *Reichsfeinde* was extremely difficult for the propertarian middle classes. Many liberals were tempted to adopt various expedients for the modification of universal suffrage, such as proportional representation, but even these posed difficulties in their implicit denial of liberal suffrage theory. To adopt proportional representation would be to espouse the "Interessenpolitik" which liberals had so long decried. The response of most German liberals by the end of the Second Reich to the dilemma posed by Prussian authoritarianism and the growth of Social Democracy was, in Gagel's words, to "hold fast to the constitutional norm" (p. 174), to maintain their theoretical position in the suffrage question despite its wide diversion from social and political realities.

Gagel's analysis is clear and perceptive; his conclusions are generally sound

and judiciously stated. This reviewer is inclined merely to question that liberals had reached such an impasse on the suffrage question by the end of the Second Reich. While Gagel generally restricts himself to the writings of leading liberals and the debates of the Prussian *Landtag* and the German *Reichstag*, a consideration of suffrage reform movements in other *Landtage* as well as of those in the municipalities might have suggested certain modifications of his general thesis. Liberals, both of the Right and the Left, in such areas actually were quite adept in the use of suffrage techniques such as proportional representation to the end of acquiring power or undercutting the opposition; and they seemed to justify their actions without apparent difficulty. While the book draws upon the most recent research published in Germany, several important non-German sources are omitted from the extensive bibliography. Indeed, J. S. Schapiro's work on liberalism and fascism is the only source in another language which is cited. Included in an appendix is a brief summary of the results of the Prussian *Landtag* election held in 1863 in the midst of the constitutional conflict between the liberals and Bismarck. The complete set of statistics, of which Gagel seems unaware, has been published in this country by Eugene N. Anderson in his *Statistics on the Prussian Elections of 1862-1863* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1954). For all that, Gagel's volume contributes significantly to our understanding of the suffrage question in a society of rapid industrial change. It should also aid its German readers in reassessing the liberal aspects of their political tradition.

Carroll College
Waukesha, Wisconsin

DONALD J. ZIEGLER

HIRSCH-WEBER, WOLFGANG, *Gewerkschaften in der Politik: Von der Massenstreikdebatte zum Kampf um das Mitbestimmungsrecht*. Köln und Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1959. Pp. xv, 170.

This study is the thirteenth volume of a series published by the Institut für Politische Wissenschaft and edited by Professor Otto Stammer from Berlin. The study covers the history of German labor unionism from 1848 through 1953; however, the Hitler period is omitted. The author is not as interested, however, in writing a history of unionism as he is concerned with the problem of the political rôle of the unions, especially in regard to the state. His major problem is to determine under what conditions labor unions are entitled to go on a political strike.

In order to answer the question, he first draws a lesson from history. In 1905 and 1933, the German labor unions preferred to abstain from any action; this lack of resistance against Hitler is explained by the author as a result of inefficient leadership and weakened unions due to unemployment (only one third of the union members were fully employed during the 1931-32 winter, p. 37). On the other hand, the general strike in 1920 defeated the Kapp coup, and the threat of a general strike in 1950-52 has maintained and expanded the *Mitbestimmungsrecht*. Considering the relationship of the major German labor union (ADGB, and after World War II, DGB) toward the German Social-Democratic Party, the author found the relationship to be close, with a largely overlapping membership. Although the Party was more aggressive, the unions displayed a more conciliatory attitude and concerned themselves mostly with economic problems of bargaining; however, World War I had brought about increasing political orientation in unions. Interestingly, despite the fact that, after World War II, unions have a more heterogeneous membership (workers as well as white-collar workers who later started their own employees' organization), Hirsch-Weber maintains that this does not

necessarily mean the German unions have become less political—following the American example (p. 136). Characteristically, he also questions Perlman's well-known thesis about the lack of political interest by "the job-conscious" workers (p. 119, footnote no. 481).

Turning to his major problem, he relies heavily upon Alfred Weber's analysis that provides for the differentiation between the legal framework (the legal integration) and the social system (the social integration) of a democratic society. Consequently, the remotely elected Parliament may not necessarily be sensitive to majority opinion; in such a situation, labor unions are entitled to go on a defensive strike (*Widerstandstreik*). The author also maintains that a general strike could never be undertaken if a majority of the people would not support it (p. 133). Furthermore, he maintains that the strikes both in 1920 and 1952 were defensive ones. Since the integrative processes of society, whether legal or social, must be permanently renewed and maintained, the general strike can function under certain conditions as an integrative force. Nevertheless, the author admits that the general strike could be misused by demagogues, but he does not elaborate on how to prevent such a misuse (p. 133).

This book is of interest not only to historians but also to political scientists and sociologists. Characteristic of the interpenetration of the social science fields are frequent references not only to Alfred Weber, but also two references to Max Weber and one reference to Talcott Parsons (p. 116). It is unfortunate that the author could not obtain more information about the overlapping membership of the Social Democratic Party and the unions for years other than those following World War II. Furthermore, the situation under Hitler should also have been studied. For example, was the labor organization more or less controlled by the Nazi headquarters than were the German universities, armies, etc.?

University of Kentucky

JÍRÍ KOLAJA

GÖHRING, MARTIN, *Bismarcks Erben 1890-1945*. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1958. Pp. 386.

This book, dealing mainly with Germany's foreign policy from "Bismarck the founder to Hitler the destroyer" is a welcome addition to history for young German students. There is nothing very new or startling in the material itself. Its value lies in its approach, in the attitude of the author toward his country's successes and failures. The book is based on lectures given recently by the writer at the technical high school in Stuttgart. Dr. Martin Göhring of the Institute for European History of Mainz is a sound scholar who displays a logic understandable to a non-German. He is a follower of Meinecke rather than Treitschke and makes his point of view extremely convincing with apt quotations and examples.

His bibliography includes not only the standard German documents and secondary sources but also leading American and British works. And what is more important, the author has made good use of Fay, Langer, Churchill and Bullock along with Ritter, Zeller and others of similar calibre.

The effectiveness of the book is due partially to the fact that while Göhring is critical, he is also constructive, and there can be no doubt about his patriotism. He enjoys playing up his heroes. But his heroes are Bismarck and Stresemann, not William II, Holstein or the generals. In discussing the reasons for Germany's defeat in World War I, the author mentions the obvious ones and then adds "But in addition to material factors there are also clearly political ones of importance. People who engage in a life and death struggle need inner unity of the strongest

sort. By 1916 this quality had been long lost to the Central Powers. But the Entente, under the most serious blows, held firmly to a clear political goal and it surprised the Germans to learn that the democratic régimes which seemed to begin at a disadvantage as opposed to autocratic Germany and Austria-Hungary showed, as the war lengthened, that the tie between leaders and people remained firm and tight. In the hour of need they had governments set up on a broad basis, led by strong men, concentrating on national aims."

Göhring regards the Weimar Republic, as does Meinecke, as the logical result of the processes of the war, not as something foisted upon the Germans and therefore to be resented. Since he recognizes the real purpose of such a government, it is not surprising to find him referring to the choice of Hindenburg as President as a "national misfortune." And his explanation of why a traditional conservative general, no matter how loyal to his oath of office, could never be even adequate as the leader of a new troubled democracy will probably be much more effective with students than the sneers offered by opponents of the old gentleman, both within and without Germany.

Both Göhring's dislike of the Versailles treaty and his feeling against Clemenceau and Poincaré are normal in a German historian, but the author does display a little naïveté when he complains because the victors did not extend the Fourteen Points to the vanquished or is surprised that the European nations did not allow an American president to lead them in settling age-old European problems. The author does appreciate Briand's attempts to close the breach with Germany and his difficulties at home as a result. In the same vein he upbraids the Germans for not appreciating Stresemann's efforts and achievements. In fact in discussing Hitler's early steps after 1933, he uses the abrogation of the Stresemann achievements as his yardstick to show the degradation of the Nazi government. That too seems to me to be an effective way to explain away the prestige of the Nazis that must still exist in the minds of many of the young people of Germany today.

Göhring is very critical of the generals on the General Staff. He points out their great responsibility as leaders beyond their military duties and finds them lacking, from Brauchitsch on. He states, both in his preface and in the body of his book, that Germany must accept the blame for her last catastrophe. However, he closes on a note of hope—in the last twelve years since the end of the war, Germany has set up a firm federal state. He can see no reason why another German statesman cannot repeat Bismarck's achievement in uniting Germany.

The book would be improved by an index and maps. Otherwise it is excellent for its purpose.

New York University

MINNA R. FALK

YOUNG, HARRY F., *Maximilian Harden: Censor Germaniae; the Critic in Opposition from Bismarck to the Rise of Nazism*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1959. Pp. 288. Guilders 26.50.

There is no objective procedure for measuring the impact of a political publicist upon the history of his times. But no student of German history, from 1890 to 1914, can fail to attribute importance to Maximilian Harden, editor and publisher of the independent weekly *Die Zukunft*. Although Harden's journal never had more than 10,000 subscribers, its readers presented a substantial part of the intellectual and political élite of Wilhelminian Germany. Harden's position as a leading political, social, and literary critic justifies this full-length study, which dis-

pels much that was legendary about the Berlin publicist and objectively assesses the man, the journalist, and the public figure.

Harden was born in a Christianized Jewish family in Berlin. His formal education was scanty and for ten years he was a professional actor before making the switch to journalism, beginning as a theater critic and moving on to literature and politics. Always a non-conformist, he repudiated the compromises and conformities required for success in Berlin journalism, and in 1892 founded *Die Zukunft*, which he continued to edit and publish until 1922. Strongly literary and political, Harden offered his journal as a forum for independent thinkers and writers with something original to say. It was not the distinguished roster of writers and critics but Harden himself who gave the journal its reputation and position. From first to last it was the personal vehicle for the thoughts, views, and aberrations of a gifted, versatile, original and communicative person. Toward the end of its life the weekly issues were written entirely by Harden. While he was a scourge to the philistine daily press, Harden as a journalist represented in some respects the weaknesses and grave deficiencies of German journalism—intemperate, polemical, frequently irresponsible, and hypercritical.

Young aptly describes Harden as "a traditionalist with a radical flare" (p. 48). Politically he flirted with the agrarians, and admired the qualities of the Prussian Junker; he was a Bismarck enthusiast, a persistent critic of William II, despite two convictions for *lèse majesté*, and a friend of Holstein's after his departure from the Wilhelmstrasse. He was pro-Russian and anti-British (later reversing his position), an advocate of force in international relations and a burning patriot and annexationist in 1914-15. Shortly, he switched to a moderate position, championing a democratic peace; he welcomed the Weimar Republic but later considered it a "gigantic disgrace." As a warner, critic, and adviser Harden's influence was negative rather than positive. At his death in 1927, Kurt Tucholsky wrote: "Maximilian Harden is dead. It is fitting to place a wreath on the grave of this great writer. [But] of what flowers?" (p. 269).

Harden first achieved world-wide notoriety by exposing the private lives of members of William II's entourage. This blossomed into the "Eulenburg affair," and the sensational trials in which Harden was a principal. His vindication did not halt the trend toward irresponsible government, which he always maintained was his objective in this campaign.

Among the positive and welcome contributions of this book may be noted: A clarification of Harden's relations to Bismarck, Holstein, and Bülow; an objective analysis of Johannes Haller's apologia on behalf of Eulenburg and a clarifying account of Harden's actions and motives; an excellent chapter on "Colleagues, Friends, and Enemies," dealing especially with Harden's relations to the banker Carl Fürstenberg, Albert Ballin, Walther Rathenau, Theodor Wolff, and Georg Bernhard; and a detailed exposition of Harden's shifting positions during and after World War I and his clouded and embittered end. The author has based his work on a substantial Harden "Nachlass" in the Koblenz Bundesarchiv, the extensive papers of Harden's companion for many years, who is identified only as "E.S.," the files of *Die Zukunft*, personal interviews, and relevant contemporary literature. This is a sound, well written, and sophisticated treatment of the "Censor Germaniae."

University of Virginia

ORON J. HALE

GROSS, FELIKS, *The Seizure of Political Power in a Century of Revolutions*. New York: Philosophical Library, 1958. Pp. xxvii, 398. \$6.99.

Though students of political history have studied or even witnessed many instances of seizure of power in this "century of revolutions" some of them have failed to grasp their character and understand their true meaning. This appears true particularly in the case of some free-world scholars who have not, fortunately enough for them, experienced a revolution and have, therefore, been unable to detect and evaluate its powerful psychological and sociological elements and its operational processes.

Professor Feliks Gross has rendered a valuable service to the broad field of social sciences. His book first clarifies in a short introductory fashion a set of political, psychological, and sociological values; it then defines various types of violent seizure of power—from the top, from the bottom, combined seizure—and finally and most importantly devotes most of the space to the series of revolutions in Russia as they started with the Decembrist movement and culminated in the Bolshevik October Revolution. It was probably not the purpose of his work to present a depth study but rather to point to the philosophical background and environmental factors out of which grew a revolutionary atmosphere in Russia. He also brings up the techniques and implements used by revolutionaries. He may not have unravelled some hitherto unknown startling facts but some of the quotations he uses to prove his point are most enlightening. He shows what one might call the organic growth of a revolutionary situation and acquaints the reader with the main theoretical writings on revolutionary strategy and tactics and their practical applications. The book is excellently organized and most readable.

The reviewer has been most impressed by Gross' description and analysis of two factors of Communist revolutionary designs, one psychological, the other organizational: mass fear and dual power. Mass fear as a product of mass terror was a constant element which facilitated Communist seizures of power; the dual power strategy, which appeared first in the fateful events of 1905 in Russia, was successfully pursued in the long series of Communist violence since 1917 up to 1948, whether the pattern was called the Soviets or National Committees. At the same time, however, one should not overlook the importance of the Communist party's illegal work and its ever present training of professional revolutionaries and paramilitary alertness.

Professor Gross logically asks himself in the concluding part of his book the question whether revolutionary symptoms and processes are absent in the Soviet world. He sees some hopeful signs in the discontent in Russia and in the revolutionary eruptions in some countries behind the Iron Curtain, particularly in the historical events in Poland and Hungary in 1956. But he rightly says that democratic movements have no pattern of revolutionary strategy and tactics, while the Communist governments have been able to develop techniques of consolidating their own power. Using the instances of World War II he concludes that an underground movement, important as it is, cannot succeed "without outside support, without an internal crisis of dictatorship, social unrest, or international defeat—without a 'revolutionary situation,'" (p. 356).

Social Science Foundation
University of Denver

JOSEF KORBEL

EPSTEIN, KLAUS, *Matthias Erzberger and the Dilemma of German Democracy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959. Pp. 473. \$10.

Professor Klaus Epstein's carefully etched pen portrait of the highly controversial Matthias Erzberger will arouse more admiration than controversy in the United States; it may well cause controversy, however, in Germany where the courageous but erratic Erzberger's reputation still stands in need of some rehabilitation. Not that the author has set out to rehabilitate his man. He has merely studied and reported, and has done both with complete honesty and objectivity and with great thoroughness.

Where Erzberger's own autobiographical *Erlebnisse im Weltkrieg* is applicable the author has used it, but never uncritically, unless it was uncritical to repeat Erzberger's—to many of us—incredible tale about the French puzzlement at Compiègne over the "Sign anyway" message signed only "Reichskanzler Schluss." (He says they knew no one named Schluss.) Generally the author has drawn much more heavily upon the Erzberger papers in the Federal Archive at Koblenz which reveal much more than the *Erlebnisse* regarding Erzberger's war-time work as Director of Intelligence and Propaganda and about his diplomatic missions that could have been learned from other sources. He has also made good use of his father's article on the Conger mission of 1919. (Fritz T. Epstein, "Zwischen Compiègne und Versailles," in *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, III [1955] 412-45.)

Tactfully remembering that many readers will want to know the originals or at least the key words of important passages quoted in translation, Mr. Epstein consistently gives both; for example: *Verzichtsfrieden* (power peace), or peace by agreement (*Verständigungsfrieden*). German invective and name-calling do not always translate well. Here also the author lets the reader roll his own: *Gelbfüßler* (yellow coward), braggart (*Fotzmaul*), *verlogener Schweinehund* (lying pig-dog) or you try it.

Erzberger all too frequently referred to himself as a thinking man, as if discounting emotion or ethical principles. His emotional motivation was always strong, but he prided himself upon being guided ultimately by his intellect rather than his emotions. He was usually thinking far ahead of the way his people felt, so, especially in war time, he frequently advocated policies which he could see were necessary but of which a majority of his countrymen failed or refused to recognize the necessity. Although an ardent annexationist and an advocate of ruthless submarine warfare until 1916, who voted for the Reichstag resolution authorizing it, he was one of the first to realize that the U-Boat was not winning the war, that an early peace was desirable, and that no such negotiated peace was to be had unless Germany publicly renounced annexations. He sought peace through Papal intervention in the summer of 1917, and blamed Michaelis and Kuhlmann for failure to attain it. He fought hard in the Reichstag for the Peace Resolution of July 4, 1917. He sympathized with Polish aspirations toward independence. He considered it necessary to sign the Armistice Agreement in November 1918, courageously assumed responsibility for doing so, and would presumably not have been deterred from doing his duty in that matter even if he had known (as apparently he did not) that he would be made the scapegoat in the "Stab-in-the-back" legend. Similarly, because he thought it necessary to sign the Treaty of Versailles he organized the Reichstag majority to authorize the signature. As Armistice Commissioner he was unable to dictate to Marshal Foch—or to defend himself against those who called him a traitor for failing to do so, except to retort that one of them (Vögler) had forgotten "the inconvenient fact that we have unfortunately lost the war." As Minister of Finance he gave the Weimar Republic a centralized and unified tax administration that was anathema to die-hard states'

righters, and a capital levy and new income, capital gains, and inheritance taxes that earned him the enmity of the powerful and privileged, who, but for the inflation, would have had to pay as they had never paid before.

To most of the unreconstructed former "upper-class" people and to many of the military, the *parvenu* civilian Erzberger was uncouth, unsympathetic, uncongenial—and dangerous. He had to find political support from "left" rather than right of center; but even of those who followed him, politically, the author says: "The cumulative heritage of the undistinguished history of German parliamentary institutions serves to explain their weakness. The *Reichstag* parties were accustomed to act as pressure groups, not responsible coalition partners."

What Professor Epstein calls "the pathological political atmosphere of 1919" was in some ways even worse in 1921, when the *Kreuzzeitung* quoted from the *Oletzkoer Zeitung* the ominously bitter comment: "Erzberger . . . has suffered the fate which the vast majority of patriotic Germans have long desired for him. . . . We cannot restore German greatness with mere sentimentality (*Gefühlsduselei*). We must sow hatred! We must learn to hate our enemies abroad, but we must also punish the domestic enemies of Germany with our hatred and our contempt. Compromise is impossible. Only extremism can make Germany again what it was before the war." Their man of wrath was even then approaching *via* Munich.

Erzberger would not have made Germany precisely what it had been. Accused of inconsistency, he had replied that the wise one learns from his own mistakes while a fool persists in his folly. He was adjustable, but popular only among his own followers. Even his irrepressible optimism, his unshaken conviction that Germany still had a future potentially more glorious than her past, seems to have given an impression of frivolity. Because he recognized the fact of defeat, those who preferred to close their eyes to it made him, in their minds, responsible for it and identified him and Weimar with it.

Despite the author's consistent objectivity, a note of sympathy for his subject may be detected in his summary: "To secure the ratification of the treaty in 1919 was Erzberger's greatest single achievement, yet it was one for which public monuments will never be erected to honor his name." Even Professor Epstein has written him no eulogy, not even an apologia, but merely an excellent biography.

University of Wisconsin

CHESTER V. EASUM

ELSNER, RICHARD, *Gesamtdeutsche Ostpolitik: Deutschland, Russland, Polen*. Göttingen: R. Elsner, 1958. Pp. 105. DM 3.20.

If there is a single theme in this little book, which is otherwise a compilation of six separate essays by Dr. Elsner and four other writers, it is that Poland has been basically responsible for the unsettled history of Eastern Europe. Her complicity has been compounded in more recent times because she is inextricably beholden to Soviet Russia; and in terms of the European balance of power she must of necessity follow the Moscow line. The Oder-Neisse boundary, which Elsner particularly singles out as politically, economically, ethnically and morally monstrous, is an issue on which the Poles are neither able nor willing to exercise an independent policy. Poland is accused by both Elsner and Pierre Valmigrè in the latter's essay, "Und Morgen? Frankreich, Deutschland und Polen," (originally published in 1929) of possessing an annexation complex, or "*Kilometerwahnsinn*."

Valmigrè bemoans especially the fact that French policy in the period after World War I was marked by so little cooperation between France and Germany and leaned so heavily upon the entente with Poland. It is his judgment that this

encouraged Poland to act frequently with impunity toward her neighbors and thus endanger the peace of Europe.

The case against Poland in the inter-war period is overdrawn, but some telling points are made against the present régime in Poland in Professor Bolko Freiherr von Richtofen's essay entitled "Die kommunistische Darstellung der ostdeutschen Geschichte." Political spokesmen and representatives of the historical profession (use of the word 'historian' is questionable) in east Germany, Poland and Soviet Russia are quoted and indicted for their self-evident contradictions and evasions in the areas of history and of logic. Indeed, the writers of history are portrayed as paid scribes of the makers of history—in Moscow, Warsaw and East Berlin.

The new line is contrasted sharply with earlier, more scientific Polish versions of the Eastern question (e.g., Boleslaw Prus-Glowacki, "Polnische Dichter des Positivismus über die deutsche Kolonisation," in *Gazeta Polska*, 1901) and Soviet versions (cf. article on Poland in *Great Soviet Encyclopedia*, 1941). The author, further, finds some satisfaction in quoting the Polish Marxist historian, Stanislaw Arnold, who, in his book *Geografia historyczna Polski* (1951) wrote:

Das frühgeschichtliche Polen vergrösserte sich durch Eroberungen. Es kam nach Schlesien und an die Ostsee nur durch diese gewaltsame Ausdehnungspolitik.

Of course, this little book is more than a polemic. By appealing to history and to logic it points up the dangers inherent in an Eastern European settlement which is based upon neither history nor logic. Conflict would certainly ensue. "Die Sehnsucht aller Menschen ist der Frieden . . . Das Wesen des Friedens ist Toleranz, das Wesen der Ideologie ist Intoleranz, ist Kampf und Unterdrückung, ja, selbst Vernichtung."

University of Nebraska

ALBIN T. ANDERSON

Sisu "Even Through A Stone Wall:" *The Autobiography of Oskari Tokoi*. New York: Robert Speller & Sons, 1957. Pp. 252. \$6.00.

For Finland, as for Russia, 1917 was the year of great crisis, during which a new political order was born; in Finland, not as in Russia, this new order was destined to be parliamentary democracy. The leaders of the Provisional Government found themselves unable to control the situation in Russia, let alone in the borderlands of the Empire. The result of tergiversation in Russian policy was the formation of Finland's first parliamentary Cabinet, a coalition in which the bourgeois and Social Democratic parties were equally represented. A Social Democrat, Oskari Tokoi, was Prime Minister. His memoirs make an interesting addition to the growing body of English-language literature on Finnish politics.

Tokoi led many interesting lives—as a young immigrant in the American West before the turn of the century, as a rising politician in the new Social Democratic Party upon his return to Finland, as liaison officer of the Murmansk Finnish Legion with the British in the chaotic period of international civil war in Russia, and finally, in exile from both Finland and Russia, as spokesman for the tightly-knit Social Democratic segment of Finnish-born Americans. All of these activities, including his motivations, are described by Tokoi in a moving and convincing way. His account of the impact upon internal Finnish politics of post-1899 Russification attempts is particularly significant. Any judgment of this volume must, however, rest essentially on his account of the events leading up to, and including, the Finnish Civil War of 1918. This was the high point of Tokoi's life, and it should be the high point of his memoirs. It is regrettable, therefore, that this portion of

the book is the least satisfactory. There are a number of serious factual errors, such as the statement (page 142) that "... in May, Alexander Kerensky became head of the Provisional Government, and in this capacity he paid a visit to Finland. At a reception in Helsinki, Kerensky made a speech in which he promised independence to the Finnish people—and sealed his promises by embracing and kissing me!" Not only is Tokoi's chronology confused, but, from all other available evidence, it appears that when Kerensky visited Helsinki, as a member (but not head) of the Provisional Government, he asked Finns to be loyal to that government.

Tokoi presents a highly romanticized version of the goals and actions of the revolutionary Finnish worker's government of 1918. It may, of course, be true, as he argues (page 160), that the aim of this government was "... the achievement of a democratic order of society." This is true, however, only if Bolshevism equals democracy. Equally questionable is the assertion (page 161) that the revolutionary constitution "... was the same, in spirit and also very largely in content, as that accepted in 1919, from other leaders." Even a cursory comparison of this constitution with the republican constitution of 1919 (still in effect) reveals the inaccuracy of this statement. It is perhaps to be expected that a partisan account of the Civil War would be presented by someone who was an active participant. It is surprising, however, that Tokoi does not attempt to explain why he accepted a position as a member of the revolutionary government. Since he had served previously as Speaker of the Finnish Parliament, as well as Prime Minister, and had been known as a leader of the parliamentarian majority within his party, this seems a rather important question. Nowhere does he deal with the crucial question of why a man who had advocated, with considerable distinction, the cause of parliamentary democracy would abandon it in its hour of greatest need. The pressure of the extraparlimentary Red Guards (mostly unemployed younger militants) upon the established leaders of the Social Democratic Party, including Tokoi, during late 1917 forced a number of these leaders to shift their basic strategy. The Finnish nation might well have avoided the tragic Civil War if the Social Democratic leadership had possessed sufficient personal courage to withstand the assault of the Red Guards upon the party machinery. This courage they did not possess. Whether *sisu* characterized such leaders, and therefore whether this book bears the correct title, is a question which each reader must answer for himself.

Brown University

MARVIN RINTALA

RICHERT, ERNST, CAROLA STERN and PETER DIETRICH, *Agitation und Propaganda—Das System der publizistischen Massenführung in der Sowjetzone*. Schriften des Instituts für Politische Wissenschaft, Berlin; Vol. 10. Berlin: Verlag Franz Vahlen GmbH, 1958. Pp. 331.

One of the secrets of Communist success lies in the application of the weapons of ideology and terror. Terror has been more generally understood even by outsiders, perhaps because of its association with fear, perhaps because movies, television and novels have eagerly seized upon the subject in recent years. The use of propaganda has been too often met—especially by Americans with a tradition of the free interplay of ideas—with the incredulous, slightly patronizing question: "Do they really believe that?" To answer this question we first have to come to an understanding of the important distinction Communists make between "agitation," and "propaganda." Not only is each directed to a different audience; they also serve different specific purposes.

Actually, a good part of "agitation" is not primarily expected to be believed, or to shape public opinion. Its major purpose is to mobilize, especially the non-Communist public, "to participate in certain social and political actions for which it is not sincerely prepared to act." The major media of mass-agitation, the press, the radio and the specific features of written and oral "agitation" known only in the Soviet orbit, are shown by the authors to reveal always this objective of yielding particular results—primarily of higher economic productivity.

The film represents a blend of the elements of "agitation" and "propaganda." Here, the "abstract theoretical formula" of the ideology is made "perpetual in its immediate applicability and significance for the daily requirements of policy," and, by making the viewer "identify himself with the fate of the hero, can lead to immediate political conclusions." (p. 243)

As examples of "agitation," the authors also present a collection of fourteen case-studies of Communist group "therapy." It should be stated, however, that in some of these the methods employed to obtain specific results by the use of pressure and the threat of exposure as "fraternizers" with the class-enemy, begin to border on the application of terror.

The product of "agitation" is usually the conformist. The desirable product is the non-Party activist, the "innovator." Agitation serves as a selective method to increase the fund of state, Party and economic functionaries—the *cadres*—who are to put the Party's ideological principles into practice. Hence propaganda, as the transmittal of the ideology is applied in a vast and highly differentiated system of training schools. The end product is to be the true believer. If he rarely conforms to the desired ideal-type, it is because of the disparity between the desired leadership qualities of strength, discipline but also initiative, and the formal rote knowledge acquired in the schools. This process is described in the last section, written by Carola Stern and partly based on personal experiences at the highest Party Academy, the *Karl-Marx-Hochschule*.

Here the vanguard is to obtain that familiarity with Marxist-Leninist theory which the Party considers a prerequisite to enable it to play that "leading rôle" which it derives from this very theory. But it must also acquire "the knowledge of the precise conclusions which—according to the will of the leadership—are to be drawn from the individual dogmatic axioms for the separate phases and aspects of practical policy." (p. 273) Especially at the Party *Internat* schools, the students live a completely regimented life, up to a period of three years. To succeed here requires complete subordination to the collective, and the training methods guarantee that few emerge with mental reservations. When the student leaves school, he knows "what is expected of him." Whether he can live up to that expectation under the counterpressures of an as yet unassimilated society in Eastern Germany, Miss Stern hesitates to answer affirmatively.

The entire study is preceded by a brief but excellent survey history of the Soviet Zone since 1945. While this latest volume from the Berlin Institute lacks somewhat the cohesiveness that we have come to expect from preceding volumes, it is nevertheless a valuable addition. The omission of an index is regrettable.

University of California at Berkeley

HORST DUHNKE

SCHULZ, KLAUS-PETER, *Opposition als politisches Schicksal?* Köln: Verlag für Politik und Wirtschaft, 1958. Pp. 165. DM 7.80.

In 1954, Klaus-Peter Schulz published his little book, *Sorge um die deutsche Linke*, and thereby stimulated what has over the years become the focal point of

discussion within and without the S.P.D.: What is wrong with German Social Democracy? Again, at a most opportune moment, we hear from Schulz, a member of the Party and one of the small band of SPD leaders who prevented the West-Berlin Party from being swallowed up by the Communists in 1946. Standing outside the Party bureaucracy and thus able to use independent judgment, Schulz bares without restraint all the historical, ideological and organizational weaknesses that have prevented the S.P.D. from playing the rôle which it alone, as the second strongest party in a virtual two-party system can and must play if German democracy is to become a viable factor. The election results of 1949, 1953 and again 1957 have, however, raised the warning question whether "opposition is the political destiny" of the S.P.D. and whether the much welcomed two-party trend will not become an empty formula.

Schulz' critique touches on few points that were not known before. But the value of this book does not lie so much in what he says but in the polemic assistance which it might give to the group within the S.P.D. for which the author claims to speak, in throwing off the ballast of outdated utopian formulas that handicap the Party's objectives. While no present S.P.D. leader may believe in a future "withering away of the state,"—to cite an example—few have come to grips with the central problem of political state power in its non-economic manifestations. Schulz ably shows the extent to which this failure has become the root of the erratic course of the Party, especially with respect to the vital issues of military power and foreign policy. Whatever the voter's feelings about the foreign policy of the present German Government may have been, he has not been able to overcome the deep-seated suspicion that the S.P.D. might jeopardize the present power balance in Europe by substituting a hopeless "position of weakness" for an inflexible "position of strength."

The Party's failure to understand the basic elements of power on which any foreign policy must be based has directly contributed to its short-sighted pursuit of re-unification as the ultimate goal of German foreign policy and the creation of a re-unification myth "whose national limitation has blocked the wider view toward world politics." This, Schulz tells his friends, has induced the Soviets to believe that they can raise their price with impunity, because there is an opposition in Germany which is willing to pay anything for the attainment of its only goal. If the S.P.D. should come into power, it would then find that it could not pay the price which, with its own policy, it has helped to raise. (p. 124f.)

Against Adenauer's solution of *Kleineuropa*, the author advocates an alternative S.P.D. policy aimed at the creation of a *Grosseuropa*, including the countries behind the Iron Curtain. Such a long-range policy would take into account a continuing process of change in the Soviet orbit so that at some future date a "socialized" freedom of the West would encounter a more "bourgeois" communism of the East and thus provide the scope of political action for which the German Social Democrats would be more ideally suited than the party in power. Such policy goals might not be immediately realizable but they would, in the author's view, at least not be utopian. They could, furthermore, produce a more realistic evaluation of those steps that are possible in the present and attract the requisite number of voters which would bring the S.P.D. into power.

A complete change of the Party's domestic and foreign policy aims would, of course, require a thorough reshaping of its ossified internal power structure and Schulz' recommendations to that effect may be considered a sound point of departure. Under the present critical conditions in Central Europe there appears little time for delay, but it would be optimistic to believe that the inertia and aimless-

ness of the S.P.D. can be quickly and easily overcome. For the general reader this little book offers a good summary of the politics of German Social Democracy; for the Party itself it is an urgent call to action.

University of California at Berkeley

HORST DUHNKE

DE JONG, LOUIS, *Die Deutsche Fünfte Kolonne im Zweiten Weltkrieg* (Quellen und Darstellungen zur Zeitgeschichte, Band IV). Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1959. Pp. 282. DM 19.80.

American scholars will probably request that the *Institut für Zeitgeschichte* in Munich did not choose to provide German readers with a translation of Louis Edmond den Dooren de Jong's original doctoral thesis which appeared in 1953 as *De Duitse vijfde Colonne in de tweede wereldoorlog* (Arnhem: Van Voghsum Slaterus). This fourth volume in their series of sources and studies in contemporary history is essentially the shortened English version which appeared in 1956 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul). The German edition adds nothing to what English and American readers already have, but of course that was not the intention of the Institut. The general effect of the shortened version is the same as that of the original: to minimize the rôle of Germans and local fascists abroad as "fifth columnists." De Jong, now chief of the Dutch Rijksinstituut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie, contends that the hysteria which gave rise to the universal belief in a "fifth column" is ultimately of as much significance as the very moderate efforts and effects of actual German groups. What is missing from the English and German editions is the solid historical setting in which the fear of the Germans arose, and the bibliographical commentary of the author in which he discusses what materials he did not have access to. The reduction of what might appear merely as the "excess baggage" of a doctoral dissertation in the English and German editions tends to make the people who cried "Wolf!" in 1940 appear even more the victims of their own fantasies than they really were. In the Dutch edition de Jong gives considerably more of the atmosphere with concrete examples, which helps to explain foreign suspicions of the Germans, and he states clearly that he does not have the records of the *Auslandsorganisation der NSDAP*, the *Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle*, and the *Sicherheitsdienst*, except in fragments.

De Jong breaks up his study into three parts. About 130 pages of the 275 pages of German text are devoted to describing the hysteria: *Angst*. In 90 well-documented pages the author undertakes to describe the real rôle of the Germans in Poland, Scandinavia, the Western campaigns, England and America, the Balkans and the U.S.S.R.: *Wirklichkeit*. Finally, in the most truncated part of the original dissertation, he attempts a psychological and a historical explanation of the phenomenon. Of the original 97 pages, only 40 (with approximately the same number of words per page) remain for German readers, entitled *Analyse*. There is no bibliography, a sad loss, owing to the outstanding completeness of the Dutch version. The German edition does have an index, but again, unfortunately, it is not detailed under terms like *Auslandsorganisation*, Hitler, etc. The English edition is.

De Jong is at his best in drawing shrewd parallels between past hysterias about secret agents and between the different stories about fifth column activities. He shows how carelessly the term was used to apply to any and all activities of Reich Germans, persons of German speech, local fascists, and oppositional elements of all sorts. He concludes that "genuine" fifth column activities occurred in the sense of military activity only in Poland and Yugoslavia; in the sense of political activity he

lays stress upon the Austrian, Czech and Memel cases. This latter area is virtually omitted from the German version, and even the analysis of the reasons for ethnic German (*Volksdeutsch*) collaboration with Hitler, supplied in the English version, are omitted for lack of space. Through careful and rigorous use of the national investigating committee reports he shows how truly insignificant the local fascists ("Quislings") were in the West, and how little Hitler depended upon them.

In summary, it seems likely that de Jong's book is correct in principle and emphasis and will be substantiated further if and when the detailed records of the Nazi agencies involved in manipulating the folk groups in East Europe become the subject of historical research. Far more of these records exist than seemed the case in 1953. The German version makes available to German scholars and publicists a sizable proportion of de Jong's findings. What appears to be a "spectral shift" toward relative German innocence from the Dutch to the English to the German versions may be a figment of this reviewer's imagination. Where issues of this kind may arise, it would seem advisable to identify the translator, as is done in the English version.

University of Nebraska

ROBERT KOEHL

NEAL, FRED WARNER, *Titoism in Action*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1958. Pp. xi, 331. \$6.50.

The author of this book has had extensive experience, practical as well as academic, with East European affairs and is well known for a number of articles and studies dealing in particular with Yugoslavia. The latest result of his research and personal observations is the work under review which concentrates on the evolution of Tito's régime since 1948. Aptly subtitled "The Reforms in Yugoslavia after 1948," *Titoism in Action* is focused primarily on the major changes which have taken place in the various institutions and patterns of Yugoslav political, social and economic organization after the break with the Cominform.

The author's declared purpose is to describe and analyze the reforms introduced by Tito and his assistants in Yugoslavia following their expulsion from the bloc of Stalin's satellites, with emphasis "on the development through 1954, by which time the basic pattern has emerged." In addition, "the book attempts to describe the Yugoslav system as it was operating in 1957" (viii). In order to make his exposition more meaningful Dr. Neal points out and contrasts the new arrangements in the structure of Yugoslav politics and economics with the preceding ones; although, by and large, this is not a comparison of the pre-1948 situation with post-1948 developments. Rather, it is a detailed survey of post-1948 innovations with only periodic reference to antecedents whenever the change was of such major proportions as to warrant detailed contrasting. The work therefore presupposes a considerable familiarity on the part of the reader with Yugoslav history of the wartime and immediate postwar periods.

Using this approach, the author focuses his attention on a series of what he considers to be the most important areas of Yugoslav politics and administration and devotes individual chapters to an evaluation of Tito's contribution since 1948 in the fields of: the new doctrine; the theory of the Communist Party; the status of the Leader; the new governmental system; the reforms in local government; the reforms in agriculture; the relaxation of totalitarianism. There is also a summary chapter entitled "Reflections on Titoism," attempting to evaluate and condense into an intelligible pattern the numerous changes which have transformed the official Yugoslav landscape during the last ten years; and a "Postscript on Yugoslav

Foreign Policy," which apparently covers the developments until the end of 1957 and thus does not include the latest about-face in Belgrade-Moscow relations.

Within each of these sections the description proceeds chronologically from the tentative and uncertain first steps of 1948 to the bold experimentations of Tito's régime today. Although, almost inevitably, the documentation is drawn from official Yugoslav sources and pronouncements and thus suffers from all the limitations of a paper approach, the author has attempted, whenever possible, to correct the one-sided impression given by extensive citations of legal provisions and Government communiqués by contrasting them with his own observations on the spot with regard to the practical implementation or operation of the decree or institution in question. To a great extent, therefore, he succeeds in attenuating in his study the aura of unreality so often prevalent in works on Communist régimes because of excessive reliance on official texts.

The author's argument, it seems to us, runs somewhat as follows: Tito and his aides were staunch Communists, even Stalinists, in 1948 when they were read out of the Cominform; to them this experience was a terrible shock which they managed to survive only because of the peculiar status of the Yugoslav leadership at the head of the only successful and independent native resistance movement against the Axis among the Soviet Union's postwar satellites; the expulsion from the Cominform forced the unwilling Yugoslavs to re-examine their policies and attitudes, resulting in the gradual formulation of a peculiar Yugoslav road to socialism, Titoism; at present, the Belgrade régime has successfully created an intermediate form of political-social-economic organization which combines some of the features of a Marxist society with characteristics of Western democracy. Internally as well as externally, the dream of the Yugoslav leaders is to make of Yugoslavia a bridge between East and West, a synthesis of the best of both possible worlds, if I understand Dr. Neal correctly.

There is no denying the author's ability in the presentation and documentation of his thesis, or his objectivity in discussing the strengths as well as the shortcomings of the house that Tito built. It is however possible to disagree with the author's optimism with regard to Tito's success in creating something both new and enduring. As Neal himself repeatedly admits, Tito's course has by and large been motivated by a negative consideration—namely the opposition to all things Stalinist. Furthermore, Yugoslav developments have been, and still are, extremely pragmatic, expedient and often contradictory. To what extent Belgrade has, therefore, been able to find a third course is a debatable proposition and the reviewer for one strongly feels that Yugoslavia's experiments have been essentially an isolated phenomenon, neither generally applicable to East European realities nor a true alternative between Western democracy and Russian communism. This, however, is of course only a difference in points of view and interpretation and in no way invalidates or weakens the value of Neal's presentation and argumentation.

In conclusion, one must thank the author for giving us a tightly organized, logically presented and penetratingly clear picture of the Yugoslav record since the fateful year, 1948. The documentation of the book is most impressive and no major source of information has been neglected or overlooked. Two final comments might perhaps be in order. The first, a minor one, concerns the unfortunate use (p. 173) of the expression "subpeople's committees" when "people's subcommittees" might have been more correct. The second one, which probably was beyond the author's control, is a protest against the publisher's practice of burying the footnotes at the very end of the book, something that is most annoying to a

serious reader and cannot but diminish his enjoyment of a well-documented and scholarly work as well as the latter's academic value.

University of California at Los Angeles

GEORGE GINSBURGS

FAINSDOD, MERLE, *Smolensk Under Soviet Rule*. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1958. Pp. 484. \$8.50.

"Smolensk Under Soviet Rule" is another monumental accomplishment by Professor Merle Fainsod. This book is based on the Smolensk Archives (200,000 pages) first captured in July 1941 by the German Army and at the end of the war they fell into American hands. These documents cover the period of 1917-1938. The Archive includes orders and instructions from the Kremlin to Smolensk and reports from the latter to the former, as well as records of Party meetings at every level of organization in that province. It also contains records of the executive branch of the Government in the form of reports of the secret police, the courts and the militia, as well as records of kolkhozes, sovkhozes, trade unions, Party relations with the armed forces, education, censorship and religion.

Now for the first time non-Russian students of Soviet government are able to find out how the Soviet Communist system actually operates in city and province; what the exact relation is between the Communist Party, the Secret Police and the Government on one hand and the Soviet citizen on the other.

Sir Richard Livingstone of Oxford once stated that great writings need three ingredients; knowledge of the facts, truth to record them faithfully, and the imagination to restore life to past realities. Professor Fainsod has all these gifts.

Professor Fainsod has divided his study into two parts: the pattern of control, and the impact of authority. The organization of the material is superb. "Like a slow-motion camera, the documents in the Archive reveal a tale of infinite complexity . . . The files—documents are peopled with ordinary human beings trying desperately to lead normal lives in the midst of extraordinary and abnormal events." A reader guided by the author witnesses the evolution of the revolutionary régime which transformed a backward agrarian society into an industrialized one through "secularization, urbanization, collectivization, industrialization, bureaucratization and totalitarianization." Nothing comparable has been published before in the West.

With his usual love of truth and unusual scholarly ability, Professor Fainsod has sifted that mass of material and in a masterly fashion has recreated the top-sided society, the top-heavy bureaucracy and the exceedingly powerful Secret Police serving its master, the Communist Party, which controls and rules an atomized society.

Unable to satisfy the basic liberties and economic needs of the Russian people, the Soviets rule the Smolensk region (and undoubtedly, the rest of the U.S.S.R.) through fear of punishment for demonstrations of dissatisfaction, through censorship and coercion. Intimidated and unable to organize any effective opposition, the Russian people pull their yoke quietly. All this is thoroughly documented by official material of unimpeachable authority.

The Pentagon is to be complimented for putting these invaluable documents at the disposal of the best authority on the Soviet Union in the United States.

University of Colorado

EDWARD J. ROZEK

POLAK, F., *Cestou ze Sovětského Koncentráku*. Published by the author: New York, 1959. Pp. 132. \$2.60.

The author, Dr. František Polak, a World War One exile and veteran of the Czechoslovak Legions, presents a personal account which reads like a modern Odyssey. It begins in 1939 when he voluntarily went into second exile, leaving Nazi-enslaved Czechoslovakia to join the Czechoslovak fighting unit just being organized at Krakow, Poland. His uncompromising stand against the Communist conspiracy there resulted in his imprisonment by the Soviet NKVD, at the instigation of the Czech Communists. In Moscow Polak was sentenced by the Lublanka to eight years' hard labor in the deep woods at Norilsk, Siberia, 800 miles within the Arctic Circle. While serving his sentence, he worked in mines and on road construction until his release under the terms of the Czechoslovak-Soviet Treaty of January 1942. This treaty permitted the Czechoslovak nationals to form a separate fighting unit in Buzuluk, in the vicinity of Kuibishev. Shortly after joining the unit, however, Polak was again denounced by Czech Communists and for the second time handed over to the Soviets; once again he found himself in the Lublanka and sentenced to five years of forced labor in the isolated forest area between Gorki and Vjatka. Polak served his full sentence and was released December 5, 1947, but discovered he was to be prevented from returning to his native land. Instead of heading for the destination assigned him (Mosir), he made an attempt to reach the Czechoslovak Embassy in Moscow, at the risk of being caught and sent back to the forced labor camps. Despite formidable obstacles Polak finally returned to Czechoslovakia early in 1948, only to find the Communists in a new process of enslavement, replacing the democratic government with a régime of his lifelong opponents. The tragedy of his country was no smaller than his own.

However, when Dr. Polak in early September 1948 crossed the border into West Germany and exile—for the third time—a new phase of his life began. He appealed to the conscience of the Free World through press conferences, newspaper articles, public meetings, reports to committees of the United Nations, particularly the Ad Hoc Committee on Forced Labor of the International Labor Office, which had been investigating charges of forced labor since 1948. It was this committee which laid the groundwork for the resolution of the General Assembly, December 7, 1954, condemning the system of forced labor. According to reports reaching the United Nations, 70 per cent of the inmates of the Soviet Forced Labor Camps have been freed since 1953. While Dr. Polak doubts the validity of such figures and suggests that camps were merely replaced by "work colonies" rather than dissolved, there is no doubt that whatever relief the victims of the Forced Labor System received, Dr. Polak, and those like him, made considerable contributions to it by championing their cause.

University of Pittsburgh

V. E. ANDIC

BIRKE, E. and R. NEUMANN, ed., *Die Sowjetisierung Ost-Mitteleuropas 1945-1957*, Bd. I, Frankfurt/Berlin: Alfred Metzner, 1959, for Johann Gottfried Herder Institute, Marburg/Lahn. Pp. 398. DM 24.

Germany, understandably enough, shares the concern of Western nations about her frontier on the East. This is witnessed by prolific publication activities in Germany on what is going on with her Eastern neighbors. The Herder Institute in Marburg is one of the scholarly institutions which is concerned mainly about the areas of East-Central Europe. Johann Gottfried Herder himself almost two hundred years ago was somewhat less pessimistic than most observers today when his attention was directed to these areas. But times have changed, and what we find in this handy, clothbound, handsome volume on *The Sovietization of East-Central Europe* is a worried concern over the happenings in that polyglottal area

since the end of the last World War. The title is modestly misleading, as actually all European People's Democracies are covered, including the Baltic States, now incorporated into the USSR, and the Balkan Peninsula with Albania, Yugoslavia, Romania, and Bulgaria.

The purpose of the volume is to substantiate the concern of Western Europe in general and of Western Germany in particular over the Russian and russifying ingression into regions which were once counted as a part of the *Abendland*. Although nowhere fully expressed, an implied notion of Communist expansion as an expansion of Russian imperialism backed by the idea of the panslav mission of the Muscovites is strongly suggested in the introduction. Since one of the consultants for the editors was the well-known political scientist and historian, Eugen Lemberg, who subscribes to this point of view, our judgment seems to be confirmed. Of course, similar views have been held by numerous students of the Slavic scene, among them the late Florian Znaniecki, an American sociologist of Polish origin, in his book on nationalism some ten years ago.

On the whole, however, the volume is a successful attempt to show the various and not always orthodox ways by which Russia has promoted the sovietization of the territories she has had a chance to lay her hands on since the collapse of German military power in the last war. The book is divided into five parts, treating as separate entities the Baltic States, Poland, Czechoslovakia, the Danubian and Balkan territories, and the Soviet Occupation Zone in Germany—the German Democratic Republic. A valuable selected bibliography on the areas covered, a name index, and one map of the areas are also provided.

The length of coverage of the areas varies, Poland being allotted the most pages as a single state. The section on Poland was written by Rudolf Neumann, one of the editors of the volume. There is no doubt that Poland deserves more attention than other satellites on the basis of her recent slight change in political atmosphere. The years 1956 and 1957 showed that the full sovietization of the Polish Republic was rather an unrealistic picture painted by propaganda than an actual condition. Similarly optimistic is the treatment of the Baltic States by Hellmuth Weiss, who himself originated in Estonia. After presenting a conscientious description of all factors relevant to the sovietization of these three small states annexed directly to the Soviet Union, he contends that the spirit of the nations enslaved is far from being crushed. Similarly, Rudolf Urban, practically the only Bohemist who learned Czech as a part of his profession as a historian, expresses the idea that the sovietization of Czechoslovakia has not reached the depth of human personality (as yet) where the Czechoslovak intelligentsia is concerned. The vivid discussions in the Czechoslovak press in the years 1956 and 1957 bear witness to his contention. Willfried Krallert contributed a package treatment of the Danubian and Balkan people's democracies. The main thing these nations have in common is the area designation, as they are different nations with different languages. Particularly, since the political development has not been unilaterally sovietizing, the fate of Yugoslavia deserved separate treatment. Nevertheless, there are some features in common, such as the forced industrialization of all countries concerned. In all fairness it must be said that here is a good picture of the territory described, especially since these areas are not the primary concern of the Herder Institute; rather they were included to fill a gap. Countries like Albania, Bulgaria, and Romania seem to have merged into the Soviet orbit without any contribution of their own to the political news headlines. They are actually hard-ridden countries with less hope than others for any desovietization at all. The fate of Hungary in 1956 put a seal on this area, Yugoslavia keeping aloof thanks

to the political *jongleurie* of Tito. A particular rôle in the *cordon sanitaire* against Western influence is played by the Eastern occupation zone of Germany, under the Russians an "independent republic." This is discussed by Karl C. Thalheim, who leaves no doubt about how deeply the influence of Soviet Russia has changed the picture of the Germany of the past. Nevertheless, Thalheim's hope lies with the human spirit clearly manifested in the East German revolution of 1953.

In summary, we can report that practically all aspects of the sovietization—i.e. the likening in form to the Soviet Union—of the countries have been covered in a brief and precise manner. For readers who do not particularly wish to wade through many individual volumes on each country of the European People's Democracies such as those brought out by Praeger Publishing Company in New York within the last few years, the reviewed volume is a very good one to gain information on the situation before 1957. However, it should be noted that some of the rather optimistic conclusions on developments within the People's Democracies which seemed valid in 1957 would have to be somewhat revised at the present time under the toughening policies indicated by recent events. Nevertheless, the volume is highly recommended for its clarity and for the scholarly lack of emotional involvement which is many times a barrier to an adequate presentation of a situation.

University of Wisconsin

DANIEL KUBÁT

GROTHE, PETER, *To Win the Minds of Men*. Palo Alto, Calif.: Pacific Books, 1958. Pp. 241. \$5.50.

Here is a book which endeavors to describe the method and conduct of Communist propaganda in Eastern Germany. The author does not pretend to give a scholarly and documented study and it would perhaps be unfair to judge it by those standards. This is primarily a journalistic effort, based on the author's personal experiences in East Berlin and the Soviet Zone. But Grothe also makes use of official statements. All are undocumented and it seems doubtful whether some of them were ever made. But the book is also poor journalism. It is distinguished by primitive language and style, by page after page of homely irrelevancies and puzzling non sequiturs. Statements such as: "Chances are that an East German taxi driver will know more about even Hemingway and Shakespeare than the average American," (p. 123) or "For East German Communists 1954 was a year marked chiefly [!] by the defection of West German security chief, Dr. Otto John," (p. 23) are typical of the author's surprising insights and judgments. There is an inordinate amount of misspellings and errors (sample: the "Free Democratic Party" (FDP) is identified as the "Free German Party," (p. 209). The translations from the German are rather poor and sometimes odd (since when has the German word *Sender* for radio station become an English term).

As a result, the reader with some knowledge of German affairs becomes exasperated; the skeptic is likely to doubt the validity of those portions of the book that are sound. For the apparently uninformed American reader to whom this book would seem to be addressed, a picture of the usual American failings in our counter-propaganda effort regarding East Germany appears in the author's conclusions. Recommendations such as for more translations of American literary works—at a time when the German book market is flooded with them—and a very heavy involvement of the United States in West German propaganda channels strike this reviewer as a relapse into the "re-education" efforts of the immediate postwar period. The decision to leave counter-propaganda to the West Germans would seem a politically wiser and more effective one.

Here then is a book by a young and well-intentioned author, imbued with a genuine abhorrence of the Communist system and its propagandistic perversions. But in the struggle "to win the minds of men" good intentions are hardly enough. One has a feeling that the author, by slipping into meetings of Communist youth and marching in Communist demonstrations has essentially wasted his time. It might have been better spent by studying the theoretical assumptions underlying the use of propaganda and its relationship to terror. The chapter "Propaganda by terror," also titled "Propaganda by Negativism," [?] in which some steps in this direction are taken, is almost unintelligible. There remains too little on the positive side to give serious consideration to this book.

University of California at Berkeley

HORST DUHNKE

BENES, VÁCLAV L., R. F. BYRNES, NICHOLAS SPULBER, edds., *The Second Soviet-Yugoslav Dispute*. Full Text of Main Documents, April-June 1958, with an introductory analysis. Slavic and East European Series, Vol. 14. Indiana University Publications, 1959. Pp. xiii, 272. \$3.50.

Yugoslavia's Way. The Program of the League of the Communists of Yugoslavia. Translated by Stoyan Pribichevich. New York: All Nations Press, 1958. Pp. xxii, 263. \$4.50.

Productive research in the area of Central-Eastern Europe and the Balkans has been materially hampered by the lack of knowledge of the rich variety of its languages. It will be easily recognized that this obstacle can be overcome only by acquisition of this knowledge or by making the original main sources available in translation. While only the first alternative would fully meet research prerequisites the second appears to be more realistic, at least for the present.

The works under review meet the second alternative in respect to Yugoslav national politics. Their editors are to be highly commended for having facilitated the studies of contemporary Yugoslavia by publishing some important documents in English translation. The books complement each other neatly: *Yugoslavia's Way* contains the full text of that highly controversial program of the League of the Communists of Yugoslavia as it was adopted by the Seventh Party Congress at Ljubljana in April 1958; *The Second Soviet-Yugoslav Dispute* brings out only the first three chapters of the program, those which caused the violent criticism of the Communist parties of the Soviet world. However, the volume represents a significant contribution by publishing such documents as the November 1957 Moscow Declaration of the Communist parties which opened the period of the "second Soviet-Yugoslav dispute"; the extensive attacks of the *Kommunist* and *Pravda* on Yugoslav "revisionism"; Chinese and other Communist countries' denunciations of Yugoslavia; and finally a few samples of Yugoslav rejoinders. The editors have provided the book with useful introductory and editorial comments.

The "first dispute," of 1948, had unquestionably been prompted by Stalin's brutal handling of Soviet-Yugoslav national and party relations. An ideological structure was artificially erected to cover the real substance of the struggle—sheer power politics and Stalin's dictatorial attitude. As time went by, the Yugoslav Party, however, developed its own political and economic measures, its own attitudes towards the problems of inter-Communist relations and of the East-West struggle. At the same time, it interpreted these measures and attitudes with a new Marxist twist. As a result the "second Soviet-Yugoslav dispute" of the current vintage has assumed the character of a serious ideological conflict. It has inadvertently revived, to some extent, the exchange of views on controversial matters

which had been completely dormant under Stalin's arbitrary dogmatism. The Yugoslav Communists, though claiming faithfulness to Marxism, insist that their program "is not a code of dogmas or ultimate truths"—a statement inflammatory enough to provide for the continuation of the dispute.

University of Denver

JOSEPH KORBEL

SHORTER NOTICES

POPOVIĆ, DUŠAN, *Srbi u Vojvodini*, Novi Sad, Yugoslavia: Matica Srpska, Vol. I, 1957. Pp. 345. Vol. II, 1959. Pp. 462. 2,000 dinars.

The author of this work of synthesis is the leading Serb expert on the province of Vojvodina, a subject on which he has written a number of monographs and articles in the past thirty-five years. The first volume of his history of the Serbs in Vojvodina deals with the period up to the Treaty of Carlowitz (1699), the second covers the bulk of the eighteenth century, while the third and final volume is planned to stop at 1860, the year the Emperor Francis Joseph abolished the province of Vojvodina.

Dr. Popović draws on many sources in Serbian, Hungarian and German to describe the turbulent history of his compatriots, who were not only subject to heavy pressure to abandon the Orthodox Church for the Catholic, but were also buffeted between the Habsburgs, the Hungarians and the Turks, who were busy fighting for the control of the Pannonian plain. The repeated attempts of the Serb people to gain a respite and improve their lot are examined with skill and understanding. Equally interesting is his account of the efforts made by the Habsburg authorities and the educated Serbs to westernize a nation consisting largely of peasants. Several illuminating chapters are devoted to this and other classes of society and the institutions which existed in the area. The result is one of the most valuable additions to Serbian historiography in recent years.

University of Manitoba

IVAN AVAKUMOVIC

TILL, RUDOLF, *Geschichte der Wiener Stadtverwaltung in den letzten zweihundert Jahren*. Vienna: Verlag für Jugend und Volk, 1957. Pp. 139.

To write in less than 150 pages a major work covering a span of over two centuries, based almost wholly on archival sources, is an onerous undertaking. To cover new ground that has hardly been touched upon by previous scholars is also difficult. Dr. Rudolf Till, editor of the *Wiener Geschichtsblätter* and dozent in history at the University of Vienna, has successfully discharged these two tasks in the above volume. For the period before 1918 he has drawn largely on the archives of the city of Vienna and to a lesser extent on those of the Lower Austrian government and of the Austrian central government. For the last section, dealing with the period since 1918, for which the archives are still closed, he has made extensive use of published documents and memoirs. More important, except for the medieval period, Dr. Till deals with a topic which has previously been touched upon almost exclusively in various articles written by the author.

The story which Dr. Till tells is, first of all, one of Vienna's gradually losing the limited privileges of self-government accorded to her during the middle ages. This process, already far advanced by 1526, reached its climax in the "absolutist" reforms of Joseph II. In dealing with Vienna, Emperor Francis merely followed the pattern established by his "reforming" predecessor.

The second story, which begins in 1848, is largely that of the Habsburg capital's gradually becoming one of the most democratically-governed cities in Europe. In 1848 the Viennese won their freedom, but the legal bases for a "liberal" city administration were not laid before 1850. The 1850 municipal reform, which made many of the principles of 1848 a reality, gave Vienna a "liberal" government

dominated by the wealthier middle classes. Further reforms in 1890, followed by a Christian Socialist victory in the city council elections of 1895, put the dominant power in the administration in the hands of the *petite bourgeoisie*. Then the far-reaching changes brought on by the collapse of the Habsburg monarchy brought the working classes into power in the Austrian capital.

University of Texas

R. JOHN RATH

PASSANT, E. J., *A Short History of Germany 1815-1945*. With sections on Economics by W. O. Henderson, and contributions by C. J. Child and Donald Watt. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1959. Pp. viii, 256. \$3.75.

This short book about recent German history is a revised and extended treatment of material appearing in the series of Geographical Handbooks produced during World War II by the British Naval Intelligence Division of the Admiralty. The author has been assisted by three specialists, Mr. C. J. Child of the Foreign Office Research Department, who has aided in the revision of the text and in preparation of the appended bibliographies to each chapter; Mr. W. O. Henderson, who has prepared the economic material; and Mr. Donald Watt of the London School of Economics, who has added the chapter covering the period of 1939 to 1945. The economic material, which appeared in the original handbook, is supplied *en bloc* for the periods 1815 to 1871 and 1871 to 1914, occupying somewhat less than forty pages of the text. There is "in the interests of brevity" no effort made to "deal with the cultural and artistic developments which took place during the period" (Preface). It is hoped by the authors to have the book serve the general reader and the school and university student who may want a background from which to approach contemporary Germany and/or German problems. The question is, then, whether these readers are served well by the book. The answer is not an unqualified 'yes'; for useful as the factual material and the frequent generalizations made in illuminating the reasons for the coming to power of Hitler and for the débâcle of 1945 are, the book is severely circumscribed. Its attention to political, diplomatic, and economic data alone limits the treatment of the subject. Failure to integrate the economic material into the political and foreign policy discussion and the paucity and generality of the economic data constitute further limitation. This reviewer finds the index far from ideal for a student and has the same reservation about the bibliography, in regard to both that apparently used by the authors and that suggested for the reader's use. One has here a thoughtful British view of Germany rather than the essence of German life during a trying century and a half.

Santa Monica, California

PAULINE R. ANDERSON

Mitteilungen des österreichischen Staatsarchivs. 10. Band. Vienna-Horn: Ferdinand Berger, 1957. Pp. 554.

The tenth volume of this learned journal is large in size and rich in contents. The subjects treated in several articles range widely, and while some of them pertain to local history, others have bearing on major problems of European history. In his study of contacts between Austria-Hungary and Vatican from 1870 to 1878 Professor Engel-Janosi pointed out the causes of disharmony marking that period. It originated partly in the international orientation of the Dual Monarchy, partly in the liberal policy of the Austrian cabinet following the abrogation in 1871 of the Concordat. Dr. E. Weinzierl-Fischer presents a related topic, Bismarck's distrustful attitude to the Vatican Council and its decrees. Her principal sources were the reports of Count Wimpffen, the Austrian envoy to the Prussian Court, covering the critical years 1869 to 1871. Written with unconcealed dislike of the Chancellor, the dispatches reveal Bismarck's keen interest in the work of the church assembly as well as in the policy of leading Catholic powers. His attempts to organize them for an energetic intervention foreshadowed his activities in Prussia, leading up to the *Kulturkampf*. Two articles shed new light on the for-

eign policy of the Habsburg monarchy around 1880: Alexander Novotny writes on Austria-Hungary and Turkey at the time of the Berlin Congress and thereafter, Ernest R. Rutkowski sketches laborious and mostly barren negotiations between Austria-Hungary, Germany and Turkey in 1881-82. Professor William A. Jenks contributed to this volume of *Mitteilungen* a detailed study in English of "Taafes Cabinet and the Nordbahn Controversy, 1883-85."

Founded in 1948 by the Austrian Staatsarchiv to stimulate research activities of its staff, the *Mitteilungen* widened the original scope and increased the size of individual volumes. Apart from articles, based as a rule on painstaking research in unprinted documents, each volume contains reports from Austrian archives, national as well as provincial, accounts of congresses or specialized conferences, and other news from the learned world. Attention should be called to a large number of book reviews and short notices. In the tenth volume this section has been introduced by an exhaustive survey of recent publications concerning Austria and the Ottoman Turks from the pen of Rudolf Neck.

Ten volumes of *Mitteilungen* is an impressive series on which both the editors and the contributors should be heartily congratulated.

University of Pennsylvania

OTAKAR ODLOŽILIK

SNELL, JOHN L., Ed., *The Nazi Revolution. Germany's Guilt or Germany's Fate? Problems In European Civilization*. Boston: D. C. Heath and Company, 1959. Pp. xvii, 97. \$1.50.

John L. Snell in this volume, another in the *Problems In European Civilization* series, brings together an excellently balanced selection of diverse interpretations of the causes and nature of the Nazi Revolution. After an introduction in which the authors cited are identified and the differing interpretations are summarized, the editor allows the "documents" to speak for themselves. An ample bibliography points to numerous studies and collections of primary sources which the student may consult in the pursuit of further knowledge in this field. The variety of interpretations offered in the text will stimulate a desire to know more in all who are sufficiently alert to recognize that the full story in any case cannot be told in an excerpt running from three to ten pages.

For the serious reader and student this volume will serve to introduce him to the complex nature of the Nazi movement. Almost inevitably, the findings of professional historians are quoted most frequently. The roster includes such respected names as Allan Bullock, Eugene N. Anderson, Friedrich Meinecke, Gordon A. Craig, Gerhard Ritter, and others. Franz Neumann, Milton Mayer, Zevedei Barbu, and Robert H. Lowie may be said to reflect the approach of specific political scientists, journalists, social psychologists and anthropologists respectively. None of them seems to be tainted with that peculiar form of inverted racialism, once so common, which saw in Nazism something peculiarly, even inescapably, German. It is recognized, of course, that the movement took some of its coloring from past German history and cultural trends. The Nazi Revolution, partly a German national reaction against the Western World, could not avoid certain manifestations which were, superficially at least, distinctly German.

The volume is an invitation to thought and study. The contrasting interpretations and marshalling of facts make the reader aware of the difficulties in the challenge of Western Civilization implicit in the command, "Know Thyself."

Montana State University

OSCAR J. HAMMEN

BOHMANN, ALFRED, *Die Ausweisung der Sudetendeutschen*. Marburg: Verlag N. G. Elwert, 1955. Pp. 216. DM 9.

The book under review is an extremely interesting and detailed study of the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans from the city and province of Aussig—now Usti nad Labem—in Czechoslovakia after the defeat of the Germans on the Eastern Front, 1944-45. The book is divided into three parts: In the first part the author

provides an excellent detailed demographic study of Aussig and its environs. This portion should have considerable interest for the sociologist.

For this reviewer the last two sections of the book proved considerably more interesting. In these two parts the author relates in detail, week by week, sometimes day by day, the circumstances attending the forcible expulsion of these Sudeten Germans, many of whose families had occupied the soil from which they were now driven for centuries; and as far as he is able he traces the destinies of the refugees in those places where they finally found a haven.

The author writes without rancor, nor does he plead for revenge. His professed purpose is to study as thoroughly as possible the expulsion and the fortunes of the refugees of Aussig. In this he has succeeded remarkably well. The statistics are there. The memoirs tell their own stark stories of misery and tragedy. The account needs no embellishment. It may indeed be that some will seek to justify the Czech treatment of the Germans of Aussig by citing the undoubted crimes of the Hitler government against untold millions. To this reviewer this seems to beg the essential question which must be couched in other terms. As long as the law of the talon prevails there will be no end to the kind of misery described in the pages of the book before us. That men or nations will learn to eschew the kind of vengeance it describes is doubtful indeed.

University of Kansas City

EDWIN J. WESTERMANN

BASS, ROBERT and ELIZABETH MARBERRY, Eds., *The Soviet-Yugoslav Controversy, 1948-1958: A Documentary Record*. New York: Prospect Books, 1959. Pp. 225. \$3.95.

In his famous speech before the Twentieth Party Congress, Khrushchev declared, in discussing the break with Yugoslavia in 1948, that Stalin had told him: "I will shake my little finger—and there will be no more Tito. He will fall." In the same speech Khrushchev admitted that: "The 'Yugoslav Affair' contained no problems which could not have been solved through party discussions among comrades." Yet today, six years after the death of Stalin, the relationship between Russia and Yugoslavia has undergone no fundamental change. The basic points of dispute which brought about the breakdown in 1948 remain unresolved and evidence indicates that these differences will remain permanently.

The authors of this volume have compiled a useful work which will be of particular value for those who are interested in the problem, but who are not specialists in the field. It contains many of the basic documents which are essential for an understanding of the most important development within the Communist governments of Europe since 1945. It is apparent from these pages that both sides were interested in effecting a reconciliation in 1955. However, whereas Khrushchev thought that his trip to Belgrade would satisfy and pacify the Yugoslavs, they in turn interpreted his journey as a confirmation of the correctness of their policy and they expected that the Soviet Union would yield on fundamental ideological points. That toleration of any form of deviation was not going to be allowed was clearly revealed in Khrushchev's speech before the Seventh Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party. There he accused the Yugoslavs of being "revisionists" and emphasized that revisionism was "the main danger to the international Communist movement under certain conditions . . . This is why the Communist and Workers' Parties are very touchy about theoretical problems and irreconcilable toward any attempt to revise Marxism-Leninism." In reply to this declaration, Tito continued to maintain firmly what he referred to as "our principled stand on the correct and just relations between socialist countries." Moreover, he dared the Soviet and other Communist parties to publish in their respective countries his speeches and statements, as he willingly did theirs, knowing full well that their attacks would strengthen his position in Yugoslavia, whereas his words would not contribute to the solidification of Moscow's supremacy in the Communist world.

University of California, Berkeley

CHARLES JELAVICH

GRUNAU, GEORGE and AXEL, *Die St. Georgen-Brüderschaft zu Elbing*. (Wissenschaftliche Beiträge zur Geschichte und Landeskunde Ost-Mitteleuropas, Nr. 21.) Marburg/Lahn: Johann Gottfried Herder-Institut, 1958. Pp. 427. DM 7.50.

Axel Grunau originally intended to write the history of the Brotherhood of St. George in the Hanseatic city of Elbing upon his retirement. The loss of the most important parts of the archives of the brotherhood during and immediately after the Second World War, however, caused him to change his plans. Among the few items saved from destruction was a copy of the fragmentary yet reliable history of the corporation covering the years 1578 to 1626 which had been prepared by his grandfather George Grunau. This account is presented in this volume in its entirety and is supplemented by three parts prepared by Axel Grunau. The first of these contains important additional and explanatory material, the second detailed information concerning persons mentioned in his grandfather's account, and the third a list of the members of the brotherhood from 1815 to 1945. A final part contains the ancient regulations and ritual as recorded in 1843 by eight members of the corporation.

The Brotherhood of St. George was one of the many corporations which were founded in the Middle Ages for both charitable and social purposes by the inhabitants of the cities of the Hanseatic League in the lands of the Teutonic Knights. It was one of the few to survive the changes accompanying the Protestant Reformation and to continue its existence to the present day.

This work is an important contribution to the local history of Elbing but also to the social history of early modern Europe. It contains much information concerning the organization, administration, charitable activities, and social diversions of guilds and brotherhoods in general. Especially interesting are the short biographies of the Englishmen and Scots who had settled in Elbing—many as members of the Eastland Company—such as Wellem Karry (William Carew), Wellem Duchloss (William Douglas), Hans Lausohn (John Lawson), and Wellem Scha (William Shaw). It is unfortunate that George Grunau, who had access to the archives of the brotherhood, did not give us his account against the political, economic, and social background of the city of Elbing and its environment. There is a helpful bibliography, followed by an index of personal names.

The Ohio State University

HAROLD J. GRIMM

KONONENKO, KONSTANTYN, *Ukraine and Russia*. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1958. Pp. 251. \$6.50.

Mr. Kononenko's thesis is simple and straightforward: for several centuries in the past, and down to the present day, Russia has kept the Ukraine in economic and political thrall, using the labor of its population and its natural resources for the enrichment of non-Ukrainians. The relegation of the Ukraine to the status of a colony has resulted in low living standards in an area which, if left to its own devices, would have been one of the richest countries in Europe. The prescription, of course, is an independent Ukraine.

The trouble with this book is not that the viewpoint expressed is completely erroneous, for there were many elements of discrimination against the non-Russian areas in czarist economic policy. It is rather that the picture is grossly overdrawn. We are asked to believe in a vast, diabolical plot, extending over several centuries, in which government officials and businessmen in Moscow and St. Petersburg were consistently and cunningly engaged in squeezing the last drop out of a hapless Ukraine. The translator has contributed to the general air of confusion by rendering Mr. Kononenko's original Ukrainian into English that is neither colloquial nor, in many instances, grammatical.

Mr. Kononenko has a bit of difficulty with the fact that after all, the Ukraine did develop, but he argues that when the Russians could not prevent economic growth, they chose the second best alternative of exploiting it for their own pur-

poses. They tried to kill the Ukrainian sugar refining industry by withholding tariff protection, then imposed a heavy excise tax to force the export of sugar in the interest of a favorable trade balance, thus depriving the Ukrainians of the fruits of their labor. The Ukrainian coal industry was impeded by the imposition of artificially low coal prices, but when nonetheless Ukrainian coal came to dominate the Russian market, a combination of Russian and Franco-Belgian "finance capital" pushed out the native Ukrainian entrepreneurs—a fate which was meted out to local interests generally. Steel production was limited to commodities which served the needs of Russian industry, not the Ukrainian consumer. Russia at first deliberately prevented the development of railroad lines in the Ukraine, then developed a rail network in order better to milk the area. And so on.

This book proves only that burning nationalist ardor is no substitute for scientific objectivity in intellectual work.

University of California, Berkeley

WALTER GALENSON

The Absent Countries of Europe. Pref. by Adolf A. Berle. Collège de l'Europe Libre, Strasbourg-Robertsan: 1958. Pp. 272.

These sixteen lectures were delivered at the sixth summer session (August 6 through September 6, 1957) of the Collège de l'Europe Libre at Strasbourg-Robertsan. The identity of the lecturers guarantees the serious and solid nature of the presentation. Sidney Hook, Czesław Miłosz, Walter Kolarz, André Philip, Paul Barton, are all names known to represent the struggle for freedom and justice. The series are broken down into six areas of thought: I, the ideological malaise in the Soviet Bloc; II, Political Problems, the paper of Wolfgang Höpke on European no-man's land points up a problem to which western statesmen and publicists have given entirely too little attention; III, Social Problems; IV, Economic Evolution in Mid-Europe. This may be the area about which outside judgments are and will continue to be the least valid; V, Communism and the churches, a certain on-the-ground intimacy with the actualities of the situation is evident in these two lectures; VI, Problems of European Unification. The approach here is broad and idealistic, even when talking of the techniques of unification. There inevitably appears a certain conflict between the concept of European unification as an end in itself and that of Europe as a part of a united world. It is not simple to keep the two concepts under control.

University of Colorado

S. H. THOMSON

Zentralblatt der bulgarischen wissenschaftlichen Literatur. Sofia: Bulgarian Academy of Science, 1959, Pp. 103.

The Service for scientific and technical information and documentation of the Central Library of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences has published the first year (1958) of the section "Histoire et Archéologie" of its *Bulletin d'analyses de la littérature scientifique bulgare*. The abstracts of 108 contributions to history are written in French, those of 50 to archeology in German. Among the Bulgarian periodicals thus exploited are the *Voенно-istoricheski sbornik* (v.27, 1958), the *Izvestija na Instituta po blgarska istorija* (v.7, 1958), the *Izvestija na Instituta po istorija na BKP* (v.3-4, 1958) and the *Istor. pregled* (v.14, 1958). Numerous articles deal with the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-78 and its Bulgarian aftermath and the history of the Socialist and Communist movement in Bulgaria.

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